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A note on the text  
Where I introduce an important term either from a philosopher or author, or 
refer back to that term after a considerable break I use quotation marks. For 
instance, the term ‘report’ is very important within Wilfrid Sellars’ work and 
when I introduce such a term in the paper I put it in quotations. However, when 
I adopt a philosopher’s term, and change its meaning either through 
consideration of peer review, my own arguments or by augmenting it with 
considerations from other philosophers I will treat the term with capital letters 
referring to the concept I am developing. For instance, ‘report’ which refers to 
Sellars’ use of the term will become ‘Report’ once I consider Andrew Gleeson’s 
points about affective vocabularies and develop what is meant by that term 
further through the thesis. The reason why some terms are treated this way, 
while others are not, depends on whether I take the terms as the original 
authors and philosophers intended them, or whether I develop them 
conceptually for the purposes of the argument presented in this paper. At times 
it is neccessary to refer to differences between my development of a term, and 
the author’s original use of that term. At other times it is necessary to compare 
an author’s specific technical use of a term, with what is meant in ordinary 
language when somebody uses the same term. Here I will use quotations for the 
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Give me a keen understanding, 
a retentive memory, and 
the ability to grasp things 
correctly and fundamentally. 
Grant me the talent 
of being exact in my explanations 
and the ability to express myself 
with thoroughness and charm. 
Point out the beginning, 
direct the progress, 
and help in the completion. 
 
From Thomas Aquinas 










Ordinary Language Arguments and The Philosophy of Mind 
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The Languages of Mind 
 
To engage your interest in this dissertation I offer to you a curious question to 
ponder. How often does a psychiatrist or a psychologist get the chance to ask 
themselves whether the words that they use to describe the mental life of their 
patient mean the same thing to the patient as they do to the doctor or analyst 
using them? Does the patient understand what the doctor or analyst is telling 
them? Equally importantly there is a question whether the patient’s verbal 
reports mean the same thing to the doctor or analyst as the patient thinks they 
mean. At first this may seem trivial given the doctor or analyst’s extensive 
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training and education. Surely this is a one sided question one might say. Surely 
the doctor or analyst can understand the patient but the patient may not have 
the educational background and training to understand the doctor’s or analyst’s 
terms, which the doctor or analyst is using to describe the patient’s own mental 
life.  
One might persist in reasoning in this way, claiming that knowledge is all 
on the medical practitioner’s side, until the point is raised that the patient may 
have experiences the analyst or doctor does not have. For instance, one might 
ask whether a psychological analyst can ever truly understand what it is like to 
have bipolar and experience a manic high? What about schizophrenia or 
Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder or Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome? 
On what foudnations are the communications between a patient and a doctor 
built? What underlies their ability to talk about deeply personal experiences 
given that one person has them while another has not?  
This is the central philosophical issue wrestled with by this paper. On 
what rests our ability to talk about personal and private experiences which do 
not have publicly observable parts, components or properties? Communication 
seems to take place, but what allows such communication to take place? How 
does one cross the gulf of private unobservable experience with words? 
Ordinary Language Arguments are one attempt at solving this otherwise 
seemingly unsolvable mystery. This introduction is aimed at acquainting the 
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theorist of mind, common practitioner, researcher, cognitive therapist or curious 
layman with the problems that surround Ordinary Language Arguments.  
This paper will begin with the problems arising from referential 
indeterminacy in theories of mind. The ‘Problem of the Indeterminacy of 
Reference’ is a significant issue for research theorists and arises from the 
language they use to describe the mind. How do the terms they use relate to the 
mind? Do they propositionally ‘picture’ entities ‘in’ the mind in true ways? Are 
terms like ego, anger, jealousy and inner-child merely conveinant fictions and 
metaphors to talk about the mind? Do these terms refer to and label ‘parts’ of 
the mind? What is the relationship between these terms and the mind?  
One possible solution emerges from an Analytic Philosopher who wrote in 
the immediate post-war era called Gilbert Ryle. Gilbert Ryle developed Ordinary 
Language Arguments as one possible solution to a number of intersecting 
philosophical and psychological problems. However, I argue that the Ordinary 
Language Argument Solution, though on first glance seems promising, is 
fundamentally flawed. Instead, I argue that sources for the study of the mind 
are better understood by a Heterophenomenological and Autophenomenological 
distinction. This raises the question as to which of the two is stronger and/or 
prior to the other when these sources produce claims that clash or contradict 






Psychology and the problem of language reference.  
 
One of the more interesting and promising areas to emerge from modern 
psychological research has been Kimberly Francis’ work on Strain Theory. 
Strain Theory was originally developed in the 1950s by Robert K. Merton to 
explain why the same patterns of socially deviant behaviours were found in 
groups of teenage boys with similar demographic characteristics1.  
Francis’ research follows the school of General Strain Theory started by 
Merton in the 1950s. However, what Francis’ modern research recently 
purported to discover was that girls fundamentally manifest deviant behaviours 
that are significantly different from those of boys. Francis’ work suggests that 
previous models of female deviance have been mistaken because they applied 
male criteria for deviant behaviour to female subjects. This suggests the reason 
why girls have been under-represented in statistical samples of deviant 
behaviours is because their deviant behaviours remain invisible to researchers 
who are essentially looking for patterns of male deviant behaviours, because 
 
1 Francis, Kimberly. ‘General Strain Theory, Gender, and the Conditioning Influence of Negative  
Internalizing Emotions on Youth Risk Behaviors.’ Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice ACJS 12, no.  





these deviant behaviours were originally established by studies into teenage 
boys. The problem evidently, for Francis, is that researchers are applying the 
criteria for the patterns derived from the original male orientated studies to 
girls.  
The fundamental thesis of Francis’ work argues that girls experience 
‘negative internalizing emotions’ which change the way they react to harmful 
factors in their environment that put them at risk. Key to her theory is the 
interaction between what she identifies as ‘anger’ and how this ‘anger’ interacts 
with what she calls ‘co-occurring emotions’ that arise in girls and change the 
way these girls experience anger. Francis’ work points to the established 
findings and defintions of General Strain Theory which found that boys 
engaging in deviant behaviours are likely to lash out in acts of anger at their 
environment. These forms of lashing out may take such forms as vandalism, 
graffiti and acts of violence against others. In contrast Francis draws on her 
research to argue that girls experience ‘co-occurring emotions’ like ‘depression’ 
and ‘guilt’ alongside feelings of anger. She thinks these ‘co-occurying emotions’ 
change the way girls experience that anger and thus have an effect on the 
patterns and behaviours by which they express their deviant behaviours. 
According to this view, Francis argued that instead of lashing out, these ‘co-
occuring emotions’ lead girls to internalize their anger. Drawing on her research 
Francis claims that co-occurring emotions internalize anger and direct it inward 
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where it manifests as feelings of guilt, shame, helplessness and frustration, and 
where she thinks these co-occuring emotions more likely to produce self-
destructive forms of behaviour. According to this view, whereas a boy lacking 
these ‘co-occurring negative internalizing emotions’ might break a window or 
attack a classmate and thus externalize their rage, girls manifest a tendency to 
turn the anger inward towards self-destructive behaviours like self-harm, self-
sabotage or avoidance behaviours where they may simply skip class rather than 
lash out or confront the cause of the problem. Francis argues that girls deviant 
behaviours include withdrawl from friends and social circles, running away from 
school or home, or both, and lose interest in the things that motivate and inspire 
them2. 
If Francis’ insight is right then her work is a revelation that should 
change the way teachers, psychologists, youth workers, counsellors, government 
groups and pastoral workers look at girls at risk. Her work is polarizing and 
controversial because it challenges assumptions about the fundamental nature 
of mental processes in teenage boys and girls and what appear to be 
developmental stages and tendencies towards emotional differences between the 
genders. None of what I say in this brief introduction is intended to detract from 
the societal, political, or socio-gender based importance of her theory. I 
encourage people to read it. It is an ethically polarizing work with abundant 
 
2 Francis, General Strain Theory, Gender and the Conditioning Influence of Negative Internalizing 
Emotions on Youth at Risk. 2014.  
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material for philosophy and in my view has not received its due recognition. 
However, it does also illustrate an obscure and underlying problem with the way 
theorists of mind use language, of which hers is an example.   
For we should ask what are these ‘negative internalizing emotions’ which 
Francis uses in her model actually referring to? This is an important question 
because it brings to light what I will call ‘referential indeterminacy’ which is a 
gateway concept into the problem of Ordinary Language Arguments and the 
subject of this thesis. Inquiring into what these ‘negative internalizing emotions’ 
are based on in Francis’ research is thus germane to introducing the 
philosophical thesis of this paper and why the fate of Ordinary Language 
Arguments is important in fields of research into the mind. 
 Francis writes  
 
Respondents rated various emotional/behavioral problems 
experienced now or in the last 6 months as not true (0), 
somewhat true (1) or very true (2) for her or him. . . .  Anger 
is the mean response to 5 items: ‘‘I have a hot temper,’’ ‘‘I 
argue a lot,’’ ‘‘I am stubborn,’’ ‘‘I scream a lot,’’ and ‘‘my 
moods/feelings change suddenly.’’  
 
We can see here that Francis’ data sample is based on five phrases that any 
competent ordinary natural speaker of English should understand. However 
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there arises a number of questions when we move from the use of the word 
‘anger’ in ordinary discourse to Francis’ theory about the mind. What is the word 
‘anger’ referring to in Francis’ theory?  
To borrow a Fregean term, we might ask what are the ‘referents’ of these 
‘negative internalizing emotions’ that Francis bases her research and theory on? 
Are these ‘negative internalizing emotions’ parts of the mind? Are they brain 
processes and chemicals in the subject’s head? Are they experiences the subject 
goes through? Are they behaviours that are publicly visible and observable?  
Allow me to progress this line of thought in the following way. I argue that 
while it may be one thing to use the word ‘stubborn’ in an everyday context as 
part of publicly accessible discourse, it is another thing to ask what 
‘stubbornness’ refers to in a theory of mind.  I suggest that in the theoretical and 
research-based studies of mind there arises a gap of vagueness between a 
subject’s use of a term like ‘anger’ and what the theorist refers to when using the 
term ‘anger’ in the advancement of their theory. Do they mean the same thing? 







Francis, her subjects and Wittgenstein’s Beetle in the Box Argument.   
 
One way we might approach issues arising from this Indeterminacy of Reference 
Problem is to look at the ‘Beetle in the Box’ argument in the Philosophy of Mind. 
Wittgenstein originally formulated the ‘Beetle in the Box’ problem because he 
was curious about the types of access one can have to one’s own private 
experiences of emotions and pains3. He characterized this as like having a beetle 
in a matchbox. The beetle is like the content of a private experience i.e. a specific 
type of pain or sadness. Another person cannot see the colour of the beetle while 
it is in the box. Colour here is symbolic of a distinctive emotional experience. My 
experience of one emotion, say anger may be like a red beetle, while what I call 
sadness may be a blue beetle. Joy may be green for instance. How do we know 
that both my and your anger are red beetles? Might they not be different 
colours? Could my anger be a red beetle and your anger be a green beetle? This 
of course is what happens in David Chalmers’ Inverted Spectrum Argument4.  
 
3 See Wittgenstein’s Account of Language Acquisition for Phenomenal Experiences in the 
Philosophical Investigations in Chapter Eighteen in this thesis for an extensive breakdown of 
Wittgenstein and J.J.C. Smart’s treatment of the ‘Beetle in the Box’ problem.  
4 Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind. London Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp 235 – 236. See 
also, Chalmers, David. ‘The Content of Phenomenal Concepts.’ In The Character of Consciousness.  






 Might not one of Francis’ participants be experiencing feelings which she 
reports as anger, while her friend may be experiencing feelings of what the first 
subject would term sadness, but the second girl would herself report as ‘anger’? 
The individuation and identity conditions of emotions seem highly important for 
the model Francis proposes since the claim that girls experience co-occurring 
emotions that ‘internalize’ anger differently to boys depends on girls having the 
same experiences as each other. The two Wittgensteianian beetles in the box, on 
a Fregeian view, would need to be the same colour for a true semantic statement 
of reference and an identity claim to be defensible. However, Wittgenstein’s 
argument tells us that what one girl may classify as anger, another girl may 
classify as sadness. This is a problem, since Francis’ theory about the co-
occurring internalizing effect of emotions depends upon identifying anger within 
a 5-item subscale based on the subject’s understanding of the term in everyday 
discourse. The Private Access and Beetle In A Box Argument presents problems 
for an emotional identity claim because the emotional experience of what one 
subject describes as emotion x may not be the same as another subject who 
claims that a different type of emotional experience is x. The same words may be 
used in the public discourse, but attached to these words there may be different 
emotional experiences. At best this type of psychology is limited by its 
speculative assumption that the Wittgensteinian beetles, or the emotional 
experiences they represent, are all the same colour, or in some way the same 
fundamental types of experience.  
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We can perhaps approach closer to the insight on offer in this paper if we 
next consider recent work done in psychometric testing and a formal case of the 
type of Fregeian Indeterminacy of Reference which arises when one considers 
differences in methodological developments in psychology and psychiatry5 and 
the senses in which terms enter a language.   
 
 
Indeterminacy of Reference  
  
As most people involved in Intelligence Quota testing know, the battery of 
educational tests which have come to be known as ‘psychometric tests’ were 
historically developed as part of a Eugenics’ Agenda in the United States6 which 
resulted in the sterilization of large numbers of homosexuals and the poor 
children of Italian, Mexican and Spanish migrants at the turn of the twentieth 
 
5 Note the use of lower case. My use of captials for psychology and psychiatry will become clear later 
in the paper. I will give the reference for these at the end of this footnote, but it is not necessary for 
the reader to look these up. I am merely explaining why I have adopted this convention. Where I 
capitalize the terms, I refer to a de jure idealized reconstruction of literal and figurative explanatory 
tendencies, within those disciplines. I do so in relation to a Sellarsian reconstruction of a specific 
stage in language development and a tension between the timeline of development between two of 
his papers. Where I use lower case spellings, I refer to psychology and psychiatry, de facto, as we find 
them in the real world. See The Trilemma of Normativity for Different Types of Claims about the 
Nature of the Mind, in Chapter Five of this thesis. Also see Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of 
Mind, in Chapter Seventeen for why there are so many caveats and careful distinctions between 
different uses of terms like psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, psychologism and anti-
psychologism in this paper.  
6 See Stern, Alexandra Minna. ‘Sterilized in the Name of Public Health: Race, Immigration, and  
Reproductive Control in Modern California.’ American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 7 (2005). Also  
Brian Evan, Bernard Waites. IQ and Mental Testing London: MacMillian Press, 1981, for their 




century. The Social Darwinist body of theory and social policies developed in 
literature promoted around these tests later came to be enacted under the 
controversial California Sterilization Laws, and in relation to these, various 
versions of the Alfred Binet and Stanford-Binet tests were developed and used 
as a criteria to sterilize poor migrant children7. Recent work within the 
psychometric field has produced a new series of tests specifically designed to 
trigger disorders based on the Weschesler Psychometric Model along with 
redevelopments of older tests8. A subset of these tests claim to be able to discern 
dyslexia, AD(H)D, autism and several other types of learning disorders9. The 
reliability of detecting AD(H)D with these tests is in particular a contentious 
issue because there are problems with the test and re-test abilities of people who 
at one time appear to have AD(H)D and at other times do not.  
 Different to the psychological psychometric studies, recent developments 
in neuroscience and psychiatry over the past three and a half decades have 
resulted in a vaster, broader and deeper understanding of brain chemistry than 
 
7 See also Greyway, Robert J. Psychological Testing Illinois Allyn & Bacon, 1996. Pp 1 – 32. The early 
Binet-Simon tests conducted by Henry H. Goddard on Ellis Island found that 83% of Jews, 80% of 
Hungarian, 79% of Italians and 87% Russians were ‘feeble-minded’.   
8 See Jerome Satter, Joseph Ryan. Assessment with the WAIS-IV. California Sattlerpublisher, 2009.  
Pp 99 – 102. For comments on the test-retest see pp 39-41. See also John Rust, Susan Golombok.  
Modern Psychometrics. London: Routledge 2009. Pp 136-137 for limitations of the Ability- 
Achievement Discrepancy Analysis.  Much of this research is ongoing. For instance research  
continues into Holtzman’s inkblots, which have become a branch of general psychometrics.  
Holtzman’s inkblots, of course, were a development on perceived deficiencies in Rorshach’s original  
tests and drew on analysis and production of subsets which evoked responses from patients. See  
Holtzman, Wayne E. ‘Holtzman Inkblot Technique ‘ In Clinical Diagnosis of Mental Disorders edited  
by Benjamin B. Wolman, 237-255. New York: Plenum Press, 1978. 
9 See John Rust, Susan Golombok. Modern Psychometrics. London: Routledge 2009. Pp 129 – 132.  
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was previously thought possible10. Psychiatry has developed admirable 
diagnostic tools which are able to scan, magnetically image, measure and 
spectrally analyse brain activity. Added to this are the ‘Object Languages’ of 
science, including chemistry, bio-chemistry and physics which medicine has 
adopted and psychiatrists receive as part of their training. Psychiatry offers a 
strongly scientific understanding of the mind through which to apply medical 
knowledge of anatomy and the functioning of the brain as an organ of the body. 
These advancements mean psychiatrists now know that deficiencies of a specific 
type of neurotransmitter in the pre-frontal cortex of the patient are correlated 
with specific patterns of brain activity that have been connected to behavioural 
descriptions of Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder11. By treating patients 
with a dopamine stimulant to accommodate deficiencies, psychiatrists are able 
to change the patterns of brain activity registered by their diagnostic equipment 
to those resembling a neurotypical person along with a decrease in the 
observable behavioural traits associated with the condition12.   
However, when one places the descriptions side-by-side, one discovers that 
there is an indeterminacy of reference involved in these matters. Both 
psychological psychometric testing and neuroscientific psychiatric forms of 
diagnosis use acronyms for attentional deficit problems. However  when the 
 
10 Carter, Rita. Mapping the Mind Revised ed. Los Angles University of California Press, 2010. Pp  
67-69, 181, 187, 191 
11 Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010. Pp 67-68, 186, 193l  
12 Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010. Pp 186-187.  
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psychologist is talking about AD(H)D, seemingly he or she is referring to specific 
test scores which originated from sets of tests that were originally developed as 
part of a social agenda to sterilize the children of poor migrants. When the 
psychiatrist is talking about AD(H)D, he or she is talking about a lack of 
dopamine in areas of the pre-frontal cortex as part of a body of knowledge 
developed from modern physics, medicine and bio-chemistry. To put this 
distinction crudely we might say that part of what the former means when 
referring to ‘Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder’ are stop watches and 
pieces of paper with questions and attentional-based problem solving exercises 
written on them. Part of what the latter is talking about are the chemical 
structures of the neurotransmitters inside the brain and a lack of them in some 
cases which has been identified as Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder 
using diagnostic brain imaging equipment which can capture the non-neuro-
typical conditions which exhibit a specific pattern of brain activity. This pattern 
is, of course, the one that some people who share behavioural and concentration 
problems have in common, and is different to what people without these 
behavioural traits tend to display in the diagnostic equipment.  
Are they talking about the same thing?   
In a perfect world we might hope that both the (1) psychometric test 
scores, and (2) the psychiatric models based on modern medical diagnostics both 
refer back to a case of (3) AD(H)D, and are referring in different ways to the 
same thing. We would like to say that this is a case like the Morning Star and 
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the Evening Star and the same referent is known in two different senses. 
However, consider, for instance, a case where a patient is diagnosed by a 
psychiatrist with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder using the benefit of 
modern (f)MIR, EEG, PET and spectral chemical analysis, and this finding is 
repeatedly verified by independent psychiatrists in the patient’s history. 
However, the patient manages to pass all of the psychometric tests, perhaps, 
because the patient has developed coping mechanisms, or perhaps because the 
patient is medicated or drank coffee which contains a dopamine stimulant, or 
any combination of these. Does this patient have AD(H)D? The psychiatrist says 
yes, the psychologist says no. The law of identity tells us they cannot both be 
referring to the same thing. The patient cannot both have AD(H)D and not have 
it. If we assume both tests were administered correctly and both practitioners of 
mind are using the term ‘AD(H)D’ correctly in their field of discourse then we 
have the Fregeian Problem of Referential Indeterminacy.  
 
 
The Problem of Twin Mental States with Identical Neurological 
Information that feel different.  
 
What should be emerging from the above examples is a genuine problem with 
referential indeterminacy in the sciences of mind.  Firstly, we have the 
Wittgensteinian Problem of the Beetle in the Box and the possibility of 
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something like an emotional inverted spectrum interfering with an emotional 
identity claim. Since subject to subject the person filling out Francis’ survey 
might mean different emotional experiences when they use terms like ‘stubborn’ 
and ‘anger’, there are class predication and identity problems with subject-to-
subject dependent claims expressed in a language. Next, researchers of mind 
themselves might mean different things since they come from a wide array of 
theoretical and methodological backgrounds and are likely to be influenced by 
these. We have an example of this sort of cross-disciplinary indeterminacy with 
the problem of the student who tests positively for AD(H)D on the psychiatric 
test, but then tests negative on the psychometric one. The law of identity tells us 
that in some cases researchers themselves are using words about the mind 
differently since the student cannot both have AD(H)D and not have it.   
 What other options are there?   
Suppose we side with psychiatry and neuroscience and have access to the 
latest psychiatric research tools and diagnostic equipment and could look at the 
activity and chemical composition of the brain being tested on one of those 
subjects.  
We might begin to develop data which reveals to us that statements about 
feelings or reports of certain emotional experiences were correlated with activity 
in certain parts of the brain. This seems like a plausible way of mapping 
different types of emotional data by using the emerging neuroscience. On first 
glance this is promising. However, there is an emerging problem with ‘twin 
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states’ that have identical neurological information but feel different to the same 
subject. One such instance is emerging research into the Insula Cortex13. 
The problem with the Insula Cortex is that activity within this area has 
been associated with different feelings of ‘mistrust’, ‘revulsion’ and ‘anger’ by the 
same subject14. This presents a problem with using neurological data to 
individuate the content of mental states. The problem we have is that sometimes 
instances of the same neurological activity and data will be defined by the 
subject as two different experiences. There is also the problem that the same 
types of experiences may result in different types of neurological activity. This 
has happened with research into anger where subjects may use the same word 
but the corresponding neurological data locates activity in different places in the 
brain and gives different types of feedback for the word that the subject is 
using15. The same word given in reports by a subject can have different types of 
 
13 Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010. Pg 171, 87.  
14 Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010. Ibid.  
15 Anger has turned out to be far more neurologically complex than anyone anticipated. The main  
strands of hard neuroscientific research to emerge which suggest anger is not a singular activity or 
chemical reaction in a specified part of the brain are the diverging and converging fields of research  
into Tourette’s Syndrome, Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome and a condition that has come to be called  
Syndrome E where people blank out during states of rage and have no recollection of the event. There  
is also further hard evidence of an entirely different condition which originates in brain damage and  
irritative lesions to the brain that trigger outbursts of rage different again to the other areas of  
research. The neurophysiology of anger, rage and ire in these cases involves different pathways  
through the somatosensory cortex, activity in the ventromedial cortex, the amygadala, and the limbic  
system. The same word ‘anger’ will have different pathologies, neurological data and bio-electrical  
information connected to it depending on the subject and their own history and chemistry. For instance  
there are grounds for supposing the possibility for a referential indeterminacy in the word ‘rage’ when  
someone with Post-Traumatic Stress is using it to explain what they were feeling  
compared to someone with irritative lesions in the emotional cortex. See Carter, Mapping the Mind,  
2010, pp 89 – 94, 55 – 97, 81 – 84. The same word can have different meanings across different patients,  
and supposing a patient with Tourette’s and Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome, or the difference  
between non-Post-Traumatic-Stress-Syndrome anger, i.e. regular rage, and Post-Traumatic Stress  
induced rage, perhaps even in the same patient.  Like ‘anger’ and ‘rage’ the search for a ‘pain-centre’  
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brain activity associated with it at different times, in different circumstances 
and contexts.  
 
 
Context Dependent States  
 
Andrew Gleeson’s work is important for exploring problems with Functionalism 
related to context dependent claims. In Animal Animation16 he points out an 
underlying problem with using environmental effects to determine mentalia. 
Functionalists often define mental states in terms of in-puts and out-puts, 
internal response precedents, or antecedent-behaviour-consequent patterns17. As 
 
to the brain has revealed that ‘pain’ is far more complex than originally thought. Rita writes ‘(brain)  
scans show there is no such thing as a pain centre. Pain arises as much from the activation of brain  
areas associated with attention and emotion as from those directly associated with sensation.’ See  
Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010, pg 13. A patient who reports being in pain in two different cases may  
have two different instances of neurological data even though the word they use is the same. Similar  
instances are emerging with complexities around depression and sadness. See Carter, Mapping  
the Mind, 2010, pg 101 for a discussion of research into the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, the Lateral  
Pre-Frontal Lobe, the Mid-Thalmus and the Amygadala. See also, for instance Atsuo Yoshino, et al.  
. ‘Sadness Enhances the Experience of Pain Via Neural Activation in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex  
and Amygdala.’ NeuroImage 50, no. 3 (2010): 1194-1201. Also Danilo Arone, et al.  
‘Increased Amygdala Responses to Sad but Not Fearful Faces in Major Depression: Relation to Mood  
State and Pharmacological Treatment.’ The American journal of psychiatry 169, no.  
8 (2012): 841-850. As well as Furman, Daniella J ; Hamilton, J. Paul ; Joormann, Jutta ; Gotlib, Ian.  
 ‘Altered Timing of Amygdala Activation During Sad Mood Elaboration as a Function of 5-Httlpr.’  
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2011, Vol. 6(3), pp.270-276 6, no. 3 (2011): 270-276. 
16 Gleeson, Andrew. ‘Animal Animation.’ Philosophia 1, no. 4 (2001): 137-169. 
17 Putnam, Hilary. ‘The Nature of Mental States ‘ In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and  
Contemporary Readings, edited by David Chalmers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.  
Armstrong, D. M. ‘The Causal Theory of Mind.’ In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary  
Readings, edited by David Chalmers. New York: Oxford, 2002. Goldman, Alvin. ‘The Psychology of 
Folk Psychology ‘ Behavioural and Brain Sciences no. 16 (1993): 15-28. Kilu, Kim. ‘Developing  
Effective Behavioural Intervention Plans ‘ Intervention in School and Clinic 43, no. 4 (2008): 140- 
149. See also Paul Alberto, Anne Troutman Applied Behavioural Analysis for Teachers Memphis  
Pearson 2013. As well as John Cooper, John, et al. Applied Behaviour Analysis. Essex: Pearson  
Education Limited, 2014. 
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Gleeson points out this makes them a school of behaviourism, or more accurately 
as they have come to be called in psychological departments Applied 
Behavioural Analysts. This is the term we will use when referring back to this 
branch of Functional-Behavourism. They are behaviourists (Applied Behavioural 
Analysts) as Gleeson points out because they look to the behavioural response a 
subject has to an input. Functionalists since Putnam have suggested doing this 
for the simple fact we cannot experience or observe another person’s inner 
responses to an input or antecedent stimulus. Thus, practically, it seems, we 
must look to their response behaviours when studying the mind. Because they 
rely on behaviour many Functionalist Applied Behavioural Analysts look to the 
effects a being has on the environment to formulate an analysis of its behaviour. 
Gleeson’s paper points out the broad general underlying problem with ‘context 
dependent claims’ like David Lewis argues for in early Functionalist literature, 
of ascribing mentality or intentionality to things that are not conscious or do not 
possess mental states18.     
 Many of the findings emerging from neuroscience support Gleeson’s 
insight into problems with broad stroke approaches to environmental effect 
analysis of mental states characteristic of these new Functionalist Applied 
Behavioural Analysis schools. Neuroscience has repeatedly demonstarated a 
problem with using the context of an experiment to determine the identity of a 
 
18 Gleeson, Animal Animation, 2001.  
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neurological state.  The problem arises from the fact that the same action at 
different times and different people at the same time often experience and react 
to the same situation or stimulus with reports of different feelings and different 
publicly accessible responses. Someone might experience ‘revulsion’ at the sight 
of a snake, while another person may experience ‘excitement’ or ‘fascination’ 
because they are interested in reptiles19. The responses do not just vary in the 
language used, but in the behaviour and physiological features of the person 
giving those descriptions. In some cases the same stimulus will produce different 
neurological data in different subjects. Sometimes the same stimulus presented 
at alternate and differeing times may present different data from the same 
person or different people. This undermines the foundation of context-dependent 
neurological identity claims. For instance a person interested in reptiles may be 
drawn to the snake and press themselves up against the glass of a reptile exhibit 
to get a better look. Someone who says they are revolted by the snake may draw 
away, or lower their eyes, or leave the room. The same person who is interested 
in reptiles may at another time lose interest in them altogether or may have a 
phobia triggered by social behaviours or events related to other people and 
behave exactly as the revolted person.  
On a deeper, harder scientific level we now know there are inherited 
responses to certain stimuli that may be present in some people which can be 
 
19 Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010. Pp 93 – 101. 
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triggered by social factors like behaviour in peer or parental groups20. While 
present in some, these responses are not present in others either because they 
have not inherited the disposition, or they have not had their ‘instinctive phobia’ 
triggered by the right social circumstances21.   
It is recognized within the research parameters of neuroscience that 
Situational Reponses are highly problematic for this reason22 and are a major 
obstacle researchers are only able to navigate around by treating them as ‘ill-
defined problems23’ and limiting research criteria to pre-selection limits and 
developing experiments that focus on highly simplified and seemingly 
unproblematic responses but which often develop into cherry picking subjects 
whose behaviours are consistent with tests24. But even so, given all of this, the 
subject’s claims are highly problematic to neuroscience researchers. This 
ongoing recalcitrant issue has resulted in what David Chalmers has called ‘The 
 
20 Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010. Ibid. 
21 Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010. Ibid.   
22 British Neuroscience Association. ‘Significant New Reform in the Reporting of Clinical Trial  
Results.’https://www.bna.org.uk/mediacentre/news/significant-new-reform-in-clinical-trial- 
publication/: BNA, 2017. See also Andrea Mulizia. ‘Brain Imaging in Affective Disorders’. In Mood  
Disorders, Clinical Management and Research Issues, edited by Eric Griez, Corto Faravelli, David  
Nutt, Joseph Zohar. Pp 229-289. West Sussex. John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 2005.  
23Jean Pertz, Adam Naples, Robert Sternberg. ‘Recognizing, Defining and Representing Problems ‘ In  
The Psychology of Problem Solving edited by Robert Sternberg Janet Davidson. Cambridge:  
Cambrdge University Press, 2003. 
24 British Neuroscience Association. ‘Significant New Reform in the Reporting of Clinical Trial  
Results.’ https://www.bna.org.uk/mediacentre/news/significant-new-reform-in-clinical-trial- 
publication/: BNA, 2017. Also see Carter, Mapping the Mind, 2010 Pp 93 – 101. In particular the  
work done on phobias and triggering response. They found that some subjects possessed the  
disposition for certain phobias into snakes and spiders, which could be triggered by peer phobic  
behaviours, while other subjects had no such subsceptability or reaction. See also Andrea Mulizia. 
‘Brain Imaging in Affective Disorders’. In Mood Disorders, Clinical Management and Research 
Issues, edited by Eric Griez, Corto Faravelli, David Nutt, Joseph Zohar. Pp 229-289. West Sussex. 
John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 2005, which also covers a number of similar issues.  
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Search for a Formalism’ that will allow neuroscientific research to progress with 
a standardized and systemically informed methodology for taking ‘accurate’ 
verbal responses from subjects rather than the wide range of eclectic, unreliable 
and assorted ones currently on offer25.  
 Thus the subject’s language which expresses his or her claims with 
information about their private experience presents a major problem for 
neurological researchers. It is this information researchers want access to in 
order to be able to explain the facts and offer a theory of the mind. Since any 
identity claim regarding private experience types which rests on the similarity 
between two pieces of neurological data is then open to a further report by the 
patient as to whether (a) the two experiences under which the similar pieces of 
neurological data that were recorded were indeed of the same experiential type, 
or (b) whether the two tokens of neurological data that appear similar or the 
same, are in fact experienced by the subject as different states entirely (as in the 
case with ‘disgust’ and ‘mistrust’ and the Insula Cortex), then it follows (that 
since the distinction is decided by the subject), that the identity states 
correlating pieces of neurological data are foundationally dependent for the 
missing premise on the reports of the conscious experience of the subject for 
their identity. The reason why it follows is that the subject can tell us whether 
 
25 Chalmers, David. ‘How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness ,‘ Annals of the New York  





the two instances of the neurological data which were recorded from the subject 
are indeed the same experience, or dissimilar. If they are dissimilar then they 
cannot be identified as the same type of mental experience without incurring a 
contradiction and breaking the laws of identity. The subject’s personal private 
experience thus decides the underlying identity conditions for the neurological 
information which at the bare minimum tells us whether two experiences are 
similar, the same or different.  
Moreover, the fact that people will respond with different overt behaviour 
to the same stimulus, situation or experimental conditions has also become 
recognized as a problem in neuroscientific research. This problem means that 
the identity of the mental state or experience cannot be drawn from the stimulus 
itself.   
Along with the problem of Situational Responses, recalcitrant problems 
with Context Dependent claims and subjects reporting different types of 
emotional content for similar, or identical samples and tokens of neurological 
data such as in the case of ‘revulsion’ and ‘mistrust’, we also have the problem of 
the emotional inverted spectrum.  
In the emotional inverted spectrum problem, we are unable to know if 
what one person describes is the same sort of emotional experience, in terms of 
the private content of that experience, as what another person who has 
described it with the same words. For instance the emotional experience that 
one subject of Kimberly Francis’ test might be describing as ‘anger’ could 
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actually be closer to what the person administering the test might refer to as 
‘sadness’. At the centre of this question, which spans neuroscience, psychology, 
psychiatry and medicine, is a question about what the language people use in a 
theory of mind actually refers to. Are practitioners of mind talking about the 
phenomenal experiences people have for various moods, feelings and emotions? 
Are they refering to the semantic elements for the thoughts in people’s minds? 
Internal monologues? Entities that exist in the mind in some Realist sense? The 
results in tests? The chemical and bio-electrical exchanges and the 
corresponding neurological data? What do the terms in psychological theories 
refer to or mean?  
At the core of Francis’ claim about the ‘negative internalizing emotions’ 
which women experience as ‘co-occurring with anger’ and which her theory then 
claims result in different types of deviant behaviour in girls is a question about 
what her subjects mean by the language they use when filling out the 
questionnaires and the status of the words that the theory is based on. What 
does Francis think the words refer to or mean in her theories. What does she 
think her subjects mean and how is this knowledge shared between them? 
This is a problem for any type of psychological theory that uses some sort 
of language sampling or therapy to form theories. I selected Francis’ work for 
introducing this problem because it is such a promising theory with what I think 
is a genuine insight into the human mind, but also, because I think her work is 
rich with implications across philosophical domains. However, this dissertation 
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focuses on the problem that arises from the question about what the words in 
Francis’ theory refer to. This quandary might equally be made to apply to 
Marcia’s Theory of Identity Formation26 as well as Berzonsky’s redevelopment of 
the ‘Identity Diffusion’ state in Marcia’s theory based on Berzonsky’s own 
research into the transition between high school and university27. It might be 
applied to various incarnations of Klein’s repudiation of the ID and her 
argument in favour of the Post-Freudian concept of the Death Drive28. The 
question might be raised in certain contexts about Albert Bandura’s sub-types of 
self-efficacy29 and statements by what might be termed resilient self-learners30.  
 
26 See for instance James Marcia, Ruthellen Josselson ‘Eriksonian Personality Research and Its  
Implications for Psychotherapy.’ Journal of Personality 81, no. 6 (2013): 617-626. 
27 See Berzonsky, Michael. ‘Diffusion within Marcia's Identity-Status Paradigm: Does It Foreshadow  
Academic Problems?’ Journal of Adolescent Research 14, no. 6 (1985): 527-538. Berzonsky, Michael.  
‘Identity Status, Identity Processing Style, and the Transition to University.’ Journal of Adolescent  
Research 15, no. 1 (2000): 81-98. See also Michael Berzonsky, Gerald Adams, Leo Keating  
‘Psychosocial Resources in First Year University Students: The Role of Identity Processes and Social  
Relationships.’ Journal of Youth and Adolescence 35, no. 1 (2006): 78-88.  
28 King, Pearl. ‘Background and Development of the Freud-Klein Controversies in the British  
Psycho-Analytical Society.’ In The Freud-Klein Controversies, edited by Riccardo Steiner Pearl King.  
London: Routledge, 1992. See also Kristeva, Julia. Melaine Klein Translated by Ross Guberman.  
New York Columbia Press, 2001, pp 27 – 29. The rejection of Freud’s Id-Ego complex and the  
pleasure principle actually goes back to Karl Abraham’s concept of objects. For Abraham the death  
drive manifests as attachement to an object. See also Devan Hodges, Janice Doane From Klein to  
Kristeva Michigan University of Michigan Press, 1995, and in particular the discussion of Nancy  
Chadorow’s rejection of Freudian psychology as inadequate for women because it focuses on the  
development of the Oedipus complex during development which dealt with male fears and  
ignored female development. Freud himself argued, of course, that women’s fear of castration  
manifested in statements about the fear of loss of love from the mother since their genitals were  
hidden during the phallic stage. See Freud, Sigmund. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis  
Translated by James Starchey. London Penguin 1991, pg 91. Here, of course, I am 
merely scratching our some of the threads involving research into a patient’s inner lives and  
suppressed emotional complexes.  
29 Bandura, Albert. ‘Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency.’ American Psychologist 37, no. 2  
(1982): 122-147. 
30 James Connell, Margaret Spencer, J. Aber ‘Educational Risk and Resilience in African-American  
Youth: Context, Action and Outcomes in Schools.’ Child Development 65, no. 2 (1994): 493-506. 
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The problem with these types of theories arises from asking questions 
about (x.1) what the theorist thinks they mean by the terms in the language he 
or she uses, (x.2) what that language refers to in the context of the theory and 
(x.3) what the research subject means when they use the terms. By the ‘subject’ I 
mean (x.3.1) the person whose data the theory is constructed from in its research 
phase (in the form of verbal reports, explanations and descriptions of their 
experiences), or (x.3.2) the language that is ultimately used by the patient to 
explain their own thought processes, experiences and mental-life.  It is not clear 
that what that person (that is the research subject who gives verbal or written 
reports) uses, at (x.3.1) is the equivalent to (x.3.2), or that (x.3.1) or (x.3.2) are 
either collectively, or individually equivalent to (x.1), and (x.2), even in cases 
where the theorist or therapist is using what appears to be the same words, or 
expressions that appear synonymous to those of the subject.  
For instance, it is not clear that a patient describing a sort of ‘anger’ at 
seeing their mother with a particular man is exhibiting a ‘Freudian Oedipal’ 
jealous rage as a Freudian Psycho-Analyst understands those terms. The 
Psycho-Analyst may think that the anger is a manifestation of an Oedipal 
jealousy that arises from a threat to the connection between the man and his 
mother formed during infancy and the anal stages of the patient’s development.  
This may not be the case. The subject may be racist and what he feels in his 
anger may simply stem from his racism, and this is how he understands and 
feels his emotions, not as a specific Oedipal jealousy that arises from a threat to 
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his relationship with his mother. He might be fine with her finding a partner so 
long as it is not a person of a specific race or perceived ethnic background. His 
dislike, resulting in what he describes as an ‘anger’ may simply be motivated by 
some sort of racial prejudice. Moreover, his direct and intense experience of his 
emotions, and the heated and agitated way they fit into the system of his racist 
beliefs from the first person view-point may be nothing like the cool, clinical 
observations of his therapist from the third person.  
From the forgoing examples of Francis’ work, as well as the racist man 
and the Freudian Analyst my aim is to illustrate one emergent fact across a 
range of theories and research into the mind. That is, the problems of referential 
indeterminacy are deeply rooted in a gap of ambiguity that originates from an 
assumption that what the therapist, subject and text-book theorist all mean is 
the same thing. The semantic problem stems from theorists and therapists using 
terms like ‘anger’, ‘fear’, ‘aggression’, ‘anguish’ and ‘anxiety’ indiscriminately and 
assuming that these terms correspond, one-to-one, with their patients and each 
other’s useage, in the first person, third person and theoretical sense31. Those 
problems derive from a question as to whether language is sufficient to cross the 
gap of ambiguity between when a person self reports in the first person, and 
 
31 Once theorists begin using terms like ‘anger’, ‘sadness’ and ‘regret’ in theories they become 
entangled in a range of epistemological issues about the status of what such terms refer to. 
Psychologists are often vulnerable to questions about the ontological and epistemic status of the 
terms their theories refer to. One often becomes frustrated when reading books, and speaking with 
psychologists about whether they are using a term like ‘anger’ in a nominialist or realist sense?  One 
often meets with much difficulty when broaching questions of sense, meaning, onotology, reference, 
and so on, with psychologists and theorists of mind. Hence the inquiry of the paper.  
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when someone makes a statement about a person in the third person. If there is 
a difference between the use of terms refering to emotive or mental experiences 
in the first and third person then this creates problems for theorists of mind and 
raises questions about in which person they are using the term.  
One very basic and fundamental problem that emerges from a difference 
between the ways in which we take a term in the first and third person is that of 
inverted meaning. For instance if what Sally refers to as feelings of ‘mistrust’ 
are what Sam refers to as feelings of ‘shame and apprehension’ and what Sam 
refers to as mistrust is what Sally would call ‘guilt and fear of inferiority’, then 
whose terminology is the correct one to use when refering to the emotional 
experiences of the subjects for either firstly; the purposes of the theory, or 
secondly; for conducting research into a theory?   
This might seem a trivial matter until we actually pick up a psychological 
theorist who uses these terms in their theory and we are left asking whether we 
should take the terms in Sally or Sam’s sense? For instance, we might select 
Erik Erikson’s Eight Stages of Epigenetic Personality Development32. We might 
ask in what sense are we to take the first five of the eight stages given in 
Erikson’s theory? If we refer to Sally and Sam in the third person, rather than 
either person individually, this would break the law of identity since the same 
 





term refers to different referents in one and excludes referents that belong in the 
same class of phenomenal experiences in the other. The other option is to take 
the terms in the first person, but which ever person we choose – whether it be 
Sam or Sally – renders the other person’s language for their experiences false 
and we have no reason at this stage to favour one person’s experiences over 
another. The problem of referential indeterminacy arises once again.  
We might extend such indeterminacy to terms like ‘self efficacy’, ‘negative 
internalizing emotions’, ‘hot and cold cognition’ and ‘identity diffusion’ or any 
other number of terms found in psychological theorizing. All these theories have 
the same ambiguity between whether the terms in use refer to the subject’s 
experience, entities in the subject’s head, parts of the subject’s mind, third 
person observations of the subject, or theoretical beings posited on (Quasi-
Carnapian) Nominalist grounds for the sake of a theory. In all cases we still 
have the problem of taking the terms either in the first or the third person 
points of view.  If taken in the third person then we have the problem of possible 
referential indeterminacy between two different users who are using a term in 
the first person, and who may be refering to different things. If I offer a term 
like ‘anger’ from the first person to describe my experience of my current frame 
of mind it is unclear that there is any guarantee that what I mean when I use 
the term is the same as what another person means when they use the term. If 
the argument can be made that I and another person have the same meaning 
and experience of anger from the first person, then can another argument be 
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made that our two uses correspond with the the theorist writing the 
psychological textbook? Is there any guarantee that all three of us will refer to 
the same thing? If not then whose use and which semantics do we privilege as 
correct? 
In one way or another all these theories that run into problems with fixing 
identity claims draw upon research into areas of the mind which crosses this 
point. What is common to these areas of cognitive research and these theories of 
the mind is that those that do not make allowances for or explain these 
questions all run into the Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference. The types 
of problematic theories and approaches I am picking out are of a type that 
struggle to explain the sense in which the objects they refer to (mental 
experiences of emotions, motivations, drives, inspirations, motives, etcetera) are 
presented. By ‘sense’ and ‘presentation’ I am referring to a Fregeian conception 
of the problem of meaning. All of these problematic theories are talis de genus in 
that they have similar types of problems about fixing their identity claims with 
meaning, and the modes of presentation such theories draw upon for research, 
or theoretical speculation.   
A helpful way of conceptualizing the difference involved in this gap of 
ambiguity is to think about the Beetle in the Box argument and the private 
accessibility of emotions. Is language enough without opening the box to look at 
the experiential content of the emotion? In this metaphor the colour of the beetle 
in the box signifies the identity of an emotional experience. The word on the box 
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signifies the emotion. Do we need to go beyond what is written on the box and 
open it to look inside? Can we? If we can, how are we to do so? If we cannot, then 
what follows from the discovery that we cannot do so, for the understanding of 
mind? It is the aim of this paper to explore these questions and come to some 
answers on them.  
 
 
Publicly Observable Behaviour and Gross-Body-Language 
Behaviourism. 
 
At this point someone might ask ‘what about behaviourism?’  
 The trouble with behaviourism is that since Skinner, Pavlov, Thorndike 
and Watson thrived into a movement in the nineteen fifties and sixties 
‘behaviourism’ has become a diverse collection of approaches within psychology 
and psychological research. We have Cognitive-Behavioural Therapies33, 
Positive Behavioural Interventions34, catchall Socio-Cognitive-Behavioural 
Theories35 and Functionalist Schools of Applied Behavioural Analysis. Through-
 
33 Where to begin? For Albert Ellis’s original Thirty-Two Clinical and Personality Hypotheses see  
Ellis, Albert. ‘Rational-Emotive Therapy: Research Data That Supports the Clinical and Personality  
Hypotheses of RET and Other Modes of Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy.’ Counselling Psychologist 7,  
no. 1 (1977): 2 - 42. William Glasser develops what many consider to be a very advanced form of  
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy Glasser, William. Choice Theory. New York: HarperCollins, 1999.  
See also Glasser, William. Reality Therapy. New York Harper & Row, 1975 for his older theory.  
34 See for instance Jennifer Freeman, et al. ‘Relationship between School-Wide Positive Behavior  
Interventions and Supports and Academic, Attendance, and Behavior Outcomes in High Schools.’ 
Journal of Positive Behavior Interventions 18, no. 1 (2016): 41-51. 
35 Dykeman, et al. ‘Psychological Predictors of School-Based Violence: Implications for School  
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out the paper I will make careful distinctions related to different uses of the 
term ‘behaviour’ and ‘behaviourism’ to avoid what may be construed as any 
slippage or equivocation in usages.  
What we might call here a ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ is a little 
bit different to what gets labelled as Functionalist Applied Behaviourism or 
Applied Behavioural Analysis. 
 By ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ I mean specifically the language 
that Jones develops within Sellars’ myth of the Rylean tribe36 but with a 
distinction between environmental effects and affective life which comes out of 
Andrew Gleeson’s insightful work.  
There is also a further distinction I shall make throughout the thesis 
based on whether a ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ which developed from 
an Ur-language is a ‘Psychiatric’ or ‘Psychological’ one depending on the types of 
access it has to language structures like metaphors, similitude, figurative 
devices and literal fact stating roles. The picture that will emerge is one where 
psychological explanations have a tendency to rely heavily on figurative devices 
like metaphor and similitude, but have extremely limited or no access to fact 
stating roles from the developed sciences; like anatomy, chemistry, biology and 
 
Counsellors. .’ The School Counsellor 44, (1996): 35-47. Also, Adeyemi, Shade Vivian. ‘Effectiveness  
of Self-Instructional and Bully-Proof Strategy on the Management of School Violence among  
Transitional Students in Junior Secondary Schools in Ibadan, Nigeria.’ Higher Education of Social  
Science 5, no. 2 (2013): 13-23. As well as Patricia A. Jennings, Mark Greenberg. ‘The Prosocial  
Classroom:  Teacher Social and Emotional Competence in Relation to Student and Classroom  
Outcomes.’ Review of Educational Research 79, no. 1 (2009): 491–525. 
36 Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, (various editions) See sections 53 – 63.   
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physics. When we look at the types of explanations psychologists offer, they are 
not ones that describe, for instance, the actual interaction of specific and 
testable organic chemical compounds found in the brain of a patient, which can 
explain the fluctuations in that patient’s mood disorder during a manic, or a 
deppresive episode. (Such explanations, of course, as one may find in the body 
and practice of psychiatry). Rather than engaging with the hard sciences in fact 
stating roles, what we find is that most psychological explanations are trapped 
behind a wall of metaphors, historical myth and figurative uses of language.  
When they do engage in the vocabulary of the hard sciences, psychological 
explanations have a tendency to borrow from the developed sciences only in 
metaphorical ways. For instance, in describing group behaviour, a psychological 
explanation might refer to the behaviour of a cluster of people as being like 
‘molecules’. Such a theory is not referring to the actual oxygen and hydrogen 
bonded hydroxy compounds making up the dopamine neurotransmitter released 
into the brain during stimulating social discourse. No. Such a psychological 
explanation is using a similie. The psychological reasoner is saying ‘like’. They 
are saying the people are acting ‘like’ a molecule that forms together from other 
molecules to form a compound.  Similalrly a psychological explanantion might 
sample the languages of physics and describe different types of thinking 
metaphorically as ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ forms of cognition. However, such a ‘hot and 
cold cognition model’ is not actually referring to testable hypotheses about 
electro-magnetic radition and the laws of thermodynamics. Rather, the 
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psychological explanation is employing the terms ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ in metaphoric 
ways. In neither case does chemistry or physics feature as a fact stating role that 
is continuous with the developed hard sciences in the psychological explanation. 
The psycholocial explanation is limited to figurative uses of scientific 
vocabularies. Psychological explanations have a tendency not to bridge 
continuously with the hard sciences, or share in discoveries from them, but only 
to borrow from their vocabularies in extended metaphors, different types of 
similititude and use those languages as merely figurative devices.  
Psychiatry, however, does bridge with the hard sciences. Psychiatric 
descriptions tend to feature explanations that utilize the vocabularies, 
discoveries and postulates of organic chemistry, medical anatomy and 
pharmacology in fact stating roles. Psychiatric research ventures deep into the 
postulates, discoveries and findings of physics in its quest to develop new 
diagnostic methods and understand the nature of mind. Psychiatry will feature 
factual descriptions of the chemicals and organic compounds in fact stating roles 
to offer explanations of human behaviour like why the patient is experiencing 
episodic highs of mania and depressive lows. Where psychological explanations 
have a limiting tendency to metaphorical and figurative uses of language, 
psychiatry will ‘telescope’ (to use a Sellarsian phrase), with the hard sciences 
along with metaphorical and figurative language use.  This difference between 
the linguistic uses and tendencies in psychological and psychiatric methods of 
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explanation becomes important when a Paleo-Behavioural Ur-Language 
develops into what I will describe as an ‘Endo-Affective Language’.  
However, it is, perhaps, too premature to spell out the full implications of 
the psychiatric and psychological explanatory tendencies at this early stage of 
the thesis. What is important to the Gleeson and Sellars picture this thesis 
draws is Gleeson’s concept of Animal Motion and what Gleeson thinks is 
involved in common language vocabularies that utilize ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’.  
 
 
Andrew Gleeson’s critique of the Methological Behavouristic Tendency 
in Functionalism and the Problem of Diagnosing Computers with 
Attention Deficit Disorder.  
 
 Functional Applied Behavioural Analysis of the type identified and critiqued by 
Gleeson suffers, as Gleeson points out, from problems associated with context 
dependent claims and the attempt to identify mental states by their effects on 
the environment. ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ as I read into Sellars’ 
developmental stages of Socio-Linguistics37 is much closer to Gleeson’s account 
 
37 Where I use capitals for ‘Socio-Linguistic’ I am referring to Sellars model in Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind. I criticise this heavily later in the paper, comparing it to his ‘Process 
Anthropology’ in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. The criticism arises from a tension 
between the two accounts about the neccessary order of epistemic lingusitic development of a 
fictional Rylean tribe, he proposes in the former work. The reason why I adopt such is that Sellars 
proposes two different and contrary accounts of the order necessary for concept development in a 
language in the two works. ‘Socio-Linguistics’, capitalized, refers specifically to the account in 
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of ‘Animal Motion’ but Sellars’ own account was perhaps naïve to the distinction 
between bodily behaviour and ‘environmental-effect strains’ of behaviourism 
which Gleeson makes (and to the twin problems of co-extension of vocabulary 
and attributing mentality to what may simply be differential environmental 
effects). For instance, one might construct a computer program which can take a 
psychometric test and give a result indicative of AD(H)D. Does that mean the 
computer test or automata has AD(H)D? Obviously not, most would agree. Yet 
the computer program produces the same environmental effect outputs as a boy 
or girl who is being tested and has AD(H)D. Gleeson thinks that what separates 
the child from the computer is a set of concepts and linguistic terms for them 
which we apply to ‘affective’ life forms and that these terms are not co-extensive 
with descriptions that feature purely environmental effects. Gleeson’s point is 
evident. If the ‘affective’ and ‘sensitive’ vocabulary terms we use to animate and 
talk about ‘Animal Motion’ were co-extensive with those of environmental 
effects, then we should not be able to conceptually differentiate between the 
computer and the child. If the terms were co-extensive then we would have no 
trouble saying the computer that took the psychometric test had AD(H)D, 
 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Where I use ‘socio-lingistics’ I refer to either the processes 
of language creation in society as I describe them in this paper, or the building of my own 




because the outputs the computer gives when taking the test match the child, 
and the diagnostic criteria38.   
The way this paper explores the difference between affective and 
environmental vocabularies of motion and behaviour is to plot out the 
developmental stages that a community would need to undergo to develop the 
languages for both of these vocabularies, in a Sellarsian speculative history. In 
terms of a speculative history of human socio-linguistics this paper argues that 
the difference between Gleeson’s environmental and affective vocabularies has 
its source in what we might call the ‘Paleo-linguistic era’ of a developing Rylean 
linguistic community.  
The Paleo-linguistic era begins with the vocabulary of a Sellarsian 
Jonesian Behaviourist who appears in the early ‘dawn ages’ of a Rylean tribe 
and teaches them his Paleo-Behavioural Ur-language prior to the emergence of 
any affective vocabularly. The Ur-language of the Jonesian Paleo-Behaviourist 
contains descriptive vocabularies of actions which are the primal seeds and 
primitive versions of what will eventually become ‘expressivity’, ‘sensitivity’ and 
 
38 Assuming, of course, that the problems psychometrics has with test and re-test scores could be 
overcome and a less fallible diagnostic criteria were reached when given for specific neurotypes 
where brain chemistry fluctuations, episodic and mood disorders, medication cycles, regulation and 
stabilization of the dopaminergic pathways, etcetera, were overcome without recourse to medico-
psychiatric tools like brainscans and spectral blood analysis. That is, supposing a psychometric test 
could be developed, for argument’s sake, that does not suffer from the current problems of 
psychometric tests, and without recourse to the psychiatric neurosciences, then it would still have 
problems telling the difference between a computer and a real boy. I call this Gleeson’s Pinocchio 
Problem.  The problem arises, as Andrew Gleeson points out, because we still rely on concepts of 
animal animation from our inherited folk vocabularies to ‘animate’ beings from objects even when we 
think that we don’t.  
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the ‘affective’ vocabularies after internalization and projection. Those seeds are 
the initial stage of what this paper defines as a Gross-Body-Language 
Behaviourism39.  
These seeds will eventually grow into an approximation of what Gleeson 
refers to as an ‘Animal Motion vocabulary’ (which uses the vocabularies of 
‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ to animate things) with a caveat which I refer to as a 
‘longitudinal fragment’ crossing several stages of the afore-mentioned 
speculative Socio-Linguistic Developmental Theory. However, at the beginning 
of my constructed Neo-Sellarsian language history of a Rylean community in 
which Jones first arrives, the language is not yet Gleesonian.    
I draw the framework for this speculative socio-linguistic history out of 
Wilfrid Sellars’ famous account of some of the stages a Rylean linguistic 
community must undergo in order to talk about each other’s mental and 
emotional lives, which Sellars, of course, provides at the end of Empiricism and 
 
39 Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism is further defined by whether it is purely and simply (a) 
figurative, metaphorical and psychological or (b) uses a fact stating vocabulary that involves 
chemistry, physics and anatomy like psychiatry tends to inherit from its association with medicine 
and the medical sciences.  
Although the material for the distinction Gleeson makes between environmental and 
affective vocabularies existed in the historically situated ‘psychological behaviourism’ of Sellars’ day, 
no one from that period in time seems to have been placed to capture the distinction between 
environmental effect and embodied affect as insightfully, deeply or profoundly as Gleeson has. In 
most strains of the Historically Situated Behaviourism of Ryle’s day, behaviour was viewed as 
having causal relationships with the environment. In Skinner this relationship was modelled in the 
terminology of Operant Conditioning39. Operant Conditioning terminology reconstructs these causal 
relations in terms of both extinction and reinforcement to reflexes, actions and behaviours39. Prior to 
Skinner most of the language was modelled in terms of reinforcement and conditioning of reflexes. 
The potential for the criticism for a distinction like Gleeson makes, thus, can be seen in Skinner’s 
original work, but Skinner himself has not made it there. See for instance Skinner, B. F. Beyond 
Human Freedom and Dignity. Middlesex: Penguin, 1976, Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour, 
1953. Skinner, Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis, 1969. 
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the Philosophy of Mind. This Gleesonian ‘longitudinal fragment’ which I draw 
into Sellars’ speculative Socio-Linguistic history, will provide the missing stages 
in Sellars’ account, necessary to tell the story of how these Gleesonian 
vocabularies of ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ develop from Jones’ original Paleo-
Behaviourist Ur Language. Reading Sellars and Gleeson into each other offers a 
completed picture. In this way I will offer a speculative account of how people 
come to use affective vocabularies. My ultimate purposes being development of a 
larger argument that involves a phenomenal zombie40 and offers an attractive 
insight into the mind. I am going to argue, by the end of this thesis, that a 
Chalmerian zombie in a Selarsian village can not learn to speak Rylean. The 
implications for this argument will be calamitous for the view that an Ordinary 
Language position that embraces Anti-Psychologism can unify the disciplines of 
mind, and instead offer the reader fresh grounds for returning to a Pre-Fregeian 
approach to cognitive semantics.  
 
 
The difference between Ryle and Gleeson’s critique of Behaviourism.  
 
Ryle’s critique of Psychological Behaviourism differs from Gleeson’s critique of 
Analytic Functional Behaviourism. Ryle wants to reject the causal hypothesis of 
 
40 Here is perhaps too premature to spell this out but read on. I mention it here so that the reader 
can see the structure of the argument presented in this paper and how those pieces fit together.  
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Psychological Behaviourism altogether, and specifically in the historically 
situated Psychological Behaviourism of his day. Ryle sees the causality of 
Behaviourist models as part of what he, (Ryle), calls the ‘Bogey of Mechanism’ 
and a continuation of a larger historical contamination of ‘Ordinary Language’ 
by importing technical and specialized vocabularies from the sciences and 
special disciplines. Ryle thinks Behaviourists mistakenly impose a mechanical 
world view on to the human mind, when they should be looking for the mind in 
the way ordinary people speak.  
Gleeson is in one sense very similar to Ryle, but in another sense very 
different. Gleeson wants to critique Functionalism which he sees as a specialized 
type of Behaviourism. Gleeson thinks Functionalist claims about looking to the 
effect on the environment for an output are either mistaken or fraudulent. He 
thinks they are mistaken or fraudulent because in practice such reductive 
programs are not co-extensive with the type of folk vocabularies Analytic 
Functionalists like Braddon-Mitchell41 and David Lewis42 are relying upon. He 
thinks that Analytic Functionalists, (what we are referring to under the 
Cognitive Science designation of Functionalist Applied Behavioural Analysts) 
are importing vocabularies that are already loaded with concepts about 
 
41 David Braddon-Mitchel, Frank Jackson Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell,  
1996. 
42 Lewis, David. ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy  
50 (249-58. Lewis, David. ‘Chapter Six.’ In Philosophical Papers Volume 1. New York: Oxford  




consciousness. He thinks such loaded vocabularies apply concepts of animal 
motion that smuggle in sensitivity and affect  
Gleeson is interested in what makes up our concept of affective life and 
which he thinks ‘affective life’ can be seen to display through the common 
ordinary language vocabularies used to describe it and the concepts applied 
when these vocabularies are used. For Gleeson the vocabularies embodying the 
concepts of ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ are not simply a matter of linguistic discourse 
but form a foundation for a fundamentally distinctive way of seeing an entitity 
or form of life to which we might apply the concepts. That is, he thinks the 
vocabularies the Functionalists are using already come loaded with the idea the 
beings they are applying them to are consciousness.  
If we take Gleeson’s argument for its networth and apply it to the 
foregoing discussion about the diagnosis of children and computers with 
Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder, by the outputs of psychometric tests, 
we can begin to see his point. One reason why we might be happy to diagnose 
the child, and not the computer with a lack of attention, is because the concept of 
‘attention’ is already loaded with the Gleesonian vocabularies of ‘affect’ and 
‘sensitivity’. Even though the program and the child may give the same outputs 
to the test, if we apply Gleeson’s insight, we can see that we already attribute 
the concept of consciousness to the child when we test it. We might say things 
like ‘the child is trying to concentrate’, ‘the child is being distracted’, ‘the child is 
struggling to stay focused’, ‘the child is plying, striving and attempting to 
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complete the tasks’. When we turn to the computer program designed to give the 
same outputs on a psychometric test as the diagnostic criteria, we ourselves 
struggle to diagnose the computer because we do not use terms like ‘trying’, 
‘struggling’ ‘distracted’, ‘seeking’, ‘attempting’, ‘striving’, ‘suffering’ or ‘making an 
effort’ for inanimate objects. These vocabularies contain loaded concepts like 
sensitivity, intentionality and affect. If we take Gleeson’s point, the 
Functionalist can either (a) diagnose both the computer and the child with 
AD(H)D and abandon the range of terms that Gleeson identifies as being 
‘affectively-loaded’, or (b) give up the project of a science of mind based soley on 
environmentally orientated outputs.  
 Gleeson’s insight is important because the ability to project and 
understand concepts, on to the behaviour of others can be used to fill in blanks 
in a developmental stage in Wilfrid Sellars’ story about how people develop the 
ability to talk about their private emotional lives.  Gleeson’s distinction between 
interpreting behaviour by bodily ‘expressivity’ and ‘environmental effect’ will 
emerge within the paper in the development of a language capable of describing 
human action and behaviour at the gross publicly observable level43. Gleeson’s 
 
43 Specifically, Gleeson’s paper is important because he draws attention to this caveat on 
Functionalist-Behaviourist schools which arises due to the difference between environmental and 
bodily interpretations of behaviour. On one side we have environmental accounts of behaviour that 
rely on effects in the environment to define mental states. On the other hand, we have Gleeson’s 
concept of ‘animal motion’ in which we project intrinsic concepts like ‘plying’, ‘struggling’, ‘trying’, 
‘suffering’ on to things we perceive as being types of ‘affective life’.   
Underlying Gleeson’s concept of affective life and what we project on to it is his elusive 
concept of ‘expressivity’. ‘Expressivity’ implies within it the notion of ‘sensitivity’. Gleeson thinks we 
come to understand something of this expressivity in the embodied life of other beings when we 
perceive them to have ‘affective life’. Coming to view other beings as having ‘affective life’ and 
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point changes how we read Sellars’ developmental stages of language and 
impacts heavily on the final stages of Jones’ Language. As such it will be critical 
to what happens when the phenomenal zombie enters the Sellarsian village and 
attempts to speak the langauge.  
 
 
Jones’s Language  
 
The creation of Jones’ Behaviourism with its Paleo-Behaviourist Observational 
Language is part of a developmental stage in a ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory of 
Language’ that this paper draws from Wilfrid Sellars’ work. Originally Wilfrid 
Sellars simply called this behavioural stage ‘Jones’ Language’. Sellars 
hypothesizes that this Ur-Language is an early stage in his account of how a 
Rylean Community comes to be able to talk about their private and emotional 
 
capable of ‘expressivity’ involves projecting our own concepts of sensitivity, pain, suffering and 
humiliation on to other life forms. Taking on board Gleeson’s insights, I argue that Jones’ Ur-
language contains the ancestral germinations of what will become ‘expressivity’ and ‘affective’ life-
form vocabularies. It contains these germinations in a Gleesonian-esque version of what Sellars calls 
an Observation Language.  
Observation Languages draw on other languages in figurative and metaphorical ways to 
describe things without being propositionally factual in their account of things. For instance, at one 
stage saying ‘x looks like a flying saucer’ when confronted with a UFO is drawing on the language of 
dinner table settings for a figurative description. The person is not saying literally the object is a 
‘saucer’, but they are affirming a descriptive content while withdrawing assent to a literal 
propositional formulation. Jones’ Paleo-Behaviourist vocabulary is one of these Observation 
Languages and contains the seeds for what this paper argues will develop into a full Gleesonian 
Affective Language which contains concepts of ‘expressivity’ and ‘sensitivity’ which Gleeson 
identifies and that this paper will show can be applied in Analogical Constructs to understand 
others.   
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lives at the end of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind44. Gleeson’s paper and 
his argument about sensation and expressivity give us the materials to not just 
hypothesize Jones’ language as a stage but a way to argue for how that stage 
happens by rejecting a methodological tendency in Functionalism and 
Historically-Situated Psychological Behaviourists to focus on the environmental 
effect rather than the projection of affect on to the physical behaviour of 
another45.  
It is important to note that Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism is only a 
stage in the account being developed in this thesis and cannot give us a final 
account on the nature of mind as a ‘cover-all’ philosophy. The problem with a 
purely Gross-Body-Language Behavioural Psychology is that it cannot detect 
when someone is feeling an emotion but displaying no outward behaviours for 
that emotion. This is the Cogitation vs Vegetation problem which also can be 
seen to emerge from Gleeson’s critique of the problems with behavioural strains 
of Functionalism. Since a Functionalist relies on behaviour to flag a cogitative 
 
44 Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, (various editions) See part XII Our Rylean 
Ancestors. Sections 48 – 63. 
45 This is what I think Sellars may have meant in his original account of Empiricism and the  
Philosophy of Mind, but I do not think he had developed the full scope for the sophistication that  
would give him the resources to argue for it in that pioneering work. Sellarsian Jonesian Folk  
Behaviourism does not focus on the distal effects of object displacement to arrive at descriptions for a  
vocabulary of action. If it did, Jones’ Language would merely be a continuation of the Object  
Languages it borrows from, and simply describe people in terms of environmental out-put  
effects, not a Paleo-Behaviourist language. Since such a language, were we to imagine it, does not  
evolve from a Paleo-Behavioural origin, it follows that the users could not come to use affective  
concepts like sensitivity and expressivity to animate objects. Such a language would have no  
Gleesonian vocabulary of animation. Of particular interest to the reader may be Sellars amendments  
to the 1963 edition. See Sellars, Wilfrid. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. 1963 ed. Electronic  
Text. 1963 Amendments, edited by Andrew Chrucky. http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm.html 1995. 
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state, the Functionalist has trouble differentiating if someone is thinking when 
either (a) that person is exhibiting no behaviours or (b) producing no 
environmental effects. In layman’s terms the Functionalist cannot tell the 
difference between when someone is in a very relaxed state and ‘vegging out’, 
perhaps even dozing or sleeping, or if they are cogitating furiously, if they either 
(c) offer no signs of bodily expressivity or (d) create no ‘distal effects’ in the 
environment. For instance, consider the soulful meditations and musings of an 
obstinate Buddhist monk who refuses to move or respond when prodded with an 
input, against a brain-dead trauma patient, and Nikoli Tesla deep in furious 
cogitations about numbers and electricity. The monk, most certainly, is a 
problem for the Functionalist and Functional Behavioural Analyst. Is the monk 
cogitating or merely vegetating when he gives no response to the input of a 
stimulating antecedent?46 What about Tesla and the brain dead trauma patient? 
Let us suppose that all three are to be found lying on their backs in a room and 
we knew not which one was which. Are all three in the same mental state? We 
would surely answer no. Yet all three are exhibiting the same observable 
behaviours. The problem becomes even more complex when it comes to dividing 
objects into animate and inanimate categories when they evince no behaviours, 
or when there are what seem to be behaviours but no agent to cause them.  
 
46 I choose this example because monks have been known to set themselves on fire in protest and sit 
in the lotus position for the duration of the conflagration.  
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Might the meditating monk be dead? What about the unresponsive state 
of the brain-dead trauma victim? If we kick both, and we kick a tree, they return 
the same behaviour. What of the tree? Is it in the same cogitative state as the 
other two? Let us explore this problem deeper.   
Consider these next two examples as a way into Gleeson’s critique of 
Functional-Behaviourist In-put/Out-put models of mind endowed entities. 
Firstly, what of a blind man in a house full of creaks? Secondly, what of a blind 
man and a silent intruder? In these last two cases we have dissimilar problems. 
In the first case, that of the blind man alone in a house full of creaks, there is 
behaviour but no animate object. There are creaks. The blind-man hears what 
appears to be an entity moving around the house. He observes what appears to 
be the consequences of antecendent behaviours. The creaks might sound 
indistinguishable from those that would be made by some entity shifting around 
the house. But we know he is alone. It is just an old house. In the second there is 
an animate object, a mind endowed entity, an intruder, but no discernible 
behaviour. The intruder is silent. It has, perhaps, been trained in the way of a 
ninja. To which would the blind behavioural functionalist attribute mental 
states? The silent house with an intruder? The empty house full of creaks? The 
former has behaviour, i.e. creaks, while the latter has no behaviour but a silent 
intruder. In both cases the blind behavioural functionalist would attribute the 
presence or absence of mind in an entity, (a.k.a. a Gleesonian animated object), 
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incorrectly. The blind functionalist is wrong about the presence and absence of 
mind on both accounts.  
There are wider practical problems than merely detecting the presence 
and absence of mind based on behaviours, for a purely Functional-Behaviourist 
approach to mind, which Gleeson’s paper also brings to light. People are clearly 
capable of having emotions without displaying any of the behaviours of those 
emotions. People can be angry without letting on they are angry. People can be 
deeply upset without crying or yelling. These are deeper problems for a Gross-
Body-Language Behaviourism than merely the Cogitation and Vegetation 
Problem of the Stubborn Buddhist monk. So a fully developed affective 
vocabulary applied to the behavioural actions of others is not the full story 
either.  
A moment’s reflection will show why the indeterminacy of reference 
problem effects neuroscience as well as Behavioural Gross-Body-Language 
descriptive strains of psychology like the Paleo-vocabularies of Jones this paper 
theorizes (for the hypothetical problem of whether a phenomenal zombie could 
learn a Rylean language), but I shall spell it out nonetheless.  
What Gleeson’s paper begins to reveal is a deeper problem that plagues 
the Mental Sciences and Disciplines which use environmental context to 
determine claims about mental states. Strapping the Buddhist monk or person 
who is non-visibly upset in to an EEG to reveal what the behavioural reactions 
our fully developed affective behavioural vocabulary cannot reveal will not fill in 
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the blanks, because neuroscience itself suffers from an indeterminacy of 
reference of its own as we saw with the research into locating anger and the 
problem of mistrust and distrust and activity in the Insula Cortex. In some cases 
what subjects identify as the same state might have different neurological data 
associated with instances of that state, while what are identified as different 
states entirely may originate in the same activity and have the same token of 
neurological data associated with them. The EEG can not give us an 
authoritative view on what the Buddhist monk’s overt behaviour is hiding 
because the EEG has its own problems with indeterminacy47.  
I have thus far pointed out that Neuroscientists and Psychiatrists have 
the following problems:  
 
(1) ‘Situational Responses’. This is where different patients respond differently 
to the same stimulus. Thus, the stimulus cannot be used to identify a mental 
state since the response between patients can be different and thus a singular 
identification breaks the laws of identity.  
 
(2) The problem of ‘non-identical twin states’. This arises because the authority 
of a claim about the identity of two neurological states with identical 
 
47 See subsection The Problem of Twin Mental States with Identical Neurological Information that 
feel different, earlier in this introduction. i.e. the problem with the insula cortex and patients who 
describe feeling different mental states for the same neurological data. Also see Problem (2) below.   
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neurological data is still open to a third claim by the subject, who can then claim 
that they do not ‘feel’ like they are experiencing the same state. We saw this in 
the case of ‘mistrust’ and ‘revulsion’ which share the same neurological data and 
activity originating in the same area of the brain but are identified as different 
types of feelings by subjects.  
 
(3) Private experiences. The fact is evident and observable that people can often 
describe their private emotions without evincing the publicly observable 
behavioural or physiological changes, including narrated histories about prior 
emotional experiences and cases where the person is feeling the emotion but not 
displaying the symptoms.  
 
Thus (C), it follows that the context, the neurological data and thorough body-
language descriptions do not furnish the resources for comprehensive identity 
and individuation claims about what mental state types the patient is 
experiencing.   
 
It also follows from (1), (2), (3) and (C) that both forms of research, the ‘Gross-
Body-Language Behavioural Psychologist’ and Neurophysiological Psychiatrist 
have recourse to the patient’s own verbal statements for how the patient ‘feels’ 
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in establishing the identity of the claim. In all three cases48 the statement of the 
person carries enough weight to negate the neurological or body-language 
behavioural charcterizations provided we have reasons for believing the veracity 
of the subject.  Thus, like other various strains of psychology that draw on 
linguistic statements or are language samples, theorists of mind applying 
neuroscience and ‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ both have recourse to 
either (a) the domain of ‘Ordinary Language’ and what the everyday ordinary 
language speaker knows, or (b) a praeter-linguistic domain beyond language for 




















Ordinary Language Arguments and the Project of Anti-Psychologism in 
the Philosophy of Mind. 
 
It is well known by people who study the problems of Analytic Philosophy that 
they are often highly abstract. This abstraction can often create an obscurity in 
what are profoundly significant insights about language, the mind, knowledge 
and meaning. Such insights can have applications across a vast domain of 
knowledge. I argue that this is the case with Ordinary Language Arguments and 
their place within the Philosophy of Mind. 
 One of the ongoing projects within the Philosophy of Mind has been the 
attempt to lay out what are the significant facts that a theory of mind has to 
explain. Ordinary Language Arguments belong to one particular type of account 
that tries to explain what are fundamental grounds for advancing a theory of 
mind. This type of theory holds that language is foundational to thought. It can 
be seen that Ordinary Language Arguments thus belong to one particular type 
of account of what the facts are that constitute the domain for forming a theory 
of mind. I shall argue that at least one practitioner of the Ordinary Language 
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approach, Gilbert Ryle, obscured a complexity in these arguments because of the 
level of abstraction at which he works.    
There is a very important question about meaning and the relative 
priority between language and mind which many theorists of mind in cognitive 
fields seem to gloss over or dismiss. In Philosophy of Mind the relationship 
between mind, language and meaning has been the subject of debate and 
conjecture for well over a hundred years. This great debate has been captured in 
the Psychologistic and Anti-Psychologistic divide and is concerned with whether 
there is anything meaningful that can be thought prior to the minmum 
requirements for linguistic competence and expression in a language.    
One might argue that if we always and only think in ‘words’ and 
‘languages’ and there is nothing meaningful deeper since nothing can be said 
without using words, then one might also argue that thought is merely a form of 
linguistic discourse and that the mind, when thinking, is as it were talking to 
itself49.  There are deeper reasons for arguing this, such as claims that thoughts 
that lack propositional elements cannot be about anything and so, are empty 
and not thoughts at all50. Indeed there are doctrines of judgement that take such 
an approach and originate in readings of Kant51, as well as semantic theories 
 
49 Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983, pg 36 
50 Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, 1956, pg 52 
51 Brandon, Robert. Articulating Reasons. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001. NB, I 
distinguish between these doctrines of judgement, with a lower j, from Chalmers Judgements, which 
I use an uppercase J, to keep the terminology tight and precise.  
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about language referents and the senses we can know them in52. This is what 
Michael Dummett argues is constitutive of Anti-Psychologistic thought53. The 
strongest strain of the Anti-Psychologistic School, Dummett argues, are the 
Ordinary Language Philosophers54.  
Gilbert Ryle is one such philosopher. He argues everything there is to 
know about the mind is already contained in our understanding of ‘ordinary 
language’. The reason why he thinks ‘ordinary language’ has this special status 
is because it is the non-technical common language people think in. He argues 
vehemently that there is no important difference between thinking something 
and saying it out loud. Since it is the language people speak, think and converse 
in, and it is the non-specialized ordinary everyday language which people use to 
describe each other’s conduct in the world, Ryle argues that ordinary language is 
the best foundation for understanding the mind. He thinks facts about the mind 
will arise from the facts established by an investigation into language. As such, 
Ryle argues, we begin with ordinary language and from it we construct a theory 
of mind. On Ryle’s view language is prior to mind. This makes him Anti-
Psychologistic.  
From a Rylean Anti-Psychologistic ‘ordinary language’ perspective what 
the ordinary language speaker knows when answering a survey, giving a report, 
 
52 McDowell, John. ‘On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name.’ Mind 86, no. 342 (1977): 159-185. 
53 Dummett, Michael. ‘What Do I Know When I Know a Language?’ In The Seas of Language, Pp 94 –  
105. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
54 Discussed later in this paper.  
61 
 
constructing a theory about the mind or expressing their emotions is a problem 
that sits at the centre of a theory of mind. A Rylean perspective on Ordinary 
Language argues that analysis of mind begins with the non-specialist language 
of the everyday world.  
The appeal of Ordinary Language Arguments is a sort of ‘the buck stops 
here’ approach. If Ordinary Language Arguments are sufficient one can 
construct theories of mind based on the knowledge the ordinary language 
speaker uses in their discourse about the mind. More generally ‘Ordinary 
Language Arguments’ are arguments that attempt to make a claim about the 
mind by the examination of the use of language used by the ordinary language 
user when speaking about the mind. If this is the right spproach to establish the 
foundations of a theory of the mind then there is no need to go any deeper. The 
enquiry into mind stops at common language about the mind.  
For psychology a theory of linguistic meaning is critical because one of the 
only ways it has of collecting data to formulate models about the mind is from 
the things people say and what they think those words mean when they say 
them, read them, fill out forms, talk to their therapist, read books or articles by 
psychologists or formulate their own theories and share them. Unlike 
behaviourally oriented strains and the neuro-psychiatric medical sciences, 
psychology is often limited to the domain of expressible language when collecting 
data or creating theories.   
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Ordinary Language Arguments are very interesting because they seem to 
offer the attractive promise of finding a simple way to get out of the 
Indeterminacy of Reference Problem. The Indeterminacy of Reference Problem, 
of course, is that words from the languages of mind can have different meanings 
and uses depending on which discipline, theorist, research field or subject is 
using them. The hope is that meaning in data collection, subject reports, theories 
and research on the mind can all be united under an appeal to Ordinary 
Language. An Ordinary Language position would argue against a ghostly stage 
with referents that pose as actors for the terms used by a patient, subject or 
research theorist. A psychologist who adapted such a Rylean Ordinary Language 
view could argue that there are no Fregian referents in a ghostly world ‘inside’ 
the mind. There is only language and language is what people think in. On a 
Rylean Ordinary Language approach there is no difference between saying “I am 
angry” outloud and thinking it in sotto voco. There is no difference between Fred 
thinking about going fishing on the weekend, and Fred talking about going 
fishing on the weekend. Ryle argues that people think in the same language 
they speak in, every day. For Ryle there is no ghostly beetle hidden in the 
matchbox. No. There is only the word on the box, and for Ryle, saying it outloud 
is the same thing as soundlessly thinking it.  
Here, on a Rylean approach to Francis’ project we might list statements 
drawn from a common language and the participants could agree to how much 
those statements apply to them based on the shared knowledge of the language 
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between the person who wrote the statements and the person who reads them. 
But there is no need to go beyond that and speculate about whether Tiffany and 
Sue have the same ghostly objects that their statements about feeling angry 
refer to.  
If we took up a Rylean position, this would give us a school of ‘Ordinary 
Language Psychology’, and what on first glance appears to be a highly attractive 
research proposal. Ordinary Language Arguments seem to offer the psychologist 
the hope of a way out of any indeterminacy of reference problems. However, I 
argue this is a false hope.  
I develop a critique of Ryle which relies on a distinction between third 
person publicly accessible discourse about the mind and first personal 
ascriptions whose semantics, at a first pass, can be partially captured in terms of 
the private phenomenology of the experience which they express. I call this 
distinction ‘Ryle’s Three Mistakes’ and refer to it as such throughout the paper. 
When one has this kind of distinction between first person and third person uses 
of a term referring to one’s mental life, the questions arise (1) are the two really 
different? (2) If they are what is the difference between first personal experience 
and third person discourse? (3) Is one of them prior to the other in relation to the 
semantics and meaning of language about the mind?  
In effect Ryle seemingly answers a resounding “no” to the first question. 
Nonetheless, however resounding his “no” to question (1) at first glance seems, I 
still argue that many of his arguments, when broken down to their ‘nitty-gritty’ 
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parts, actually rely on there being a surrepititiously hidden ‘occult’ difference 
and that these differences are phenomenological in nature. As you shall see from 
reading it, a large part of this paper is concerned with a study of this ‘occult 
phenomenology’ in Ryle and bringing out the full implications of what is hidden 
away in there. I argue that what is hidden behind Ryle’s arguments is a 
surreptitious misuse and obfuscation of the difference between publicly 
accessible linguistic behaviour and private personal experiences. Ryle manages 
this through a concealment of reflective practices which he gets the reader to 
undertake when reading his arguments. I call this strain of argumentation in 








Anti-Psychologism and the Occult Phenomenology. 
 
Historically Psychologism as a thesis began with an objection Frege had to 
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics55. Kant thought that both geometry and 
arithmetic could be grounded in the categories of space and time as extensive 
and intensive forms of magnitude56. This in effect tied mathematics to human 
perception. Gottlob Frege disagrees with Kant on this point. Frege rejects the 
notion that mathematics is simply a relic of man’s perception and a product of 
his faculties. Frege’s overall project can be seen as the attempt to objectify 
mathematics through set theory. Frege used the term ‘psychologism’ pejoratively 
for Kant’s view on mathematics and described his own project to objectify 
mathematics as Anti-Psychologistic57.      
 Since Frege, Anti-Psychologism has been extended into the theory of 
language, chiefly, by Dummett and McDowell. Both criticize ‘psychologism’ as an 
 
55 Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884. See section 11, pp 29 – 42. 
56 Here, of course, there are many sources one could point to, and write an extensive treatise on this 
point. I list Otfried Hoffe’s discussion for his expertise and what is generally considered an unbiased 
orthodoxy between Analytic and Continental receptions of Kant. See Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, 1994. 
Pp 44 -47. 59-72. 
57 Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmatic Translated by Dale Jacquette. New York Pearson  
Longman 2007. Pg 19, Section 3. See also Jacquette, Dale. ‘Introduction ‘. In Gottlob Frege, the  




untenable project. Tim Crane deviates from the Anti-Psychologistic consensus 
adopted by most Analytic Philosophers. Tim Crane explains what McDowell 
thinks Psychologism  is, including what McDowell argues that a Psychologistic 
Theory of Language is, which of course McDowell argues against. John 
McDowell is Pro Anti-Psychologismistic. 
 Tim Crane writes  
 
(McDowell argues that) Psychologism is the view according to which 
‘the significance of others’ utterances is a subject for guess work or 
speculation as to how things are in a private sphere concealed 
behind their behaviour58.  
 
Meaning, on this view, would not be transparently open to intersubjective 
understanding. People would need to guess what words meant and what the 
people using them were getting at. In the paper I refer to this problem that 
Psychologism faces as ‘The Guess Work Objection’. ‘The Guess Work Objection’ 
is a very good reason, on first appearance, to abandon Psychologism since people 
appear to be able to understand one another. However, I will offer an alternative 
account of why it seems that this is the case. That account, which I offer, will 
involve what I call ‘Analolgical Constructs’. Unfortunatley it is so early in the 
 
58 Crane, Aspects of Psychologism. 2014. Pg 2. 
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sequence of arguments making up this paper that any explanation now will 
serve only to confuse. It is better if the reader remembers the term and how it 
fits in with the objection McDowell and Dummett raise and the promissory note 
issued here, that what I am calling ‘Analogical Constructs’ will offer an 
explanation to answer the ‘Guess Work Objection’.   
 Tim Crane also points to an acquisitional-autobiographical element in 
Dummett. Crane explains that what Dummett construes Psychologism as being 
arises from a confusion between the ways and means people have to acquire 
concepts and what it means to have concepts59. What is perhaps confusing is 
that, as Crane points out, Frege himself held certain notions about Psychologism 
in his theory of language so that while Frege himself delved into aspects of 
Psychologism and the relationship between language and thought with his 
account of Vorstellung and Gedanke60, the Fregeian concept of Anti-
Psychologism grew into a broader Analytic Anti-Psychologism under Dummett 
and McDowell and the broader Analytic Community. Crane points out that this 
broader Anti-Psychologism of philosophers like Dummett and McDowell was 
applied beyond the original scope of Frege’s objection to Kant’s view of 
mathematics. Crane argues that Dummett and McDowell’s Anti-Psychologism 
has gone largely unchallenged in terms of both scholarship and advocacy of the 
 
59 Crane, Aspects of Psychologism, 2014, pg 2.   
60 Crane, Aspects of Psychologism, 2014, pp 4 -7, and in particular see page 6.  
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correct theory on mind, as well as languages, thought and their relationship to 
semantics. 
One reason I can see for rejecting Anti-Psychologism and embracing 
Psychologism, while also rejecting McDowell and Dummett’s position would be 
the argument that there are elements of mind that we understand that are non-
linguistic. Another is that people’s use of a language may rely on semantic 
elements that are not publicly accessible which leads to guesswork about 
people’s meaning. I shall argue for both and the reason for doing so will be 
revealed as deriving from insights into the difference between first personal 
experience and third person discourse61.  
 Crane also defines another aspect of Anti-Psychologism as being one that 
involves it in research and analytic endeavours based on describing mentalistic 
concepts in terms of language and grammatical descriptions. It is this school of 
Anti-Psychologism that I am attacking, because I think, given the work of 
Dummett and McDowell and the inherent appeal of Ryle’s arguments, which is 
revealed by how deeply influential Ryle’s arguments have been in Analytic 
Philosophy of Mind, that Ordinary Language Anti-Psychologism appears to be 
 
61 The distinction is drawn from David Chalmers insight into the different types of data one finds  
between the first and third person in his paper Chalmers, David. ‘How Can We Construct a Science  
of Consciousness ‘Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1303, no. 1 (2013). One might argue  
in a trivial sense that the distinction between first and third person is linguistic, however I argue  
that the data is not. The types of phenomenological arguments in Ryle I am drawing attention to rely  
on the data of first-person experience and not the linguistic distinction. In fact, a lack of ‘linguistic  
behaviour’ is what characterizes these types of behaviour. They do not exemplify in a single concrete  
manifestation with inheritance properties for the inter-sentential relationships between words and a  
grammatical analysis that can uphold the distinction they are based on.  
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the strongest approach to describing the mind with language. Thus, one very 
compelling reason for using Ryle, qualified by Dummett and McDowell is that 
removing the strongest root will have an effect towards uprooting the entire 
tree.   
I argue that Anti-Psychologism, of which Ordinary Language Arguments 
represent a subspecies, has a problem with the irreducible differences between 
first personal experiences and third person discourse. This difference is an 
unwritten autobiographical story that takes place between the ascription of 
meaning in a term learnt in a sphere of public exchange and the ways and 
processes through which someone comes to grasp and use the concept they 
attach to the term. This unwritten story contains non-linguistic elements in a 
hidden realm behind the first person ascription that, I argue, requires 
guesswork to construct an interpretation of. I call these areas of guesswork and 
hidden non-linguistic elements ‘Analogical Constructs’. As stated above in my 
‘promissory note’ the account of ‘Analogical Constructs’ on offer in this paper will 
provide an explanation to counter ‘The Guess Work Objection’62 launched by 
Anti-Psychologisticists63. This account will explain why people appear to be 
evidently able to talk about and use highly complex vocabularies of affect, which 
 
62 I have copied Dummett’s separation of guesswork into Guess Work, and capitalized it, to separate 
it from my own use of the term guesswork, through out the paper. 
63 An Anti-Psychologisticist is not a Anti-Psychologist. Psychologism and Psychology are different 
notions, and thus their antitheses are different also. For further clarification see Psychology, 
Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Languages, as well as Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of 
Mind, and Endo-Affective Languages all in Chapter Seventeen in this thesis.  
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refer to private experiences with publicly inaccessible properties but also using a 
publicly accessible language.    
Once I remove ‘The Guess Work Objection’ I will then present evidence 
against Anti-Psychologism in the form of an extended argument about the 
acquisition of language by a subject whose capacity for private experiences of 
phenomenal content have been removed. This is the “Phenomenal Zombie 
Argument” I mentioned earlier. For Ordinary Language Philosophy to work as a 
thesis about the mind it needs publicly accessible discourse to be able to capture 
everything there is to know about the mind. If a subject who is missing these 
private faculties cannot grasp and use a language competently, then this 
presents a problem for the view that a publicly accessible discourse is able to 
capture everything. There are reasons this paper lays out why the subject (the 
phenomenal zombie) cannot do this. These reasons need to be explained in 
further depth. However, the critique in this paper, seen thus, presents a threat 










Psychology, Psychiatry and the Object Languages of The Medical 
Sciences.  
   
Long before medicinal neuropharmacology and neuroscientific psychiatry 
blossomed into hope and effective treatments for Manic-Depression as well as 
newer types of antipsychotics for schizophrenia64, and a raft of other treaments 
that offered the chance of a non-institutionalized life to what have been 
historically considered as ‘the incurable mad’, Wilfrid Sellars forsaw the way 
medicine and science would intersect and unlock knowledge about the mind.  
Sellars saw that scientific developments would lead to new modern diagnostic 
technologies of the brain. He forsaw that such developments along the scientific 
front would result in a new image of humanity. Indeed, long before a whole vista 
of knowledge about learning disorders and other cognitive conditions was made 
possible by a new wave of (f)MIR, PET and EEG diagnostic technology, Sellars 
realized that there would come a point where the ‘Scientific Image of Man’ being 
developed by the fledgling neurosciences would come to challenge the 
established Manifest Image handed down and inherited from the Folk Ages. It 
 
64 The timeline is significant. Viable antipsychotics developed in the 1960s and spread during the 
1970s. Significantly neuroleptic medications became widely available for standardized use in clinical 
practice by the 1980s by which time common, practical and lived knowledge of their uses and effects 
became commonplace for nurses, doctors and patients. Sellars’ philosophical foundations and 
research date from the post-war period of the late 1950s and 1960s, before such knowledge was 
commonplace in the medical workplace and practice. It is worth considering his work with an eye to 
the developing common practices in medicine. Common insights freely available in our era were not 
so at the time that Sellars was writing and forming his views. Psychiatry was yet to yield the 
pharmacological revolution that emerged during the second half of the 20th century.  
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should stand to his credit that Wilfrid Sellars was one of the first philosophers to 
realize the vast potential for neuroscience to come to radically challenge the way 
we look at the mind. It is my goal, in this part of the thesis, to begin to place his 
insight within the developing methodological explanatory tendencies of 
psychiatry and psychology.  
 In the world and history of cognitive research and theory there are many 
places where psychology and psychiatry65 overlap. Both embody normative 
descriptions of what should be viewed as healthy. Some might see this 
normativity as grounds for questioning how scientific either one actually is66. 
But it is also true that much of the actual research being done in cognitive fields 
stems directly from these two disciplines. Moreover, what emerges from the two 
are methodological and historical tendencies in practices. Psychology tends more 
towards being grouped with the social sciences. In addition to this grouping 
psychology also peddles talking cures67 and uses language-based data sampling 
in its research and questionnaires. Moreover, the language of some of its 
foundational schools is drawn directly out of folklore and myths like Freud’s 
Oedipus and Electra’s complexes, or Jung’s use of European folk stories. For 
good or ill many psychologists actually describe their research as ‘empirical 
 
65 Later in the paper I will come to refer to a Psychological Image and a Psychiatric Image. Where I 
use captials for Psychology, or Psychiatry like I have just done, I refer to the ‘Images’ in the Neo-
Sellarsian model I build, idealized by methodological tendencies we find in real world psychology.  
66 Nowell-Smith, Ethics and Psychology, 1955. Sober, Philosophy of Biology, 2000.  
67 Bankhard, C.P. Talking Cures: A History of Western and Eastern Psychotherapies. California. 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 1997. 
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studies’ and for these reasons I characterize its tendencies as an applied field of 
the Manifest Image within Sellars’ framework68. Psychiatry, on the other hand, 
tends to inherit the harder sciences of medicine like chemistry, biology, 
anatomy, as well as advanced areas of physics and pharmacology as noted above.      
 We might see the potential for conflict between the normativity in 
psychiatry and psychology in quasi-Sellarsian terms in the following analogy. 
Suppose an athlete damaged their knee while training. The fitness instructor 
would be able to rub it, would be able to say ‘it looks like a torn hamstring’ from 
the way the athlete limps around on it, but ultimately would not be able to cut 
the leg open and fix it nor have the diagnostic ability to confirm whether it was 
in fact the hamstring, or if it was the knee. The surgeon on the other hand has a 
knowledge about the knee joint and reconstructive surgery from his medical 
training which would allow him to cut the knee open and fix the joint. In this 
case we would say that the surgeon has a superior knowledge to the fitness 
instructor.  
 If we refer this back to the case of the psychometric test and the 
psychiatrist’s EEG device, we can see the surgeon as analogous to the 
psychiatrist and the fitness instructor as analogous to the psychologist. A clash 
 
68 Sellars framework for the Manifest Image in Philosophy and the Scienfific Image of Man is of 
course, that it contains two older Images. One is the Anthropomophized Image, and the Other is the 
Empiricial Image which is a negation of the Anthropomorphic Image (presented as The One), which 
categorizes ‘nature’ as the domain of ‘truncated persons’. Certain tendencies in psychology towards 
folk sources, empirical doctrines and talking cures lead me to characterize those tendencies in that 




between a psychiatrist and a psychologist over whether a patient has AD(H)D is 
a genuine clash between two different frameworks much like the clash of the 
Manifest and Scientific Images Sellars envisaged in Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man. In the psychologist’s case, like the Fitness Instructor, 
they may be able to say ‘it looks like AD(H)D’ in the way the Fitness Instructor 
says ‘it looks like a hamstring injury’.  
However, sophistications within the psychiatrist’s language about the 
brain and diagnostic equipment give the psychiatrist, like the surgeon, a 
methodological superiority. This superiority will be explained at length in the 
paper as deriving from the fact stating ‘roles’69 that medicine inherits from the 
Object Languages of the medical sciences. This is important as it relates to the 
differences in Observation and Report Languages in Sellars’ developmental 
Socio-Linguistic story and to an insight that comes out of Ryle’s argument about 
the contamination of natural languages by specialized sciences. A ‘pure 
psychology’, in the view offered by this paper, is trapped at a Post-Jonesian 
‘observation stage’ of Sellars’ Socio-Linguistic development and limited to 
metaphorical descriptions that resist rational fact stating assent. The argument 
presented in this paper has a deeper and more pessimistic moral about the 
 
69 Sellars’ use of the term.  
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inability of Psychology, or rather the Psychological Image70, to rise above 
metaphorical speculation. 
It is important to point out that I am using ‘Object Language’ in relation 
to my reading of Sellars and not in the standard Object Language/ 
Metalanguage distinction in Semantics71. By Object Language, as will be 
explained, I mean the stages of Sellars’ theory where he is dealing with 
Observation and Report Languages that deal with inanimate objects, or the 
stages in his Anthropology where Sellars argues that Empiricism when it 
develops at the foot of the Scientific Image, truncates anthropomorphic qualities 
left over from earlier ages.  I read into Sellars’ distinction Andrew Gleesons’ 
point about the languages of object and ‘affect’72.   
 It is also important not to confuse my claim that (i) Neo-Sellarsian 
Psychiatry which has access to Fact Statements from highly advanced Object 
Languages is able to progress, while Psychology because of its limited access to 
metaphorical uses of the Object Languages is doomed to a ‘speculative science’ 
 
70In part I was inspired by the way David Misselbrook read into Sellars Two Images the idea of 
medicine. We do not often think of medicine as one of the sciences but here, of course, we are 
mistaken. Where else would we see the amalgamation of our scientific knowledge of man coalesce 
but in medicine? David Misselbrook was right. I am deeply indebted to his paper for this insight. See 
David Misselbrook. ‘Images of Man; the ‘scientific’ versus ‘the manifest’ images of Wilfrid Sellars. 
British Journal of General Practice.  63, no 614. (2013). 484. 
71 Putnam, Hilary. Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. For Susan Haack’s 
discussion, see her book. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1978. Pp 
129-130. The term ‘Object Languge’ I have lifted from Sellars use of the term. See Chapter Sixteen. 
Observational and Report Languages. In Part Four of this thesis.  
72 Gleeson’s original use of the term.  
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with my claim that (ii) Autophenomenology is foundational to claims about the 
mind.  
 
Can the Chalmerian zombie in the Sellarsian Village learn to speak 
Rylean? 
 
In the full scope of the thesis it will be argued that (ii), Autophenomenological 
introspection is a type of normative source that actually underlies many common 
ordinary language claims about the mind. It is this same source which offers 
insight into the use of a number of emotive words. This insight can only arise 
once someone has passed through a certain stage and learnt to internalize a 
language. This is because the stage after internalization is the one where people 
begin learning how to make Analogical Constructs. This stage is the one where a 
person learns to use their internalized vocabulary and applies it to others to 
understand what they are saying, to make claims about their emotional life and 
to try and understand other people’s behaviour. In the final stage of the Socio-
Linguistic theory developed in this paper it will be revealed that while the 
ascription of third personal terms derives from behavioural foundations, the 
meaning of the terms derives from first person insight. Thus, it can be argued 
that the meaning in these terms is based on Analogical Constructs built up from 
the first person by someone who is competent in using a fully developed 
language meaningfully. To understand this claim, however, it is necessary for 
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the reader to undertake the developmental stages of language built into the 
thesis. In order to discover the reasons why David Chalmers’ phenomenal 
zombie cannot learn the language of Wilfrid Sellars’ fictional Rylean tribe it is 
necessary to take the reader through a systematic exploration of each one of 
those stages73.   
Once a subject has undergone the stage I refer to as ‘internalization’ they 
can then build up ‘Analogical Constructs’ that allow them to apply experiences 
they first learnt words for while either displaying or witnessing publicly 
observable behaviour. Later they are able to connect these words with the 
private emotions they felt while displaying those behaviours and use the terms 
when feeling private emotions without displaying the emotions behaviourally. 
‘Analogical Constructs’ are created out of a type of analogical reasoning that 
allows them to make the connection between their own private experiences and 
to use these when reasoning about what someone else might be experiencing. 
Within the scope of the thesis it will be revealed that this inability to internalize 
and connect words with private qualitative experiences is the reason why 
Chalmers’ zombie cannot internalize to move beyond Jones’ Language with its 
proto-vocabulary of publicly observable behaviours, (what we are calling a 
 
73 The reason why the Chalmerian phenomenal zombie cannot learn the Rylean language of the tribe 
is it cannot undergo all of the Sellarsian stages necessary for Gleesonian language competency. It is 
by going through those stages am I able to show the reader exactly where the zombie falls short. 
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Gross-Body-Language Behavioural Language74) to Self Reports of a private 
experience. The phenomenal zombie has no private experiences to connect to 
Jones’ word beyond the public display of a behaviour. The phenomenal zombie 
thus cannot talk about instances when it is feeling emotions but not displaying 
the body language for those emotions because it does not have any of these 
emotions.  
  The Psychologistic thesis (not to be confused with Psychology or 
Psychological75) this paper offers is also further supported by the view that a 
pure neurological language cannot cover the facts of mind relevant to a theory of 
mind, because pure neuroscience is just another Object Language. A pure 
neuroscience might talk about the bio-electric frequencies the brain emits which 
are detectable with a certain device or the complex organic chemistry involved in 
neurotransmitters that pass bio-electrical chemicals producing the frequencies 
the brain emits. It might begin to talk about the relationship between cell 
membrane and the way dendrites relate to each other with complex strains of 
protein and describe how this process changes according to bio-chemical shifts at 
the cellular level, and ways of looking at this activity on a larger scale using a 
(functional) Magnetic Resonating Device and some of the complex physics that 
makes such imaging possible. But such an approach of itself has no ‘human’ 
 
74 The repetition of the term ‘language’ here is perhaps confusing. In the first use the term ‘language’ 
refers to physical gestures, posture, and movements. In the second ‘language’ here refers to the 
names someone like Jones develops for them and then begins teaching the community.   
75 See Chapter Six: Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Language in this paper. 
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concepts to connect this Object Language to. Indeed, I shall argue no, the 






The Three Tiers of Solving the Indeterminacy of Reference 
Problem in the Philosophy of Mind.  
 
What emerges from the problem as I have laid it out should begin to be 
discernible as a three-tier system of proposals that have emerged as attempts at 
solving a highly abstract problem. The first tier is what we might characterize as 
‘off-the-shelf’ theories and bodies of research into the mind which run into 
problems with referential indeterminacy. These are the fields of research around 
the sciences and disciplines of mind like Kimberly Francis’ work in Strain 
Theory, or emerging neuroscientific research into the Insula Cortex. The second 
tier are Ordinary Language solutions which seem to offer a way out of the 
referential indeterminacy problem and various disciplines and sciences of mind. 
This Ordinary Language approach seems particularly promising for psychology 
which has limited access to the hard scientific dialects of the ‘Object Languages’, 
but which I argue is a forlorn hope. The third tier is where this paper picks up in 
medias res as the flaw in Ordinary Language Arguments and what I propose is 
the solution. I will now lay out the three tiers in detail bringing us to the 
argument about ‘David Chalmers’ zombie’ and ‘Wilfrid Sellars Rylean tribe’, 
before beginning the thesis formally which will lay out the caveats for this 




The First Tier: Fregeian Theories of Meaning and Naïve Psycho-Realist 
Theorists of Mind.  
 
When a theorist of mind starts using terms like ‘anger’, ‘cathexic charge’, ‘inner 
child’, ’enantiodromian pathway’, ‘negative internalizing emotions’, ‘besetzung 
transmogrifier’, ‘super-ego’, ‘noetic pole’,’fixation of the mortido drive’ or ‘the 
dark anima of the psyche’, it is always interesting to ask such a theorist 
preliminary ontological Carnapesque questions to inform us in what sense we 
are to take their theorizing. Do they (a) think such terms as they use have real 
world referents and existent entities, or (b), are such terms merely convenient 
fictions the theorist uses to talk about and understand the mind? If after some 
thought the theorist answers yes to (a), the first part of that dilemma, and no to 
(b), the second part of that dilemma76, then we would call that theorist a ‘Naïve 
Psycho-Realist’.  
On a ‘Naïve Psycho-Realist view’ words like ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ refer to 
actual and existent mental entities, and not merely convenient fictions for ways 
of talking about the mind.  On such a Psycho-Realist view statements using such 
terms that are made by a theorist of mind ‘picture’ these entities as ‘parts’, 
‘organelles’, ‘mentalia’ or ‘elements’ of the mind. On a Psycho-Realist view truth 
 
76 If they answer yes, however, to the second part then they are a Psychologist in the sense of the 
Figarato-Literao model as discussed in Chapter Sixteen and Chapter Seventeen of this paper. That is, 
a Psychologist as one who speaks of the mind in convenient fictions, riddles and metaphors, but 
withholds assent to the fact-stating role of the languages they borrow from to construct riddles, 
similies and metaphors.  
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arises in a sort of naïve ‘picture theory’77 in which the theorist’s words ‘picture’, 
describe and/or truthfully assemble, in propositional form, the relationship 
between these mentalia making up the mind. I shall now give two simple 
examples. (i) If we were to argue there really are ‘entities’, ‘organelle’, ‘parts’, 
‘complexes of parts’, ‘thoughts’, ‘experiences’ or ‘constituents’ either ‘making up 
the human mind’ or ‘forming the mind’ or ‘in the mind’ corresponding for 
instance to Francis’ ‘negative internalizing emotions’ then we would be 
adherants to a Psycho-Realist position78. Likewise, (ii) if we were to believe that 
in some entity called ‘the mind’ there really is an ego which we can dissect to 
discover an ID, or an entity or mental organelle corresponding to what we might 
refer to as parts of an Oedipus Complex then we would also be naïve Psycho-
Realists79.     
 
77 Here I am thinking of the sort of picture theory advanced by the earlier Wittgenstein and puzzles 
that arise from thinking of the mind in a pictorial sense, and specifically like that which George 
Pitcher at length discusses in his commentary and scholarship on Wittgenstein. See George Pitcher, 
The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,1965. See pp 75 – 105 for a general introduction. Of particular 
interest to the Psycho-Realist debate is the discussion on page 201 for problems of conceiving of the 
mind in a pictorial sense. For an introduction to Logical Atomistic theories see Barry Gross. Analytic 
Philosophy. New York, Pegasus Press, 1970. For an indepth analysis of Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus see the deeply interesting, and highly underappreciated Peter Carruthehers, Tractarian 
Semantics. Oxford. Basil Blackwell Inc. 1989. For a treatment of Russell’s Atomoist stage see the 
highly insightful C. W. Kilmister. Russell. Kent, The Harvester Press, 1984.   
78 By ‘naïve’ I am referring to a dewy-eyed ignorance leading to a lack of jadedness about the raging 
debates between Descriptivists and Referentialists about ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ semantics of 
the referent and definite descriptions. See Kallestrup, Semantic Externalism, 2012. Pp 10 – 57 for 
the kinds of debates a ‘naïve’ Psycho-Realist would be unaware of.  
79 Freud, Sigmund. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Translated by James Starchey.  
London Penguin 1991. See ‘Dissection of the Personality’ pp 82-112, for Freud’s model of the ID and  





The reasons why a Psycho-Realist position is indefensible in 
neuroscientific forms of psychiatry is different to psychology. The problem with a 
Psycho-Realist theory in psychology is that a psychologist has no means of 
proving or refuting the truth of this Realist position since they have no recourse 
to the mind except through language. They are limited to speculation about 
whether the word ‘anger’ means the same thing between two different subjects 
using it in reports, data collection or therapy sessions. They cannot connect 
patients to an EEG or an (f)MIR to see what their brain activity is, or work out 
what the chemical relationship underlying the neuronal exchanges related to 
that activity are. There is no way to obtain (what appears to be) evidence that 
‘anger’ means the same thing between different people since, in general, there is 
no way for a psychologist to check that the word stimulates the same types of 
bio-electrical feed-back registering as activity in brain scans and other similar 
devices.  
In neuroscientific forms of psychiatry there are problems related to 
Situational Responses and cases where Two Twin States have identical 
neurological data but feel different like in the case of activity in the Insula-
Cortex and the non-identical feelings subjects report of mistrust and disgust 
corresponding with similar or identical activity in this area.  
These sorts of issues create a fierce frost storm which rains down a silver 
thaw of unsolvable problems. These problems accumulate around the edges of 
research projects and eventually solidify into a philosophical glacier over what is 
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the real hidden issue plaguing all of the various avenues of research into the 
mind. Such an issue involves recalcitrant struggles with semantic ascriptions 
and obrogation. Obrogation is a term which describes the ‘caveat authority’ by 
which a research subject can correct a therapist or researcher about what the 
research subject is actually feeling. Even though researchers might be able to 
locate activity in the insula-cortex using brain-scanning equipment, they rely 
upon the subject to report whether they are feeling mistrust, or disguist to 
identify the brain activity. This is particularly true when there are states with 
similar or identical patterns of brain activity in the same parts of the brain, 
which subjects experience as different states.  
 This hidden problem cannot be solved in the case of neuroscientific 
psychiatry by looking beyond the mind to the types of scenarios and contexts 
likely to cause either disgust or mistrust, respectively. Such an attempt leads 
back with circularity to the problem of Context-Dependent Identity Claims and 
Situational Reponses. Situations and contexts can not offer identity foreclosure 
on a patient’s emotional experiences where neuroscientific data falls short, for 
the simple fact that different people will respond to the same situation or 
context in different ways.   
For instance, Jane might like Tom. If presented with Tom, Jane might 
give a specific type of reaction. However, Joanne does not like Tom. If presented 
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with Tom, Joanne would give an entirely different reaction80. The emerging 
context for Jane and Joanne’s responses to Tom cannot be indexed as “Tom-
dependant” for an identity claim about their brain-states, nor can they be 
situationalistically dependent on meeting Tom because Jane and Joanne can be 
seen to experience different emotional reactions to seeing Tom. If we try to base 
an identity claim on the context of encountering Tom in relation to Jane’s and 
Joanne’s brain scans, or what either one professes to feel for Tom, we will break 
the law of identity because they both feel different things. 
The ‘take-home message’ at this early stage of the paper is that disciplines 
like psychiatry, psychology, cognitive science and branches of neuroscience fit 
what we might describe as naïve ‘Psycho-Realism’ when there is a hidden 
assumption or implied supposition that the words they use for mental beings, 
 
80 This is a very polite way of putting the problems they had with getting female primates to present 
for male primates to measure male sexual activity in the brain. See Y. Oomura, et al. . ‘Central 
Control of Sexual Behaviour.’ Brain Research Bulletin 20, (1988): 863-870. One of the emerging 
reoccurring problems with affective life forms, or ‘conscious beings’ is that they often react to the 
same stimulus or situation differently. So while context dependent states might be fine for defining  
at what temperature lead melts or water boils, there is a problem with conscious beings and defining 
mentalia by situational context. Gleeson brings this to the forefront with his critique of 
Functionalism as a form of ‘behaviourism’ and also points out the general problem  
with assigning mentality based on environmental effects.  The other side of this  
problem with environmental effects and context dependent individuation of mentalia, of course, is  
that a computer program might be designed to display personality traits or score within a certain  
percentile on a psychometric test; it may use pattern recognition software while taking the Holtzman 
ink blot that correlate with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Likewise, the computer might be 
programmed with language and numeracy patterns such that when it takes the WAIS-VI arithmetic 
and written subsets, it presents out-puts consistent with a dyslexic diagnosis. Does that mean the  
computer has schizophrenia or dyslexia? Normally we would say that no, it doesn’t. The Gleesonian  
‘affect/effect’ distinction brings to light this side of the problem. I argue that the difference between a  
computer and a human taking these tests is the concept of ‘affect’ which we ascribe to the subject.  
The other side is the problem where affective life forms may not react to a stimulus in the same way.  
The question these two sides of the problematic raise is, of course, what do the categories, concepts  
and vocabularies of affect which we apply to other beings, ultimately, rest on? I answer that question  
at the end of this paper.  
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emotions, feelings, thoughts or sensations correspond to universalized entities, 
experiences, parts, bio-electrical feedback, electro-magnetic activity, or elements 
making up the mind81. As has been argued such theories have a tendency to 
suffer from an ‘indeterminacy of reference’. The ‘Problem of the Indeterminacy of 
Reference’ arises most acutely when researchers and theorists from the fields 
studying the mind are using language about the mind that can change between 
first-person and third-person use. There is a difficulty in establishing whether 
the words such theorists and researchers use in their theories refer to the same 
things that their subjects are talking about, and if these meanings are the same 
between different subjects.  
  
 
81 The paper will reveal that the problem with words like ‘anger’ is that they are not entities at all, 
but rather a confusion between two different sources of information, that become entwined together 
because of the stages involved in language acquisition. These two sources will be revealed as 
approximating to what we think of as first and third person perspectives and will be refered to in the 
later part off the paper, after many caveats, as the normative source inside of 
Heterophenomeological and Autophenomenological arguments. These sources end up being 
developmentally codified together due to the stages of language development. I invite the reader to 





The Second Tier: Ordinary Language Arguments and the hope of 
unifying discourse about the mind.  
 
The second tier of problem-solving approaches to arise in the history of 
Twentieth Century Philosophy is the Ordinary Language approach. Ryle 
spearheaded this approach with a novel solution. That is to say a Rylean 
position on language would allow one to build a theory of mind based on the 
knowledge and use of terms of the everyday ordinary language speaker. On first 
appearance this seems to be a most tenable position. It offers the attractive 
proposition that researchers and theorists of mind speak and think in the same 
language as the subjects they study. On this view the words are intersubjective 
and meaningful whether they are in the mouths of the patients or the books read 
by the common ‘head-shrink’.  This view is especially attractive to psychological 
researchers and the ongoing search for a ‘talking-cure’.  
Since psychology lacks what I refer to as an ‘Object language’, (not to be 
confused with the distinction beween object/metalanguages in semantics82) and 
 
82 Putnam, Hilary. Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. For Susan Haack’s 
discussion, see her book. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1978. Pp 
129-130. The term ‘Object Languge’ I have lifted from Sellars use of the term. See Chapter Sixteen. 




we have carefully separated Behaviouralist Strains of Thinking, it thus remains 
that the chief method psychology has of discovering and studying the mind of 
another is through the use and analysis of language. For psychological 
investigation to work as a branch of research into the mind all the facts relevant 
to the domain of a theory of mind need to be discoverable through language. If 
they cannot draw information from observing the behaviour of a research 
subject, then psychologists need to talk to thier research subjects to get 
information. Language is the conduit through which a nexus of mind and its 
research flows in this case. The research subjects then relate their emotions and 
thoughts in everyday, non-specalized language, assuming they have not been 
trained at any length in the specialized languages of psychology and its 
branches.  
This being so, and given the other factors above; if Gilbert Ryle is right, 
this would appear to make Ordinary Language the best type of theoretic scheme 
for discovering the mind. Moreover, the curious consequence follows that if 
Gilbert Ryle is right then Anti-Psychologism is the right approach based on  
Ryle’s argument that language is explanatorily foundational for developing a 
‘concept of mind’. If Anti-Psychologism is the right approach and language is 





psychologists Anti-Psychologistic. However, there is a problem with the 
Indeterminacy of Language to first consider before making such an argument.       
Consider the problem that the indeterminacy of language presents for 
statistics and statistical research. If 9 out of 10 people tick ‘anger’ on a survey 
question, then how do the researchers know these statistics present an accurate 
finding in a sample? What if 3 of those people had been referring to what 
another 7 of them thought was sadness? Where a neuroscientist or psychiatrist 
can consult PET scans or blood-chemical analysis for further analysis of 
dopamine, or readings on hormone levels, and present some kind of medico-
factual grounds, the psychologist does not generally have recourse to the same 
sorts of ‘Object Languages’ of the medical sciences when trying to establish the 
identity conditions of a mental state, entity, part, constituent, organelle or 
etcetera. Language is the best and most readily available currency the 
psychologist has to spend on his or her83 research.    
Therein lay the appeal to the psychologist and why Ryle is an attractive 
proposition. The novelty of Ryle’s Ordinary Language position on the mind rests 
on the fundamental assumption that we think in language. The authority, on his 
view, for a theory about the mind derives from the analysis of the language used 
 
83 I must apologize at some point, and this is as good as any, for the binary slant of the language I 
have used through out the writing of this paper. I am aware there are non-binary terms such as 
‘they’, ‘shem’, ‘non-male’, ‘non-binary’, ‘neuter’, ‘non-gendered’ and so on for people who do not 
identify as masculine and feminine, and also terms for those who do not identify as people, such as 
‘wolf-kin’ and other ‘non-humans’. I acknowledge those here and apologize to them for the binary 
language I use in the formal context of the academic thesis I am presenting.  
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by the ordinary natural language speaker when talking about the mind in 
everyday discourse.  
The chief importance of Ryle’s argument lies in the claim that his 
Ordinary Language Account of the Mind can cover all of the facts necessary for a 
theory of the mind. This is Ryle’s weak spot, and it is this which I attack in the 





The Third Tier: Introspection, Phenomenology and the End for Anti-
Psychologism.  
  
The third tier is introspection. Here I refer to phenomenology and first person 
exploration of consciousness and the mind. Where that introspection is applied 
to another I call it ‘insight’. Insight is a specific type of Analogical Structure, 
however there is not room here in this introduction to talk about insight and 
what makes insight possible. Where phenomenology differs from psychology is in 
its ego-centricity. By ego-centricity I mean something that emerges out of the 
final parts of this paper where it is possible that each person has a different 
meaning for ‘anger’, but within their own use of language it is consistent. Here 
there is no indeterminacy of reference between subjects, theorists, other subjects 
or any combination because each person sets their own references for the words 
they use.  The way this occurs will be laid out systematically in the 
developmental stages of a socio-linguistic theory of language development and 
will include Wilfrid Sellars’ treatment of the Infinite Regress of Rules in 
Wittgenstein’s account of language application and public meaning.  The 
completion of the thread of arguments dealing with Wilfrid Sellars’ treatment of 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of the paradox of language rule-attribution will involve 
developing a language between a teacher and a student for an experience which 
the student has, but the teacher does not.  
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Unfortunately, detailing the complexities of that argument involving 
firstly Wittgenstein, secondly Sellars’ work on Wittgenstein and thirdly, the 
hypothetical construction of a language between a teacher and an autistic-
spectrum student, at this early stage of the thesis will only serve to overload the 
reader with too much information too early. There is deep and complex 
scholarship that involves different threads of Wittgenstein’s self-criticism, as 
well as Sellars’ treatment of Wittgenstein’s work which is far too detailed and 
technical an argument to offer anything, but broad brushstrokes at this stage of 
the paper. However, I invite the reader to keep this argument in mind as it will 
ultimately offer insight into the processes of language internalization.  
The processes of language internalization, it will be revealed through the 
course of the paper, are part of a stage in the development of a language where 
people come to be able to report in the terms they have learned for their 
experiences. The account of the processes for internalization which this paper 
offers is integeral to my argument, because ultimately, it provides the 
groundwork for answering Dummett’s Guess Work Objection. Dummet’s Guess 
Work Objection is the strongest argument against my position and my argument 
for a return to a Pre-Fregian Theory of Meaning. So, it is critical that I address 
it, which I do.   
Along with an answer for Dummett’s Guess Work Objection, the processes 
of language internalization I argue for later in this paper during the section 
dealing with the scholarship on Wittgenstein, also offers an attractive 
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autobiographical account of language meaning. The autobiographical theory of 
semantics this paper offers is one in which the meaning of a term and the 
process of acquiring that meaning are ceaselessly and interminably ravelled 
together. This autobiographical semantic theory presented in this thesis offers 
the reader one possible reply to McDowell’s Autobiographical Objection84. 
Together the replies to Dummett’s and McDowell’s objections to Psychologism, 
presented in this thesis, offer an argument for the feasibility of a return to a Pre-


















Ordinary Language and The Cartography of the Mind 




Linguistic Behaviourism and Logical Behaviourism 
 
In contrast to all the different varieties of Psychological Behaviourism85 I am 
using the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ to refer to Ryle’s claims that describe 
 
85See, for instance Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Mind. London: The Muirhead Library of 
Philosophy, 1951, for Russell’s discussion of Watson, page 52, or Thorndike’s laws page 53, or how 
Russell builds these into psychological definitions as part of his behaviour cycles pp 64 – 65. This 
Russellian Taxonomy of Behaviourism is interesting, and indirectly influences some of the 
terminology of this thesis. The problem with Russell’s taxonomy and definition for Behaviourism, is 
it has not been updated since Russell wrote it. So it does not contain insights from Putnam and Ned 
Block’s work in Functionalism, or recent developments in Functionalist Applied Behaviorual 
Analysis, or Gleeson’s critique of Functionalist-Behaviouralist terminologies. However, when I refer 
to waves of Historico-Psychological Behaviourism later in the paper, I do so with a nod to Russell’s 
taxonomy. For Skinner’s own formulation of a definition see Skinner, B. F. Beyond Human Freedom 
and Dignity. Middlesex: Penguin, 1976. Skinner analyzes behavior in terms of aversion and 
reinforcement on page 104, which he builds into a definition of good or bad starting with survival 
contingencies. On page 124 these natural contingencies of survival become conditioning in society. 
He thinks that this conditioning is positive or negative depending on whether it rewards or punishes 
behaviour. And he speculates on the connection between this and whether a response reinforces 
behaviour or is aimed at its extinction. On page 140, Skinner argues that when behavior is followed 
by reinforcement either in rewards or praise it conditions the subject and replaces natural 
contingencies of the environment. This completes his definition which he starts on page 48, with his 
discussion of dignity. Skinner argues that dignity is the illusion that arises from not knowing the 
true conditions of a person’s conditioning while freedom is simply the illusion that allows a person to 
be conditioned by random chance and events rather than structured reinforcement for behaviour. 
Skinner’s own Psychological Behaviourism, of course, falls criticism to Gleeson’s critique of animated 
vocabularies. Skinner’s vocabulary of ‘freedom’, ‘pain’, ‘pleasure’,’positivity’, ‘diginity’ and ‘reward’ is 
filled with animate, sensitive and affective concepts and subject to Gleesonian criticism and hence 
problematic as a foundation to start this paper. Hence why I have rejected it as a point of origin for a 
definition or taxonomy, despite Skinner’s historical significance.  It will be revealed over the course 




‘Autophenomenological appeals’ which are the normative source for concepts of mind. Hence, I have 
not classified Ryle using Skinner’s terms because Skinner is subject to both Ryle and Gleeson’s 
critiques, in different ways and such classification would be erroneous. See also, for instance Sellars, 
Wilfrid. ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, pp 1 - 40. 
California: Ridgeview, 1991. See, specifically, page 24 – 30 for Sellars’ own Behaviouristics 
distinctions. See also Willem A. DeVires, Timm Triplett. Knowledge, Mind and the Given. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 2000, pp 136-140 for a insightful and penetrating 
discussion of Sellars on this point, and specifically, the distinction between philosophical and 
methodological behaviourism. However, I was lead to reject both of these as a point of origin for this 
paper, after careful reading, because of an underlying tension between a number of Sellars’ papers 
about the order that he thinks a language needs to develop in, in order to develop a vocabulary of the 
mind. See Observation and Report Languages, in Chapter Sixteen of this thesis for a discussion of the 
tension between Sellars’ papers.  For the dubious classification of Ryle as a ‘Philosophical 
Behaviourist’ see Stout, Rowland. ‘What You Know When You Know How Someone Behaves.’ The 
Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, no. 7 (2002): http://ejap.louisiana.edu/archives.html. I 
argue contra Rowland, that Ryle, himself, rejected Behaviourism and you will find discussion of 
Ryle’s critiques of Behaviourism in Chapter Seventeen, of this thesis, in the subsection Where Ryle 
and Gleeson’s Critiques fit into the Neo-Sellarsian Psychiatric and Psychological Model. This thesis, 
as it progresses offers a very attractive and developed lexicon and taxonomy of Behaviourist strains 
of psychology taken from different theorists and philosophers views on what they think a 
‘psychological behaviourist’ move is, including an earlier and later critique by Ryle as already 
mentioned. This is done in stages because misreadings of Ryle have often classified him as just 
another type of behaviourist without taking a closer look at what he argued or the nature of some of 
the claims he makes. Hence why I start over with a description of him as a Lingsuitic Behaviourist 
drawn from what Weitz got wrong. In this footnote I have listed some of the background influences 
and places where people might go to find ‘other’ Behavioural Taxonomies which I have rejected after 
studying them. In contrast to these taxonomies and readings of Ryle as a ‘behaviourist’, I argue for a 
new definition and a new study. I argue that Ryle developed a method I call ‘Linguistic 
Behaviourism’, which is not a form of ‘behavioural psychology’, although psychologists might make 
Linguistic Behavioural claims. Rather than a movement, ‘Linguistic Behavioural Arguments’ are a 
type of argument that provides a grammatical analysis of a concrete manifestation of language in 
order to either advance an Ordinary Language Argument that upholds a claim about the mind, or to 
negate claims made by another philosopher on a linguistic basis. All Linguistic Behavioural 
Arguments are Ordinary Language Arguments but not all of what Ryle claims are Ordinary 
Language Arguments turn out to be Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. The term ‘Linguistic 
Behaviour’ is taken directly out of Ryle, where he calls his investigation into the interaction and 
relationship between words an investigation into their ‘behaviour’. This word ‘behaviour’ and the 
term ‘behaviourism’ when used in conjunction with ‘Lingusitic Behaviourism’ has no direct 
derivation from Skinner’s term, nor Watson’s use of the term, nor Thorndike’s Laws, nor Russell’s 
classifications, nor Rowland’s classification of Ryle via Behaviourism. This is purely derived from 
Ryle’s own word, and originates from Ryle, and I use it with ‘linguistic’ to distinguish this closer 
reading of a specific type of argument that Ryle made from the much more general ‘Logical 
Behaviourist’ interpretation and classification which Weitz, inter alia, presents, and which I argue is 
inaccurate and problematic, for which see the chapter affixed to this very long footnote. My intention 
of course, in writing this footnote is to cut off any objection as to why I did not use such and such’s 
theory of behaviourism, to distinguish Linguistic Behaviourism as not being derived from, or 
unrelated to, instead of the actual critiques of Behaviourism I draw out of Ryle and Gleeson, or 
fragments of Russell and Weitz.  
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or can demonstrate relationships between bits of language spelled out in 
grammatical descriptions of linguistic behaviour.  
Ryle’s arguments contain many interesting and attractive appeals. Ryle 
himself argues that the appeals in his argument constitute an ‘Ordinary 
Language Account of the Mind’ and that they arise from what is common and 
everyday people already know about language about the mind. For he thinks 
‘Ordinary Language’, when taken as an authoritative and normative source, can 
provide the resources for a theory of mind that covers all of the relevant and 
germane facts of mind without recourse to theories of consciousness, analogies of 
sea water, light, motion, introspection, or the invention of some new specialized 
vocabulary to explain what he thinks people already know and talk about, by 
virtue of having a mind and possessing a common and shared language already 
to talk about it. Ryle thinks relevance, in this case, is taking the facts other 
types of theory of mind try and often fail to explain, and instead explaining these 
facts using his everyday language account of the mind based on the way people 
already talk about it.  
 However, this is an ambiguous claim. The ambiguity arises from Ryle’s 
own arguments. There are several different types of argument hidden in his 
‘Ordinary Language’ account of the mind. By carefully redefining the 
components of Ryle’s style of argumentation we can dissect the nature of the 
appeals in his arguments and see if they do in fact arise from the same 
normative source. I shall argue in this paper that they do not, that ultimately 
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there are other normative and formative claims in his argumentation, which 
Ryle cannot account for in the official terms of his account and that his 
‘Ordinary Language’ account falls short. A close re-examination and 
classification of the ‘argumentata’ that appear within Ryle’s work The Concept of 
Mind will allow us to do this.   
This re-examination of Ryle’s arguments on offer in this thesis will show 
the following: a) There are facts about the mind that language analysis cannot 
cover. b) There are facts in the domain of Ryle’s own arguments (and generally 
applicable to the domain of a theory of mind) which the type of argument he 
makes in his polemic against consciousness cannot cover. That is Ryle has 
arguments against consciousness, but some of his arguments against 
consciousness implicate the very types of conscious mental acts he argues 
against. c) That the critique of Ryle presented in this thesis threatens the 
general project for an Anti-Psychologistic theory of mind. A re-examination and 
classification of the ‘argumentata’ that appear within Ryle’s work The Concept of 
Mind will allow us to do a, b and c.   
From this point on, what I have just said shall serve for the purposes of 
fixing a beginning to what I refer to as Ryle’s ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’. This is 
one particular kind86 of ‘Ordinary Language’ argument Ryle uses, where in his 
 
86 ‘Species’ is perhaps a better word if we take Ordinary Language Arguments to be the genus. While 
all Linguistic Behavioural arguments are a kind or a species of Ordinary Language Arguments, 
Ordinary Language Arguments are not a species nor kind of Linguistic Behavioural Argument. The 




own words he analyses the ‘behaviour of words’ in the context of their ordinary 
common useage to reveal hidden properties in the relationships certain words 
have, when expressed in a given turn of phrase.   
 I should first like to distinguish Linguistic Behaviourism from several 
mistaken readings of Ryle that representation out of his philosophy under the 
term of ‘Logical Behaviourism’ and most commonly paint it as a forerunner of 
‘Reductive Functionalism’ as he has often been interpreted and classified in 
Twentieth Century histories of the Philosophy of Mind. By now there is such a 
wide variety of meanings for the term ‘Logical Behaviourism’ associated with 
‘Gilbert Ryle’ that the simplest way forward is to show two species of 
interpretation and why the problems arising between them suggest that we need 
to start over and leave all the other readings by the wayside. To these ends the 
two most pertinent thinkers to the present project are Morris Weitz and David 
Chalmers. 
Morris Weitz was, perhaps, the first person to define Gilbert Ryle as a 
Logical Behaviourist. He uses the term ‘Logical Behaviourism’ to describe Ryle 
without referencing anyone, and I, myself, can find no earlier. He tried to 
capture the spirit of Ryle’s linguistic analyses in three propositional model 
sentences that describe behaviourally descriptive categories. On first appearance 
Weitz’s project seems a good one. For if we are able to reduce behaviour to 
propositional models then there is the promise we can further define those 
models using a criteria of meaning and truth values. Therein lay the promise of 
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uniting behaviour and what we know about propositions and the burgeoning 
field of mathematical logic to develop a new science: ‘Logical Behaviourism’.  
Chalmers is, perhaps, one of the most important thinkers in Philosophy of 
Mind today. His outstanding work on the conscious mind and his research into 
neuroscience have changed the face of Philosophy of Mind, and re-written the 
history of how we have come to re-examine the role of consciousness in the 
development of philosophy from Descartes to the modern era.  
It is from these two accounts of ‘Logical Behaviourism’ that we will begin 
our ‘Linguistic Behaviourist’ and ‘Ordinary Language’ thread of argumentation. 
We will focus on what is essentially missing from both accounts and thus will 
give us our Ordinary Language and Linguistic Behavioural threads. The goal of 
these two threads, starting from Weitz and Chalmers, will be to forge tools in 
order to ‘dissect’ Ryle’s arguments.  
Ordinary Language Arguments use an ‘it makes sense to say’ statement to 
advance a normative claim about language related to another claim about the 
mind that draws on the knowledge possessed by the speaker in that language to 
endorse the claim. Ordinary Language Arguments thus support Linguistic 
Behavioural arguments since the speaker of a language needs to agree with the 
use of the sample of language. However, later I am going to argue that not all 

















One of Chalmers great services to Philosophy of Mind has been to dissect 
Western conceptions of cognition into two rival theories of mind. Chalmers 
thinks that the philosophical concept of mind can be divided into two dominant 
concepts that arose from a division that began with Descartes and ended up 
developing into Functionalism. These two concepts of the mind are the 
‘phenomenal’ and the ‘psychological’87. The introspective qualities of what 
thoughts are like Chalmers calls the ‘phenomenal’ and he characterizes as 
 
87Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford, 1996.Pg 11 
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‘feels’88 while the psychological he gives a first approximation as what the mind 
‘does’ in differential responsiveness to the environment89.  
 Chalmers writes  
 
The phenomenal and the psychological aspects of 
mind have a long history of being conflated. Rene 
Descartes may have been partly responsible for 
this. With his notorious doctrine that the mind is 
 
88Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 Pg 11 – 17, pg 182 shows how these two processes parallel 
each other. This comes out in his treatment of judgments. For Chalmers judgments are beliefs with 
all of their phenomenal properties subtracted. This explains his earlier claim on pg 174, that 
judgments are purely psychological states. The difference is important for his central thesis. This 
difference comes out in the discrepancy between (2) and (3) of the conditions that make up the 
paradox of phenomenal judgment. Chalmers holds that whereas judgments about consciousness are 
logically supervenient on the physical, consciousness itself is not. This in turn explains the argument 
on pg 95 and the claim that phenomenal zombies are conceivable, since they would only employ 
Judgements, and not have Beliefs, and in turn Chalmers argues that this explains how a 
phenomenal zombie might think he is conscious when he in fact is not, since the structure of his 
judgment is determined by his psychological state and not the content of his phenomenal experience. 
This parallel between phenomenal and psychological states later develops into the principle of 
structural coherence, see page 219. I shall argue, in systematic stages through the course of the 
thesis, that there are certain judgments like whether the ‘flash’ one feels is one of ‘anger’ or ‘regret’ 
which it requires the phenomenal properties to make. I maintain that in order to make a meaningful 
statement about whether one feels anger or regret one needs the emotional experience for the 
semantics of one’s statement. The phenomenal zombie, of course, will not be able to make 
meaningful statements based on its Judgements because it does not have the emotional content of a 
‘flash’ of ‘anger’ or ‘regret’ to tell the difference. Its Judgements do not have a one-to-one 
correspondence with its real-world twin, who has the semantical content to make such a Judgement 
because of his or her experience.   
89 This approximation is problematic. I take it he means ‘does’ in a functionalist in-put and out-put 
sense, although there are causal problems with configuring the Freudian position in terms of in-put 
and out-put analysis. There is a problem because some of the Freudian’s drives are causally generic 
and in-built, and thus are not determined by in-puts and therefore can’t be functionalist by the 
definition he gives. See the block quote from Chalmers, which I’ve reproduced below on Freud. For 
Freud himself on this matter see Freud, Sigmund. ‘Three Essays on Sexual Theory.’ In Psychology of 
Love, Pp 111-220. Victoria: Penguin, 2010, pp 138-142 for the sexual drive in neurotics, and Freud, 
Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. Translated by David McLintock. London: Penguin, 2004. 




transparent to itself, he came close to identifying 
the mental with the phenomenal. Descartes held 
that every event in the mind is a cogitation, or 
content of experience. To this class he 




In Chalmers’ history this Cartesian tradition of a conscious mind is not seriously 
challenged until Freud who, Chalmers argues, makes a move towards the 
psychological by arguing that accessibility to consciousness is not essential to 
explaining a mental state or its existence.  
 Chalmers writes  
 
It appears that Freud construed the notions 
causally. Desire, very roughly, was implicitly 
construed as the sort of state that brings about a 
certain kind of behaviour associated with the 
object of the desire. Belief was construed 
according to its causal role in a similar way. Of 
 
90Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 pg 12 
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course Freud did not make these analyses 
explicit, but something along these lines clearly 
underlies his use of the notions. Explicitly, he 
recognized that accessibility to consciousness is 
not essential to a state’s relevance in the 
explanation of behaviour, and that a conscious 
quality is not constitutive of something being a 
belief or a desire. These conclusions rely on a 
notion of mentality that is independent of 
phenomenal notions91.   
 
According to Chalmers the next stage separating the phenomenal from the 
psychological started with the Behaviourist Movement. The significance of the 
Behaviourist Movement, for Chalmers, was the rejection of the introspective 
tradition for an objective brand of psychological explanation. Chalmers argues 
that some behaviourists recognized consciousness but ignored it, and some 
denied it existed92. However Chalmers holds that the overall significance of the 
Behaviourist Movement, when taken together with the Freudian, was the 
creation of a new Freudian-Behaviourist Orthodoxy which was ultimately 
 
91Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 Pg 13 
92 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 Pg 13 
104 
 
established and preserved in the move towards Functionalism and then 
Cognitive Science.  
Functionalism, Chalmers argues, is the converse of Descartes’ argument 
that all psychological phenomena can be assimilated to the phenomenal. The 
reason why it is the converse, Chalmers holds, is that Functionalism, as defined 
by David Armstrong93 and David Lewis94 takes it that a mental state is defined 
by  
 
(a) the stimulation that produces it  
(b) the behaviour it produces  
(c) the way it interacts with other states.  
  
This history is important to David Chalmers’ conceptualization of Ryle’s Logical 
Behaviourism. Chalmers sees Ryle’s Logical Behaviourism as a sort of precursor 
to Functionalism. I take it that David Chalmers means ‘reductive functionalism’ 
in this earlier part of the book because later he goes on to announce that his 
overall project is the search for a non-reductive functionalist account of 
consciousness95 and to these ends gives a deeply insightful account that focuses 
 
93 As defined in Armstrong, David. A Materialist Theory of Mind London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1968. 
94 As defined in his paper Lewis, David. ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory.’ Journal of 
Philosophy 63, no. 1 (1966): 17-25..  
95 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 Pg 229. 
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on the difference between Beliefs and Judgements96, consciousness and 
awareness97 and various bridging principles98.  
Indeed, it is easy to see how an account of dispositions like Ryle’s might be 
important to the development of (reductive)99 functionalism as conceived by 
Armstrong and Lewis100, of particular importance here is defining a mental state 
by (a) the stimulation that produces it and (b) the behaviour it produces.  
Chalmers argues that between the historical rise of the Behaviourist-
Freudian orthodoxy and (reductive) Functionalism is the period of Logical 





96 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 As I noted he reveals that judgments are beliefs with all of 
their phenomenal content subtracted on pg 182. Prior to this on page 175 he lays the foundations for 
this move and reveals that the contents of First Order Judgements make up the contents of 
awareness.  
97Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996. The difference between consciousness and awareness is one 
of the central themes of the book and starts with the discussion of Ned Block’s discussion of 
consciousness on pg 29. However, immediately preceding this he has a discussion of Armstrong’s 
concepts of introspection and reportability. Pg 228 is where he finally posits the principles for the 
basis of the distinction. The paper Chalmers draws from on page 29 of The Conscious Mind is Block, 
Ned. ‘On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18,  
(1995): Pp 227-47. 
98 Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 NB The concept of bridging principles he, likewise, 
introduces early, but spells out on page 237 as part of the discussion about using coherence 
principles as epistemic levers. 
99Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 My parenthesis. He defines his project properly on page 229 
but doesn’t seem to clarify it any earlier. I take it that this is what he means.  There is a discussion 
on pp 104 -106 and a reply to Searle on pp 130-131. In the former he argues that proponents of 
reductivism favor functionalism because it is the only tenable option. The latter is a rebuttal to 
Searle’s position that consciousness must play a ‘functional role’ which Chalmers thinks ignores the 
fact that consciousness is ‘ontologically novel’. Neither capture the ‘(non)’ of the (non)-reductive 
aspects of functionalism he develops later in the work. 





In philosophy, the shift in emphasis from the 
phenomenal to the psychological was codified by 
Gilbert Ryle, who argued that all our mental 
concepts can be analysed in terms of certain 
kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of 
dispositions to behave in certain ways. This view, 
Logical Behaviourism, is recognizably the 
precursor of much of what passes for orthodoxy in 
contemporary philosophy of psychology. In 
particular, it was the most explicit codification of 
the link between mental concepts and the 
causation of behaviour101.  
 
 
This focus on ‘associated behaviours’ and ‘dispositions to behave in certain ways’ 
may be true in certain aspects from a historical interpretation-of-Ryle point of 
view, and certainly there are those who may have read Ryle this way102. 
 
101Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 pg 14 
102 G.E. Myers for instance, see Myers, G. E. ‘Motives and Wants.’ Mind Vol. 73, no. 290 (1964): Pp. 
173-185. Pg 173. Also, see Chapter Eight. Was Ryle a Behaviourist? If so which type of Behaviourist? 
In this thesis for a discussion of the link between Myers and Chalmers view in the history of Western 
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However, Ryle thinks the true normativity for a claim about the mind comes 
from analysis of common language intuitions. What I think Chalmers has 
identified in his potted history is a historical tendency to misread Ryle, that 
reoccurs in much of the peer-review literature. There are problems with 
labelling Ryle either as a (a) Freudian or (b,) some kind of Skinnerian or 
Thorndike behaviourist. I will deal at length with this elsewhere in the paper103. 
More problematic is what is missing from Chalmers’ account about the type of 
arguments that Ryle made. For Ryle was first and foremost an Ordinary 
Language Philosopher. His approach to the mind was firmly centered in the 
view that the mind reveals itself through the common use of ordinary language 
and this is what we need to study to understand the nature of the mind. Ryle 
thinks that everyday use of language has a special status in the Philosophy of 
Mind. The reason why it has this status for Ryle is that everyday language is the 
language that, he argues, people think in. Chalmers does not address the 
normative source of force behind Ryle’s arguments 
In a discussion related to Augustine’s ‘volitions’ and the ‘Para-Mechanical 




philosophy and why I think it is misleading to read Ryle as a ‘behaviourist’ in the historically 
situated Psychological Behaviourist sense.  
103 See the chapter Ryle’s Limited Uses of the Terms ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Introspection’ in this thesis. 
See also Ryle’s argument against conceptualizing the mind in causal terms. See Ryle, Concept of 
Mind¸ 1983 The Bogey of Mechanism Pp 74-80.  
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Ryle writes  
 
If ordinary men never report the occurrence of 
these acts, for all that. . . they should be 
encountered vastly more frequently than 
headaches, or feelings of boredom; if ordinary 
vocabulary has no non-academic names for them; 
if we do not know how to settle questions of their 
frequency, duration or strength, then it is fair to 
conclude their existence is not asserted on 
empirical grounds. . .104 
 
 
104 Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983 Pg 64. I take it that when Ryle says ‘empirical grounds’ he leaves it 
open that rare and unwonted mentalia could be justifiably posited on empirical grounds. While this 
may be so, it seems clear from The Concept of Mind and later writings, that Ryle does not regard the 
posits of the theories of mind of his day to be justified posits on ‘empirical grounds’. What he would 
think of as posits of theories in special sciences of mind in our day is less clear. The relation of, say, 
‘negative internalizing emotions’ that are not usually reported by girls in abusive circumstances to 
‘empirical grounds’ for assessing their existence is probably more fraught, in a Rylean perspective, 
than, say, the relation of positrons to the empirical grounds for positing them. If theories in 
contemporary psychology where empirical grounds for the existence of their posits maybe stronger, 
the issue that can be anticipated is whether the conception of those posits is sufficiently like 
something mental or psychological, as analogously conceived, to count as being part of a theory of 
mind. So once due acknowledgement is given to Ryle’s openness to novel posits justified on empirical 
grounds, the point remains that it is a presumption of Ryle’s approach to mind that the onus is on 
such a conceptual venture to justify its existence by its empirical power, but, otherwise, if it is no 
part of the layman’s understanding of him or herself, and others’ mental lives, got from his or her 
competence in ordinary language discourse about the mind, Ryle would argue that it is likely to 
cause unnecessary puzzles and other forms of confusion. In this sense I put this ‘test’ as criterion of 
mental items in Ryle.  
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Ryle’s argument here is that if the terms or a claim about the mind can not be 
found in common, then he will dismiss it. Thus, Ryle must reject any theory of 
mind that posits facts about the mind which must be inaccessible or 
undiscovered in the way that a psychological theory of mind as defined by the 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory might suggest. This is a problem for Chalmers’ 
claim that Ryle is part of the Freudian-Orthodoxy105. There are also issues with 
painting Ryle as a Psychological Behaviourist which I will touch on in Ryle’s 
critique of Psychological Behaviourism when I deal with Ryle’s use of the term 
‘Introspection’ later in the thesis106.   
For Ryle, legitimacy in a theory of mind demands that linguistic 
knowledge must already be known in some intrinsic sense to the competent 
ordinary language user. According to Ryle’s view the authority behind claims 
about the mind arises from what it makes sense to say in an ordinary language 
with the vocabulary of the everyday user. For Ryle the ‘orthodoxy’ he condones 
must be one of ordinary language and not of the unconscious or the strictly 
proto-functionalist behavioural orthodoxy107. The exact nature of this ‘intrinsic 
 
105 Chalmers, The Concept of Mind, 1996. Pp 14-15.  
106 See Chapter Nine in this thesis, the subsection titled Sea Water, Consciousness and Introspection. 
Gilbert Ryle on Mindfullness. 
107In the B. F. Skinner sense of the ‘Psychological Behaviourist Movement’ popular in the 1960s that 
Chalmers is referring to in his history, and not the ‘Linguistic Behavioural sense’ this paper is 
developing. See Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, See, specifically, the introduction by K. Kolenda’s , pp 1 – 
17, and in particular pg 1, where he sketches out Ryle’s basic move against a Cartesian or 
Behaviorist account. Kolenda writes ‘Ryle’s basic move is well, even notoriously, known. He 
inveighed repeatedly against a twin mistake: to put the concept of mind into either a mechanistic 
(Behaviorist) or a ghostly (Cartesian) framework. . . Ryle undertook the task of reminding us of what 
we pace Behaviorist or Cartesian distortions, are perfectly familiar with.’ 
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sense’ is important to Ryle’s position and I shall also bring this out later in the 
paper108.  
Suffice it to say, at this stage of the paper, the problem with Chalmers’ 
account of ‘Logical Behaviourism’, for our purposes, is that it leaves out precisely 
what is essential to Ryle’s ‘concept of mind’. Ryle thinks what is special about 
everyday language is that people think in it and they have common language 
names and terms regarding the mind in the language of those thoughts. Ryle 
was not just rejecting the Cartesian tradition of phenomenal consciousness. 
Rather he was rejecting the concept that the academic and scientific had 
anything more to teach us about the mind that we didn’t already know or could 




108 This is the ‘later Ryle’. There are two stages of Ryle’s critique of historically situated 
Psychological Behaviourism based roughly on Ryle’s analysis of mind into two types of dispositions. 
The earlier Ryle thinks he can provide an account of the concept of mind from the Tendency 
Dispositions and some of their inheritance properties and inter-sentential linguistic relationships. 
The later Ryle of On Thinking is less concerned with tendency verbs, and more concerned with 
developing the adverbial phrases for the Rylean capacity verbs. The critique he develops of Historico-







Morris Weitz’s concept of Logical Behaviourism 109 is a much closer reading of 
Ryle’s position in The Concept of Mind than David Chalmers because he takes 
into account Ryle’s position on ordinary language. Weitz bases his taxonomy of 
Ryle’s analysis of ordinary language on propositional structures or model 
statements. This seems like a good idea in many respects. If we can base a 
 
109Weitz, Morris. ‘Professor Ryle's ‘Logical Behaviourism’.’ The Journal of Philosophy Vol 48, no. 9 
(1951): Pp 297 - 301. To be fair, Ryle does describe his project with a certain ambiguity in the 
preface, that could lend itself to Weitz’s analysis. However, a closer reading of Ryle’s actual 
arguments shows Weitz’s position to be quite naïve. This reading is supported and clarified by Ryle’s 
position in his paper on Use, Usage and Meaning. See Gilbert Ryle, J. N. Findlay. ‘Use, Usage and 
Meaning.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society; Supplementary Volumes 38,  (1961): Pp 228-229. 
Ryle differentiates between ‘language’ and ‘speech’, where language is ‘having words’ and speech is 
‘saying things with them’. Confusing the two results in equating the use of the sentence with its 
meaning. The use of the sentence depends on inter-sentential relationships with other words, 
whereas looking for the meaning, Ryle thinks, results in treating sentences ‘as if (they) could be 
solecisms’. This accords with Dummett’s concept of an implicit language theorist which, I think Ryle 
is. For this reason I have rejected the dominant tradition of a ‘Logical Behaviourist’ reading which 
interprets Ryle’s account of dispositions as using model propositional sentences, Weitz being the 
earliest concrete example I could find, and possibly even the origin of the error.  The distinction Ryle 
makes in Use, Usage and Meaning influences my reading of him, and why later, as we will see, I put 
him in the implicit language position in relation to meaning with Michael Dummett. This reading of 
Ryle makes him important to the ‘indetertminancy of reference’ debate because on first glance Ryle 
seems to offer an attractive a way out. What Ryle presents is what seems to be one possible way of 
solving the indeterminacy problem with the argument that words do not refer to phantasms in an 
abstract realm of thought, or ghostly actors on a haunted stage, rather, Ryle argues that words are 
the thoughts themselves. Ryle insists that the words we use to talk about our mental lives are our 
mental lives. Ryle would maintain, for instance, that there is no essential difference between 
thinking ‘this seminar boring’ to ones self, and saying aloud ‘this seminar is boring’. Ryle maintains 
that the words do not refer to any extra thoughts, because they are the thoughts. However, Weitz’s 
reading reintroduces The Problem of Indeterminacy for while the categorical sentence ‘Reg drove his 
car on Tuesday’ presents itself as unproblematic in terms of naming referents of the sentence that 
would make it true in a propositional sense if it pictured a true state of affairs, truly, the categorical 
sentence ‘Reg felt upset on Tuesday’ reintroduces the very problem of indeterminacy that Ryle 
offered us the promise of a way out of. To adopt Weitz’s version of Ryle would not only be erroneous, 
it gets us no-where.  
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linguistic model of the mind on propositional structures then we can utilize what 
we know about logic and truth conditions for the understanding of the mind. I 
take this to be the most common understanding of the term ‘Logical 
Behaviourism’ and the beginning of ‘functionalism’ in the sense Chalmers offers 
in his account. Weitz is a very early example of this reading of Ryle. Weitz’s 
account of Ryle provides the semantics to differentiate three model sentence 
structures. Before turning to the specifics of Weitz’s interpretation a general 
comment on Weitz’s work is in order.  
While Weitz provides a much closer reading of Ryle’s arguments, than 
Chalmers does, it is still not entirely accurate. Ryle himself bases his analysis in 
The Concept of Mind not on three model sentences with propositional structures, 
but on extra-sentential relations of words that arise from sets of Linguistic 
Behavioural distinctions based on grammatical analysis of language at the level 
of nouns, verbs, epithets, adverbs and adjectives. The reason they are extra-
sentential is that Ryle’s analyses contain appeals to properties, relations and 
characteristics that defy analysis at the level of whole model sentences. If one 
thinks of the antonyms love and hate, then as antonyms these words share an 
extra-sentential relationship of meaning to each other. While love has its own 
internal logic, and relates the subject to the object of affection in a propositional 
form, love as an antonym to hate has a meaning that does not require a 
propositional structure to be meaningful. The two words can exist as a dyad of 
extra-sentential meaning in comparison to each other. It is part of the meaning 
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of the words that they express antonymity to each other  In the same way that 
love and hate have extra-sentential antonymity between them, many of Ryle’s 
configurations and language clusters share extra-sentential relationships of 
meaning to each other. Ryle uses these language structures to build many of his 
Logical Behaviouristic claims about the mind.  
Ryle does not engage in a doctrine of judgements110 like that for instance 
of Brandom’s analytic reading of Kant111. Ryle’s investigation of language is not 
one that requires analysis of whole sentences expressing propositions like most 
Analytic Philosophical theories of meaning. This is because Ryle’s language 
behaviour analyses can pick out configurations of words comparatively, i.e. by 
comparing them to each other, and thus can differentiate between groupings of 
vocabulary items which are not limited to presentation in a model propositional 
form. Ryle does not base his work on formal propositions or complete sentences, 
but on comparing words, and specific manifestations of language. He is not 
interested in truth values, but in the way people use specific words and what 
 
110 Note that where I use Judgement, with capital J, I am specifically referring to Chalmers account 
of Judgements being comprised of experiences and beliefs without phenomenal properties.  On this 
account a red Judgement is the ability to detect red, without necessarily having an experience of red. 
Here above, however, in this part of the introduction, I am not referring to Chalmers, but rather, I 
am referring to Kant’s doctrine of judgements and Brandom’s reading of Kant. One of the problems 
is that philosophers will often use the same word. Thus, through out the paper I make distinctions 
like capitalization and extensive taxonamization to keep which term and reference I am using clear. 
See the footnotes to Wittgenstein’s Account of Language Acquisition for Phenomenal Experiences in 
the Philosophical Investigations in Chapter Eighteen of this thesis for an account of what I adopt 
from Chlamers’ Judgments.   
111 Robert Brandom. Articulating Reasons. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001. See also  





that reveals about the mind. To make this clearer, it is best if we turn now to 
what Weitz and Ryle actually said.  
 Weitz writes of the first model sentence 
 
There are, first of all, the categorical, those 
sentences which describe episodes, like ‘Jones 
looked for his dog,’ or ‘Jones solved the puzzle.’ 
These are simple narratives utilizing the many 
tasks and achievement verbs at the command of 
ordinary speech112. 
 
On the second type Weitz writes  
 
Secondly, there are sentences whose logical 
behaviour Ryle calls ‘hypothetical’ or 
‘dispositional’. Among them are sentences like 
‘Jones is vain.’ ‘Jones is a careful driver,’ and 
‘Jones knows French’. None of these is a 
categorical, in spite of its surface similarity to 
‘Jones sees a dog.113‘ 
 
112Weitz, Professor Ryle’s Logical Behaviourism, 1951 Pg 296. 




Weitz writes of the third type 
 
The third logical species of ordinary mind-
sentences which Ryle’s logical behaviourism 
discloses is one that he calls either ‘mongrel 
categorical’ or ‘semi-dispositional’. . . So far as 
ordinary mind-sentences are concerned these 
mongrel-categoricals are embodied especially in 
sentences containing ‘heed’ concepts; ‘noticing’, 
‘taking care’, ‘concentrating on’, ‘knowing what 
one is doing’, and the like. Consider for example 
the difference between ‘Jones is a careful driver’ 
and ‘Jones is driving carefully’. The first is 
completely dispositional; when ordinary people 
utter it, they mean that if Jones were to drive, 
under certain specified conditions, then he would 
obey traffic laws, be on the alert for other drivers 
and pedestrians, etc. But the second says more, 
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and is spoken only if Jones is driving in such a 
manner114.   
 
If we take the second type of sentence in Weitz’s taxonomy, the dispositional 
sentence ‘Jones is a careful driver,’ for example, Weitz lacks the linguistic 
resources, on the propositional sentence-based structure of that taxonomy, to 
distinguish between the specific types of dispositions which are a distinctive 
feature of Ryle’s analysis of ordinary everyday language use. Take ‘careful’ from 
the example above.  
‘Carefulness’ refers to a disposition of a certain type that belongs 
alongside a set of semantic distinctions which Ryle makes on the basis of the 
linguistic behavioural traits of adjectives and adverbs and specific grouping of 
verbs they can be applied to. This distinction drawn from the types of verbs that 
carefulness can qualify adverbially, bottoms out in the behaviour of two distinct 
groupings of verbs which, Ryle argues, reveals something he thinks is very 
important about the nature of mind. ‘Carefully’ as an adverb can be used on the 
set Ryle calls ‘capacity verbs’. These are different from the set Ryle calls 
‘tendency verbs’. Ryle would argue that ‘careful’ and ‘carefully’ could never be 
used for the set of linguistic behaviours related to the tendency verbs, neither in 
an adverbial phrase nor as a dispositional description. Ryle would no doubt 
 
114Weitz, Professor Ryle’s Logical Behaviorism, 1951 Pg 299 - 300 
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claim that Weitz is mistaken in his analysis and has fallen into the trap of 
assuming that there is a ‘one-pattern intellectual process’ for dispositions and 
thus Ryle would argue that Weitz has made the mistake of assuming that 
dispositions have a uniform exercise.  
Ryle writes explicitly as follows 
 
Epistemologists, among others, often fall into the 
trap of expecting dispositions to have uniform 
exercises. For instance, when they recognise that 
the verbs 'know' and 'believe' are ordinarily used 
dispositionally, they assume that there must 
therefore exist one-pattern intellectual processes 
in which these cognitive dispositions are 
actualised115. 
 
Weitz’s mistake, of course, is to assume there is a one pattern intellectual 
exercise. Weitz, if not among the epistemologists, would no doubt be among the 
others. Rather than limiting the role of natural language analysis to a set of 
model sentences with a uniform exercise, as Weitz’s Logical Behaviourist’s 
treatment of Ryle’s dispositions does, Ryle’s own examination is implicitly 
 
115Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983 Pg 44. Italics, mine. 
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interested in an investigation into the specific sets of relationships and 
structures that arise from the behaviour of natural language at a level that 
bottoms out, not just at propositions and whole sentences, but in extra-
sentential relations that hold between groups and configurations of expressions 
that can be defined by linguistic behaviours at the level of adjectives, verbs, 
nouns, epithets and adverbs and comparisons between them. Ryle will often 
make comparisons in his arguments between individual words in the way a 
linguist might compare the words ‘hut/ house/ mansion’ to find layers of meaning 
brought out by the comparison of the behaviour of the words in the 
configuration. Ryle’s methodology for the most part is to analyse everyday 
language about the mind and construct arguments out of these analyses usually 
using grammatical observations and vocabulary. 
Ryle is interested in sets of relationships that hold between different 
words at the level of the dispositions themselves and their expression in 
everyday common discourse in conversational references and utterances about 
the mind.  Ryle is not looking for uniform propositional models. In this case ‘to 
know’ and ‘to believe’ have different kinds of sets of word relations and sub-
sentential patterns that Ryle is deeply interested in, and which a linguist might 
describe as ‘layers of meaning’ that characterize them. These different patterns 
arise because the verbs and their cognates behave differently when compared 
with each other and other words in subsentential sets like the lists of adjectives 
that can qualify them, and those that cannot. Such is Ryle’s interest in 
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constructing his arguments about the mind from grammatical analysis of 
everyday language.  
 Ryle writes 
 
but even when it is seen that both (know and 
believe) are dispositional verbs, it has still to be 
seen that they are dispositional verbs of quite 
disparate types. 'Know' is a capacity verb, and a 
capacity verb of that special sort that is used for 
signifying that the person described can bring 
things off, or get things right. 'Believe', on the 
other hand, is a tendency verb and one which 
does not connote that anything is brought off or 
got right. 'Belief ' can be qualified by such 
adjectives as 'obstinate', 'wavering', 'unswerving', 
'unconquerable', 'stupid', 'fanatical', 'whole-
hearted', 'intermittent', 'passionate' and 
'childlike', adjectives some or all of which are also 
appropriate to such nouns as 'trust', 'loyalty', 
'bent', 'aversion', 'hope', 'habit', 'zeal' and 
'addiction'. Beliefs, like habits, can be inveterate, 
slipped into and given up; like partisanships, 
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devotions and hopes they can be blind and 
obsessing; like aversions and phobias they can be 
unacknowledged; like fashions and tastes they 
can be contagious; like loyalties and animosities 
they can be induced by tricks116. 
 
 
As we can see from the above, Ryle distinguishes among verbs by using 
grammatical descriptions of the behaviour of adjectives and the nouns that are 
qualified by them and sorts them by the specific adverbial structures these 
qualifications discriminate. In the broad he creates two sets or ‘families’ of 
dispositions based on sub-sentential relationships found among adverbs and 
adjectives that apply to specific types of verbs and nouns, and not at the level of 
whole sentences with specific propositional structures as Weitz’s suggests. Ryle’s 
The Concept of Mind has its roots in the distinctions made by relationships 
between the sub-sentential parts found making up sentences. ‘Sub-sentential’ 
here refers specifically to adjectives, and the relationship certain adjectives have 
to verbs and related classes of nouns in comparisons Ryle makes. 
  This distinction between dispositional terms used in everyday talk about 
beliefs and knowledge is based on adjectives that can describe the nouns 
 
116Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 128. 
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identified by Ryle’s own grammatical description of the behaviour of the verbs as 
well. He also draws upon corresponding adverbs separating the verbs with the 
same distinction.  
The distinction between knowledge and belief does not end here but is 
part of a much larger configuration that runs through The Concept of Mind. 
There is a model of the mind inside Ryle’s work based on a tendency/capacity 
distinction between verbs. On one side of the configuration Ryle argues are the 
capacity verbs constituting one family of dispositions. On the other side we have 
the tendency verbs constituting the other family. This difference between the 
two groups of disposition making up the ‘Capacity/Tendency Configuration’ is 
further supported by the form of epithet applied to people who simulate or fake 
one side or the other.  
 Ryle argues  
 
Both skills and methods can be simulated, but we 
use abusive names like 'charlatan' and 'quack' for 
the frauds who pretend to be able to bring things 
off, while we use the abusive word 'hypocrite' for 
the frauds who affect motives and habits117.  
 
 
117Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 128. 
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Hence for people who lie about their skills and methods and the related family of 
verbs that Ryle allocates to Capacity Dispositions118 on the Know-How side of 
the ‘Capacity-Tendency Configuration’ Ryle points out we use the epithet 
‘charlatan’ and ‘quack’. For people who lie about their beliefs, motives and habits 
we use the term ‘hypocrite’.  
The reading of Ryle as a Logical Behaviourist of the sort proposed by 
Weitz, simply fails to take into account the full range of Ryle’s arguments at the 
level of sub-sentential analyses for his descriptions.  The trouble with a Logical 
Behaviourist interpretation of Ryle like Weitz offers is not only that it is too 
crude to capture these distinctions behind the configurations but in its 
crudeness, it ignores the detailed linguistic behaviour revealed by the analyses 
of the relationship between specific parts of natural language that Ryle is 
interested in. These sorts of Logical Behaviourist readings are particularly 
troublesome for distinctions Ryle makes when ryle appeals to the linguistic 
behaviour of ‘how’ and ‘that’ because they ignore the difference between capacity 
and skill dispostions, and those that contain families of linguistic behaviours 
that are linked to beliefs, motives, inclinations, aspirations and predilections. 
Weitz has missed some of the most important points about the specific linguistic 
 
118 Where I capitalize ‘Capacity Dispositions’ or ‘Capacities’ I am refering to the body of linguistic 
behaviours Ryle brings together as a family, including verbs, nouns, adjectives and epithets. Where I 
use capacity verbs or capacity adverbs I am refering to the specific behaviours of grammatical 
classes. Ryle did not think of verbs as parts of the mind, but rather he had a classical concept of 
mind that he wanted dissolve using analysis of inter-sentential relationships between the linguistic 
behaviours of different parts of language.  
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behaviours that Ryle was interested in, in his classification of Ryle’s philosophy 












Summarizing the findings of the first chapter. 
 
Let us now summarize the progress we have made this chapter by drawing 
attention to the problems with Chalmers’ and Weizt’s ‘Logical Behaviourist’ 
readings of Ryle. Rectifying these problems will begin the Ordinary Language, 
and Linguistic Behaviourist threads running through the paper.  
Firstly, the problem with the Logical Behaviourism that Chalmers 
attributes to Ryle in his ‘potted history’ was that it missed Ryle’s fundamental 
philosophical claim and what is perhaps most interesting and novel about Ryle 
on mind. Chalmers neglects the novelty of Ryle’s overall project which was to 
produce an ‘Ordinary Language’ account of the mind. Chalmers reduced Ryle’s 
complex and novel position to a proto-functionalist account, which he 
characterized as a ‘codification of the Freudian-Behaviourist orthodoxy’ with a 
focus on ‘dispositions to behave in certain ways and associated behaviours’. 
Chalmers’ concept of the ‘psychological’, what we will refer to as ‘Chalmerian 
psychology’ (so as not to confuse it with the development of an Endo-Affective 
Neo-Sellarsian Psychology Language, which I will introduce later in the paper), 
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is the pro-functionalist interpretation of the mind as to what it ‘does’, and is 
contrasted with the ‘phenomenal’ which is what Chalmers defines as what the 
mind ‘feels’. It would be interesting to compare Chalmers view with Gleeson’s 
critique of Functional Behaviourism, but it is too early in the paper to do 
anything but foreshadow this specific insight.  
 However, what we can see at this stage is that there is a lacuna in 
Chalmers’ account of Ryle because he misses Ryle’s attempt to explain the mind 
using an analysis of common language. Ryle’s novel and highly interesting 
claim, of course, was that Ordinary Language has a special status in the 
Philosophy of Mind because it is the language that people think in. From this 
lacuna in Chalmers’ account we will go on to develop Ryle’s insight into the 
normative power that ordinary language has for justifying claims about the 
mind.  
Secondly the problem with Weitz’s account was that he neglected the 
complexities of linguistic behaviours that Ryle was interested in, because Weitz 
neglected the unique type of argument that Ryle was making. From the deficit 
in Weitz’s account we will develop the thread that will result in Linguistic 
Behavioural Arguments.  
What emerges from the deficits in Weitz’s and Chalmers’ accounts, what 
both philosophers failed to pick up on, are two different but yet inter-related 
types of argument that Ryle uses. (I) Ordinary Language Arguments are 
characterized by claims about what it makes sense to say in a language, while 
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(II) Linguistically Behavioural Arguments are characterized by detailed 
grammatical analysis.  It is by comparing, these two that this paper will reveal 
an ‘occult phenomenology’ hidden within The Concept of Mind.   
Thus, let us finish the first chapter with the following; neither David 
Chalmers nor Morris Weitz provides adequate grounds for an encounter with 
Ryle. As such, let us abandon the term ‘Logical Behaviourism’ and further define 
‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ and ‘Ordinary Language Arguments’ from our own 
intrepid investigation into the types of arguments and claims that occur in 




















Episodes and dispositions. 
What exemplifies Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourist Claims? 
 
So far, we have looked at two attempts to define Ryle’s philosophy of mind. Both 
attempts were too coarse grained to capture the nature of the types of claim Ryle 
advances in The Concept of Mind, nor do they succeed at capturing why Ryle 
thinks such claims are fundamental to the exploration and understanding the 
nature of mind through language.  
In Chapter One of this thesis it was revealed that Chalmers’ account 
failed to identify the normative force behind Ryle’s argument. Recognizing what 
was missing from Chalmers’ account, gives us an opportune place to begin to 
explore rich philosophical complexity of the normative thread of Ordinary 
Language Philosophy running through The Concept of Mind. Ryle justifies his 
arguments by what it makes sense to say in ordinary language. However, Weitz 
is a little more tricky. Weitz did not allow for a linguistic difference between 
dispositions expressing Beliefs and Capacities, and thus we might say Weitz (to 
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paraphrase Ryle’s own words) ‘fell into the trap of expecting dispositions to have 
uniform exercises119’ by assuming that there exists a ‘one pattern intellectual 
exercise120’. This error emerges from close analysis of Weitz’s second type of 
sentence121. Weitz’s general mistake, of course, is to focus on whole sentences 
rather than the implicit understanding expressed in relations between different 
categories of words which I refer to as ‘configurations’, and the subsentential 
families Ryle thinks these relations between words belong to.  
However, while this illuminates what was wrong with Weitz’s analysis of 
Ryle’s philosophy of mind, it does not reveal what Ryle bases his claims about 
language and linguistic behaviour on. For that we need to look more closley at 
Ryle’s distinction between Dispositions and Espisodes.  
Ryle writes 
 
The verbs 'know’, 'possess' and 'aspire' do not 
behave like the verbs 'run', 'wake up' or 'tingle'. 
We cannot say 'he knew so and so for two 
minutes, then stopped and started again after a 
breather', 'he gradually aspired to be a bishop', or 
'he is now engaged in possessing a bicycle'122. 
 
119Gilbert Ryle’s actual phrasing. See Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 44 
120 Again Gilbert Ryle’s actual terminology. See Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 44 
121 Morris Weitz calls these sentences either ‘hypothetical’ or ‘dispositional’ and uses the terms 
interchangeably. Weitz, Professor Ryle’s Logical Behaviourism. 1951.   





One set of verbs, the determinable set, ‘know’, ‘possess’ and ‘aspire’ do not 
behave like another set of verbs which belong to the group that contains ‘run’, 
‘wake up’ and ‘tingle. In Ryle’s own words the first group do not ‘behave’ like the 
second group. (This is where I draw the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ from). In 
Ryle’s own terminology what he is doing is analysing the ‘behaviour’ of everyday 
language to construct arguments about the mind.  
The paper will carefully build up Ryle’s case, and show why his Linguistic 
Behaviourism falls short of explaining all of the facts in the domain that his 
Ordinary Language Account of the Mind purports to cover. These ‘facts’ are not 
additional facts added to his account of the mind, but are facts about the mind 
discoverable from some of his arguments. These arguments which contain facts 
about the mind he cannot offer an account for, and I shall refer to later as an 
‘occult strain’ of argumentation hidden in Ryle.  
 I use the term ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ because ‘behaviour’ is the word 
Ryle himself uses for his type of grammatical and linguistic analysis. I am 
careful to distinguish Ryle’s ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ from Historical 
Psychological Behaviourism which covers specific instances of the kind of work 
behaviourists like B. F. Skinner, Thorndike, Pavlov and Watson were associated 
with, or Psychological Behaviourism as we might think of the movement itself 
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historically situated as the work of Skinner, Thorndike, Pavlov and Watson 
collectively.      
 
The difference between Wilfrid Sellars’ Ryle and Gilbert Ryle’s Ryle.  
 
If a specific difference is desired, initially, then it can be pointed out that Sellars’ 
model of Ryle is developmental and part of a stage in a Socio-Linguistic theory. 
Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourism on the other hand is engaged in ‘field-work’ 
analysis of language as we find it used in the everyday world. Ryle examines 
samples of everyday language to make claims about the mind. I use the term 
‘Socio-Linguistic Theory’ for Sellars’ theoretical model of the developmental 
stages a community must go through to build up the resources of a fully 
functioning language as he explained in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. 
I use the term ‘Linguistic Behavourism’ for Ryle’s analysis of everyday language 
as we find such language commonly used in the world. Since Ryle’s language 
analyses relies upon the way people use words, it is also normative because it 
assumes common useage is the correct useage and this adds weight to his 
argument when we find ourselves agreeing with him, because we ourselves, as 
common language users, use language in such a way. When Ryle attaches a 
claim about the mind to a sample of his language analysis this is what I call a 
Linguistic Behavioural argument. But is this a fair methodology for Ryle to 
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adopt? There is a question that arises as to whether language is enough to cover 
all of the facts of mind? 
One of the key arguments built into my thesis concerns what I argue 
would happen if a Chalmerian zombie were to enter into the Rylean community 
which Sellars hypothesizes at the end of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
and were to try to learn Sellar’s Rylean tribe’s language. If the zombie were able 
to learn the language of the tribe and use it competently, then all would be fine 
and dandy in what we might call the ‘annals of Anti-Psychologism’ and there 
would be no reason to suspect that language is insufficient for an account of the 
facts relevant to the domain which a theory about the mind must cover. If, 
however, the phenomenal zombie cannot learn to use the language of the tribe 
because it/she/he is a phenomenal zombie, then this suggests that there are non-
linguistic phenomenal facts that competent use of language requires in order to 
master competency. This in turn suggests that semantics rests at least partially 
upon non-linguistic facts since one must have a grip of these facts to competently 
use a language. If the phenomenal zombie cannot learn the Sellarsian tribe’s 
Rylean argot, then, suffice it to say, this is bad news for Anti-Psychologism.    
Before my thesis reaches that stage I spend some time dealing with Ryle 
and various claims about whether he was a behaviourist and what type of 
behaviourist he was. I will carefully define behavioural terms used within the 
thesis in greater detail. These distinctions will show a plurality of Ryles against 
the background of a multiverse of behavioural theorists and interpetations of 
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what Behaviourism means as a movement and from which historical readers of 
Ryle drew their interpretation of, in order to classify Ryle as part of that 
particular school. However, to begin this process and at this stage of the paper 
we are only interested in showing what is wrong with many of the Logical 
Behaviourist readings of Ryle. So, having distinguished Sellars’ Ryle from 
Gilbert’s Ryle, and how this distinction fits in to the overall paper, it is best now 
to return to the rich and rewarding Linguistic Behaviourist reading of Ryle on 
offer in this paper with these qualifications in mind. Let us do so now.      
 
 
The Second Set of Verbs. The Episodes.  
 
The second set of verbs in the ‘Dispositional-Episode Configuration’ of course are 
the episodic verbs that Weitz tried to capture in his first model sentence; the 
‘categorical narratives’ and what Chalmers characterized as ‘associated 
behaviours’ in his history.  
To grasp this difference between episodes and dispositions, on the side of 
the episodes, we might say of someone, say one Reg, that if Reg is running down 
the road, or if Reg ran down the road, if Reg has started running down the road, 
that the behaviour of these verbs are governed by a set, or sets of instances in 
time which we mark by tenses like the Imperfect, the Pluperfect, the Past-
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Imperfect, the Past-Completed, and thus belong to a specific episode embedded 
in a time frame with a content, namely, that of Reg running.  
In contrast to these episodic verbs, Ryle asserts that dispositional terms, 
the afore-given examples ‘know, aspire and possess’, are not singularly episodic 
in the same way that we might describe the time we saw Reg running down the 
road being chased by Rod. That incident involving Reg and Rod refers to a single 
event that unfolded around a specific pattern of tenses used by the speaker 
describing the event. The event in question contains lots of smaller events, i.e. 
now Reg is ducking Rod, now Reg is dodging Rod, now Reg is running back this 
way to escape Rod. For instance ‘Wake-up’ refers to an episode. One moment Reg 
is asleep. The next he has woken up. The bit between is the waking up.  
Ryle thinks dispositional and episodic verbs reveal something interesting 
about the mind which we can only understand from a grammatical examination 

















Ryle and Analytic Philosophy 
 
I 
Ryle’s Two Most Fundamental Insights on the Mind and the 
Relationship between these Insights and Linguistic Behavioural 
Arguments. 
 
Ryle thinks that his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments are good arguments 
because people think in everyday language. He thinks that by examining the 
language of everyday use we can learn something about the mind and its 
relationship with the world. Ryle thinks the interaction between the mind and 
the world discovered through language analysis is important for dealing with 
the sorts of views that are characterized by what he sees as a ‘Cartesian 
mistake’, which he thinks involves the view that the mind is its own ‘place’ 
separate from the world.  
Ryle’s first ‘radical insight’ is that the ‘world is the place where minds 
happen’. By that I mean that Ryle’s most fundamental argument, and where he 
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breaks with classical philosophy, is that the world is literally where we find the 
mind at work, at play, at toil. I do not dispute this claim. I think that 
philosophers have been far too long under the illusion the mind happens inside 
the head. Ryle thinks that when we look at a colourful, richly landscaped bed of 
flowers, we see the beautiful mind of the lady who planted them. When we look 
at a finely crafted desk, we see the mind of the woodsmith in every turn, notch 
and dovetail. Ryle thinks separating the mind from the world is a category 
mistake. For Ryle the mind happens in the world.  However, Ryle’s second 
radical insight is connected to a range of problematic claims. He thinks people 
already know all there is to know about how to talk about the mind happening 
in the world123.  
Ryle writes 
 
We possess already a wealth of information about 
minds, information which is neither derived 
from, nor upset by, the arguments of 
philosophers. The philosophical arguments which 
constitute this book are intended not to increase 
what we know about minds, but to rectify the 
 
123 See Ryle’s discussion of heed concepts in The Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pp 130-142. 
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logical geography of the knowledge which we 
already possess124.  
 
What ordinary language speakers do not have, Ryle argues, is a map or a 
drawing board of how those concepts fit together.  
 
It is, however, one thing to know how to apply 
such concepts, quite another to know how to 
correlate them with one another and with 
concepts of other sorts. Many people can talk 
sense with concepts but cannot talk sense about 
them; they know by practice how to operate with 
concepts, anyhow inside familiar fields, but they 
cannot state the logical regulations governing 
their use. They are like people who know their 
way about their own parish, but cannot construct 
or read a map of it, much less a map of the region 
or continent in which their parish lies125. 
 
 
124Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pp 9 – 10. 
125Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pp 10 – 11 NB Italics, mine. 
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This is an interesting point. To see why consider Dummett’s paper What Do I 
Know When I Know a Language?126For it would seem to follow from Dummett’s 
argument that he should, prima facie, argue that what Ryle is attempting to do 
is impossible since it seems Ryle wants to make explicit what people know 
implicitly. It is that ‘about’ in the Ryle quotation that I put in italics which 
causes the problem.  
The central argument of Michael Dummett’s paper involves two types of 
knowledge, these are implicit and explicit. The implicit / explicit distinction in 
Dummett is important for the Linguistic Behavioural thread of the thesis 
because it has an impact on how we conduct language analysis of ‘la parole’ or 
the concrete manifestation of language we are looking at. On an ‘implicit’ view 
we may adopt the sorts of configurations Ryle brings out in comparing one set of 
verbs with another set of verbs and their relationship to adverbs and other sub-
sentential components. On an explicit view we would be confined to propositions 
about language and its use, and formal statements about meaning. (Such a 
theory is perhaps the view of the model Weitz is working on).  
Let us assume that explicit knowledge entails a propositional body of 
statements. Assume also that explicit and implicit knowledge cannot be 
assimilated into the same mode of exercise of competency. This is because one 
 
126Dummett, Michael. ‘What Do I Know When I Know a Language?’ In The Seas of Language, Pp 94 - 




form, the explicit, involves a propositional body whereas the other, Dummett 
argues, occurs in the exercise of the knowledge itself and can be found in types of 
knowledge where the expression is intrinsically difficult. Explicit knowledge can 
only be expressed where there is implicit knowledge to be expressed, however 
implicit knowledge may be exercised even when the person may not be able to 
explicitly express the knowledge they are exercising.  
This can result in a pragmatic paradox where the person knows how to do 
something but cannot tell you how they did it. If asked explicitly they might say 
‘I don’t know’ when clearly the performance demonstrates the implicit 
knowledge that they do.  
 Dummett writes 
 
Explicit knowledge is manifested by the ability to 
state the content of the knowledge. This is a 
sufficient condition for someone being said to 
have that knowledge only if it is assumed that he 
fully understands the statement that he is 
making; and, even if it is assumed that he fully 
understands the statement that he is making; 
and, even if we make this assumption, his ability 
to say what he knows can be invoked as an 
adequate explanation of what it is for him to 
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have that knowledge only when we can take his 
understanding of the statement of its content as 
unproblematic127.  
 
This is a problem because  
 
In many philosophical contexts, we are entitled to 
do this: but when our task is precisely to explain 
in what, in general, an understanding of 
language consists, it is obviously circular. If we 
say that it consists in the knowledge of a theory 
of meaning for the language, we cannot then 
explain the possession of such knowledge in 
terms of an ability to state it, presupposing an 
understanding of the language in which the 
theory is stated128.  
 
 
Ryle has already considered this point, in relation to what Ryle considers to be 
one of the central problems of psychology, but from a different angle.  
 
127Dummett, What Do I Know When I Know a Language?, 1993. 
128 Dummett, What Do I Know When I Know a Language?, 1993. 
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 Ryle says 
 
Indeed, supposing that one person could 
understand another's words or actions only in so 
far as he made causal inferences in accordance 
with psychological laws, the queer consequence 
would follow that if any psychologist had 
discovered these laws, he could never have 
conveyed his discoveries to his fellow men. For ex 
hypothesi they could not follow his exposition of 
them without inferring in accordance with them 
from his words to his thoughts129.  
 
For Ryle, meaning must be conveyed within the expression of a language130. 
Without recourse to telepathy, on this view, language is the only means we have 
 
129This was the problem with Chalmers and Freud I pointed out earlier. It is also the reason why I 
avoided the Extended Mind debates and ‘The Historian Argument’ of Ryle. See Ryle, Concept of 
Mind¸ 1983 Pg 55 – 57 The novelty of Ryle’s solution is it seems to allow us to side step the causal 
issues that plagued Descartes by concentrating on the way people talk about the mind and the 
mind’s relationships with people’s activities through the types of things people do in the world. See 
also G, Steiner. After Babel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. Pg 26 and Parkinson, 
Translation Theory of Meaning, 1977: See Pp 14-16 for his discussion on Ryle’s Historian Argument. 
130 See Ryle, Findlay, Use, Usage and Meaning, 1961, for Ryle’s distinction between ‘language’ and 
‘having words to say things with’ and ‘speech’ which involves ‘saying things with them’. Ryle thinks 
that language and the meaning of words as found in a dictionary is a different thing to using words 
and saying things with them.  The failure to distinguish between them leads to a view of sentences 
as ‘solecisms’. The attempt to explain the meaning of such solecistic setences in terms of truth 
values, instead of the relationship between words, like the inheritance properties Ryle uncovers 
through his grammatical analysis, leads to what Dummett would call an explicit theory of meaning. 
Ryle, of course, rejects the explicit criteria of meaning. It is a mistake, Ryle thinks, and a costly one. 
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of conveying meaning. On this view if a new theory of linguistic behaviour 
emerged then the psychologist would only be able to tell his colleagues and peers 
about it, using language itself. This is the point of Ryle’s move towards finding 
sets of relationships, properties, internal relations and characteristics using 
Linguistic Behavioural kinds of argument.131  Ryle thinks that analyses of the 
mind must be done inside language using the resources available to the 
language user. Moreover it must be ordinary language. For Ryle, going beyond 
ordinary language into models of scientific causation say, would be to represent 
the facts belonging to human action and thought in the idioms and analogies of 
something else. He thinks the history of philosophy has been filled with these 
sorts of mistakes.  
That is why Ryle says  
 
To explode a myth is accordingly not to deny the 
facts but to re-allocate them. And this is what I 





I’ve focused on the arguments in The Concept of Mind, for the purposes of this thesis, but such as 
they are my reading is decidedly influenced by Ryle’s view in Ryle’s 1961 paer Use, Useage and 
Meaning over some of the peer review literature like that advanced by Weitz. 
131 Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 52. 
132Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 10. 
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A myth is, of course, not a fairy story. It is the 
presentation of facts belonging to one category in 
the idioms appropriate to another. 133 
 
That is to say, Ryle, I take it, simply wants to explain what features of natural 
language about the mind are significant, to re-order the idioms that have been 
appropriated by different myths and in doing so, explore how these relate to 
each other, and some of the ways meaning is expressed by these features. This 
will give him the elements he needs to construct a geography for the concept of 
the mind from the ways people speak about the mind in the world. According to 
Ryle’s view the nature of the mind is already known and this knowledge is 
implicit in the way people use language.  
An interesting question here is whether Ryle is committed to 
Psychologism since he is no longer dealing with an explicit theory of meaning. It 
is worth asking the Psychologism question in light of the Dummett paper. Ryle’s 
analysis of word uses borders on breaking what has been called ‘The Primacy of 
the Proposition’. The Primacy of the Proposition134 has a methodological 
tendency to influence language analysis among Western Analytic philosophers 
to be done at the level of complete sentences or whole propositions because they 
are considered ‘meaningful’ since it is only at the level of a complete sentence 
 
133Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983 Pg 10. 
134 Robert Brandom. Articulating Reasons. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001. Pp 159-163. 
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can the sample of language assert something true or false. The common 
doctrines maintaining The Primacy of the Proposition originate from 
generations of philosophers reading Frege’s philosophy of language135.  
Analytic Philosophers often describe incomplete sentences as ‘gappy’. For 
instance ‘is a girl’ is meaningless because it does not have a noun in the subject 
case. The transitive verb, preposition and noun which makes up a predicate and 
affirms ‘is a girl’, does not affirm it about anyone. It is thus incomplete. The 
collection of words ‘is a girl’ can be neither true nor false because the predicate of 
the sentence has no subject to affirm it of.  
This type of analysis which was driven by doctrines of meaningfulness in 
terms of truth value has a methodological tendency towards complete sentences, 
and/or propositions. Ryle does not do that. He conducts analysis of predicates 
and sub-sentential and sub-propositional collections of words to find 
relationships between them.  
As an example, these relationships, like that Ryle points out between 
verbs like ‘shoot’ and adverbs of manner like ‘carefully’, contain the semantic 
materials for the inheritence conditions which define the two major families of 
dispositions in The Concept of Mind. Ryle also describes in detail one side of the 
normative values for these inheriatence conditions where sets of words in 
different grammatical categories inherit relationships such as the ‘Take-heed’ 
 
135 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 2001. Pp 159-163.  
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family of adverbs of manner. ‘Take-heed’ concepts are the set of semantic 
relationships between verbs, adverbs, classes of active noun expressing what 
Ryle thinks of as the ‘mind and the world’ and certain adjectives, which the 
Capacity Dispositions inherit.  
For Ryle the ‘Take-heed’ family of linguistic behaviours is significant. The 
relationship between ‘Take-heed’ inheritance conditions forms one wing of the 
primary attack on the Two Worlds Myth which Ryle mounts. Ryle maintains 
that the failure to recognize the role and importance of the ‘Take-heed’ family of 
adverbs, made up of words like ‘carefully’ and ‘attentively’’, leads to a 
philosophical puzzle and the illusion which creates Cartesian Dualism136.  Ryle 
thinks that the mistake that comes from not recognizing the importance of the 
class of adverbs describing the family of Skill and Capacity Dispositions, adverbs 
of manner like ‘carefully’ and ‘attentively’, is to assume that the situation were 
one where one must first plan how to do something in a mental world of 
causation and then proceed to carry it out in the physically material world of 
causation. If one were to progress in this way, Ryle thinks, one would end up in 
 
136 Not all Ordinary Language Arguments are Lingusitic Behavioural arguments, however Linguistic 
Behavioural Arguments, are by normative force and the way they work, Ordinary Language 
Arguments. They must be so because they rely on what the reader knows about language use to 
make their argument through analysis of nouns, verbs, adverbs, and so on. Here in the ‘Take-care’ 
strain of the Capacity Family set of arguments about the two different families of Dispositional 
Genus found in The Concept of Mind , we can see the way Ordinary Language arguments are 
connected to Linguistic Behavioural analysis. More importantly we can see how they are aligned in 
order to negate another philosopher, in this case, Descartes. The normative force in Ryle’s argument 
against Descartes is something noteworthy, and worth thinking through and reflecting on. It is an 




an infinite regress where one, for instance, plans to plan how to do something. 
That further planning precedes planning to plan how to do something, and this 
in turn would require further acts of planning, and so on, repeat ad nauseum.  
Instead of this ‘Two-Worlds myth’, Ryle argues that adverbs like ‘carefully’ 
reveal that the relationship between the mind and the world is one where 
thought and action occur as the same thing. Ryle thinks part of that importance 
is that adverbs like ‘carefully’ reveal that the ‘Two-Worlds myth’ is a category 
mistake. One can sweep the driveway carefully or carelessly. One can play a 
rugby game carefully or recklessly. Adverbs of manner, in this way, describe the 
mind as we find it in the world. For Ryle the mind is not a separate fantasia of 
causality, or a ghostly Macbethian stage populated by phantasms. Ryle thinks 
the mind is all around us in the way we organize our offices, drive our cars, 
enjoy our leisure and keep our gardens. In this way Ryle argues that analysis of 
terms like ‘carefully’ and the inheritance conditions that hold between words 
found in different grammatical categories, once properly understood, reveal that 
this is the case and that the origin of the mistake of Cartesian dualism arises 
from not understanding how words work. Such a lack of understanding, Ryle 
argues, leads to confusions between the two different types of Dispositional 
Families and is what he thinks lay behind the origin of the Cartesian category 












The Primacy of the Sentence and Propositional thought 
 
 
As Dummett and others point out137 the Doctrine of the Primacy of the 
Proposition has dominated analytic philosophy circles of thought for the past 
century. For Dummett it begins with Frege’s argument that words have 
meaning only in the context of the sentences they appear or can appear in. The 
idea is that a word’s meaning consists in the contribution the word makes to the 
meaning of the sentences in which it either appears138, or can appear139.  
 
137 Brandom, Robert. Tales of the Mighty Dead. Harvard University Press. Massachusetts. 2002. Pp 
57-75, 21.  
138 Dretske, Fred. Explaining Behavior. Reasons in a World of Causes. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1988.  NB see Pp 62 – 64 for Dretske’s treatment of natural systems of representation and 70 – 77 
for his treatment of Frege’s Sense and Reference distinction.  
139 See Frege, Gottlob. ‘Illustrative Extracts from Frege's Review of Husserl's Philosophie Der 
Arithmetik.’ In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Pp 79 - 85. New York: 
The Philosophical Library, 1952. Frege, Gottlob. ‘On Concept and Object.’ In Translations from the 
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Pp 42-56. New York: Philosophical Library Inc, 1952. And 
Frege Gottlob’On Sense and Reference.’ In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob 
Frege, Pp 59 - 78. New York: The Philosophical Library Inc, 1952. See also Crane, Aspects of 
Psychologism, 2014. Crane has developed an alternative reading of Frege to the one that has 
dominated and shaped Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy and that this paper draws on. I will 
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Dummett writes  
 
Philosophers before Frege assumed. . . that what 
a speaker knows is a kind of code. Concepts are 
coded into words and thoughts which are 
compounded out of concepts, into sentences, 
whose structure mirrors, by and large, the 
complexity of the thoughts. We need language, on 
this view, only because we happen to lack the 
faculty, that is, of the direct transmission of 
thoughts. Communication is, thus essentially like 
the use of a telephone: the speaker codes his 
thoughts in a transmissible medium, which is 
then decoded by the hearer140. 
 
Why is this important? Dummett writes  
 
The whole analytical school of philosophy is 
founded on the rejection of this conception, first 
 
leave the debate between Crane and Dummett over Frege’s view of language to the footnotes, but for 
what it is worth I think Crane is right with his ‘Gedanke’ and ‘Vorstellung’ distinction.  
140Dummett, What Do I Know When I Know a Language?, 1993. 
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clearly repudiated by Frege. The conception of 
language as a code requires that we ascribe 
concepts and thoughts to people independently of 
their knowledge of language; and one strand of 
objection is that, for any but the simplest 
concepts, we cannot explain what it is to grasp 
them independently of the ability to express them 
in language141. 
 
So, what does Dummett think Frege’s major contribution was? Was it in fact the 
‘primacy of the sentence’ or was it the rejection of this theory that language is 
some sort of code for putting thoughts into? If the latter, then does Dummett go 
over to ‘the other side?’ Does Dummett, (pace Tim Crane’s analysis of him142), 
argue himself into some form of advocacy of ‘psychologism’? 
 Dummett in the same paper writes  
 
I am not here concerned with the particular 
features of Frege’s theory, but only with the 
general line of approach to the philosophy of 
 
141Dummett, What Do I Know When I Know a Language?, 1993 
142 See Anti-Psychologism and the Occult Phenomenology in the Introduction to this paper. Also see 
Crane, Aspects of Psychologism. 2014. Pg 2’. 
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language of which it was the earliest example. 
Frege’s theory was the first instance of a 
conception that continues to dominate the 
philosophy of language, that of a theory of a 
specific language. Such a theory of meaning 
displays all that is involved in the investment of 
words and sentences of the language with the 
meanings they bear. The expression ‘a theory of 
meaning’ may be used in quite a general way to 
apply to any theory which purports to do this for 
a particular language143. 
 
The general line of approach Dummett is concerned with is the primacy of 
language in the Philosophy of Mind for formulating a theory of mind. An Anti-
Psychologistic approach to a theory of mind holds that language and a theory of 
meaning is essential for establishing a theory of mind independently of any pre-
linguistic knowledge of mind.  
 As David Simpson rightly points out, Dummett avoids the charge of 
psychologism ‘because of his insistence (that) knowledge of implicit use of 
language must be manifested in (that very same) use of language’144. Dummett 
 
143 Dummett, What Do I Know When I Know a Language?, 1993 
144Simpson, David. ‘Language and Know-How.’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 5  
150 
 
argues against an explicit theory of meaning, but he has not gone all the way 
back to a Pre-Fregeian psychologism. Dummett is still arguing for the priority of 
language to a theory of mind. To be sure, he is arguing against Frege’s theory of 
meaning as a model for explicit theories but he has not argued all the way to the 
point of advancing a position that views language as a code for thought. 
Dummett thinks that meaning needs to be implicit inside language expression 
and that a philosopher’s business is to spell out the form and parts of language 
in which meaning is itself manifested.  
 Dummett is anti-explicit but he is also anti-psychologistic. This is because 
an anti-psychologistic theory of meaning need only argue that implicit 
knowledge of meaning is prior to or necessarily undermines an explicit theory of 
meaning. The reason why such is so is because arguing that either (a) implicit 
knowledge of meaning is needed to understand an explicit theory of meaning or 
(b) that implicit knowledge of meaning is fundamental, intuitive, non-reducible, 
primitive, or foundational for an explicit theory of meaning, (that is arguing for 
either (a) or (b) of the dilemma), is not the same thing as arguing that non-
linguistic knowledge is prior to any fundamental relation to implicit or explicit 
knowledge of meaning. If Dummett argues that meaning bottoms out in, arises 
from, or is grounded in implicit understanding of language then he has not gone 
over to the psychologistic side of the Language of Mind Debate. He still upholds 
 
(2010): 629–643. Pg 638. 
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an anti-psychologistic theory of meaning. He has, therefore, neither reverted, 
nor abdicated to psychologism. Psychologism argues that regardless of claims 
whether knowledge of linguistic meaning is more fundamentally theoretical and 
explicit, or more implicit and practical, non-linguistic knowledge is prior to 
knowledge of linguistic meaning. Dummett has not argued for non-linguistic 
knowledge, but rather, he has argued for implicit linguistic knowledge as 
essential to a theory of meaning.  
Ryle has the same general thought as Dummett, or at least this is what 
Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourist arguments try to implement. They analyse pieces 
of natural language inside the idiom of their usage. As such Ryle argues a 
similar position to Dummett’s. The Linguistic Behaviourist side of Ryle, and in 
fact the central block of his most consistent and clear argumentative practice, is 
that implicit knowledge of meaning is fundamental to making precise the 
meaning inside language.   
 Dummett writes  
 
It is part of the business of a philosopher of 
language to explain in what specific feature of 
this use a speaker’s knowledge of each particular 
part of the theory of meaning is manifested145.  
 




If we refer Dummett’s requirement back to Ryle, we can see that this agrees 
with what Ryle is doing in his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. These 
arguments draw attention to the linguistic relations, structure and 
configurations in the use of mental language in which the ordinary speaker’s 
understanding of that language is manifested. So while Ryle at least might be 
seemingly cleared of psychologism at the level of his official self-understanding, 
the overall significance of my argument and of the thesis is that he is not. Ryle 
makes a number of arguments that have surreptitiously hidden phenomenal 
appeals. These arguments, when fully spelled out, offer strong support for a 
psychologistic position on in the Philosophy of Mind debate.  
In the meantime it is important for our immediate purpose to note that 
insofar as Ryle moves from Linguistic Behavioural claims and descriptions of the 
way language behaves to an argument in which the perfect domain for doing 
philosophy of mind is inside a purified and idealized domain of common 
language free from scientific and terminological contaminations, he is making a 
normative move.  
For the moment let us return to the thread of exposition I started on 








Capacity and Tendency configurations. 
 
As already pointed out Ryle divides the dispositional verbs by their behaviour, 
into two groups he calls ‘families’ of dispositions. This division of dispositions 
into two family groups goes right through his concept of mind and will be 
important for understanding the critique of Ryle offered in this paper. These two 
groups are, of course, the ‘capacity’ and ‘tendency’ dispositional verb sub-groups 
whose ‘behaviour’ is individuated and grammatically described by similarities in 
sets of verbs and applicable adjectives like ‘wavering, obstinate, inveterate’ as 
well as the grouping of these two families of dispositions under the ‘hypocrite’ 
and ‘charlatan’ epithets based on people who lie about one family of dispositions 
or the other. 
 Ryle supports this division of ‘capacity’ and ‘tendency’ verbs in several 
different ways but the following will suffice to note for our purposes. The 
adverbial form ‘carefully’, as part of the ‘take-care’ genus that Weitz partially 
identified, needs a capacity to identify its execution. For ‘carefully’ to apply to 
someone they need to be doing something that requires the execution of skill or a 
capacity. The ‘carefully’ adverb refers to the action that is being done in the 
manner in which it is being done.  
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 Ryle argues that one important difference between Capacities and 
Tendencies as sets of identifiable linguistic behaviour can be found in the 
‘inheritance conditions146’ one can attach to the respective families of verbs and 
nouns, through specific adverbs of manner. Ryle argues the term ‘carefully’ 
separates the capacity verbs from the family of tendency verbs because it does 
not make sense to use ‘carefully’ with certain tendency words that describe 
beliefs, motives, desires, longings, addictions or aspirations.  
 For example, Ryle holds that it does not make sense to have either 
‘careful motives’ or ‘careful beliefs’. One can be careful about their beliefs, but 
this refers to the ‘how’, which is accompanied by, or answered with the verbs 
either for the skills, or that feature in descriptions of the methods employed in 
forming the subclause or answering an interrogative. The person might be 
careful to check into things, or check up on things. They may exercise their 
scepticism regularly as part of good practice in building, making or establishing 
their beliefs, or they may be selective in what they bring to light to consider for 
 
146The term ‘inheritance property’ I’ve adopted from Ryle’s intellectualist legend to refer to whether 
something is done intelligently or stupidly, carefully or heedlessly, which Ryle at various times 
refers to with adverbs, ‘mongrel categoricals’, verbs, adjectives, adverbial phrases and so on. See 
Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, pp 130 – 134, for uses and types of ‘heed concepts’, pg 32 for the 
distinctive claim that intelligence is a practice not an antecedent or an event. See also the discussion 
on pp 67 – 69 for the question of fault and adverbial structures in relation to capacities related to 
heed concepts, pp 47-48 for the semi-episodic, semi-dispositional mongrel categorical which Ryle lists 
as examples ‘alert’, ‘careful’, ‘critical’, ‘ingenious’. See Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, pp 17 – 31 for Ryle’s 
discussion of adverbs and ‘adverbial verbs’ of thinking. I refer to all of these structures, for 
simplicity, as ‘inheritance properties’ in, associated with, or related to an act, except where I refer to 
a specific construction and its linguistic behaviours. ‘Inheritance properties’ simply refers to the 
tendency for words to display certain relationships and typical behaviours according to the intuition 
of the native speaker, like the relationship between (a) ‘carefully’ and the verbs belonging to the 
Capacity Family of Dispositions, or (b) ‘wavering’, ‘obstinate’, ‘inveterate’ to ‘beliefs’, ‘habits’, 
‘convictions’ and the Tendency Family of Dispositons.   
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their belief. Even so these are all sets of skill verbs that one uses to establish 
one’s belief, and not verbs, adverbs or adjectives that feature in the description 
of the belief. Similarly, one can be careful ‘about’ one’s motives. Here the ‘about’ 
may refer to attempts at concealing one’s motives, being critical and self-
conscious147, or simply ‘being alive to’148 the ways in which one makes decisions. 
 
147 Specifically the sense in which Ryle allows self awareness. See Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, pg 
149 for where Ryle makes the ordinary language philosophy of mind ‘implicit claim’ that ‘the sorts of 
things I can know about myself are the sorts of things I can know about you.’ What he means here is 
related to the public accessibility of language. Ryle has two theories of consciousness. One is an 
‘occult’ stream, implied by the sorts of phenomenological style arguments he makes. The other is an 
overt stream where he thinks he can cover all of the facts attributed to ‘consciousness’ in traditional 
theories of mind with language analysis. Such language analysis involves Ryle’s criteria for making 
‘special status reports’, an ‘internal narrator’ and his use of the term ‘being alive to what one is 
doing’ to which Ryle ascribes a certain importance. I will go into some detail on this, but for the 
purposes of curiosity, and to show where this is headed, the overt stream is chiefly made up of types 
of ‘talk’ and the way people use the term conscious, so for instance Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983 pg 
150 he distinguishes self-conscious as associated with embarrassment, and associates this with types 
of ‘guarded talk’. Another use is similar to Ned Block’s ‘phenomenal’ and ‘access’ consciousness 
distinction in his paper, Block, On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness, 1995, where a 
person might become conscious of a noise only after it has stopped, or similarly they might lose 
consciousness from the knees down. It is what Chalmers identifies as a type of functional state he 
refers to as awareness. The phenomenal aspects of an experience might be present but the 
awareness isn’t. On page 150 of The Concept of Mind¸ 1983 , Ryle refers to consciousness indirectly 
by referring to ‘unconscious’ ‘phobias’ and ‘desires’. But here there is a problem, since they are 
unconscious the person would not be able to give a ‘special status report’ since they would not be 
‘alive to what they are doing’ and this would clash with the conditions he lays out against volitions. 
That is Ryle argues that the person can’t make a report about volitions since he would not know 
what to say about them. Ryle argues that it doesn’t make sense to talk about how many volitions it 
takes to get out of bed and there is no ordinary language sense in which one encounters talk about 
the term. Here Ryle must decide one side or the other, either he allows volitions, even though people 
can’t make reports on them, and he dismisses his argument against them, or he rejects unconscious 
desires in the Freudian sense. I should argue on the basis of page 99 where he argues that a man 
‘finds out he is tired because he yawns’ and the log keeping role of retrospection on page 160 of The 
Concept of Mind, and the general thesis that his philosophical condition would collapse if he allowed 
Freud’s unconscious states that he would most likely dismiss them. The conflict between Ryle’s own 
strictures about the reportability of status reports would mean that Ryle would drop ‘unconscious’ 
‘desires’ and ‘fears’ from his account since there are no common terms for Freud’s states that men 
use and they would thus suffer the same fate as Ryle’s ‘volitions’ if Ryle were being consistent on this 
point. See Ryle’s Use Of the Terms ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Introspection’ and The Species of Mindologue 
in this paper for Ryle’s ‘log keeper roles’ and the way Ryle allows the use or the terms ‘introspection’ 
and ‘consciousness’. See also Was Ryle a Behaviourist? And What type of Behaviourism for Ryle’s 
retrospection and Wilfrid Sellars’ ‘in forro interno’ reading of Ryle ‘concept of mind’ as an ‘in forro 
interno’ log keeper.  
148 Another piece of Rylean.  We will explore this terminology at length later in the paper. For the 
moment refer to the distinctions in the above footnotes.  
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Again these are skill verbs and if one questions them one is inclined to use a 
‘how’ in the interrogative to uncover the corresponding sets of verbs for the skills 
being employed. ‘How is he being careful about his motives?’ ‘How is he careful 
in establishing his beliefs?’ These are different questions from ‘why would he do 
that?’  
 Motives, Inclinations and Beliefs, thus explained, come under a different 
family of dispositions from Capacities. Ryles Motives, Inclinations and Beliefs 
belong to the ‘why-that’ side of the linguistic behaviours and have a different set 
of adverbs and adjectives apt for use with them. These adjectives and adverbs of 
manner like ‘wavering, obstinately, inveterate’, are used to describe motives, 
beliefs and inclinations, i.e. one might say ‘obstinate in his belief’, or ‘obstinatley 
held on to his beliefs’, and these are located on the other side of the How/Why-
That Configuration which Ryle uses to separate the ‘tendency’ and ‘capacity’ 
verbs. Ryle sepparates the tendency and capacity verbs by arguing the tendency 
verbs lose their meaning when applying the adverbs of manner from the other 
family. Neither ‘he obstinately swept the driveway’ or ‘he inveterately woke up 
that morning’ entirely make sense because they are from the wrong family of 
adverbs. Here we can see a direct appeal to our own common natural language 
intuitions. We know ‘he inveterately woke up that morning’ sounds wrong from 
our grasp of the language as natural speakers, and knowing that it sounds 
wrong, compels us to agree with his argument. 
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 Beliefs and motives are linked together, according to Ryle, the same way 
skill and methods are. Ryle writes 
 
Roughly, 'believe' is of the same family as motive 
words, where 'know' is of the same family as skill 
words; so we ask how a person knows this, but 
only why a person believes that, as we ask how a 
person ties a clove-hitch, but why he wants to tie 
a clove- hitch or why he always ties granny-
knots. Skills have methods, where habits and 
inclinations have sources149.  
 
 
The reason that Ryle thinks there are two terms on this side of the knowledge-
how/ knowledge-that divide is because he thinks that ‘how’ has a double function 
as both an interrogative and as a relative adverb of manner introducing a sub-
clause. One can ask, ‘How do you know that?’ One can also state ‘this is how you 
do it’ when demonstrating some knowledge. Similarly, it makes sense to Ryle to 
ask someone why they believe that, but Ryle thinks it does not make sense to 
ask, ‘how do you believe that?’ Knowledge, as Ryle envisages it, is almost entirely 
 
149Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983 Pg 129 
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based on ‘know how’ as an extra-linguistic process about the ‘mind’s doing’ in the 
world and he thinks this extra-linguistic capacity is captured by the class of 
adverbs ‘carefully’ belong to.  That is Ryle thinks the skills identified by the 
linguistic patterns of the capacity verbs do not need an extensive account of 















150 Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, Pg 266. Ryle rejects the notion that people always and only think in 
language while performing tasks, skills and pieces of work. The confusion arises from a failure, in 
many readers of Ryle, to make the Capacities/Tendencies distinction, and thus many readers have 
failed to notice that there are more than one type of disposition in Ryle. Ryle rejects the notion that 
all of the dispositional capacities are linguistic, nor that people are thinking ‘in sotto voco’ when 
performing such tasks. See the ‘ball of wool’ argument on page 266, where Ryle argues that 







Gilbert Ryle, Wilfrid Sellars and science. 
 
Part of the confusion with many contemporary accounts of Ryle in the 
Philosophy of Mind arises from the fact that he was read by a wave of early 
Analytic Pro-Science Materialists and Physicalists. Indeed, he was read by 
highly influential and talented people like J. J. C. Smart and David Armstrong 
who looked towards Ryle as a novel way out of mind-body dualist arguments and 
the lingering spectre of Descartes. These early reactions to Ryle have also since 
become confused with much of the Historically Situated Psychological 
Behaviourism of that period. The result is that many books and articles written 
on the history of Analytic Philosophy of Mind have erroneously interpreted Ryle 
as offering a materialist ‘pro-science’ psychological behaviourist151 account about 
the mind.  
 For instance, Professor Weed writes 
 
Head-scratching is objectively observable. 
Incestuous desire is not; nor is universal doubt, 
 
151 As in a pro-science, materialist, Historically-Situated Behaviourist of the same ilk as Watson, 
Skinner and Thorndike.  
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apprehension of infinity, or Cartesian 
introspection. Philosophers like Carl Hempel and 
Gilbert Ryle shared the view that all genuine 
problems are scientific problems152.  
 
I just don’t think that was Ryle’s view. In fact Ryle thought that many 
philosophical muddles about the mind actually originated in ‘science’ and that 
attempts to apply scientific vocabularies to the mind were the cause of the 
problem. Ryle maintains the view in The Concept of Mind that the complex 
theoretical languages of the sciences create confusions which this kind of 
philosophy inherits. Ryle, of course, concluded that the way to solve this was to 
elevate the status of ‘ordinary language’ and examine the behaviour of the 
language we use in our everyday talk about the mind.  
 Ryle ‘himself’ in The Concept of Mind writes 
  
Whenever a new science achieves its first big 
successes, its enthusiastic acolytes always 
fancy that all questions are now soluble by 
extension of its methods of solving its 
questions. At one time theorists imagined 
 
152Weed, Laura. ‘Philosophy of Mind an Overview.’ Philosophy Now Nov/Dec, no. 87 (2011). Pg 6. 
Weed is, perhaps some might think, rather aptly named for this type of error.   
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that the whole world was nothing more than 
a complex of geometrical figures, at another 
that the whole world was describable and 
explicable in the propositions of pure 
arithmetic. Chemical, electrical, Darwinian 
and Freudian cosmogonies have also enjoyed 
their bright but brief days. 'At long last', the 
zealots always say, 'we can give, or at least 
indicate, a solution of all difficulties and one 
which is unquestionably a scientific 
solution'153. 
 
Indeed, ‘at long last (the zealots always say) we can give, or at least indicate, a 
solution of all difficulties and one which is unquestionably a scientific solution’. 
This is what Ryle actually wrote, tongue in cheek, which, of course, is contrary 
to Weed’s assertion and numerous introductions to Ryle and the Philosophy of 
Mind. This is important because a history of errors in reading Ryle have created 
an alternative view of Ryle. This alternative view impacts accounts of Ryle like 
that we found in David Chalmers, and it obscures the novelty and insight in his 
argument, as we will see.  
 
153Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983 Pg 74. 
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 Ryle’s argument here is that fanaticism by ‘scientific zealots’ 
contaminates the domain of ordinary language with philosophical muddles and 
category mistakes which he is at pains to clear up and repair.  
 One example of such a muddle for Ryle is the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory 
of Mind’. Ryle argues the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ has two parts and is 
a type of problematic reoccurring ‘language construct’ in the Philosophy of Mind 
which Ryle thinks was originally created from trying to treat the mind like a 
machine. Volitions form one side of this language construct and thus make up 
one of those parts.  
 Ryle writes 
 
The physical sciences launched by Copernicus, 
Galileo, Newton and Boyle secured a longer 
and a stronger hold upon the cosmogony- 
builders than did either their forerunners or 
their successors. People still tend to treat laws 
of Mechanics not merely as the ideal type of 
scientific laws, but as, in some sense, the 
ultimate laws of Nature. They tend to hope or 
fear that biological, psychological and 
sociological laws will one day be 'reduced' to 
mechanical laws though it is left unclear what 
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sort of a transaction this 'reduction' would 
be154.  
 
The physical sciences, Ryle thinks, cause contaminations when applied to 
mental concepts which result in ‘myths’ like the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of 
Mind’ which Ryle sees as a contamination of ordinary language with mechanistic 
accounts of the mind. For Ryle science is the cause of the problems and 
confusions in Philosophy of Mind.  
Sellars disagrees with Ryle.  
Sellars writes 
 
My point is rather that what we call the scientific 
enterprise is the flowering of a dimension of 
discourse which already exists in what historians 
 
154Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1984. Pg 74 This is the reason I avoided using Aizowa and Adams’ paper. I 
should argue that the ‘Mark of the Cognitive’ is a special application of what is at the base of the 
Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind since it individuates on the basis of causal factors.  See Adams, 
Fred. Aizowa, Ken. ‘Defending the Bounds of Cognition.’ In The Extended Mind, edited by Richard 
Menary, Pp 67-80. Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 2010. Pg 40, and pg 70: since individuation for 
the ‘Mark of the Cognitive’ depends on intrinsic representations with non-derived content, then 
cognition on this view would be little more than the origin of causal processing and representation. 
Menary clarifies this point; See the ‘Introduction.’ In The Extended Mind, edited by Richard Menary, 
Pp 1 - 25. Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 2010. Pp 18-19. This position that Adams and Aizowa 
put forward on individuating cognition on a causal basis clashes with Ryle’s Anti-Cartesian position 
on the problem of causation which Ryle argues leads either to ‘The Two World Myth’, or the ‘Bogey of 
Mechanism’. Specifically, Adams and Aizowa’s position would be subject to classification of that 
passage on pg 79, Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1984, which was pointed out a few footnotes ago, where 
Ryle claims men are not machines. This, I argue, would lead Ryle to the position of viewing Adams 
and Aizowa’s position as just another development on the Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind, with its 
faults, since Adams and Aizowa seek to individuate cognition on the basis of causation.  
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call the ‘prescientific stage,’ and that failure to 
understand this type of discourse ‘writ large’ -- in 
science -- may lead, indeed has often led to a 
failure to appreciate its role in ‘ordinary usage,’ 
and, as a result, to a failure to understand the 
full logic of even the most fundamental, the 
‘simplest’ empirical terms155.  
 
This Sellars thinks is because 156 
 
scientific discourse is but a continuation of a 
dimension of discourse which has been present in 
human discourse from the very beginning.  
 
 
155Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 80. 
156 In Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991, Pg 24 the Scientific Image starts off 
as a methodological development of the Manifest Image, see pg 20. What characterizes the Scientific 
Image is its use of imperceptibles, pp 18-19. However, as Sellars later points out, in ‘The Language of 
Theories.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, Pp 106 - 126. California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 120, if 
our theory is a good one (kinetic theory) we are entitled to say that the entities (molecules) exist. 
There is a genuine rivalry. However, as Sellars points out at the end of Empiricism & the Philosophy 
of Mind, 1997, pg 113, to ask how impressions fit together with magnetic fields is mistaken. This is 
because impressions themselves are theoretical entities that we come to perceive, pg 111, 115. I will 






This argument that the ordinary, everyday view of the world is replaced by a 
scientific account is problematic for Ryle because it threatens Ryle’s assumption 
that Ordinary Language is a special and distinct normative source for 
arguments. Sellars argument is a threat to Ryle’s project of providing an 
‘unmuddling’ to problems he thinks the theoretical vocabularies of science have 
created. The reason, of course, is that if Sellars is right, ordinary language and 
the special vocabularies of science are not as separate as Ryle would like them to 
be.   
 The position that Ryle introduces in The Concept of Mind, is not, of 
course, the position he maintains in all his writing. In On Thinking, his 
philosophy is implicitly in the domain of Ordinary Language, and his analyses 
for the most part are confined to Linguistic Behavioural descriptions even 
though he is not explicitly or implicitly universally Anti-Psychologistic about 
understanding the Capacities157. In Dilemmas, for instance, Ryle’s view is that 
 
157 Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, pp 17 -31. See also Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, Pg 266. The error in the 
scholarship arises from people who read into Ryle the idea that there is one uniform type of 
disposition. Ryle has several different families of disposition. This was one of Weitz’s mistakes. Chief 
among Ryle’s families of language-uses, which are built up from inter-connected distinctions based 
on extra-sentential relationships between different word configurations are the Tendency and 
Capacity Families of Disposition. Ryle argues that the Capacities do no require mental chatter, 
silent soliloquy, (what Sellars refers to as thinking ‘in sotto voco’), or mentally stated propositions.  
The most direct evidence for this is the skein of wool argument in The Concept of Mind, on page 266. 
While performing tasks, exercising skills and fulfilling capacities Ryle does not think that thought is 
characteristically linguistic. However, he does argue that the way we describe these actions and 
behaviours is linguistic. We use terms like ‘carefully’ or ‘heedlessly’. These are the adverbial 
descriptions he refers to as ‘heed concepts’ with inheritance properties. These inheritance properties 
derive from the person carrying out the action. If John is a careful driver, we would say he drove 
‘carefully’ and this is ‘characteristic’ of him. If he drove recklessly, then we would say this was 
‘uncharacteristic’ of him. But, this does not mean John necessarily need think the word ‘carefully’ in 
order to drive thus, or that he mentally narrates his driving, or forms statements about his driving 
as he does so, or that the exercise of his capacity to drive is foundationally linguistic. However, the 
166 
 
highly theoretical vocabularies exist alongside an Ordinary Language domain, 
but they exist as a different way to see the contents of that domain. There, Ryle 
argues the view that science is just another perspective on the world158, a 
‘peninsular offshoot’ as Sellars might describe it159. In Dilemmas Ryle thinks the 
‘world of science’ is rather like ‘the world of poultry’ or ‘the world of 
entertainment’ that can co-exist with the mundane world described by the 
Ordinary Language user, but in a different vocabulary.  
 Ryle writes  
 
We know that a lot of people are interested in 
poultry and would not be surprised to find in 
existence a periodical called ‘the Poultry World’… 
It is quite innocuous to speak of the physicist’s 
world, if we do so in the way we speak of the 
poultry keeper’s world or the entertainment 
world. We could, correctingly speak of the 
 
Tendency Dispositions, Ryle thinks, are governed by a different group of linguistic behaviours.  We 
could not describe a man’s motives, beliefs or inclinations with adverbials like ‘carefully’.  The 
descripition of a person’s motives, habits, beliefs and inclinations are very different and are related 
to the behaviour of a different set of families. These are the Propensities and the Occurrences which 
is where we find a description of the moods and their relationship with the Family of Tendencies. 
Here, Ryle is implicitly Anti-Psychologistic and argues that these are foundationally linguistic. For a 
breakdown of Ryle’s description of the linguistic behaviours governing the ‘Propensities’, and their 
relationship to mood terminology, see Ryle’s Moodology and ‘Flash Bangs’ in Chapter Six of this 
thesis. See also Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, Pg 81.  
158 Ryle, Gilbert. Dilemmas. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1987. Pg 73 
159 Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1954.   
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bacteriologist’s world and the marine biologist’s 
world160.  
 
He goes on to support this view of ‘science’ as a collective noun unifying all the 
concepts associated with science, with an analogy. The analogy is that of a deck 
of cards. Ryle argues we may view, for instance, the house of hearts in the highly 
technical vocabularies of either Bridge or Poker, but this does not privilege 
Bridge, as a more truthful representation of, say, the Queen of Hearts, than that 
which would place it as a Poker schema in a Royal Flush161. For Ryle of the 
Dilemmas the Queen of Hearts is the domain of Ordinary Language, while the 
Poker and Bridge interpretations are technical vocabularies, analogous to the 
special sciences and chicken farming. In short, contra-Weed, Ryle does not put 








160Dilemmas. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1987. Pg 72 - 73 
161Ryle, Dilemmas, 1987. Pg 86 - 87 
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The Influence of Rudolf Carnap on Wilfrid Sellars’ Epistermology and 
the Tension between Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind and 
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.  
 
There are problematic strains in the accounts Sellars offers in Philosophy and 
the Scientific Image of Man162, and Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind163. 
These strains emerge from two papers he presents between them164. The papers 
Truth and ‘Correspondence’, and The Language of Theories are both part of a 
refutation of Carnap and a larger riddle that Sellars is trying systematically to 
resolve. This riddle is most explicitly expressed in Philosophy and the Scientific 
Image of Man where Sellars characterizes the everyday world as the ‘Manifest 
Image’. The Manifest Image contains, most notably, the Empirical Image, but 
also the Original Anthropomorphic Image. The Empirical Image contains ‘all of 
Mill’s inductive canons’, Hume’s philosophy, and is the grounds from which 
develops Sellars’ classification of Substantive Dualism165.  
 Alongside the Empirical Image, making up the Manifest Image, is the 
Original Primal Category of Persons in which natural objects and forces are 
personified into anthropic beings. In this early stage of the Manifest Image the 
 
162 Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. 
163 Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. 
164 Wilfrid Sellars. In Science, Perception and Reality, 106 - 126. California: Ridgeview, 1991. 
165Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 11, what Wilfrid Sellars calls 
substantive dualism develops from depersonalization of the a) empirical b) categorical, form of the 
Original Image.  
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wind is personified as being ‘cheeky’, while lightning may be personified as being 
‘angry’.  The Original Primal Category of Persons, what we might call the 
penultimate achievement of an Anthropomorphic Age, is actually what Sellars 
thinks sets the stage for a transformation into the Empirical Age. The way 
Sellars thinks that transformation occurs is that the polydeistic 
anthropomorphic beings like the ‘cheeky’ wind and ‘angry’ lightning eventually 
give way to a Mono-Anthropomorphic Age, which contains a single entity Sellars 
calls ‘the One’. The negation of the personhood of the One is what allows the 
Empirical Image to come into existence as the truncated domain of persons and 
negated anthropic traits in nature. In order for this to occur, the entire history of 
Sellars’ Process-Anthropology needs to begin with an Anthropomorphic Age. One 
could pin-point the tension between Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 
and Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man by raising the question where 
would a Pre-Jonesian Society get the behavioural concepts for this 
Anthropomorphic Age?  
 Allow me to explain. In this earlier Anthropomorphic Age of Philosophy 
and the Scientific Image of Man, which precedes the era of the Empirical Image 
and the domain of nature as ‘Truncated Persons’166, the wind for instance is 
treated as possessing a personality167. During these Folk Ages the totality of the 
world when seen in the singleness of a unified mono-anthropomorphic entity 
 
166Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 12 – 13. 
167Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 15 – 18. 
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forms the Primal Category of the One, and this is what Sellars categorizes as 
‘The Perennial philosophy’168. The society in Philosophy and the Scientific Image 
of Man must begin with a language of personhood.  
 We might view the argument Sellars presents in Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man as a type of ‘Process Anthropology’. In the first part of 
this Process Anthropology, the animistic and anthropomophizing eras finally 
culminate in what Sellars refers to as ‘the Primal Category of the One’169. This is 
a view of all of nature as one grand and universal entity; what a Christian might 
call ‘God’ or a Jew might refer to as ‘Elohim’. Here we can imagine a sort of 
transition from Polytheism to Monotheism, and finally to Deism. The negation of 
the One produces a sort of ‘Atheistic Stage’ which allows for the truncation of 
nature into a de-personalized, non-anthropic category with no personality traits 
or anthropomorphic properties. This truncated category Sellars refers to as ‘the 
Empirical Image’. The Anthromorphic and Empirical Images make up two 
halves of the Manifest Image. The Manifest Image is what we might refer to as 
the collective vision of humanity’s image of itself and society in the world during 
the Folk Ages. The Folk Ages we might use to refer to humanity during these 
early stages of development. The Manifest Image, according to Sellar’s theory of 
Process Anthropology in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man is finally 
 
168Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 20. 
169 Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 21. 
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superseded by the development of a ‘Scientific Image’ which is fundamentally 
different to the Manifest Image, which contains the earlier two stages.  
 The Scientific Image is different from the Original Anthropomorphic and 
Empirical Images making up the Manifest Image because the Scientific Image, 
according to this theory, accesses unobservables and uses theoretical entities in 
its explanation. Here we can see Carnap’s influence on Sellars’ thinking in 
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. Through-out Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man we see Carnapian themes. We see the influence in (what 
perhaps might be given the following Baroque label) Sellars’ Para-Carnapian 
Quasi-Compte-ian idea that a Scientific Image emerges alone and distinct from 
the misty Folk Ages with the determinate and distinctive ability to utilize 
theoretical and unobservable entities in its explanations of observable 
phenomena. This same Para-Carnapian Quasi-Compte-ian Positivist Process of 
Anthropological-Episteme for an Emergent Scientific Image – if we are to give a 
name to it – is what is at odds with the ‘Socio-Linguistic Process Epistemology’ 
Sellars offers in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind for two reasons.  
 Firstly, Sellars maintains in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
that the linguistic practices underlying modern scientific processes are 
continuous with earlier and older linguistic practices in ordinary language which 
I dealt with above170. Moveover in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 
 
170 See last chapter, Chapter Five. Gilbert Ryle, Wilfrid Sellars and science, in this thesis. Sellars 
writes ‘scientific discourse is but a continuation of a dimension of discourse which has been present 
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unobservable and theoretical entities become ‘reportable’ when they enter the 
space of reasons and shift from postulates and descriptions of an Observation 
Language to becoming part of the Report Language. As Sellars points out 
scientists learn to see the mu mesons in Wilson Cloud Chambers.  
 Secondly there is the problem of the development of anthropic language. 
The order of development is ‘out of whack’ between Sellars’ Process 
Anthropology and the stages of his Socio-Linguistic Theory. In order to develop 
the rich psychological resources of the Primal Category and an Anthropomorphic 
Age that would allow tribes living in this era to think of the wind as cheeky, or 
to view lightning as angry, they would need to develop the full resources of a 
Post-Jonseian Linguistic Age.   
 In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind the vocabulary for reporting 
using rich expressions like ‘angry’, ‘happy’ or ‘cheeky’, can occur only after the 
Messianic Sellarsian Behaviourist called Jones has come along and taught the 
tribe an Observational Language for understanding Gross-Body-Language at the 
level of of actions, gestures and various acts. Jones’ Language lays the 
neccessary grounds for the pre-requisite sophistications that allow a Rylean 
tribe to describe phenomena using a developing language of theoretical 
 
in human discourse from the very beginning.’ Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. 
Pg 80.  
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entities171 such as intentions, thoughts, and motives. According to Sellars’ Socio-
Linguistic account in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, it is only after 
this language has passed through social conditions and a space of reasons that it 
develops the ability to make reports in an anthropomorphized language. The 
reason why Jones and his age are necessary is because those resources 
necessary for anthropomorphic reports develop from Jones’ language. The 
linguistic resources that allow Rylean tribe members to describe the wind as 
‘cheeky’ or lightning as ‘angry’ grow out of the seeds of Jones’ language during a 
period I label in the tribe’s history as the Paleo-linguistic era172.  
 In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind the Psychological Report 
Language used by the Rylean tribe is the last stage in development of the 
language which begins with the ability to talk about publicly observable objects.  
The order of the developmental stages in Wilfrid Sellars’ Socio-Linguistic Theory 
in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, is at odds with the order in which 
the Manifest Image develops in the Process Anthropology of Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man. In one of Sellars’ papers the language of personhood 
emerges at the dawn of that civilization and begins the epistemic process of 
development towards what will become a Scientific Image of Man173. In the other 
 
171 Here, see the now seminal Jay F. Rosenberg. ‘Wilfrid Sellars on ‘Mental States’’. Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy, no 28. (2004): 239 – 265. We stand upon the shoulders of giants, and, of course, 
Rosenberg is right about the Myth of Jones. It is a theory of thoughts.  
172 My name for the period when Jones is teaching the tribe his language and the tribe are learning 
how to use it for the first time.  
173 Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. 
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of Sellars’ papers the languages of personhood comes at the end of that tribe’s 
development, and must draw on the resources of those earlier developmental 
stages to fully develop174. 
 We may temporarily set aside this problem by positing that the rich 
psychological vocabulary necessary for an Anthropomorphic stage in the 
Manifest Image, which of course is neccessary (prior to the development of the 
Empirical Image with its domain of nature as truncated persons) is fertilized by 
inserting Jones into the Pre-history of Sellars’ Process Anthropology. Later, as 
we shall see, this will create a problem with the transition to the Scientific 
Image in the developmental stages of Sellars’ ‘Process Anthropology’. The 
problem arises because processes and special features that are supposed to 
emerge and separate the Scientific Image from the Empirical Image are already 
present in the developmental stages of Jones’ Language and its development 
from an incomplete descriptive proto-behavioural tribal argot, taught by a 
wandering Jones, to fulfilling the role of a ‘Konstatierang’ fact-stating language 
capable of reporting the rich affective, sensitive and personafiable terms from 
the kind of Gleesonian vocabulary necessary for an Anthropomorphic Age. The 
development of Fact Stating Roles arises from a thread of arguments on offer in 
this dissertation that originates in Ryle’s ‘Moodology’ and what I label ‘flash-
bangs’, which will ultimatley, later in this paper, cause us to reject Sellars’ 
 
174 Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. 
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account of the Manifest and Scientific Images in favour of an acceptance of a 
genuine rivalry between Neurophysiological data and Linguistic Behavioural 
style analysis of specific ‘la parole’ manifestations of language. This rivalry is 
one of three which I will explain in the next section. There I will also briefly 
illuminate how these three sources of normative claim about the mind will 
eventually fit into the Heterophenomenological and Autophenomenological 
distinction. Keep in mind the conditions I laid out for the type of Psychologism I 
am selling. We are moving towards a theory where language is passed down in 
linguistic communities, but meaning is ascribed in at least some instances 
individually according to a private realm of individual experience. In arguing so 
this thesis will thus advocate a type of Psychologism which Crane drew out of 
Dummett and McDowell, and which I discussed in my Introduction. However, 
there are several stages that need to be developed first.      
  
 
Language Analysis vs Neuroscience.  
What is the foundation for our strongest claims about the mind? 
 
So, let us return to the contention between Ryle and Sellars over the argument 
for the authority of Ordinary Language and the developing ‘Scientific World 
View’. Sellars, from the perspective of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of 
Man would maintain, that the Scientific Image, while it methodologically feeds 
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on the Manifest Image175 may very well be like the world of poultry, and a 
peninsular off-shoot from the Manifest Image. But, Sellars would also argue, 
countering Ryle of The Dilemmas, that when the Scientific Image is strong 
enough it becomes a genuine rival to the Manifest Image and will eventually 
replace it176. 
 However, while the Scientific Image is developing Sellars thinks that the 
Scientific Image can feed off the Manifest Image.  One important feature of the 
Manifest Image for Sellars is the way thought is treated. For Sellars somewhat 
agrees with Ryle, at least during the period of the Manifest Image, that thought 
is or at least can be treated as somewhat analogous to language.  
 Wilfrid Sellars writes  
 
It is no accident that when a novelist wishes to 
represent what is going on in the mind of a person, he 
does so by 'quoting' the person's thoughts as he might 
quote what a person says. For thoughts not only are 
the sort of things that find overt expression in 
language, we conceive of them as analogous to overt 
discourse. Thus, thoughts in the manifest image are 
 
175Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 20 




conceived not in terms of their 'quality', but rather as 
inner 'goings-on' which are analogous to speech, and 
find their overt expression in speech -- though they can 
go on, of course, in the absence of this overt 
expression.177 
 
Sellars thinks that when we move into the Scientific Image what we know about 
thought which we can represent with italicised speech like the thoughts of a 
character in a novel, will come to be replaced with information from devices like 
EEGs and Polygraphs which can inform us about mental phenomena in the form 
of neurological information conversant and derived from physiological 
processes178. Sellars thinks that the move from treating language as thought to 
also being informed by neurological information is one of the last stages in the 
developing Scientific Image of Man. However, Sellars makes a distinction 
between sensory information and conceptual information, the latter of which he 
conceives of as ‘roles’ which have a specific significance within the terminology of 
his philosophy179 and which you’ll find running through the Post-Sellars 
 
177 Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1954, pg 32.  
Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1954. 
179 The term ‘role’ has both neurological and sociological meanings within Sellars’ work. For instance, 
he thinks it is possible to get around the problem of introspection by ignoring the ‘qualitative’ aspect 
of a word related to an experience or feeling, and focus on the ‘role’ it plays. Sellars, Philosophy and 
the Scientific Image of Man, 1954. See subsection VI. The Primacy of the Scientific Image. A 
Prolegomenon. In Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 1956, language roles have 
sociological and epistemic conditions attached to them like for instance Observation and Fact Stating 
Reports which vary in the authority ascribed to the ‘Fact Stating Role’ by the community according 
to standard conditions and whether the person themself has mastered the ability to report in that 
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vocabulary this thesis is written in. Conceptual thinking which is comprehended 
as analgous to language by people during the age of the Manifest Image, Sellars 
conceives of as being replaced by Neurological Information. However sensations 
create a dilemma for him that results in a ‘sensory-conceptual’ dualism he is 
unable to solve without turning the physical sensations of the Manifest Image 
into theoretical entities180.  
 While Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man was originally 
presented as a series of lectures given at Pittsburgh in December 1960 and 
Empiticism and The Philosophy of Mind was published four years earlier181 
there is reason to suspect that these papers were either not written in the order 
they were presented and published in, or they were not intended to be read in 
that order. The reason for this is the order that the papers are presented in 
Wilfrid Sellars’ book Science, Perception and Reality, begins with Philosophy and 
the Scientific Image of Man182. The order in the book then follows Being and 
Being Known, Phenomenalism, The Language of Theories and finally 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. This suggests to me given the 
 
language. There is need for a scholary paper that deals with Sellars’ concept of language roles 
linking his Socio-Linguistics and his philosophy of mind together. However, the full extent of this 
works falls beyond the scope and focus of the present paper. Suffice it for the reader to note that I 
argue that the two are linked but the way they are linked lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, 
in this paragraph, I am refering specifically to the special meaning he conceives for language roles in 
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. 
180 Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1954. See subsection V. The Clash of the 
Images, and also VII. Putting Man into the Scientific Image.   
181 Wilfrid Sellars. ‘Acknowledgements.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, 106 - 126. California:  
Ridgeview, 1991. 
182 Wilfrid Sellars. Science, Perception and Reality. California: Ridgeview, 1991. 
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methodocial and systematic nature of Sellars’ philosophy he intended the works 
to be read thus. 
 Another key reasons why the order of presentation in Science, Perception 
and Reality is important is because the problem he is left with at the end of 
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man about whether reducing sensations 
and impressions to theoretical entities183 will solve the theoretical trilemma 
arising from Descartes higher and lower mental states, is the same one that 
occupies him for the majority of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind184. We 
will return to Sellars’ position in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
concerning theoretical entities and sense impressions in depth, and consider it 
further with an oft overlooked criticism by Fodor185. Fodor argues that there are 
limits to the theory-ladeness of perception. This will give us a chance to present 
an answer to Fodor that is already latent in Sellars’ account of sensory 
experience and theoretical entities in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 
but which needs to be brought out to avoid this possible objection and caveat.  
 Exploring Sellars’ account of sensation and theoretical entities in light of 
Fodor’s criticism of the ‘New Look School’ will also provide us with insight to go 
 
183 Here see Jay F. Rosenberg. ‘Wilfrid Sellars on ‘Mental States’’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, no 
28. (2004): 239 – 265. I agree with Rosenberg. Sellars introduces the Myth of Jones to explain how 
human thought develops through a language in a community, moreover, to explain human thoughts 
as theoretical entities and solve problems that are the focus of his other papers.  
184 See Chapter Seventeen. Observation and Report Languages in this thesis for the start of an 
indepth discussion of Wilfrid Sellars in relation to the problem of sensory experience and theoretical 
entitites.  
185 In Chapter Sixteen, Observation and Report Languages of this thesis.  
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further and explore the different types of epistemic language creation processes 
in Sellars’ Epistemology and the types of fact stating and language access they 
offer when formulating arguments and avenues of research into the mind. We 
will be able to apply these insights to a developing model of Psychology186 and 
Psychiatry that takes into account what is, perhaps, most fruitful in Sellars’ 
distinction between the Manifest and Scientific Images once we have resolved 
the tension between the timelines in his two papers by looking closely at the 
types of access an Anthropomorphic or Paleo-Behaviouristic language has to 
other types of ‘Non-Anthropo-Behaviouristic’ specialist languages187. It will 
emerge that this ‘access’ is a type of access Psychology and Psychiatry inherit to 
the ‘Object Languages’ from the types of disciplines that feed into them, that is 
defined by different ways of talking about them. Psychology draws very deeply 
from Folk and Humanistic traditions and utilizes a lot of metaphors, similies, 
forms of similitude, myths, various religious concepts, and religious practices 
like meditation and forms of confession. It inherits a lot of metaphoric, 
mythological, allegorical and figurative uses of language. Psychiatry, on the 
otherhand, inherits a lot of very hard, scientific concepts about the mind as an 
organ of the body. Psychiatry utilizes a lot of scientifico-medical knowledge 
 
186 Note the capitalization. This is in anticipation of the Litero-Figurative Model I adopt later in the 
paper. See Chapter Seventeen. Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Language. I. 
Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of Mind. In this thesis.  
187 The way I solve the problem between the two incongruent timelines in Sellars seminal papers is 
to propose two different types of Images, one Psychological and Psychiatric. Where I refer to these 
Images I use capitals and treat them as proper nouns in accordance with Analytic Philosophical 
conventions for treating normative sources as formal proper nouns i.e. ‘good’ and ‘the Good’.   
181 
 
about brain chemistry as well as physiological symptoms and even cognitive 
impairments that can be located in the structural anatomy of the brain. What 
will be further revealed is the way Psychology and Psychiatry vary in their use 
of Fact Stating Roles when drawing on the resources of the developing ‘Object 
Languages’ while forming Observation Languages about the mind. Psycholgy 
draws on myths like Electra or metaphoric uses of other languages like “hot and 
cold” to talk about types of cognition. Psychiatry sometimes uses these, but it 
tends towards a different type of explanation that is less commonly found in 
Psychology, because Psychiatrists get a lot of hard science from the linguistic-
educational medical complex that doctors, nurses and surgeons are trained 
under. Psychiatrists usually undertake medical training in areas like anatomy, 
chemistry, micro-biology, pharmacology. Psychiatry thus tends to utilize Fact 
Stating Roles that draw on the Scientific Object Languages very strongly, not 
just in theory, but in the practices of diagnostic methodology, pharmacology, and 
surgical intervention as well. Psychiatrists will tend to use the medical 
equipment developed from medicinal science while making their diagnosis and 
in ongoing treatment. They will tend towards using (f)MIRs and EEGs, blood 
spectral analysis, nurse’s observations, blood pressure, fecal and urine samples, 
and so on. I will use this Psychological and Psychiatric model not only to develop 
a Neo-Sellarsian framework that can repair the rift between Empiricism and the 
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Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, but also 
more importantly, to also explain what is causing it188.  
 As I indicated above, if we read Sellars works in the order he organized 
them in for his volume of collected papers189 we can see that between Philosophy 
and the Scientific Image of Man and Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
Sellars’ position on theoretical entities begins to change with a critique Sellars 
develops of Carnap’s arguments about observational frameworks.  
 In The Language of Theories Sellars breaks from Carnap’s frameworks 
and argues that if a theory is a good theory it should entitle the holder of the 
theory to claims that the postulates of the theory exist and are not merely 
theoretical entities. Specifically, Sellars argues that if kinetic theory is a good 
theory it should entitle the holder to claim that molecules exist. Sellars argues 
against Carnap’s notion that molecules are not just useful fictions we attach 
onto our empirical observations and experiences with linguistic frameworks, but 
rather than convieniant nominial fictions, Sellars thinks that learning molecular 
theory will come to shape and radically change the way a person sees the world. 
Sellars argues that the holder of kinetic theory may not be able to see the 
molecules, but he can see the effects of the molecules and this should, according 
to Sellars, entitle him to the view that the molecules exist and are not simply 
part of a “merely” theoretical framework. The explainatory space the theorist 
 
188 See Chapter Sixteen, and Chapter Seventeen in this thesis.  
189 Wilfrrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, 106 - 126. California: Ridgeview, 1991. 
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utilizes for explaining the way they see the world, is, of course, the start of what 
Robert Brandom calls the ‘space of reasons’ in his own development and 
expansion of Wilfrid Sellars philosophy190. In Some Reflections on Language 
Games Sellars begins to construct a framework around ‘language entry 
transitions’ and ‘language departure transitions’ in order to solve a vicious 
regress that arises from one of Wittgenstein’s arguments. Sellars’ formulation of 
Wittgenstein’s infinite regress focusses on the public accessibility of rule 
interpretation and rule applications. The Wittgensteinian Metalanguage 
Regress arises from the need for a metalanguage when obeying a rule, and the 
need for a metalanguage for obeying the metalanguage of the rule, and so on191.  
 The ‘entry transition positions’ in Sellars language epistemology are 
learned responses to a stimulus. This is what Sellars calls a ‘Report Language’ 
in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. The move between ‘Report 
Languages’ and ‘Observation Languages’ is the way in which Sellarsian beings 
which Brandom labels as ‘Sapients’ come to see theoretical entities as real. 
While formulating his or her theories and conducting new experiments Sellars 
argues that the scientist will use an Observation Language. The Observation 
Language will use ‘models’ and ‘similes’ and objects already within the scientist’s 
 
190 See Brandom’s famous and seminal commentary on Wilfrid Sellars. Brandom, Robert. ‘Study  
Guide.’ In Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind. edited by Richard Rorty. United States: President  
& Fellows of Harvard University, 1997. Pg 143.  
191 Wilfrid Sellars. ‘Some Reflections on Language Games.’ Philosophy of Science 1, no. 21 (1954). In  




linguistic framework which the scientist has inherited from the community. 
Sometimes components of the Observation Language are drawn from other co-
existing domains and used in assent with-holding metaphorical and 
similitudinal structures for interpreting a stimulus. However, Sellars argues 
that when the scientist begins to see the effects of the molecules in his or her 
experiment as the molecules themselves the scientist has shifted from the use of 
what Sellars calls an ‘Observation language’ to what Sellars calls a ‘Report 
Language’.  
 This ability to move from Observation Languages to Report Languages 
is an important feature for Sellars’ philosophy. Report Languages can change. 
Sellars argues that we are brought up with them as part of the system he refers 
to as ‘Language Roles’ within the ‘Standard Conditions’ of a linguistic 
community. These ‘Standard Conditions’ allow for Konstatierang statements to 
be made by members of the linguistic community. However, beyond 
Konstatierang fact-making states of a Report, given for a stimulus in standard 
conditions, Sellars thinks there is a descriptive framework where theoretical 
objects can be described with similes, metaphors and similitudinal models 
drawn from objects and descriptive properties already describable in that 
language as part of an Observation Language, but for which the Fact Stating 
Role is denied. These figurative uses are important in Jonesian productions of 
behaviourist vocabularies and when given time can become Report Languages 
within a space where sufficient reasons are given for seeing the stimulus in a 
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new way within the practices of that language community. When these new 
Observational Languages become part of the Report Language that the subject 
uses, Sellars argues that the subject sees the entities or postulates no longer as 
merely theoretical, descriptive or metaphorical, but as actual entities. The 
holder of the theory comes to see the world in terms of their theory. The 
structure changes from figurative to literal ‘Statements of Fact’ when the subject 
learns how to give a report on it. This is important because people can also see 
themselves in the terms of a Behavioural Language and begin to self-report. 
This will be important later in the dissertation in the argument on Wittgenstein 
and Private Access192.  
 
 
The Conflict between Ryle and Sellars over the Predominance of 
Science or Language in the Philosophy of Mind.  
 
However for the moment I want to highlight this tension in Sellars and the 
unresolved issues at the end of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man and 
draw attention to a developing sophistication arising from Sellars’ account that 
will be important to the central thread of this dissertation. In Philosophy and 
 




the Scientific Image of Man Sellars introduces us to a ‘Bi-Componential View’193 
where his account of mind contains a view of (1) thinking as analogous to 
speaking, as well as (2) hard neurological information about mental processes.  
 Both sources of Sellars ‘Bi-Componential View’ of the mind are publicly 
observable.   (1) The Ordinary Language platform maintains some authority of 
language in arguments about the nature of mind, however Sellars would argue 
that (2) the Scientific Neurological platform presents stronger normative 
grounds since he argues in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man these 
developments will come to replace our Folk Ages vocabularies of mind (which we 
are calling the Ordinary Language platform) for arguments about the mind 
(specifically Conceptual Roles) as the Scientific Image replaces the Manifest 
Image.  
 Ryle, however, argues that Ordinary Language is a stronger source for 
arguments and claims about the mind. Ryle maintains that science is a source of 
confusion and the ‘bad guy’ when it comes to the mind because it introduces 
theoretical language constructs and highly technical vocabularies borrowed from 
other domains which, Ryle thinks, then muddle our understanding of the mind 
and obscure it. Ryle argues that the ordinary language of everyday people is the 
language that people think in and can reveal for us the mind if we’d only stop 
paying attention to scientists, philosophers and psychologists. For Ryle 
 
193 My term for describing Sellars view that language and neuroscience will merge at the crossing 
over point of the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image.  
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philosophers and scientists thus confuse what is evident in ordinary common 
language about the mind when they apply what Ryle refers to as their 
‘specialized vocabularies’ to talk about it. For Ryle, this affords Ordinary 
Language a special place in arguments about the mind since he thinks it can be 
used to clear up mistakes introduced by scientists, psychologists and 
philosophers. Thus, Ryle views Ordinary Language as a stronger source of 
support for arguments and theories about the nature of the mind than the 
specialized vocabularies of the sciences.          
 The Trilemma of Normativity should now emerge. We have three 
competing sources in claims about the mind; (1) language, (2) scientific 
discoveries like neuroscience, and (3) phenomenology. This does not present a 
problem, so long as these three sources are consistent with each other. But what 
happens when they are not? Which is the stronger source? Which is 
foundational? At the foot of this emerging conflict is an argument over whether 
we should use language or we should trust science. We saw this in the 
Introduction to this thesis in the conflict between psychology and psychiatry in 
the prescriptive and diagnostic methods for AD(H)D. The psychologist has 
problems with whether the words in the text book mean the same thing as the 
ones the patient uses to describe their experiences. The psychiatrist has a 
different problem, one that arises with caveat authority. Sometimes patients 
react differently to pharmacological agents and sometimes they describe 
different experiences for identical neurological data.   
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 We can see that the origins for this debate over which is a more 
authoratative source in claims about the mind first emerge between the works of 
Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Ryle. Is ‘science’ a stronger foundation for making 
claims and arguments about the mind like Wilfrid Sellars argues in Philosophy 
and the Scientific Image of Man, or is it ‘Ordinary Language’? In a case where 
you have the developing Scientific Image of Man saying one thing, and 
arguments based on Ordinary Language discourse supporting contradictory 
claims about the mind, which is the source one should support? Should one 
support what scientists are saying about the mind with their studies and 
specialized vocabularies, or what the ordinary person in the street claims to 
know about the mind from the common language they use to talk about their 
emotions and experiences? 
 Both Scientific194 and Ordinary Language sources are publicly 
accessible. This makes them both what will be referred to later in the paper as 
‘Heterophenomenological sources’. ‘Heterophenomenological’ is a term that will 
come to mean specifically evidence which can be drawn from the ‘third person 
 
194 Where I use capitals, in reference to distinguishing types of argument in Sellars and Ryle, I am 
referring to a normative source identified by either Sellars or Ryle, and the strength that such a 
normative source presents for accepting a claim. Rivalries often arise between different claims and 
the normative value of the claim is often put forward when the question is asked about what type of 
claim it is, and what it is based on. Within Sellars I identify ‘Scientific’, capital S, with fact-stating 
literal roles within a community of like-minded researchers, which he describes as ‘telescoping’ with 
the developed hard sciences, i.e. anatomy, physiology, physics, chemistry and so on.  Later I will offer 
a resolution on both of these types of claims and the conflict between Ryle, and the two Sellars using 
the idea of Heterophenomenological analysis and the insight that the normative value of both types 
of claim are open to scruitiny from the third personal perspective, while Autophenomenological ones 
are in a very specific sense, private. I refer to this privacy as ‘first personal’. 
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direct view’. This is in contrast to the term ‘Autophenomenology’ which refers to 
what will be described as the ‘first person direct view’ after a critical 
engagement with Wittgenstein. The direct views contain special types of 
primary information from those perspectives. The ‘indirect view’ will be shown to 
contain ‘Analogical Constructs’ incorporating secondary assumptions drawn 
from the direct views which create the illusion of the unity of Ryle’s Ordinary 
Language Account of The Mind as a homogenous single Hetrophenomenological 
source. It is this illusion which the thesis will reveal underlies Ryle’s failure at 
providing an Ordinary Language Account of the Mind.  
 The Occult Strain of Phenomenology hidden in Ryle is made up from 
surreptitiously concealed Autophenomenological appeals to a reader’s own 
experiences. Once we remove the Occult Phenomenological Stream of 
Argumentation hidden in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account of the Mind, we are 
left with his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. Linguistic Behavioural 
Arguments are, of course, Heteropheneomenological by default since the 
linguistic behaviour analysed contains grammatical examination of rules, uses 
and conventions which are publicly observable.  
 The argument to arise out of this framework against Ryle is as follows. A 
Linguistic Behavioural Account of the Mind stripped of all occult phenomenology 
is insufficient to cover all the facts within the domain which Ryle thinks a theory 
of mind would require. The Linguistic Behavioural Account of the Mind left in 
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Ryle, once we remove his ‘occult phenomenology’ cannot even cover all of the 
facts present in Ryle’s own arguments.  
 What we will be left with is a ‘chastened account’ of Ryle’s Ordinary 
Language philosophy. This chastened account lacks the semantic resources to 
provide a distinction between different instances of a specific ‘flower’ in the 
garden of ‘Ryle’s Moodlogy’ that he calls ‘feelings-proper’195 to which I will attach 
the label ‘flash-bangs’ in the next section. Without hidden and surreptitious use 
of phenomenological insight, Ryle’s chastened account lacks the resources to 
discern a behaviour that can distinguish between the language of the ‘canny 
reader’ and the ‘witness’ of an event in Ryle’s ‘Reader/Witness’ argument196. Nor 
is Ryle’s chastened account able to provide a behavioural analysis with a set of 
grammatical rules or descriptions that can cover introspective insight into the 
process of thinking that Ryle describes in his ‘Anticipatory Thought 
Argument197’ .  
 The work for scrying this occult phenomenological thread hidden in Ryle 
that these three arguments will emerge from, began in this thesis with David 
Chalmers’ description of ‘phenomenal’. I build on this by applying Ryle’s problem 
of accounting for different flash-bangs with a Linguistic Behavioural distinction, 
 
195 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1983, see Chapter IV for Ryle’s ‘Moodology’ pp 81 – 110. 
196 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1983, see Chapter VIII, pp 232 – 257. 
197 I refer to Ryle’s argument where he gets you to try and anticipate your next thought before you 
have it. You need to try the exercise of anticipating one’s next thought before one has it to realize the 
‘Occult Phenomenological Argumentative’ paradox. Ryle offers none and I submit that there are no 
rules in grammar or model linguistic behaviour that can account for this insight. It arises from 
trying the exercise out. Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983, pp 186-189 .  
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to one of Chalmers phenomenal zombies. I will then develop this critique 
revealing an important difference between Chalmers and his phenomenal 
zombie twin which will demonstrate, Counter-Chalmers, that Chalmers is 
capable of content-bearing cognitive ‘Judgements198’ which his zombie is not. 
This argument will occur in Sellars’ Rylean Community, after a number of 
caveats and careful qualifications.   
 Emerging from the central thread of the thesis are three normative 
sources that the reader should now be able to discern. These are three rival 
normative sources foundational to arguments for claims about the nature of 
mind. These are (i) analyses of the use of common ordinary language, (ii) 
scientific neurophysiological investigation (iii) phenomenological insight. 
Moreover the reader should be able to see that (i), (ii), and (iii) can be further 
categorized by the Autophenomenological/ Heterophenomenological Distinctions. 
Both (i) Ordinary Language Arguments (once they are divested of occult 
surreptitious phenomenal appeals) and (ii) scientific neurophysiological sources 
will be revealed as Heterophenomenalogical, while what will be exposed as a 
hidden source of appeal in some of Ryle’s arguments, namely (iii) 
phenomenological insight, will be revealed as hidden sources of 
 
198 Note here I am using my typical notation for turning terms used by a philosopher into proper 
nouns, but also, specifically, here I am referring to David Chalmers’ doctrine of Judgements which is 
quite different from analytic readings of Kant’s doctrine of judgments. Where I use a capital J I am 




Autophenoemnological appeals based in arguments that conceal Analogical 
Constructs.   









Ryle’s Moodology and ‘Flash Bangs’. 
 
 
For Ryle, expressions for Occurrences, in contrast to those for the Propensities, 
contain an interesting sub-species of linguistic expression that I think can 
further our purposes towards good philosophical practice by illuminating the 
difference between Behavioural Linguistic claims from those of Ordinary 
Language Arguments. This subspecies of Occurrences is designated by Ryle as 
‘feelings proper’ and can be isolated by their unique linguistic structure. They 
will be important later in this paper because they form part of the thread 
making up the ‘flash-bang’ strain of arguments which will reveal reasons why a 
Chalmerian zombie cannot join a late Rylean community that has passed 
through all of the Sellarsian developmental stages and possess a Gleesonian 
vocabulary of ‘affect’ and ‘sensitivity’ and learn its mental language. But first, 
we need to establish grounds for distinguishing the Linguistic Behavioural and 
Ordinary Language strains in Ryle, which include (i) how to distinguish between 
them, and (ii) why they are an interesting species of argument. Then we will be 
able to discern the Phenomenological strain of arguments hidden in Ryle from 
the difference between Linguistic Behaviourism and Ordinary Language 
194 
 
Arguments that shall emerge. To do that, it is best if we observe the difference 
between ‘Occurrences’ and ‘Propensities’ very early on.  
 Properly speaking, emotions as Ryle describes them in his ‘Moodology’ 
have four different types. Two of those types are collapsable into each other. A 
third is what happens when those two collide either with each other, or contrary 
versions of themselves, or a factual impediment; and a fourth type, which is 
separate from the other three.  
 Ryle writes 
 
(T)he word 'emotion' is used to designate at  
least three or four different kinds of things, 
which I shall call 'inclinations' (or 'motives'), 
'moods', 'agitations' (or 'commotions') and 
'feelings'. Inclinations and moods are not 
occurrences and do not therefore take place 
either publicly or privately. They are 
propensities, not acts or states. They are, 
however, propensities of different kinds, and 
their differences are important.199 
 
 




So, under the designation of Propensities, we have (1) Inclinations or Motives (2) 
Moods (3) Agitations or Commotions. Different to (1), (2) and (3) is (4) 
Occurrences. Occurrences can take place publicly and privately. A subspecies of 
these Occurrences will become important to the overall project of this paper and 
these, of course, are the ‘flash-bangs’. Let us keep them in mind.  If we turn now 
to the first subspecies of the Propensities, which include (1) the Inclinations and 
Motives, we can see how both (2) and (3) emerge from the linguistic behaviours 
of the expression for them. This is because both (2) Moods and (3) Agitations, for 
Ryle, actually originate from properties and linguistic behaviours Ryle identifies 
between the language vocabularies of the Inclinations and Motives.   
 Take (3) Agitations as an example of this derivation process.  
Ryle writes about agitations  
 
A keen walker walks because he wants to walk, 
but a perplexed man does not wrinkle his brows 
because he wants or means to wrinkle them, 
though the actor or hypocrite may wrinkle his 
brows because he wants or means to appear 
perplexed. The reason for these differences is 
simple. To be distracted is not like being thirsty 
in the presence of drinking-water; it is like being 
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thirsty in the absence of water, or in the presence 
of foul water. It is wanting to do something while 
not being able to do it, or wanting to do something 
and at the same time wanting not to do it. It is 
the conjunction of an inclination to behave in a 
certain way with an inhibition upon behaving in 
that way. The agitated person cannot think what 
to do, or what to think200.  
 
For Ryle Motives and Inclinations are not Agitations, but they are what we 
might call ‘combinatorial’ or ‘contributable’ or perhaps ‘collectively formative’ 
when combined together in certain ways into Agitations, and because they can 
form Agitations they can thus form Moods. Ryle argues something similar 
happens with Habits which are the semi-agitated forms of the Commotion.  
 Ryle writes 
 
Motives then are not agitations, not even mild 
agitations, nor are agitations motives. But 
agitations presuppose motives, or rather they 
presuppose behaviour trends of which motives 
 
200Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 94. 
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are for us the most interesting sort. Conflicts of 
habits with habits, or habits with unkind facts, or 
habits with motives are also commotion- 
conditions. An inveterate smoker on parade, or 
without any matches, or in Lent, is in this 
plight201. 
 
Agitations thus presuppose Motives and Inclinations, the same way Commotions 
presuppose Habits and Addictions. 
 The Ryleistic idea, however, is simple enough. We can get out our 
notebook, sit down, and calculate an Agitation. Combine any two contrary 
Inclinations, or Motives, or one Inclination, or one Motive with one factual 
impediment, and you’ll get a specific type of Mood, an Agitation. Moods, of 
course, are the genera to which Agitations are the species.  
 But Ryle also cautions us that 
 
Mood words are commonly classified as the 
names of feelings. But if the word 'feeling' is used 
with any strictness, this classification is quite 
erroneous. To say that a person is happy or 
 
201Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 94. 
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discontented is not merely to say that he has 
frequent or continuous tingles or gnawings; 
indeed, it is not to say even this, for we should 
not withdraw our statement on hearing that the 
person had had no such feelings, and we should 
not be satisfied that he was happy or 
discontented merely by his avowal that he had 
them frequently and acutely. They might be 
symptoms of indigestion or intoxication202.  
 
But what are these feelings, these ‘tingles’ and ‘gnawings’. How might ‘tingles’ 
and ‘gnawings’ be mistakenly applied to Moods, and why are Moods, as 
Propensities, different to Occurrences? Moreover, why might someone who has 
‘feelings’ in this second sense of ‘gnawings’ and ‘tingles’ and claims to be in a 
‘Mood’ deserve our dubious glare? What separates these mistaken Moods from 
feelings? Why does Ryle think the title ‘feelings’ so improper? 
 Ryle writes 
 
Feelings . . . are occurrences, but the place that 
mention of them should take in descriptions of 
 
202Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 97. 
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human behavior is very different from that which 
the standard theories accord to it. Moods or 
frames of mind are, unlike motives, but like 
maladies and states of the weather, temporary 
conditions which in a certain way collect 
occurrences, but they are not themselves extra 
occurrences203.  
 
Again, Ryle speaks of Occurrences, from the Propensities and Occurrences 
distinction, which I pointed out at the start of this section.  
 So, it seems, Moods can also contain collections of Occurrences but are 
themselves not Occurrences even though feelings are of course Occurrences. 
That much would make sense, since both Inclinations and Motives are 
Propensities. However, we still do not have an account of what feelings are. 
What exactly does he mean by ‘feelings’? 
 Ryle writes 
 
By 'feelings’ I refer to the sorts of things which 
people often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs, 
throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, 
 
203Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 81. 
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loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, 
tensions, gnawings and shocks. Ordinarily, when 
people report the occurrence of a feeling, they do 
so in a phrase like 'a throb of compassion’, 'a 
shock of surprise’ or 'a thrill of anticipation’204.  
 
At this point I will introduce my own piece of jargon because these little ‘throbs 
of compassion’ these ‘shocks of surprise’ and the ‘thrill of anticipation’ will be 
important to our account, and what, I shall argue, is haunting Ryle’s elaborate 
grammatical machinery. These are the ghosts in Ryle’s machine. The term I 
shall use is ‘flash-bangs’ for the veritable and genuine quality the term evinces 
of the feelings. 
 Flash-bangs are, if a definition is sought, Neo-Rylean semi-Linguistic 
Behavioural terms, that are in Original Rylean205 feelings proper as a sub 
genera of Occurrences, with specific structures that employ either bits of 
onomatopoeia left laying around from other linguistic phenomena, or fragmented 
bits of adjective connected either to a noun of emotion in the genitive case, or an 
emotional adjective functioning substantively.  
 
204Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 81. 
205 Later I will be introducing Rylean sub-dialects. Neo-Rylean are the set of handles I use for these. 
Original Rylean is the Ryle in The Concept of Mind. 
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 Flash-bangs are ‘semi’ Linguistic Behavioural terms in the developing 
description of Ryle’s Linguistic Behavioural methodology because they have a 
number of peculiar properties. The question of just how peculiar these properties 
are is part of the job of this thesis to determine. Just so the form of the argument 
being developed in this thesis is clear, later. I will attack this point from several 
fronts before I question Ryle’s Linguistic Behaviourist distinction to show where 
it breaks down and how we can locate the Occult Stream of Phenomenology in 
Ryle. This is done by locating a point where he uses an Ordinary Language 
argument to justify or ground an argument that Ryle doesn’t have a Behavioural 
Linguistic analysis for. I am going to argue that this type of argument is found 
by locating an Ordinary Language argument without a Linguistic Behaviourist 
description attached and examining the basis on which it rests its distinction or 
point. In most cases it will be a ‘phenomenological’ argument. This customized 
mini-methodology I develop to draw out the ‘occult’ phenomenological content, 
and thereby cross classify the arguments Ryle uses in the Concept of Mind. I 
have called this mini-method ‘Ghostography’ because it reveals where all the 
ghosts haunting the work are hiding. We will see it in action.  
 Ryle writes 
 
Feelings, in any strict sense, are things that come 
and go or wax and wane in a few seconds; they 
stab or they grumble; we feel them all over us or 
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else in a particular part. The victim may say that 
he keeps on having tweaks, or that they come 
only at fairly long intervals. No one would 
describe his happiness or discontentment in any 
such terms. He says that he feels happy or 
discontented, but not that he keeps on feeling, or 
that he steadily feels happy or discontented.206 
 
So far, we can see that flash-bangs have a semi-episodic structure to them, but 
they also have this other part to them, this ‘feely’ bit, that is, we feel them like 
pin pricks. This of course, is part of the problem with a mere Behavioural 
Linguistic description of them because, as Ryle says;  
 
 
It is an important linguistic fact that these 
names for specific feelings, such as 'itch', 'qualm' 
and 'pang' are also used as names of specific 
bodily sensations. If someone says that he has 
just felt a twinge, it is proper to ask whether it 
was a twinge of remorse or of rheumatism, 
 
206Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 97. 
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though the word 'twinge' is not necessarily being 
used in quite the same sense in the alternative 
contexts207.  
 
It is here that we move from a Linguistic Behaviorist claim to an Ordinary 
Language argument, because we are no longer describing linguistic behaviour in 
the claim but calling upon the user’s knowledge of common language.  
 Let us, in fact, consider the difference between ‘a glow of pride’ and a 
‘glow of warmth’. How are the two forms in fact different? Are they different? 
What is the difference between feeling ‘warmth’ and feeling that sudden glow of 
‘pride’? How would we tell the difference? One might, justifiably say that the 
difference is in the use of the expressions and although we can’t actually tell the 
difference from the way the language behaves because the two structures may in 
all other respects behave the same way, so we might still fall back on a common 
domain of language use. That is to say Ryle might claim that it depends on the 
common knowledge possessed by the average user of that language, and say 
‘well he knows the difference’.  
 But suppose this isn’t enough. Suppose that our philosopher insists the 
following, ‘I know he knows the difference, but in your original project, you 
pointed out that he already knows how to use these concepts, but he doesn’t 
 
207Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 81. 
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know how to correlate them, and if your project is to be merit worthy, you also 
promised to give us a map that would show us how to correlate these differences. 
And the map must include this difference. If a map it is, it must be able to map 
it.’  
 ‘Now’ such a philosopher might declare ‘where’s the map?’ 
 And indeed this is a problem for Ryle because the very way out of this 
problem of the difference between glows of pride and glows of warmth, he’s cut 
himself off from because he has disavowed consciousness and introspective 
reflection. If one tried to answer ‘well pride feels this way, and warmth feels that 
way’ and he might accompany this difference by standing our intrepid 
philosopher next to the fire, and then showing the philosopher a picture of a 
woman holding a baby. But is this enough, or does he need the stubborn 
philosopher to participate in the distinction in some way? Does he need the 
philosopher to ‘feel’ these differences? Indeed, he does. The only way one can tell 
the difference is by the exact thing Ryle is arguing against. One must ‘feel’ the 
difference.  
 What exactly is it that one ‘feels’?  
 If we all know what a glow of pride or a glow of warmth is and we can 
relate to them, then what exactly is it that is going on in that act of relation? Do 
we have to stop, take a non-sensory look inside of ourselves, and find that 
difference? Is this some sort of act of ‘introspection’ perhaps? It is here that we 
enter into the third domain of Ryle’s arguments, the surreptitiously hidden 
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Chalmers, Judgements and Phenomenal Zombies. 
 
One of the most insightful and important philosophers working in contemporary 
philosophy of mind today is David Chalmers208. In The Conscious Mind, 
Chalmers defines Consciousness and Judgements in relation to each other.  
 He writes  
 
Alongside every conscious experience there is a content-
bearing cognitive state. This cognitive state is what I am 
calling a first-order judgement209.  
 
 
208 His papers on the unity of consciousness and constructing a science of consciousness are essential 
reading. See Chalmers, David. ‘The Content of Phenomenal Concepts.’ In The Character of 
Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp  251 – 277. See also Chalmers, David. 
‘How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness ‘ Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
1303, no. 1 (2013). 
209 Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind. London Oxford University Press, 1996. Pg 175. Note, 
where he has used the term judgements in his own writings which I quote, I have retained his use of 
lower-case j, however when I use his terminology, and not Kant and Brandom’s doctrines of 
judgement, I use an uppercase J. 
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Phenomenal zombies as Chalmers explains them lack the ‘conscious’ part of 
their cognizance but they are in full possession of the cognitive-content-bearing 
state. So, for instance a phenomenal zombie might be able to detect that a patch 
of colour is red, and the zombie may be able to judge that it is red, but the 
phenomenal zombie would not be able to have a ‘red experience’. We might 
understand this better if we imagined some sort of device that can detect a 
specific wave-length of light that passes in front of its lens, but it does not have 
an experience of the rich and vibrant shade of red that we see.  
 What is important to this unfolding thread of argumentation in this 
thesis about Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie is the claim that the zombie has the 
same Judgements as David Chalmers. What Chalmers means by this is that the 
zombie does not have ‘experiences’ but Chalmers thinks that it is still able to 
form the same Judgements as him. For Chalmers Judgments are Beliefs 
stripped of all of their phenomenal properties210. Phenomenal properties are 
experiences of colours, tastes, smells. A phenomenal zombie might be able to 
detect garlic in the sauce but it would not have the experience of smelling or 
tasting the garlic. Nonetheless he affirms that the phenomenal zombie would 
have exactly the same corresponding Judgements. It will be this that I will be 
bringing into question. 
  
 
210 David Chlamers, The Conscious Mind, 1996, pg 173 – 179. 
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 Chalmers writes  
 
As I am using the term, I think it is natural to say that my zombie 
twin judges that he has conscious experience, and that his judgements 
in that vicinity correspond one-to-one with my mine.211 
 
Chalmers’ argument is interesting and no doubt a valuable addition to the 
Philosophy of Mind.  One of the difficulties I’ve have with Chalmers’ argument 
involves the notion of phenomenal zombies and applying the notion of ‘flash-
bangs’ I introduced in the section immediately prior. I do not think Chalmers’ 
zombie has enough semantics to tell the difference between a flash of joy and a 
flash of anger. I think that pursuing this thread leads to a refutation of 
Chalmers’ claim that both he and the zombie have one for one, the exact same 
Judgements212 even though the zombie does not have the phenomenal 
component in its thoughts. For while I might be able to envisage a zombie or a 
device like a phenomenal zombie that can detect a ‘flash of red’, I find it difficult 
to imagine a phenomenal zombie that can detect and then discriminate a ‘flash 
of anger’ or a ‘pang of regret’ without feeling the anger or the pang of regret. The 
 
211 David Chlamers, The Conscious Mind, 1996, pg 174. 
212 I adopt Chalmers term Judgements but reject his ‘Three Orders of Judgement’ for Sellarian 
reasons that have to do with the pseudo-subjunctive-conditional structure of fact-witholding assent 
by members of a linguistic community. See the footnotes to Wittgenstein’s Account of Language 
Acauisition in the Philosophical Investigations in Chapter Eighteen of this thesis for more discussion 
on this point.  
209 
 
reason why is that neither context, nor linguistic behaviour can offer the 
grounds to do so.  
 Chalmers writes  
 
Judgements can perhaps be understood as what I and my 
zombie twin have in common. My zombie twin does not have 
any conscious experience, but he claims that he does; at 
least, his detailed verbal reports sound the same as my 
own.213 
 
The trouble I have with Chalmers’ claim, and which I argue leads to a refutation 
later in the thesis214, begins with the ‘detailed verbal report’ the phenomenal 
zombie gives. If we return to the problem with Ryle’s ‘flash-bangs’ then there 
arises a questions about where does the zombie get the semantics to tell the 
difference between a ‘flash of sadness’ and a ‘flash of anger’. It might, I concede, 
be able to judge the difference between a ‘flash of light’ and a ‘flash of heat’ 
without recourse to a conscious experience. But without conscious experience of 
what a ‘flash of anger’ is, how does the zombie get the resources for the semantic 
knowledge to tell the difference between flashes of ‘anger’ and ‘sadness’? 
 There are different types of anger to be sure.  
 
213 David Chlamers, The Conscious Mind, 1996, pg 174, 
214 See Chapter Ten: Neuroscience and the Identity of Emotional States in this thesis.  
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 The type of anger I am thinking of right now is what might begin as a 
heavy feeling in the gut. We might call it ‘gut anger’. Gut anger for me starts 
heavy then passes through me in a flash. It has something like a physical 
internal sensation all of its own. I have found myself using the phrase ‘sick to 
my stomach’ in conjunction with the start of it.  It is a unique and specific type of 
anger with a specific character to the way it feels. Without that internal feeling, 
that ‘flash’ one unmistakably feels passing through them, it is difficult to know 
what a ‘flash of anger’ actually is. The semantics for the meaning of the word are 
intimately related to my own experiences of what such a ‘flash’ feels like. Envy 
feels different to a flash of ‘gut anger’. To me they both feel distinctly different to 
what I would describe as sadness.  
 Without those feelings it is puzzling where the phenomenal zombie gets 
its understanding to tell the difference between the ‘flashes’ in order to make its 
verbal reports about how it feels? 
 I put the following forward in this thesis. While Chalmers might be able 
to get his phenomenal zombies to form Judgements about cognitive states 
concerning the detection of publicly observable sensory objects like ‘red’ and 
‘hard’, or temperature, through covariance with the environment like Price’s 
Thermostat, the trouble I have is with the ‘non-optical’ introspective sensory 
qualities of emotions, ‘feelings proper’ or ‘flash-bangs’ and the verbal reports the 
zombie might offer about its emotions. Quite simply I think that the zombie does 
not have the semantic understanding to make the same meaningful statements 
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about ‘flashes of anger’ or ‘flashes of envy’ that humans can make. I think it can 
not do so, firstly, because it can not develop semantic language competence for 
these statements, and secondly, because it simply can not feel them. It is a 
phenomenal zombie. By definition it can not have ‘flash-bang’ experiences.  
 However, before I can demonstrate that point at length, we need to 
examine Ryle’s arguments on language and thought, even deeper because they 
will reveal a fatal flaw in attempts to reduce all thought to mere language and 
why language is insufficient for covering all of the facts in a domain of mind. 
These will not be new or exotic facts, but rather facts drawn from Ryle’s own 
philosophical arguments. To do so we need to clear up a few facts about Ryle, 
and correct some common tendencies in historical misreadings. It is to this that 








Introspection, Retrospection, Consciousness and the Log Keeper of the 
mind 
 




Was Ryle a Behaviourist? If so which Ryle and which type of 
Behaviourist? 
 
As David Armstrong points out, one of the most puzzling aspects of The Concept 
of Mind is Ryle’s position on introspection and consciousness.  
 Armstrong writes  
 
As a physicalist I originally thought, when young, 
that Gilbert Ryle’s Concept of Mind, read as a 
sophisticated behaviourism, might do the trick 
for the mind. I was always troubled, though, by 
the apparent denial of introspection. Ayer’s clever 
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remark that a behaviourist must pretend to be 
anaesthetized struck home.215 
 
Indeed G. E. Myers in his taxonomy of Rylean Behaviourism and Rylean  
Behaviourists, echoed by David Chalmers, tends to think that the significance of 
a ‘behaviouristic’216’ move in psychology which they see Ryle as making is to 
disengage from introspection, consciousness and introspective states while 
offering an account of mind217. But just because Ryle is attacking historical 
doctrines of phenomenal consciousness does not make him a Behaviourist. I 
think this is where many misreadings of Ryle begin, for while Ryle does attack 
historical notions of consciousness218, Ryle also attacks and critiques 
Behaviourism as being part of a Stoic-Hobbist tradition that commits itself to 
the ‘Bogey of Mechanism’ and seeks to provide a ‘volitional account’ of human 
behaviour.   
Sellars’ position on Ryle is more informative. Sellars’ reading of Ryle 
focuses on (i) the ‘log keeper’ cognitive function in Ryle’s notion of retrospection, 
and (ii) various species of Ryle’s ‘mindologue’ along with the findings from Ryle’s 
Linguistic Behavioral Analysis, the most important of which, for Sellars, are 
 
215Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pg 
105 
216 Not in these sense I use it, in the more general sense like G. E. Myers defines it. See the footnote 
immediately below.  
217Myers, G. E. ‘Motives and Wants.’ Mind Vol. 73, no. 290 (1964): Pp. 173-185. Pg 173 
218 See Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp 153 – 154. 
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Ryle’s ‘achievement verbs’. Sellars uses the term ‘in foro interno’ to refer to the 
mental narrator in our inner thoughts, which I take to equate with Ryle’s ‘log 
keeper’ role and certain species of ‘mindologue’219. Here we find that Sellars has 
picked up on Ryle’s argument about language not refering to thoughts, but 
rather (just as Ryle argues that thought can be treated as language within the 
domain of a philosophy of mind), Sellars argues that thoughts can be treated as 
analogous to language in the fledgling stages of the Scientific Image of Man. 
However, Sellars position is not that of Ryle’s.  The fledgling stages of the 
Scientific Image of Man occur, in Sellars’ Developmental Anthropo-
Epistemology, when the newly emergent Scientific Image of the World clashes 
with the older inherited Manifest Image of Man. The use of language as a 
medium for capturing thought is merely a convenient stage in Sellars 
Developmental Anthropo-Epistermology. Sellars think the fledgling 
neurosciences will eventually surpass common language ascriptions of thought 
in a body of neurological and scientific knowledge. Sellars is pro-Ryle, but only 
until a proper neuroscientific project gets off the ground. Ryle is merely a stage 
in Sellars’ big picture.  
Sellars thinks that a Rylean language can avoid paradoxes that arise from 
introspection by starting with a theory about the social conditions under which 
public meaning can become expressible as part of the linguistic practices of a 
 
219 See Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 pg 91, numbered section 48 for Sellars 
discussion of a Rylean language.   
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community and the development of language 220.  Sellars’ ‘Socio-Linguistic 
Theory’ of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind focuses on the way in which 
Observation Languages, which contain certain features of natural language, like 
similes and metaphorical descriptions, become Report Languages which are 
capable of carrying the full epistemic authority of factual statements221. Sellars 
sees the point of a Rylean Behaviourist language not as a denial that 
consciousness takes place, but as part of a developmental stage in his ‘Socio-
Linguistic theory of language’ and critical for explaining what Sellars sees as 
linguistic processes underlying the creation of knowledge. Sellars thinks Ryle 
can provide the grounds for a stage in a theory about how language impressions 
and ideas develop as theoretical entities222 into a rich vocabulary that is able to 
explain human thought. The picture that emerges is one in which Sellars sees 
Ryle as part of a developmental story that entails a type of behaviourism which 
we characterized and filled out with caveats and insights from Gleeson, as 
‘Gross-Body-Language Behaviourism’ in the Introduction.  
 
220Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 see pp 87 – 88 for Sellars account of ‘private 
reports’ which Sellars argues a Rylean language cannot posses. I agree with Sellars, Ryle, from a 
Linguistic Behaviourist perspective cannot argue for ‘private episodes’ in the sense of the 
phenomenological distinction in the Reader/Witness argument, or the Remember-How/Remember-
When distinction although ‘Original Ryle’ does. Seen from this angle, my strategy is to focus on the 
inconsistency between Sellars reading and the arguments that actually occur in Original Ryle to 
bring out these phenomenological elements and exploit them as resources for an argument for a 
return to a Pre-Fregeian Psychologism.  
221 Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, (various editions). Section 34. 
222 See Jay F. Rosenberg. ‘Wilfrid Sellars on ‘Mental States’’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, no 28. 
(2004): 239 – 265, and his argument that the Myth of Jones is a theory of thoughts.  
216 
 
Ryle’s own position on Historically Situated Psychological Behaviourism is 
perhaps a little more cryptic because it changes between The Concept of Mind223, 
where Ryle thinks it is mistaken, but is also positively disposed towards the 
possibilities of its discoveries, and later in On Thinking, where he rejects it224. 
But even in his earlier positive phase, there is a highly critical element in his 
interpretation of what a Psychological Behaviourist approach entails. While 
critical, this earlier criticism is different to what emerges later in his negative 
account of Psychological Behaviourism in On Thinking.  
  In The Concept of Mind Ryle thinks that what is positive in strands of 
Historically Situated Psychological Behaviourism like Skinner’s and Watson’s is 
the rejection of what he holds as the ‘‘Two World’s Myth’ and the Cartesian 
notion that the mind is its own place.  What he sees as the positive side of the 
Psychological Behaviourist notion is that it challenges accounts of psychology 
that rely on the assumption there is a mysterious inner world separate from the 
everyday world people live in. Ryle thinks that the place the mind happens is 
the world. He thinks that the mind of the Rugby Union player is not inside his 
head, it is on the football field. Likewise, the mind of the Judoka is out on the 




223 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1983, pp 308 – 311.  
224 Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, pp 17 -31. 
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Ryle writes in The Concept of Mind 
 
The Behaviourists’ methodological program has been of 
revolutionary importance to the program of psychology. But 
more, it has been one of the main sources of the philosophical 
suspicion that the two-worlds story is a myth225.  
 
This is Ryle’s positive view of Historically Situated Behaviourism in The Concept 
of Mind. However, Ryle also sees a negative tendency in Historically Situated 
Psychological Behaviouristic accounts to collapse into a kind of ‘mechanist’ view 
of human behaviour, akin to the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ where the 
Psychological Behaviourist engaged in research searches for causal factors of 
human behaviour226. Ryle thinks this is a methodological fault in their research. 
Ryle sees this fault built into the methodological research project of 
Psychological Behaviourism in general and he thinks this causes it to veer off 
into the cluster of category mistakes and problematic language constructs that 
Ryle sees as making up ‘The Bogey of Mechanism’ he argues fervently against in 
The Concept of Mind227. This is the same type of mistake that Ryle finds in 
Augustine and the Stoics. He sees Augustine and the Stoics as the start of a 
 
225 Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 310. 
226 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1983, pp 308 – 311.. 
227 Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pp 61 – 74. 
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historically situated strand of philosophical thinking that tries to explain human 
behaviour using ‘volitions’. This tendency to mechanize human behaviour, which 
he thinks derives from borrowing concepts about scientific causality, originates 
in Aristotles models of causation. It is this which lies behind the critical and 
negative side of Ryle’s reception of the historical schools of Psychological 
Behaviourist Theories in his earlier phase of The Concept of Mind. He thinks 
Augustine and the Stoics are the ancient part of a thread that develops into the 
‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’ during the Enlightenment and that the 
Behaviourists have picked up a version of this category mistake from Thomas 
Hobbes.  
             Indeed, he calls this methodological tendency to view human action in 
causal mechanistic terms a ‘Hobbist view’ of human behaviour when it is applied 
by Historical Behavioruistic Schools to a research agenda228. Thomas Hobbes is 
of course famous for the view that thinking is but a motion of limbs229 and here 
Ryle thinks historical schools of Psychological Behaviourists like those started 
by Pavlov, Thorndike and Watson, are mistakenly searching for what causes 
those limbs to move to give an account of the mind.  
In describing this tendency of the Psychological Behaviourist to veer 
towards Hobbesian Mechanism, Ryle writes in The Concept of Mind  
 
228 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1983, pp 308 – 311. 
229 See Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2007, pg 38. There he 




It is a matter of relatively slight importance that the 
champions of this methodological principle have tended to 
espouse as well a kind of Hobbist theory, and even to 
imagine that the truth of mechanism is entailed by the truth 
of their theory of scientific research method in psychology.230 
 
Ryle’s view of Psychological Behaviourism changes in his much later work On 
Thinking. As I pointed out earlier, in The Concept of Mind Ryle rejects the 
notion that all the types of thinking that accompany the execution of the sets of 
verbs in the family of dispositions which he identifies as ‘Capacity Dispositions’ 
are essentially linguistic in character. For instance, Ryle rejects the notion that 
untangling a skein of wool involved thinking only in words231. Ryle thought that 
a demonstration of competence did not necessitate or automatically entail the 
ability to state that knowledge in propositional forms which  need-be encoded 
into sentences, or that internalized linguistic thought was necessary to 
accompany the execution of skills. In The Concept of Mind Ryle’s thesis is that 
the everyday language that ordinary people use has a special authority in claims 
about the mind within the Philosophy of Mind. It has this authority, Ryle 
thinks, because this is the language that people think in. This focus on language 
 
230 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1983, pp 308 – 311. 
231 Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, Pg 266. 
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leads Ryle to reject consciousness and see it merely as a historically constructed 
notion within the larger picture he paints of specialized disciplines using their 
vocabularies to muddle Ordinary Language Discourse. Ryle replaces 
‘introspection’ with ‘retrospection’ which uses what he describes as a log keeper 
account of the mind. The evidence for the existience of this ‘log keeper of 
retrospection’, Ryle points out, is if you ask someone what they are thinking 
about, they have no trouble telling you232.  
                The foundation for the distinction between the types of dispositions 
which use language in their thinking, and those that do not can be found in his 
rejection of introspection and his assertion that introspection takes a ‘non-
optical’ look at the contents of thoughts. Ryle thinks that the facts relevant to 
the domain, which most classical theorists of mind like Descartes and Locke 
thought could be established by introspection, Ryle thinks could be much better 
covered by retrospection and his ‘log keeper’ account. Ryle thinks classical 
thinkers of mind were mistaken in focussing their efforts on private experience, 
rather than focusing on language.  
In On Thinking Ryle develops a thesis with a very different focus to a 
historical critique of the concept of the mind in philosophy and the sciences. 
There he takes on the task of developing an ‘alphabet of thought’ based on the 
adverbs of manner233 which contain the inheritance conditions of the capacity 
 
232 See Chapter Ten, Ryle’s Log Keeper of the Mind, in this thesis.  
233 Ryle, On Thinking, 1979. Pp 17 -31. 
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verbs. These are the same kinds of capacity verbs which he identifies and 
originally talks about in The Concept of Mind234. In On Thinking he also rejects 
the sweeping statement that all thinking is a form of talking to one’s self, and 
the related claim that all thought is language. Quantifiably235 this is the same 
thesis he presents in The Concept of Mind. (i.e. (∃x) (Lx . Tx) where L is language and 
T is thought). But in On Thinking he expands on his original discussion of 
capacity verbs236, and explores relationships between adverbs of manner. In both 
works he maintains that some thinking is done in language, but not all.  Where 
he changes is in the emphasis Ryle places on the strength of what that ‘some 
thinking’ entails.  
The Concept of Mind, however, maintains a much stronger and 
philosophically novel view than On Thinking because it deals with the authority 
of Ordinary Language within the Philosophy of Mind. Earlier Ryle bases the 
authority of language analysis and the claim it can unravel the mysteries of 
mind, on refuting views about introspection, consciousness, feelings, sensations, 
motives, memories and so on made by other philosophers. The earlier Ryle is 
concerned with sketching a map made up from the families of Tendency 
Dispositons, Propensities, Occurrences, Moods, Motives, Commotions, 
 
234 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1983. Pp 130-146.   
235 I mean specifically here, Ryle argues in The Concept of Mind (∃x) (Lx . Tx), some types of thinking 
is language. In On Thinking he argues (∃x) (Lx . Tx), some thinking is language. The doctrine that 
changes is what Ryle thinks the mind is. The categorical mistake is to equate all of thinking with the 
doctrine of mind offered by classical theorists since the Stoics.  
236 Ryle, On Thinking, 1979. Pp 17- 31. Particularly pp 26 – 29.  
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Inclinations and ‘Feelings proper’. Earlier Ryle of The Concept of Mind uses his 
map and families of words to explain away the facts a theory of mind normally 
covers inclusive of an account that does away with the need to explain 
consciousness and doctrines about reflection, amphibolies, perceptibility, 
impressions, passions and introspection. The Concept of Mind maintains that 
Ordinary Language has a special type of authority in the philosophy of mind 
because this is the language people think in237. If this is so then it makes an 
anti-psychologistic project tenable. However, pace Ryle, I will argue, of course, 
that it is not238 .  
What differs between Ryle’s two works is that the emphasis on language 
to explain the mind in his account in On Thinking is not strong enough to 
support his earlier claims about the authority of Ordinary Language in The 
Concept of Mind. On Thinking focuses on skills, methods, abilities and, in 
particular, the Capacity Dispositions. It is my view that a theory that tried to 
reduce an account of skills and capacities to language would reduce the domain 
of those skills and capacities to instances of the mere expression of language 
which is plainly ridiclious. Such a theory would only make sense if people lived 
 
237 What Ryle means by that can be found specifically in the argument that he can replace 
introspection with a log keeper account of the mind. Why this is important is because if Ryle is right 
he can cover all of the facts in the domain of a theory of mind about consciousness and introspection 
with a language-based account of the mind. He can use an Occam’s Razor to slice off the need for an 
account of consciousness and simply use his unique language analysis of the common spoken word to 
cover all the facts covered in traditional and classical theories about the mind. 
238 See both the Introduction to this paper, and the Conclusion and Afterword.  
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in internet chatrooms, inhabited books or everything one did had to be 
represented in language, to get done. I call this the Gumby view of the mind, and 
Ryle rejects it. Gumby was a fictional character in children’s entertainment, who 
could live inside the language of books and go on adventures.  Ryle maintains a 
similar rejection to the Gumby argument that all thought must be language-
based in The Concept of Mind, except there he argues that people can talk about 
the Capacity Dispositions, using adverbs of manner. However, while he thinks 
adverbs of manner like ‘carefully’ can identify capacity verbs, he also thinks it is 
not necessary to be thinking in verbiage while completing capacity tasks239 
 Where the emphasis changes is that  On Thinking does not attempt to 
replace historical doctrines about consciousness and the mind with an analysis 
of language. He has dropped the argument that he can replace the philosophy of 
mind, and a need for an account of consciousness with a philosophy of language. 
He has shifted from the family of Motive, Belief, Inclination, Propensities, 
Occurrences and Moods in his ‘map’ which he thought could replace a philosophy 
of mind, to examination of the other major family he touches on in his earlier 
work. On Thinking is chiefly concerned with developing a philosophy of the 
Capacity Dispositions. This is why it is so important to go back and correct 
Weitz’s mistake about Ryle and see that there is not one uniform type of 
disposition, but, in fact, there are many different dispositional types in Ryle. 
 
239 Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, Pg 266. 
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These different dispositional types are what lay behind Ryle’s why/how 
distinction. Ryle’s argument is that beliefs and motives are ‘that-clauses’ 
whereas skills answer how-clauses. This is also part of the body of the Linguistic 
Behavioural Arguments Ryle uses to sepparate the family of Motives, 
Inclinations and Beliefs he identifies, from the family verbs making up the Skill 
and Capacity  Dispositions. The Skills and Capacity Dispositions are what 
concerns the later Ryle in On Thinking. At both stages of his development he 
does not think the Skills and Capacities are all reducable to linguistic 
expressions or that people are necessarily thinking in language while 
performing them. However, his thesis about how much of the mind can be 
explained away by language-analysis does change with his new focus on adverbs 
of manner for capacity verbs.   
 Along with his shift to adverbs of manner for capacity verbs in his On 
Thinking stage he also has a much weaker version of the thesis that some types 
of thinking are done in language. Accompanying this there is a shift in his view 
of what Behaviourism and Cartesian claims are based on, and a newer refined 
negative critique he develops of them from the adverbial descriptions of the 
verbs belonging to the Capacity Dispositions he is studying in On Thinking. 
What he is attacking are what he sees as Cartesian and Behaviourist versions of 
the view that all thinking is done as a type of language. His ‘adverse account’ of 
Behaviourism in On Thinking becomes the argument that Behaviourism tries to 
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reduce all of thinking to audible forms of soliloquizing or internal narration240. 
His adverse account of the Cartesian mistake in On Thinking is that it treats all 
types of thinking as an internal duplicate of language241.  
In both cases his criticism of Cartesian and Psychological Behaviourism 
changes from that in The Concept of Mind to the one he offers in On Thinking. 
In The Concept of Mind, of course, he thought the mistake with the historical 
forms of Psychological Behaviourism budding in his era242, was the tendency 
towards a causal mechanism he characterized as ‘Hobbist’, while the Cartesian 
mistake he also argues in the earlier work, The Concept of Mind, was a series of 
blunders that led to viewing the mind as its own place. For the purposes of 
developing the thesis we are not interested with Ryle’s later work of On 
Thinking because the adverbial account he develops for an ‘alphabet of thinking’ 
is not strong enough to support what is most novel in Ryle, which is the 
argument for an Ordinary Language Account of the Mind which can do away 
with the need for both theories of introspection and an account of consciousness. 
At this point it is well to recall, now, that the specific reason we are interested in 
Ryle’s account in The Concept of Mind is that it offered psychologists a way out 
of the Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference which plagues statements, 
theories, surveys and collection of data in the disciplines of mind.   
 
240 Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, pp 17 -31. 
241  Ryle, On Thinking, 1979, pp 17 -31. 
242 I.e. Pavlov, Thorndike, Watson &c.  
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There are other changes in On Thinking, and some incongruence in some 
of his statements that make On Thinking problematic for drawing material to 
support his earlier work. For these reasons this paper concentrates on his earlier 
work in The Concept of Mind.  
I think that getting Ryle’s views on ‘psychological behaviourism’ 
‘consciousness’ and ‘introspection’ (which have confused or puzzled many 
important philosophers as David Armstrong, himself admits), untangled is 
important scholarly work because it makes Ryle’s position clearer and secures 
many of his insights as accessible for future work. What I want to do, briefly, 
now is draw out exactly what Ryle means by ‘introspection’ and ‘consciousness’ 
in The Concept of Mind in as quickly, shrewdly and accurately a way as possible 
because interpreting what Ryle meant by ‘introspection’ and ‘consciousness’ has 
become a bit of a muddle in many contradictory accounts of what Ryle’s 
significance was, and as Armstrong admits, it has bothered many philosophers 










Sea Water, Consciousness and Introspection. Gilbert Ryle on 
Mindfulness. 
 
The account of Ryle’s position on ‘introspection’ I offer will be limited to that 
presented in The Concept of Mind and shall avoid confusing this with views in 
his other major works and papers. What makes Ryle’s arguments even more 
confusing than one might anticipate is the ‘Occult Strain of Phenomenological 
Argumentation’ hidden in the work itself. On the one hand, Ryle argues against 
introspective acts of consciousness 243 but on the other hand he has an account of 
the mind’s eye244 which, as we will see, requires introspection of exactly the ‘non-
sensory’ and ‘non-optical’ kind, the same kind that Ryle argues does not exist. 
Understanding what is wrong with Ryle’s attack on introspection involves 
understanding the nature of the attack, which has two stages, and then 
contrasting this with some of his other arguments from The Concept of Mind 
that seem to require these very same introspective acts he eschews. 
For the first stage of his attack on introspection Ryle argues that 
introspection is a theoretical and technical term introduced by art. 
 
243Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 149.  




‘Introspection’ is a term of art and one for which 
little use is found in the self-descriptions of 
untheoretical people.245.  
 
Ryle argues ‘introspective’ is used as an adjective for the type of person who pays 
more heed than usual to problems regarding ‘his own character, abilities, 
deficiencies and oddities’246. This also fits in with one of the uses he allows for 
the term ‘self conscious’ which we will explore in a moment247. However here 
“introspective” is being used in a dispositional sense as a personality trait much 
like an Inclination or a Tendency.  
 Ryle does not allow ‘introspective’ as an adjective to describe phenomenal 
properties of types of experience. He would reject the term ‘the introspective 
qualitative aspect of consciousness’ and dogmatically deny that phenomenal 
aspects of consciousness have introspectible qualities. This leads to the second 
stage of his attack. The second stage of Ryle’s strategy is to attack what I term 




245Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 156. 
246Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg156. 




(I)ntrospection is described as being unlike sense 
observation in important respects. Things looked 
at, or listened to, are public objects, in principle 
observable by any suitably placed observer, 
whereas only the owner of a mental state or 




The difference here is that  
 
 
Sense perception, again, involves the functioning 
of bodily organs, such as the eyes, the ears, or the 
tongue, whereas introspection involves the 
functioning of no bodily organ249. 
 
 
248Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 157. 
249Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 157. 
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There is a problem here in what Ryle is trying to do. The problem runs through 
The Concept of Mind, and once one has seen the cause of the problem, it 
immediately arises like a fault-line in the geological strata of his argumentation.  
On the one hand Ryle argues against introspective scrutiny, in favour of 
the view that we can understand the mind using language. He thinks that 
consciousness is a false doctrine that arose from the Protestant Reformation, 
and that the notion of introspection is, likewise a mistake. He thinks it is 
mistaken because thought is not like sea water. For Ryle the types of thought 
that is normally discussed by theorists of mind as introspection, consciousness, 
conscience and contemplation are accessibly linguistic, and thought is language 
either in silent soliquay (in sotto voco is Sellars’ term for Ryle’s doctrine of 
thinking in language), or spoken aloud in which case Ryle thinks it is clearly 
communicable since people are able to understand each others’ emotions, 
feelings and motives in the everyday world. Ryle’s argument why such is so, is 
that if you ask someone what they are thinking they can tell you. Moreover, 
when they tell you what they are thinking it is in simple and plain words and 
not the languages of Freudian fixations, Carl Rogers personal development or 
Blooms taxonomy. He argues that one person does not need special training or 
knowledge to understand the thoughts of another person when they ask them 
what they are thinking. Ryle thinks it is only when people utilize highly abstract 
academic languages about the mind that confusions arise over what the terms 
mean and refer to. What we think of as ‘consciouness’ Ryle typically thinks is a 
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mistake that has crept into our language from historical periods. For Ryle 
‘consciousness’ is either ‘awareness’ of objects, the loss of sensation in some part 
of the body (I lost consciousness from the knee down), or noticing something 
different or new, (I was conscious the furniture had been changed.) Moreover, 
Ryle makes a further interesting claim which creates challenges for the Naïve 
Psycho-Realist. He thinks there are no hidden organs of introspection or 
consciousness in the mind. The evidence for this, Ryle thinks, is the fact that 
when asked to perform an act of perception or introspection, to introspect upon 
consciousness, or to talk about conscious perception, people can not do so 
without reference to some external object or to a bodily organ. Prima facie this 
seems like a good argument. One struggles to find talk of the ID or the 
enantiodromic pathways in everyday talk to analyze, but plenty of discussion of 
noticing a change in a room’s furniture or becoming conscious of an itching 
sensesation on the nape of a neck.   
On the other hand, however, Ryle uses arguments himself that rest their 
appeal upon hidden acts involving what it is natural to describe as introspective 
scrutiny. You could say that Ryle shoots himself in the foot, because many of the 
arguments buried in The Concept of Mind contain counter-examples to his 
leading arguments once one has sat down, and spent some considerable time 
reflecting on them. For instance, Ryle’s argument that ‘seeing’ involves 
visualization and seeing involves perception depends on an act of introspectable 
discrimination, which in turn requires the ability to differentiate between the 
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phenomenal aspects of consciousness involved in sense perception and 
visualization250. This is a distinction so fine, Ryle thinks, that Hume was unable 
to discern it.  
 Ryle writes 
 
To see is one thing; to picture or visualise is 
another. A person can see things, only when his 
eyes are open, and when his surroundings are 
illuminated; but he can have pictures in his 
mind's eye, when his eyes are shut and when the 
world is dark. Similarly, he can hear music only 
in situations in which other people could also 
hear it; but a tune can run in his head, when his 
neighbour can hear no music at all251. 
 
In particular, he needs these two senses of see and ‘see’ as well as hear and 
‘hear’ to differentiate between two uses of the term ‘lively’ for which, he thinks, 
Hume was mistaken.  
  
 
250Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 257 NB. This is the account of the ‘mind’s eye’ which I also 
mentioned in the introduction.  
251Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pp 236 – 237. 
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Ryle writes  
 
Hume's attempt to distinguish between ideas and 
impressions by saying that the latter tend to be 
more lively than the former was one of two bad 
mistakes. Suppose, first, that 'lively’ means 
‘vivid'. A person may picture vividly, but he 
cannot see vividly. One 'idea'  
may be more vivid than another 'idea', but 
impressions cannot be described as vivid at all, 
just as one doll can be more lifelike than another, 
but a baby cannot be lifelike or unlifelike. To say 
that the difference between babies and dolls is 
that babies are more lifelike than dolls is an 
obvious absurdity. . . . Alternatively, if Hume was 
using 'vivid' to mean not 'lifelike' but 'intense', 
'acute' or 'strong', then he was mistaken in the 
other direction; since, while sensations can be 
compared with other sensations as relatively 
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intense, acute or strong, they cannot be so 
compared with images252.  
 
Moreover Ryle writes 
 
When I fancy I am hearing a very loud noise, I 
am not really hearing either a loud or a faint 
noise; I am not having a mild auditory sensation, 
as I am not having an auditory sensation at all, 
though I am fancying that I am having an 
intense one. An imagined shriek is not ear-
splitting, nor yet is it a soothing murmur, and an 
imagined shriek is neither louder nor fainter 
than a heard murmur. It neither drowns it nor is 
drowned by it.  
 
For Ryle sensations are not like images, and imaged or visualized things are not 
like things one sees. An imagined or fancied sound is not like a heard shriek. To 
see and ‘see’ and hear and ‘hear’ are different things. He needs something like a 
theory of introspection of exactly the kind he eschews to differentiate between 
 
252Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pp 236 – 237. 
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the qualitative features and aspects of the phenomenal properties in either case 
and draw a qualitative difference between them. If he tries to base the difference 
between perceptual seeing and visualizational ‘seeing’ on the fact that one can 
do the latter while his eyes are closed he is going to run into problems with (a) 
the non-sensory element of visualization, that is, because no sense organ is being 
used while the eyes are closed and (b) which as Ryle admits the difference 
between the two types of ‘seeing’ can also be experienced while the eyes are 
open. Likewise hearing and ‘hearing’ requires one to take stock of differing 
introspective qualities between the two acts to fully appreciate the distinction. 
Surely one can visualize while one’s eyes are open or ‘hear’ a tune which 
someone else cannot without stopping up the ears. What Ryle needs is exactly 
what he eschews, that is Ryle needs a theory of ‘introspection’ as a process that 
‘involves the functioning of no bodily organ’ to uphold this difference. 
Indeed this is what I suspect has puzzled many philosophers because 
many of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments use introspective scrutiny and 
rely on an examination of different types of consciousness. These arguments will 
provide the key for the overall argument of this thesis and provide material for 
identifying the surreptiously hidden ‘phenomenal source’ behind many of Ryle’s 







Ryle’s Log Keeper of the Mind. 
 
Ryle posits a sort of log-keeper internal mechanism to replace the notion of 
introspection. This log keeper internal mechanism keeps a log of events and is 
responsible for a type of status report that can report events, activities and 
actions253. 
Ryle writes  
 
It is certainly true that when I do, feel or witness 
something, I usually could and frequently do pay 
swift retrospective heed to what I have just done, 
felt or witnessed. I keep, much of the time, some 
sort of log or score of what occupies me, in such a 
way that, if asked what I had just been hearing 
 
253 Ryle, Concept of Mind, 1983. Pg 153. See Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. 
Section XII Our Rylean Ancestors, Subsection 48. Sellars calls this log keeper form of narration ‘in 
foro interno’. It arises from the language of the behavourism of the ‘Messianic Behaviourist’ Jones, 
and the sophistication that develops when an Observational Language that describes behavour 
moves into a Report Language and people begin applying third personal observations to first 
personal reports.  
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or picturing or saying, I could usually give a 
correct answer.254 
 
This last distinction is in line with a specific argumentative move that Ryle calls 
‘being alive to what one is doing’. The argument here is that the person must be 
able to report their actions or thoughts in a verbal manner. Ryle thinks that if a 
person cannot or does not report the presence of a mental phenomena like that 
of Augustinian ‘volitions’, Humeian ‘passions’ or Freudian ‘castration fears’ as 
part of ‘being alive to what they are doing’ or as a status report for an activity 
like reciting ‘Little Miss Muffet’ backwards, then such terms and theoretical 
concepts are not applicable to an account of the nature of mind. This view is 
what underlies his argument for an implicit criterion like we investigated earlier 
in the chapter on Dummett255. For Ryle the person needs to be able to 
 
254Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 152. Also see Chalmers. The Conscious Mind, 1996. Pg 28, where 
Chalmers distinguishes phenomenal consciousness, consciousness, access consciousness and 
reportability which parallel the above distinction in Ryle. Specifically, what Ryle is describing 
parallels what is defined by Chalmers as ‘access consciousness’. ‘Access consciousness’ is a state in 
which the content of consciousness is poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, rational control of 
action and rational control of speech. My strategy is to focus on anological constructs that arise from 
what I claim is a pre-linguistic position accessible from the direct first personal perspective, and 
codified with the third person perspective when it enters into a language ‘role’. This insight depends 
on developing the argument from ‘flash-bangs’. That argument won’t make complete sense until the 
end of the thesis. Suffice to say, the linguistic codification of ‘access consciousness’ implicates, from 
the position argued by the end of this thesis, a third personal perspective. I will point out how the 
pieces fit together in the footnotes as we go along. See also Tim Bayne & David Chalmers. ‘What Is 
the Unity of Consciousness.’ In The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation edited 
by Chris Frith Axel Cleeremans. Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012 @ 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198508571.001.0001/acprof-
9780198508571 downloaded 05/06/2012: Oxford, 2003. Section 3, for Bayne and Chalmers’ discussion 
of Access Unity and Phenomenal Unity.   
255 See The Primacy of The Sentence and Propositional Thought, in this thesis. 
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communicate their thoughts because they think in language. Ryle and Dummett 
hold that language is the very medium of thoughts. For Ryle and Dummett 
language is not a code that thoughts are put into in order to transmit them. If 
every day people have no words in their ordinary everyday idiom to match the 
neologismistic speculations of the psychologist or philosopher then Ryle thinks 
such speculation has no place in an account of the mind.   
 The trouble facing Ryle for the ‘log-keeper role’ in his account of 
‘retrospection’ is that he does not have the Behavioural Linguistic support for 
his own arguments. Like the question of whether a phenomenal zombie can 
make content-bearing Judgments without the ability to introspect on the 
phenomenal qualities of those Judgements, we may ask where Ryle’s log keeper 
gets the understanding to tell the difference between flashes of envy, sadness 
and anger if they do not have the conscious experiences to reflect on. If a log-
keeper of the mind does not have the conscious capacity to distinguish between a 
‘glow-of-pride’ and a ‘glow-of-joy’ because it cannot reflect on the way those 
emotions make them feel, how does it get the capacity to differentially articulate 
the way someone is feeling to retrospectively keep a log of it? The difference 
cannot be situational in the way that a person can make a report in the presence 
of a publicly observable object in standard conditions, and that report can be 
endorsed or rejected according to the standards of the community, like a 
Sellarsian Object Report Language. For people feel a multitude of different 
emotions in the same situation and the same publicly observable conditions. The 
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same ‘stimulus’ given in standard conditions can evoke anger, fear, disgust, 
envy, sadness or anxiety. The report given for the way something makes 
someone feel does not depend upon a correct interpretation of the stimulus 
according to the standard conditions endorsed by the linguistic community. 
Rather it depends upon the person’s reaction which is not publicly observable 
and accepted within the standard conditions interpreted by that community.  
 Without the ability to introspect it is very difficult to see where the 
internal narrator of the log keeper gets the understanding to talk about ‘flashes 
of grief’ and ‘flashes of anger’, and be able to differentiate between the ways they 




















The Three Examples of what you cannot do with language alone. 
 
Ryle has more facts than he can cover in his theory of mind. That is, Ryle’s own 
arguments produce more facts than his language-based theory of mind can offer 
us the semantics for. These are not new or exotic facts, imported from another 
philosopher. They are facts which arise from Ryle’s own arguments. They arise 
from his occult phenomenology.  
 I am going to focus on three specific examples that go beyond his ability 
to offer an account using Linguistic Behavioural descriptions. By ‘occult 
phenomenology’ I mean specifically that he engages in phenomenological 
argumentation surreptitiously without acknowledging that he is doing so. By 
‘phenomenological argumentation’ I mean argumentation that requires 
phenomenal introspection into what something is like, rather than relying on 
linguistic analyses of specific bits of language, i.e. concrete manifestations of 
language as an investigation characterized by either an implicit or explicit 
theory of linguistic meaning.  Phenomenal arguments require insight into ‘what 
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something is like256’ rather than simply grammatical analyses of competence in a 
bit of language. Where one compares the phenomenal properties of one 
introspective experience with the phenomenal properties of another 
introspective experience, to make an argument, and reflects on these differences 
I say that they are doing phenomenology.  
 The three examples will be (1) the Reader / Witness argument, (2) the 
species of Occurrences designated as ‘feelings-proper’ which I pointed out and 
called ‘flash-bangs’ so as to dramatize them in a memorable way and (3) the 
exercise of anticipating one’s next thought. These will allow me to isolate the 
Occult Phenomenological Strain hidden in Ryle’s method of argumentation. 
Differentiating this Occult Phenomenological Strain hidden from the Linguistic 
Behavioural Strain in Ryle’s argumentation is important because later I will use 
it to pin-point a contradiction that arises from Linguistic Behavioural 
descriptions of ordinary language uses of dispositions based on Robert Wolff’s 
argument against Ryle. Robert Wolff thinks dispositions act holistically when 
given and used to describe someone from the third person. Wolff thinks they 
describe what someone is likely to do rather than acting as a force compelling 
people to do different things and causing ‘aggitations’ and ‘commotions’. Ryle of 
course thinks they cause ‘aggitations’ and ‘commotions’ when certain 
 
256 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 1996. Pp 152 – 182. Bergson, Henri. Time and Free  
Will, an Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Translated by M.A.  F. L.  




dispositions come into conflict with each other or are impeded by an obstacle. 
What Wolff’s argument reveals is the illusion in Ryle of dispositions acting like a 
force compelling people to act in certain ways rather than a description taken 
from the third person point of view. Ryle’s argument trades on a type of 
Autophenomenological Normativity which employs its persuasive force through 
an Analogical Construct surreptiously hidden by what Ryle purports to be a 
linguistic description of common ordinary language usage. There is a type of 
first-person phenomenology that is active in some of Ryle’s arguments and this 
is where it exerts its influence. The result of such careful analysis in to the 
Wolff-Ryle dispute will be to show that a contradiction arises from rival claims if 
we take them both as Ordinary Language Arguments when in fact there are two 
different normative sources of appeal in Ryle’s argumentation. The rivalry 
















Ryle’s Diachronic attack on consciousness. 
 
Ryle’s line of attack on the concept of consciousness is directed at giving an 
account for developmental diachronic stages257 of what Ryle thinks is a socially 
 
257The term ‘diachronic arguments’ I’ve ‘liberated’ from Semiotics where ‘diachronic’ is used to refer 
to the properties and shifts in meaning and use of concrete manifestations of language over time. In 
Semiotics the term ‘diachronic’ refers to a distinction that depends upon a polarization between 
‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’. This polarization of binary opposites is of course problematic as the 
Post-Structuralists point out. I use the term more loosely in a ‘family resemblance’ way to 
approximate similarities that can be used to describe arguments that depend upon chronological 
shifts in the meaning, usage and context of words over time. This species of argument is familiar 
enough though I won’t go much beyond defining them in a general sense for this paper. One might 
call them ‘etymological attacks’ as they make arguments based on the etymological roots of words. 
One might call them ‘philological arguments’ as Philology was often used in this way. These are like 
Nietzsche’s philological excursions into the origin of resentment, (Nietzsche, Friedrich. The 
Genealogy of Morals. Translated by Horace Samuel. New York: Dover, 2003 pp 19 – 21) for example. 
Lyotard’s ‘differend’ is based on the sorts of shifts in meaning that occur in language use. See 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute Translated by Georges Van Dan Abbeele: 
University of Minesota Press, 1989. The sorts of archeological and etymological surveys we find in 
Foucault’s role and treatment of contradictions in the history of discourse are based on a diachronic 
style of argumentation that focuses on the shift in methodology and meaning over time, See 
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. Oxon: 
Routledge, 2005. Pg 166-173. Likewise Katz and Fodor’s attack on Chomsky’s generative grammar is 
a very famous analytic example. Katz and Fodor attack Chomsky’s demarcation of the gender 
pronoun ‘male’ which historically meant a baby seal. They argue the fact the word ended up being a 
gendered pronoun is contigent on shifts of meaning in the development of English over periods of 
time and thus attack Chomsky’s use on ‘diachronic’ grounds. See Katz, Fodor. ‘The Structure of a 
Semantic Theory.’ Language 39,  (1963): Pp 170-210., See also Pritchard’s arguments on the origin of 
moral philosophy for another example of a diachronic style of approach, in Prichard, H. A. ‘Does 
Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ Mind 21, no. 81 (1912): Pp 21-37 . These are arguments that 
focus on historical shifts in meaning and the use of language overtime, and in different social and 
historical contexts to make their point. One might call them ‘etymological arguments’ but they are 
not strictly limited to what language meant in the past from the present, but like Katz and Fodor, 
and Ryle’s argument on consciosness, they make arguments about processes of language. They are 
an interesting species of argument, not unrelated to ‘Ordinary Language’ arguments, in a general 
sense given that the normativity of such arguments rests upon the knowledge possessed by 
competent native speaker’s of the language at different points in history. For the purposes of this 
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constructed and mistaken concept that arose from historical contingencies. Ryle 
thinks that ‘consciousness’ is a myth that grew out of the Protestant Revolution 
and developed into a species of what he calls ‘para-optics’. Unlike ‘retrospection’ 
and his ‘log keeper’ account and rare instances that he thinks have crept into 
common usage (like ‘to be conscious of events’ or ‘being conscious the furniture 
had been changed’ or synonyms for being ‘awake’ like the way ‘losing 
consciousness’ is used synonymously for not ‘staying awake’), Ryle rejects the 
notion of consciousness altogether and sees it as a historical invention and a late 
fiction, and not a natural faculty that can reveal the inner workings of thought 
by reflection on prior or present acts.  
Ryle writes 
 
When the epistemologists' concept of 
consciousness first became popular, it seems to 
have been in part a transformed application of 
the Protestant notion of conscience. The 
Protestants had to hold that a man could know 
the moral state of his soul and the wishes of God 
without the aid of confessors and scholars; they 
 
thesis, however, we will limit ourselves to Ryle’s claim in the context of the Philosophy of Mind and 
what Ryle’s ‘diachronic’ attack boils down to as a claim about consciousness and language, i.e. the 
aspects of language which semioticians were trying to target along with the ‘synchronic’ axis’.  
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spoke therefore of the God-given 'light' of private 
conscience258.  
 
This Protestant version of ‘do-it-yourself’ moral conscience, according to Ryle, 
gets picked up after the Reformation during the Enlightenment where it gains 
an other-worldly aspect with both dualist theories of mind and causal theories of 
consciousness.  
 Ryle writes 
 
When Galileo's and Descartes' representations of 
the mechanical world seemed to require that 
minds should be saved from mechanism by being 
represented as constituting a duplicate world, the 
need was felt to explain how the contents of this 
ghostly world could be ascertained, again without 
the help of schooling, but also without the help of 
sense perception. The metaphor of 'light' seemed 
peculiarly appropriate, since Galilean science 
dealt so largely with the optically discovered 
world. 'Consciousness' was imported to play in 
 
258Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 153. 
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the mental world the part played by light in the 
mechanical world. In this metaphorical sense, the 
contents of the mental world were thought of as 
being self-luminous or refulgent259.  
 
In Ryle’s history the theory gets picked up by John Locke, in whom it becomes 
refined into a ‘reflective’ model in which, Locke claims, consciousness can turn 
back on itself and examine, or rather, reflect on its own operations by means of 
introspective scrutiny. 
 Ryle writes 
 
This model was employed again by Locke when 
he described the deliberate observational 
scrutiny which a mind can from time to time turn 
upon its current states and processes. He called 
this supposed inner perception 'reflexion'260, 
 
259Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 154. 
260Our 'introspection'. See McCosh, James. Realistic Philosophy. Vol. II. New York: Scribner, 1900. 
Pp 56 – 59. What Locke specifically meant, according to McCosh, who I agree with, was something as 
follows. Locke took the schoolmen’s vocabulary of ‘phantasm’, ‘notion’, ‘species’ whereby the school 
men took ‘phantasm’ as the representation of a thing, ‘notion’ as an intellectual operation involved in 
apprehending the thing, and ‘species’ to refer to the visible appearance and objects classified. Locke 
then reduced them all to ‘ideas’. Ideas, for Locke, are produced by sensations which later become 
Hume’s impressions which fade into Hume’s ‘ideas’, but for Locke, these are produced by the primary 
qualities of the object. Primary qualities become ‘ideas’ via an ‘impulse’ in the sense faculties. 
(McCosh, Realistic Philosophy, 1900 Pg 58). Once the ideas are produced, reflection then sorts them 
out in to their proper place in categories via ‘semblances’. ‘Reflection’, on this view, is the focus of the 
mind on the inner faculties. For the distinction between ‘ectypal’ and ‘archetypal’ ideas, see 
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borrowing the word 'reflexion' from the familiar 
optical phenomenon of the reflections of faces in 
mirrors. The mind can 'see' or 'look at’ its own 
operations in the 'light' given off by themselves. 
The myth of consciousness is a piece of para-
optics261.  
 
Consciousness, then, Ryle maintains, is a myth that began with the 
Reformation, underwent several modifications, or reincarnations, and ends up 
with a ‘reflective doctrine’ in John Locke. This, according to Ryle’s account, in 
turn gives us the causal theory of consciousness, which David Hume inherits, in 
which sensations impress ideas on us and from which their conjunction creates 
the sentiment of belief262. 
 
Gotterman, Donald. ‘A Note on Locke's Theory of Self Knowledge.’ Journal of The History of 
Philosophy 12, no. 2 (1974): 239-242. Ectypal ideas contain reflections on the operations of the mind 
along with abstractable representations of substances. This later type is analogous with our 
introspection, and at an approximation to the way that Ryle is using the term if we look at what his 
attack amounts to in a ‘synchronic’ sense. See also Ryle, Gilbert. ‘John Locke on Human 
Understanding.’ In Critical Essays, edited by Julia Tanney, I, Pp 132-153. Oxon: Routledge, 2009. 
261 Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 153 
262 Something that is perhaps troubling, reading back into Ryle, from Richard Rorty via Sellars, is 
the notion that perhaps we are able to introspect and we may also have consciousness simply 
because we’ve developed those abilities out of developments in history. That is, indeed Sartre may 
very well be right, one might argue when he pin points the implication of and uses for introspective 
arguments (for instance in Trnscendence of the Ego, Abington, 2004), but one might try to counter 
this and argue that phenomenology is only possible because it developed out of a Western historical 
context. Prior to that context one could not introspect. See Rorty, Richard. The Mirror of Nature. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2009. Pg 218-220. My reply is that one would have to reflect 
to see if that were true, and the instant somebody did, they will have discovered reflective and 
introspective consciousness. See also J. R. Oshea ‘'The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of 




However, I just do not think this is the case. I think consciousness, 
conscious reflection, and introspection of conscious states are all faculties of 
human thought, and not historical inventions. I think something like 
introspection goes on and that Ryle in many of his arguments unwittingly 
employs it when he draws on his audience to observe the phenomenal differences 





















Part Three:  




Ordinary Language Arguments and their ability to affirm or negate 
claims about the mind. 
 
In this section I will be exploring the ways Ordinary Language Arguments can 
be used to affirm or deny claims about the mind by considering some explicit 
examples. Specifically, the examples I will be looking at are those where Ryle 
purports to make a direct appeal to the reader’s knowledge of language and 
practice to support one of his arguments or lodge an objection against another 
philosopher. 
 For instance, Ryle argues as follows    
 
the language of ‘volitions' is the language of the 
para-mechanical theory of the mind. If a theorist 
speaks without qualms of ‘volitions', or 'acts of 
will', no further evidence is needed to show that 
he swallows whole the dogma that a mind is a 
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secondary field of special causes. It can be 
predicted that he will correspondingly speak of 
bodily actions as 'expressions' of mental 
processes. He is likely also to speak glibly of 
'experiences', a plural noun commonly used to 
denote the postulated non-physical episodes 
which constitute the shadow-drama on the 
ghostly boards of the mental stage263.  
 
In advancing this argument against the right wing of the ‘Para-Mechanical 
Theory of Mind’264 Ryle makes a direct appeal to the domain of common 
language for justification. The authority for dismissing an account of action 
based on ‘volitions’, for Ryle, is founded in a direct appeal to the common 
consuetude of everyday language. He rejects an account of mind based on 
‘volitions’, because he rejects the authority of the theorist, and with them the 
 
263Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 62 
264 The right wing of Ryle’s ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of Mind’, of course, is the Humean ‘passions’ see 
Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983, pg 91. Also Fredrick Adams and Kenneth Aizowa, Defending the 
Bounds of Cognition, 2010 NB One of the reasons I avoided going into the Extended Mind hypothesis 
debate is that Adams and Aizowa’s ‘mark of the cognitive’ on a reading of Ryle would be a special 
version of this sort of Para-mechanical Theory since it individuates the ‘cognitive’ by specific 
reference to its cause in terms of causal mechanisms.  However, the dissolution of Ryle’s Ordinary 
Language solution, I argue, re-introduces the problem of causation in theories of mind, and 
specifically, I’m going to argue at the end of this paper presents a new problem of causation in 
models that utilize theories about consciousness. See footnote 93 and 95. Read 95 only after carefully 
completing each stage of the paper. Redefining the bounds of cognition in terms of the irreducible 
direct first and third person positions, is of course, the project of a psychologism and the causal 
fixation model the paper finishes on.  
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normative source for meaningful talk about the mind to derive from either (x.1), 
or (x.2)265.  This is an example of an Ordinary Language argument that refutes 
another thinker’s theory of mind, in this case the ‘volitional thesis’.  
 Here is the refutation.  
 Ryle writes 
 
Despite the fact that theorists have, since the 
Stoics and Saint Augustine, recommended us to 
describe our conduct in this way, no one, save to 
endorse the theory, ever describes his own 
conduct, or that of his acquaintances, in the 
recommended idioms. No one ever says such 
things as that at 10 a.m. he was occupied in 
willing this or that, or that he performed five 
quick and easy volitions and two slow and 
difficult volitions between midday and lunch-
time. An accused person may admit or deny that 
he did something, or that he did it on purpose, 
but he never admits or denies having willed. Nor 
do the judge and jury require to be satisfied by 
 
265 See the section Context Dependent States at the beginning of this thesis.  
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evidence, which in the nature of the case could 
never be adduced, that a volition preceded the 
pulling of the trigger. Novelists describe the 
actions, remarks, gestures and grimaces, the 
daydreams, deliberations, qualms and 
embarrassments of their characters; but they 
never mention their volitions. They would not 
know what to say about them266.  
 
Notice here, the justification for dismissing volitions is based on several things: 
firstly, that the ordinary language user has no knowledge of ‘volitions’ so he 
would not know what to say about them. The argument simply put, is that 
ordinary people do not use ‘volitions’ in their vocabulary so Ryle thinks it follows 
that they must not exist. Ryle thinks the fact that a person may not know how 
many volitions are in an act, or how many volitions they may have performed 
that particular day, counts for evidence in his argument against them. Ryle is 
trying to avoid the response that people need to be conscious of their experience 
in some way so as to be able to report whether they experience volitions with his 
‘log keeper’ account of the mind and the special status reports made from 
‘knowing what one is about’ by surrepetiously focusing only on the linguistic 
 
266Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 63. 
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evidence. All of these types of appeals that Ryle makes, which focus on the 
statements of a person giving a ‘special status report’, are directed at the 
language user’s knowledge in both the speaker’s use, and that of the audience 
reading the argument. The authority for these appeals derives from (x.3.1) and 
(x.3.2)267. However, with (x.3.1) the patient has the caveat authority of 
obrogation to overturn statements about their emotional life. 
 This is not so in all of Ryle’s arguments. Some of Ryle’s arguments 
betray strands of an occult philosophy of conscious states running through Ryle’s 
work. Here I use ‘occult’ in the sense of something hidden or concealed. In Ryle’s 
case, surreptitiously.  
 Ryle writes 
 
However, when a champion of the doctrine is 
himself asked how long ago he executed his last 
volition, or how many acts of will he executes in, 
say, reciting 'Little Miss Muffet' backwards, he is 
apt to confess to finding difficulties in giving the 
answer, though these difficulties should not, 
according to his own theory, exist268.  
 
 
267 See ‘Context Dependent States’ in the Introduction to this thesis.  
268Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 64. 
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This is a sophistication on the earlier argument. Instead of depending on an 
Ordinary Language criterion like whether or not people use ‘volitions’, Ryle is 
drawing on the resources of a ‘special status report’, one which is consistent with 
his position on thought possessing a log keeper role and the process he defines as 
‘being alive to what one is doing’. Ryle’s line of thought here is problematic. We 
should ask; without conscious introspection how would someone know what a 
volition felt like? Even if Ryle could argue that one knew what a volition felt like 
without violating his own strictures against conscious experience or his claim 
that they do not exist, how would one know without the ability to introspect 
whether one was having one? One would still need to take a ‘non-optical’ look 
inside in order to determine whether one was having volitions. Ryle’s log keeper 
account of the mind runs into the same problems with volitions as it did with 
‘flash-bangs’.  
   
 Take this next argument from Ryle  
 
[Consider] the use of the verb 'to remember’ in 
which a person is said to have remembered, or 
been recollecting, something at a particular 
moment, or is said to be now recalling, reviewing 
or dwelling on some episode of his own past. In 
this use, remembering is an occurrence; it is 
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something which a person may try successfully, 
or in vain, to do; it occupies his attention for a 
time and he may do it with pleasure or distress 
and with ease or effort269.  
 
Note that this is the episodic case, as in ‘to remember when’. This forms one side 
of the linguistic usage which is the episodic case of an event.  The following 
passage from Ryle illustrates the ‘to remember’ (how) side of the configuration 
and shows how ‘to remember how’ can be used in the sense of having not 
forgotten a skill, as for example, in the instance Ryle compared linguistic 
useages in the descriptions of the way the teacher trains his pupils. This forms 
the other side of the distinction and connects the verb ‘to remember’ to the 
Capacity side of the configuration governing the distinction between Capacity 
and Tendency Dispositions.  
 
By far the most important and the least 
discussed use of the verb is that use in which 
remembering something means having learned 
something and not forgotten it. This is the sense 
in which we speak of remembering the Greek 
 
269Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 259. 
256 
 
alphabet, or the way from the gravel-pit to the 
bathing-place, or the proof of a theorem, or how 
to bicycle, or that the next meeting of the Board 
will be in the last week of July. To say that a 
person has not forgotten something is not to say 
that he is now doing or undergoing anything, or 
even that he regularly or occasionally does or 
undergoes anything. It is to say that he can do 
certain things, such as go through the Greek 
alphabet, direct a stranger back from the 
bathing-place to the gravel-pit and correct 
someone270.  
 
Note the difference between the two uses. The former is episodic in the sense of 
events that occur and the latter is dispositional in the sense of skills and 
abilities. Note too that this distinction can be based on the linguistic behaviour. 
‘Remember-How’ is linked to the linguistic behaviour of capacity verbs. This 
forms one side of the knowledge-how/knowledge-that distinction Ryle maintains 
throughout The Concept of Mind. We add to this a further distinction and we can 
ask ourselves: why don’t people use the term for the other side of the 
 
270Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 258. 
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dispositional table? Why don’t people use it for the Motives, Inclinations and 
Beliefs somebody has? This gives us a further linguistic behaviour to 
differentiate Capacities and Tendencies since Motives, Beliefs and Inclinations 
are not the sorts of things somebody can ask a ‘remember how’ or a ‘remember 
when’ question about. But someone might ask ‘do you remember why you did 






























Not all of Ryle’s ‘phenomenological arguments’ can be read as having a 
Linguistic Behaviourist side like the ‘to remember’ and the ‘flash bang’ sub-
strains we’ve looked at. It is just easier to discriminate the phenomenological 
content by using the treatment I have developed and to refer to it under the 
moniker of ‘Ghostography’. In using this ‘Ghostography’ we only have to look for 
Ordinary Language justifications without a corresponding Linguistic 
Behaviourist claim. When Ryle makes his Ordinary Language Arguments he 
usually offers the Linguistic Behaviourist analysis, either in traditional 
grammatical terms, or in his own bits of jargon referring to linguistic behaviours 
like ‘mongrel-categoricals’ or ‘heed-concepts’. Sometimes he offers a distinction 
that seems intuitively correct and justified from an Ordinary Language point of 
view, but he doesn’t offer the Linguistic Behavioural analyses with the 
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grammatical distinctions. If there is no Linguistic Behaviourist claim then we 
ask the question ‘what is the Ordinary Language Argument justifying?’ I submit 
that if one looks a little deeper one will see that the examples we’ve already gone 
through have a ghostly finger pointing towards a phenomenological content.  
 There are also a handful of pure phenomenological treatments in The 
Concept of Mind, which do not have Ordinary Language Argument justifications 
or Linguistic Behavioural Arguments attached to them. These seem to me to 
infringe directly on his prohibition against consciousness. If nothing else they 
undermine the general line of his etymological historically diachronic claim that 
the concept of consciousness is a piece of ‘para-optics’ that arose from the 
Reformation. Here Ryle unwittingly provides the facts which demonstrate that 
his language-based account of the mind cannot cover all of the facts relevant to a 
theory of mind.  
  Take the following as an example of a pure naked phenomenological 
argument out of Ryle. He writes 
 
The reader of a report of a race can, subject to 
certain restrictions imposed by the text of the 
report, first picture the race in one way and then 
deliberately or involuntarily picture it in a 
different and perhaps conflicting way; but a 
witness of the race feels that, while he can call 
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back further views of the race, yet alternative 
views are rigidly ruled out271. 
 
 
To make that distinction one actually has to put one self in the shoes of the 
person at the centre of both cases. One has to think back to a day at the track or 
of a football game, from a specific vantage point in the stadium and then think 
about another case where, instead of watching from the stadium one has read 
the report in the newspaper; and thus compare the two.  
 To turn these into Linguistic Behavioural Arguments without 
phenomenological participation is very difficult. One can talk about seeing in the 
world and ‘seeing’ in the ‘mind’s eye’ as two different uses of ‘seeing’. It is very 
difficult to see how one can make that distinction in purely Linguistic 
Behavioural terms without the phenomenology. 
 On first appearance, if we take a witness to an event and a reader of a 
report about that same event and put them in different chairs and asked them 
questions, there are things the witness could not tell us, if Ryle is right, and that 
the reader of the report could, since the reader’s view, as he might imagine it, is 
not hampered by a man sitting in front of him, perhaps with a funny hat, unless 
the reader perhaps wishes to imagine the man there. The witness, if he was 
 
271Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 262. 
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unfortunate enough to be seated behind the man with the silly big hat, may have 
had his view hampered, or be victim to any one of the endless varieties of 
contingencies his witnessing the event made him subject to on the day. The 
reader, however, would not be limited to one perspective, in reading the report, 
but only by his powers of conjuring up the details of the race’s report.  
 But let us imagine a canny reader, who, for his own reasons, needs to 
make a convincing report272 for he wishes to convince our canny Judge that he 
really was at the race track on the day in question. He, foreknowing the 
distinction between a witness and a reader, sits down and visualizes his entire 
day from start to finish as if he lived it. Since he has relative freedom to imagine 
the races from any perspective this should not be a difficult task, since he has 
only to imagine the one perspective, and to stick with it.  
 Were such so, I argue that there is no discernable difference between the 
linguistic behaviour of the cunning reader and the genuine witness at the level 
of a purely Linguistic Behavioural analysis. The witness might likewise make up 
his own details after the event for any parts he or she missed, with relative 
freedom, just like the reader.  
 Furthermore, there is no ‘ordinary language’ appeal or justification for 
this distinction in Ryle, and in fact, it is hard to imagine what an Ordinary 
Language justification or an appeal might look like. We can only understand 
 
272 In the ordinary common language use and not Sellars, nor my own development of Sellars’ use.  
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this bit of phenomenology by stepping into it and thinking about it. The point of 
the argument only arises as ‘the sugar melts’ as Sartre likes to quote Bergson273. 
One must make consciousness itself, in this case the imagining consciousness, 
subject to an act of consciousness to see the distinction.  
 As such, the argument for the distinction between the reader and the 
witness at the race track is a purely phenomenological argument, and one that 
requires the twin processes of introspection, and consciousness, both outlawed 
by Ryle’s own strictures, in order for the argument to make sense. That is, by 
the very inclusion of this argument, in Ryle’s Concept of Mind, Ryle has argued 
against one of his own leading theses. He has undermined his thesis that the self 
luminous Cartesian and Protestant Para-Optic strand of philosophy of mind is 
an unmitigated mistake. Ryle demonstrates in practice that the introspective act 
itself required for this argument fulfils all the criteria of introspection by being 
deliberately conscious, attending to the phenomenal contents of consciousness 
twice, as well as drawing attention to non-optical and non-sensory elements that 
are not apparent in the act of perception, but only become present in the act of 
reflection through introspective scrutiny. And in fact, the only way to avoid this 
conclusion once Ryle has pointed out that the above act contains the very 
properties of consciousness he wishes to deny, is if Ryle then claimed not to be 
 
273Sartre. The Imaginary, 2004. Pg 8. 
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able to perform the introspective act. But his very practice puts the lie to such a 
claim.  
 Recall that a Linguistic Behavioural claim involves a concrete 
manifestation of a piece of language, a la parole, and a grammatical description 
of that piece of language which purports to analyse the behaviour of the relevant 
words.   An Ordinary Language argument bases the claim it forwards on what it 
makes sense to say in a language. There is nothing in the behaviour of the 
language of the canny reader, which can alert a canny judge to the fact that the 
reader was not there at the track on the day of the race. The insight on offer in 
the Reader/Witness argument does not depend on a specific configuration of 
words characteristic of a Linguistic Behavioural Argument. In fact, once one has 
grasped the distinction one can think about the difference between a reader of a 
race report, and a witness of the actual race in visual terms that do not rely on a 
specific set of linguistic behaviours described, in grammatical analysis. 
 This next argument is the ‘Anticipatory argument’. It involves 
attempting to anticipate one’s next thought before one has it.  
 Ryle writes 
 
(W)hile normally I am not at all surprised to find 
myself doing or thinking what I do, yet when I 
try most carefully to anticipate what I shall do or 
think, then the outcome is likely to falsify my 
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expectation. My process of pre-envisaging may 
divert the course of my ensuing behaviour in a 
direction and degree of which my prognosis 
cannot take account. One thing that I cannot 
prepare myself for is the next thought that I am 
going to think274.  
 
It is not immediately obvious, at least from verbs, nouns and adjectives, nor 
from any immediately obvious idioms, that one cannot anticipate one’s next 
thought. It is not until one tries the exercise that one begins to see the problem. 
Likewise, the problem of advice is not prima facie obvious, otherwise we 
wouldn’t go to people for advice. One cannot give the advice, and then give 
advice on how to take that advice, and then give further advice on how to take 
the two former bits of advice, and so on. There is a regress. Likewise, one has to 
try anticipating one’s next thought in order to make the trick work. Let us note, 
this is a phenomenological argument – at least so far as in the above example. It 
is a pure, naked, phenomenological argument because one cannot account for 
this phenomena in Behavioural Linguistic terms or find a way to justify it as an 
Ordinary Language argument with what it ‘makes sense to say’ unless one first 
 
274Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 188. 
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tries it out for oneself275. The insight is found in the exercise and not the 
behaviour of specific clusters and classes of words.  
 Now consider another example from The Concept of Mind 
 
A man is interested in Symbolic Logic. He 
regularly reads books and articles on the subject, 
discusses it, works out problems in it and 
neglects lectures on other subjects. According to 
the view which is here contested, he must 
therefore constantly experience impulses of a 
peculiar kind, namely feelings of interest in 
Symbolic Logic, and if his interest is very strong 
these feelings must be very acute and very 
frequent. He must therefore be able to tell us 
whether these feelings are sudden, like twinges,  
 
275 Perhaps it is worth noting that there is no obvious reason why a phenomenological distinction or 
point cannot enter into ordinary language use under the aegis of a metaphor or new linguistic 
behaviour involving the invention of new verbs that bring this process of thought out, and offer insight 
into, using inverted commas, or as a set of nouns that posit entities as a theoretical species of thought 
processes, that may, given time, become publicly observable phenomena. But, of course, once we start 
allowing new phenomenological arguments, processes, experiences, exercises and techniques, the 
introduction of such ‘new words’, ‘forms of words’, or letting ourselves conjure up grammatical forms 
not easily found in everyday use then we have moved away from the domain of purely ordinary 
language in the sense Ryle thinks it best to do philosophy of mind in, and stepped into the realm of 
Psychological Nominalism, Jones’ Language, and the shifting ontological sands of Wilson Cloud 
Chambers and Manifest Images that Wilfrid Sellars posits to describe it. This point will be picked up 
later in the paper in the examination of Sellarsian Socio-Linguistic Theories and developmental 




or lasting, like aches; whether they succeed one 
another several times a minute or only a few 
times an hour; and whether he feels them in the 
small of his back or in his forehead. But clearly 
his only reply to such specific questions would be 
that he catches himself experiencing no peculiar 
throbs or qualms while he is attending to his 
hobby. He may report a feeling of vexation, when 
his studies are interrupted, and the feeling of a 
load off his chest, when distractions are removed; 
but there are no peculiar feelings of interest in 
Symbolic Logic for him to report. While 
undisturbedly pursuing his hobby, he feels no 
perturbations at all276.  
 
Firstly, this is another example of the hidden phenomenological strain of 
arguments in The Concept of Mind. Secondly this, of course, is a demonstration 
of the difference between flash-bangs on one side, and Motivations and 
Inclinations on the other. It is important to see that one cannot actually make 
this argument without the audience thinking it through for themselves. One 
 
276Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pp 84 – 85. 
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needs to think the argument through before it makes sense. However, two 
things are noteworthy that happen when you do think such an argument 
through.  
  While we can attach an Ordinary Language argument to it in the form 
of; ‘it doesn’t make sense to say that a man was so agitated by his interest in 
math that he couldn’t study it’ or ‘a man that was so patriotic that he couldn’t go 
to war for his country’, this is a different kind of argument from getting the 
audience to sympathize or asking the audience outright how many times in an 
hour of study does one feel the impulse to study logic? There are two arguments 
here. One asks what it makes sense to talk about in common ordinary everyday 
language. The second asks you to ‘take a (non-optical) 'look' at what is passing in 
(your) mind’ in the introspective sense. 
 Secondly, also noteworthy is what is missing from this argument. There 
is no Behavioural Linguistic claim attached here, to the ‘‘introspective’ (non 
optical)’ element, nor to the prior Ordinary Language argument. The Symbolic 
Logic Scholar Argument has a normative force from an Ordinary Language 
claim. That is to say, there is an Ordinary Language ‘it makes sense to say’ style 
of argumentation here, (i.e. ‘it doesn’t make sense to talk about a man who was 
so patriotic he couldn’t go to war for his country’ or ‘a man who was so interested 
in logic he couldn’t study it’). But there is no specific ‘la parole’ for us to analyse 
for linguistic behaviours. There is no bit of language at the centre of the 
Symbolic Logic Scholar Argument to be held up for Linguistic Behavioural 
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analysis. Instead there is a phenomenological act of introspective scrutiny 
hidden in the argument. We must examine our own past experiences of hobbies 







Midway map of the paper 
 
I 
The Three Chief Types of Argument Found in The Concept of Mind 
 
 
We have progressed far enough into the technical complexity of the thesis that I 
can present a short map of the arguments, and how they fit together to lead to 
the call for a considered return to Psychologism. This I shall now do. 
 So far, we have looked at Ordinary Language Arguments and Linguistic 
Behavioural Arguments. I drew my definition of Linguistic Behavioral 
arguments from the shortcomings of Weitz’s ‘propositional model’ of Logical 
Behaviourism. Weitz’s simplified propositional model failed to make distinctions 
at the level of natural language analysis that Ryle was specifically interested in.  
Instead of looking towards the type of language ‘behaviour’ Ryle based his 
arguments on, Weitz focused on a generalized propositional model.  
 Weitz’s model and the subsequent Logical Behaviourist approach, of 
course, have similar sorts of problems with referential indeterminacy to the 
various cognitive disciplines and fields of research that we looked at in the 
introduction to this thesis because of the problem with correspondence theories 
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of truth. These correspondence problems are the reason why Logical 
Behaviourist models like those proposed by Weitz generally fail. It was generally 
taken on tautological grounds, by early Analytic Philosophers that for truthful 
propositions to be true they must picture true states of affairs277. The terms of 
the proposition, therefore, must picture what they refer to in true ways. It is 
important on this view that the terms and their referents be semantically 
determinate since if they are not determinate then it directly effects the truth of 
any statements with propositions that utilize those terms with those putative 
referents. We saw that while one of Weitz’s ‘Categorical sentences’ expressing an 
episode like ‘Rod ran down the road on Tuesday’ may appear relatively 
uncontroversial in terms of the determinacy of the references, the same is not 
the case for propositions like ‘Rod is afraid of thunderstorms’ and ‘Rod felt upset 
at not being invited’. What the speaker of the proposition describes as ‘upset’ 
might be closer to what Rod himself might refer to as ‘anger’ and ‘frustration’ 
while what Rod himself might describe as ‘upset’ might be closer to what the 
speaker of the proposition describes as ‘sadness’ and ‘weariness’. Both of these 
may have no correspondence to what a listener of the proposition might take 
 
277 Largely influenced by Early Wittgenstein, Russell and Logical Atomism. This was in the 
background to Weitz and his generation and I argue, this is what has influenced his misreading of 
Ryle. For an introduction to Logical Atomistic theories see Barry Gross. Analytic Philosophy. New 
York, Pegasus Press, 1970. For an indepth analysis of Wittgenstein of the Tractatus see the under 
appreciated Peter Carruthehers, Tractarian Semantics. Oxford. Basil Blackwell Inc. 1989. For a 
treatment of Russell’s Atomist stage, in the development of his philosophy see C. W. Kilmister. 




‘upset’ to mean in relation to their experiences. In any case since propositional 
models of human behaviour picture states of affairs, those states of affairs refer 
to things, and when they refer to human experiences of emotional content there 
is reason to question the determinancy of these references.  
 Chalmers psychological and phenomenal ‘potted’ history neglected the 
normative foundations of Ryle’s arguments. Ryle’s dispositions were not 
psychological, but linguistic. Ryle develops his dispositions from the analysis of 
language and argues the authority for them comes from what the average 
language user knows and what it makes sense to talk about. This lacuna in 
Chalmers history is the origin for our analysis of the strain of Ordinary 
Language Arguments in Ryle.  
 The critiques of the Chalmers’ and Weitz’ accounts of Ryle this paper 
started off with are important, because what is missing from each account 
furnishes the two strains of taxa of Ryle’s argument that run through this paper. 
The deficiency of Chalmers’ account of Ryle was the language-based justification 
for Ryle’s claims about dispositions and ‘associative behaviours’. This allowed us 
to begin our classification of Ryle’s argumentation. The critique of David 
Chalmers’ account of Ryle is the start of the taxa leading to the description of 
Ordinary Language Arguments in this paper. Deficiencies in the Weitz account 
allowed us to begin our analysis of Ryle’s Linguistic Behavioural Strand. The 
Linguistic Behavioural Arguments deal with specific ordinary examples of word 
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use. and reveal their behaviour through implicit examination of the grammatical 
constructions and the contexts of their use.  
 I will now provide a short chart of the arguments found in Ryle for the 
reader’s benefit should they need clarification or a point to refer back to through 
the remainder of this paper.  
  
Footnote to the above chart278 
 
278 Our taxonomy of Ryle’s arguments can thus be summarized in this way. Firstly there are 
Linguistic Behavioural Arguments. These can be typified as the examination of verbs, nouns, 
linguistic phrases and grammatical terminology. Typically Linguistic Behavioural Arguments make 
claims about the mind based upon specific examples of language and that usually utilize 
grammatical descriptions of the linguistic behaviours of these examples of language. Some of these 
arguments focus on the behaviour of different verb components and sub-sentential configurations. 
Understanding the sub-sentential configurations is important for understanding what Ryle thinks 
he can capture in his language-based account of the mind because the relationship between different 
categories of words and their inheritance properties are what he bases his claims about the mind on.  
Secondly the taxonomy contains the Ordinary Language Arguments. It is important to keep 
in mind what these two types of argument are because only by comparing them can the third type of 
argument in Ryle’s The Concept of Mind be revealed. Ordinary Language argumentation uses a 
special type of claim. This claim is based on what it purportedly makes sense to talk about in a 
language. These types of argument make claims that involve the term or one that is more or less 
synonymous with ‘it makes sense to say’ to forward a claim about the mind, or ‘it does not make sense 
to say’ to negate a claim about the mind. Ordinary Language Arguments draw on common everyday 
knowledge possessed by any competent language speaker, but as we have seen not all Ordinary 
Language Arguments justify themselves with grammatical analysis of concrete manifestations of 
language. We might describe some Ordinary Language argumentation as amphibious because it can 
be analysed with grammatical distinctions and descriptions, but it can also be thought of in a 
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Most importantly I have developed my methodology for drawing out the 
phenomenological content in Ordinary Language Arguments by looking for a 
claim that does not have a Linguistic Behavioural analysis attached to it. Not all 
Ordinary Language Arguments are Linguistic Behavioural Arguments even 
though all Linguistic Behavioural Arguments are Ordinary Language 
Arguments.  The two are not equivalent. Ordinary Language Arguments are 
normative claims that purport to be about what it makes sense to say, while 
Linguistic Behavioural Arguments contain samples of concrete manifestations of 
language and are usually grammatical studies of these samples.  
The basic strategy of this thesis is to bring out some of the facts of mind 
Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments present which his Linguistic Behavioural 
account cannot explain. This reveals the ‘Occult Strain of Phenomenological 
Arguments’ haunting Ryle’s argumentative practice. This ‘Occult Strain’ not 
only contradicts Ryle’s offical arguments against consciousness, but it reveals 
the key that will be used to unlock the stages that a phenomenal zombie cannot 
undergo to learn the language of a tribe and reveal why the ‘Judgements’ and 
‘Cognitive-Content Bearing State’ of David Chalmers and his zombie do not 
 
phenomenal sense through conscious introspection of introspective properties. The latter use of 
introspection and introspective is, of course, the same type of introspection Ryle disavows.   
Finally the third strain is made up of arguments that engage Ryle’s surepititously hidden 
phenomenological content. These types of arguments get us to bring certain aspects of our 
consciousness to attention through an exercise, in order to make a point or get us to engage with 
phenomenological acts in order to understand the argument. The stages of the argument may be 
written out in language but the argument itself is not based on grammatical analysis of those 




correspond one to one. These stages, once revealed, will counter the Crane-









Attacking the Myth About the Mind 
 
Ryle argued that the facts that fall within the domain of a theory of mind are 
normally obscured from public scrutiny by a number of myths that have arisen 
from contamination of everyday non-theoretical language by sciences and 
theoretical branches of inquiry. Some of these myths discussed in this thesis, 
that come out of Ryle’s The Concept of Mind are the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of 
Mind’, the ‘Bogey of Mechanism’, the ‘Cartesian Two Worlds Myth’ and the 
‘Double-life Account’. Ryle thinks he can dissolve the Cartesian Two World’s 
Myth, Double-life Account and ‘Private Consciousness’ positions with the 
argument that there is no difference between saying something aloud, writing it 
down, and thinking it in one’s mind. But for this to work he has to convince us 
that Ordinary Language can teach us everything there is to know about the 
mind. One reason for rejecting Ryle’s view would be the discovery there is 
something wrong with treating Ordinary Language as a unified source for 
justifying claims about the mind.  
 Moreover, Ryle argues that these facts of mind are made accessible in 
ordinary language by the intuition of the native speaker, which Ryle thinks has 
an authority above and beyond historical, specialized and theoretical branches of 
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philosophy, as well as psychology and other types of research into the mind. Ryle 
argues this is so because people think in the everyday language they talk in.  
 An implicit linguistic Anti-Psychologistic reading of Ryle is important 
because the old Logical Behaviourist readings of Ryle, like we find in Weitz, had 
Psycho-Realist tendencies since they relied on propositional models that 
functioned on truth values and implied referents that were pictured either 
truthfully or falsely in model propositions. The problem, of course, with terms 
like ‘anger’, ‘fear’ and ‘jealousy’ is that they are indeterminate. We do not know if 
what Sue means when she uses these words is what Jane means when she uses 
the words. Sue’s grief might be Jane’s remorse. Ryle wanted to do away with 
these kinds of puzzles by focusing on the ways people used language when 
talking about the mind.  
 Ryle railed against individual reflection, introspection, volitions. 
passions and causal theories of human behaviour. The project of The Concept of 
Mind emerges as the attempt to de-jargonize what Ryle sees as historical and 
socio-disciplinary mistakes of classical philosophy and attempts at creating new 
‘sciences of mind’ which have fallen into language riddles. Ryle thinks these 
language riddles can be dissolved by returning to the way people speak about 
the mind in non-specialized, common, everyday discourse.  
 It is Ryle’s ‘concept of mind’ which interests us because his Ordinary 
Language Arguments offered the possibility of solving the Indeterminacy of 
Reference Problem by simply ‘stereoscoping’ language and thought together with 
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a log-keeper account and the notion of special status reports. On this view words 
do not refer to either parts ‘inside’ the mind or constituents making up the mind 
because words and their various combinations are simply thoughts and Ryle 
thinks that we can analyse the mind through the grammatical examination of 
the behaviour of language to make claims about the mind. This gave us Ryle’s 
Linguistic Behavioural Arguments which make claims about the mind based on 
analysis of concrete manifestations of words taken from everyday language.    
 I pointed out both Dummett’s criterion for the Pre-Fregeian view of 
psychologism and his arguments against it. A Pre-Fregeian view of psychologism 
holds that language is like a code that thoughts are compounded into. The thesis 
of this paper is to argue for a return to a Pre-Fregeian theory of mind because it 
offers us a chance to escape the pitfalls from the past century, and solves many 







Dummett and the Implicit Language Philosophers 
 
Ryle read in the light of Dummett presents the strongest case for an exclusively 
language-based account of the mind. The reason, of course, is that Dummett 
provides us with what I take to be strong grounds for rejecting the explicit 
attempt at an Anti-Psychologistic project of a theory of meaning. Dummett 
argues that an explicit form of Anti-Psychologism is one that can only lead into a 
vicious regress that ends in circularity. If this is so then it takes the explicit 
theorists out of the game and leaves only the implicit Anti-Psychologistic 
language theorists to argue what the foundations are for a theory of mind. 
Among the implicit language theorists, Ryle stands out as having developed a 
sophisticated and systemic analysis of the mind that uproots the major strands 
of thought in the history of philosophy about the mind. Moreover Ryle’s 
arguments also offer the attractive prospect of solving the Indeterminacy of 
Reference Problem that arises within many different branches and fields of 
research on the mind, as discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.   
However, for Ryle’s account of the mind to work, he needs to present 
Ordinary Language as a unifying implicit source of knowledge for claims about 
mental phenomena. The weakness in Ryle’s account of the mind arises from an 
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‘Occult Phenomenological Strain’ hidden inside some of his arguments that 
undermines the overall general project of The Concept of Mind.  
There are three ‘Occult Phenomenological Arguments’ I drew attention to 
which Ryle presents but cannot be broken down into these Linguistic Behaviours 
and logkeeper roles. These were (1) the Witness/Reader Argument, (2) 
Anticipating One’s Next Thought and (3) the Flash Bangs which were pointed 
out early on in this thesis and explained in depth in Chapter Fourteen, under the 
section entitled Phenomenological Arguments, of this thesis.  
Out of these three ‘Occult Phenomenological Arguments’ haunting Ryle’s 
grammatical machinery in The Concept of Mind, the most important for this 
thesis is the ‘flash-bang’ strain which I will be raising again as the paper 
progresses. The theme of this séance with Rylean ghosts will be a voodoo one 
and involve zombies.  Such zombies arise from David Chalmers’ concept of 
‘phenomenal’. This paper will ask the question whether Chalmers’ own 
phenomenal zombie has the semantic resources to make statements about flash-
bangs. The paper will argue that the zombie cannot, and since it cannot, this 














Chalmerian zombies and the ‘flash-bangs’. 
 
To resolve the question whether Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie can make 
meaningful statements about the emotional experiences of ‘flash-bangs’ which it 
does not have (because it is a phenomenal zombie bereft of emotional qualia, 
sensation or phenomenally qualitative experience) I will introduce the 
phenomenal zombie into a Rylean community using the model of ‘Socio-
Linguistics’ Wilfrid Sellars builds in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. 
This thread of arguments will culminate in the refutation of Chalmers’ claim 
that he and his phenomenal zombie twin have a one to one correspondence in 
their Judgements by showing one important difference when the zombie 
attempts to learn the Messianic Jones’s Language of human behavioural terms 
whence it enters the Rylean linguistic community.  
The zombie’s inability to learn the language of the community shows that 
the resources needed for the semantics for one specific type of language 
behaviour exceed the resources of a publicly learnt language.  
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Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie is emotionally dead, overt behaviours not 
withstanding. It has no emotional feelings. It experiences no qualia. All 
phenomenal experiences are absent or dead to the zombie. Its inability to master 
the language of the tribe and express itself and understand others will show that 
language rests on non-linguistic knowledge that the zombie specifically lacks. 
The zombie either cannot learn certain words related to emotions, or if it uses 
them, it does not know what it is talking about. It does not have the semantic 
resources to understand its own statements because of its missing phenomenal 
experience. Such being so, the phenomenal zombie cannot mature into the full 
and competent use of a human natural language. Any words the zombie might 
use to try and describe its emotional experiences would have no more meanings 
than the Hangul characters in Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment. The 
zombie’s inability to learn the emotional language of ‘flash-bangs’ or 
discriminate between kinds of flash-bang and apply the concepts meaningfully to 
others, despite having all of the other resources available to it, will demonstrate 
that some parts of language get their semantics from non-linguistic components. 
The reason, of course, is that the zombie with all the resources of a linguistic 
community cannot make the leap to learn parts of the language and use it 
meaningfully because it does not have the experiences that the semantics of the 
language of mind rely upon for meaning. It either does not know what it is 




The failure of the zombie to learn the language of the tribe will in turn 
show that a language-based account of the mind cannot cover all of the facts in 
its domain. I argue that the failure of a language-based account of the mind to 
cover all of the facts in the domain of a theory of the mind leads to the rejection 
of the Anti-Psychologistic project as untenable, since the nature of mind cannot 
be captured without loss by language and its analysis. Foundationally 
something prior to language is needed for some types of language to be 
meaningful. We must reject language as foundational for mind and instead 
search for what this thing is.  
A theory of meaning in language must go beyond the linguistically 
expressible components of language and into the experiences which the zombie 
lacks. The reason, of course, is that the zombie cannot talk meaningfully about 
these experiences even with all of the language facilities it can develop. However 
people with those emotional experiences the zombie lacks can talk meaningfully 
about them. This leads to the final argument in the paper which is the 
dissolution of Ordinary Language as an authority in claims about the mind and 
the call for a return to Pre-Fregeian Psychologism in which a theory of mind is 
prior to a theory of both meaning and language in what I am marketing as a 








The end for the Ordinary Language Philosophy thesis as a Grand Unifiying 
Theory of Mind 
   
The strain of ‘Occult Phenomenological Arguments’ hidden in Ryle threaten the 
homogeneity and unification of his language-based account of the mind. The 
Occult Phenomenological Arguments once fully drawn out are what ultimately 
rupture the attractive and hopeful project of reaching a Unified Theory of Mind 
through Ordinary Language Arguments. This is, indeed, a sad outcome for Anti-
Psychologism because such Ordinary Language Arguments presented 
themselves like a ‘padzar bezoar stone’ of the late Mahumad Bin Masud to the 
problems arising from indeterminacy of reference in fields of research on the 
mind. For if there are elements of the mind that lie outside the scope of either an 
implicit or explicit theory of meaning, that is to say, if there is phenomena that 
cannot be captured in specific analyses of words by a Linguistic Behaviouristic 
Account of arguments, but instead depends upon phenomenal reflection for the 
argument to have meaning, then this jeopardizes the tenability for an Anti-
Psychologistic program. The reason such non-linguistic elements become a 
threat is that one can no longer search within language for an implicit criterion 
of meaning and build a theory of mind from language if the meaning of the 
terms of that theory of mind do not depend upon implicit use of the language 
284 
 
itself. Implicit explanations for the semantics of language were the best and 
strongest candidate for an Anti-Psychologistic theory of mind. They offered the 
best chance of solving the philosophical problem of mind based on Dummett’s 
arguments against explicit explanations. If Dummett is right about ‘implicit’ and 
‘explicit’ language theories, then explicit statements of meaning are problematic 
and result in a trilemma. As we saw earlier in the paper, Dummett argued that 
explicit theories are doomed to either circularity, or an infinite regress, or 
termination in an implicit statement.  Since the only way out of Dummett’s 
trilemma of explicit explanations without either circularity or an infinite regress 
is through a final and terminating implicit statement then the problem of extra-
linguistic determinants, or praeter-linguistic components for meaning is one 
that effects explicit explanations. By extra-linguistic determinants, or praeter-
linguistic components I mean elements of meaning which can obrogate the 
common consuetude of language about the mind279. Praeter-linguistic obrogation 
means simply that there are non-linguistic components and determinants that 
either make up part of the meaning of words, or determine the words use, but 
which themselves are beyond language. Beyond language means that an entity 
bereft of these components could not learn to speak and use a language 
 
279 I distinguish between extra-linguistic determinants and praeter-linguistic components for reasons 
that are not immediately obvious here but will becomes so by the end of thesis. Extra-linguistic 
determinants refer to non-verbal forms of communication. Praeter-linguistic components refers, 
specifically, to the phenomenal experiences that a Chalmerian zombie lacks which determine 




competently without them. In our own case the argument I am making is that a 
phenomenal zombie can not learn to speak the language of emotions because it 
can not tell the difference between what a ‘throb of anger’ and a ‘throb of 
jealousy’ feels like. Since it can not tell what this difference is with all of its 
language facilities then there must be some other source beyond language. 
Obrogation means that these components can over-ride customary use of words. 
For instance, if Peter were yelling obsecenities, we might say Peter was angry 
because this is one of the behaviours we predicate as “angry behaviour”. Later 
Peter can correct us and say he was yelling, not out of anger, but because he was 
fearful and terrified. Peter has obrogated our ascription of his emotional life to 
his behaviour by using information that is not directly available to us (in the 
third person) but gives him a caveat authority (in the first person) to correct 
third-person ascriptions. I will argue that such information is praeter-linguistic. 
Praeter-linguistic information is information that goes beyond the language 
being presented. In this case Peter’s first-person caveat authority to correct our 
third person ascriptions of what he is feeling is based on praeter-linguistic 
information280 that we do not have access to.    
The relationship between caveat authority and praeter-linguistic sources 
is important to (x.3.1) and (x.3.2). This is because the authority for the sources 
 
280 Such information may not be able to be put into language. Hence why I introduce the term here. 
It is my contention that, indeed, some of the information that informs our linguistic useage, itself, 
can not be made linguistic. But I will argue this, stage by stage, through the remainded of the paper. 
Here I am simply using the term to refer to information that Peter has access to in the first person 
that gives him caveat authority over our third person ascriptions.  
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for (x.3.1) as well as (x.3.2)281 originate from and remain with the patient or 
subject. For instance, one might say to a person who did not want to go to a 
wedding “is it because you were angry with the groom?” The person might reply 
“no, not anger. I felt grief over losing a friend to her.” In this case the meaning of 
the word anger has been obrogated by the subject describing the state of mind 
behind their actions. He feels what he terms as grief at the loss of a friend to 
someone he does not like. The important question to ask here is where do you or 
I, or the subject (i.e. the man who didn’t go to the wedding), get the semantics to 
talk about our emotional life with meaning? 
 Consider how deeply this problem runs. If the meaning of words like 
‘anger’, ‘saddness’, ‘grief’ and ‘joy’ depend on some component that can not be 
found in the common use of language, and the evidence of this is obrogation, that 
is subjects can over-ride third person ascription of something they experience in 
a first person state, then there is a real question about whether psychologists 
and theorists of mind can write about these terms with any certainty. This is 
why Ryle and the Occult Strain of Phenomenology hidden in his work is so 
important. It reveals an extra-linguistic component that arises as a normative 
force that can compel the reader to agree with the argument. It is only when one 
stops, and goes back and examines the argument, spurred on as I was by 
inconsistencies between Ryle’s overt stance against introspection and 
 
281 See the section titled Context Dependent States at the beginning of this thesis.  
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conscisousness, and the types of introspective acts hidden in his Occult Strand of 
Argumentation, that one realizes there is a hidden normative force in 
performing the exercises that Ryle’s arguments require in those instances.        
If the strain of Ryle’s arguments which violates his own strictures about 
consciousness and introspection reveal a prater-linguistic component, that is, 
they reveal a component that is necessary for linguistic-determination of 
meaning, and that component is not found in a specific configuration of words or 
a set of propositions, but is instead found through the conscious act of 
performing the introspective exercise in the argument, then this reveals a 
problem for any theory that assumes it is able to discover what there is to know 
about the mind by simply using language. The revelation of these extra-
linguistic determinants and prater-linguistic components can be found in the 
normative force of Ryle’s surreptitiously concealed introspective arguments. 
Such a normative force is found when one performs the introspective act hidden 
inside a phenomenological argument and one comes to agree with the argument 
because of what that introspection reveals upon performing the act. For 
instance, trying to anticipate one’s thought before one has it, or finding the 
difference between a flash of anger and a flash of regret both involve acts of 
introspection. The discovery of rival forms of normative force in Ryle’s 
arguments will upset his theory that the mind can be understood through the 
study of the consuetude and semantics in Ordinary Language.  
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Thus, this thesis argues that the clash between Phenomenology and 
Linguistic Behaviourism will undermine the authority of Ordinary Language as 
a unifying force in the philosophy of mind.  That is to say Phenomenological 
style arguments and Linguistic Behavioural ones are not happy campers in the 
Ordinary Language park. This clash I am preparing the way for will be drawn 
out using an obscure Rylean critic, Robert Wolff.   
 
VI 
The Robert Wolf Paper and Autophenomenology 
 
In my view Robert Wolff’s paper is important because it pinpoints an insight into 
problems with Ryle’s analysis and use of ordinary language. Wolff offers us an 
obscure criticism of Ryle that comes out of another age and epoch in philosophy, 
though, obscure as it is, it is a valuable insight in to the second of Ryle’s 
mistakes, which is the difference between first person experience and third 
person discourse282. 
A redefinition of terminology will become necessary in the last parts of the 
paper to access this insight. Therein Phenomenology becomes 
Autophenomenology. Autophenomenology is redefined by an argument about the 
impossibility for neurophysiological data to transcend the irreducibility of the 
 
282 See Ordinary Language Arguments and the Project of Anti-Psychologism in The Philosophy of 
Mind, in the Tntroduction to this thesis for Ryle’s Three Mistakes. See also Conclusion and 
Afterword for what becomes of them.  
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first person. There are two further normative sources for arguments about the 
mind. These sources are Neuroscientific Object Languages and Linguistic 
Behavioural Analysis. Both are hetero-imperative. That is, the source of 
normativity for these claims is open to an intersubjective dispute from the third 
person point of view in such hetero-imperative uses. One cannot resort to a first-
person subjective realm of personal experience for correction like in the cases of 
ascription and obrogation given above. The source of normativity for these 
arguments is not Heterophenomenal. When I re-define terms, both 
Neuroscientific Object Languages and Linguistic Behaviorual Analysis will be 
relegated to the domain of the third person Heterophenomenologies.   
The argument for the transition of phenomenology to Autophenomenology 
is particularly important as it upholds the distinction between first and third 
personal points of view. The argument I present, briefly, is this. Even if I could 
experience your experiences these would be my experiences of your experiences. 
For instance, if technology ever reaches a point where they could implant your 
memories into my mind, these would be my experiences of your memories when 
I either experienced them or recalled them for the first time.  Language, 
however, contains Analogical Constructs that allow me to apply my experiences 
to interpret your behaviours and equally independently ascribe meaning to some 
of your words. This is what creates the illusion of the intersubjective nature of 
language. These Analogical Constructs are actually what lay behind the 
Indeterminacy of Reference Problem. What the Analogical Constructs reveal is 
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that I apply my own meaning, based on my own experiences, to the words you 
use. This is deceptive and illusory and leads to methodological problems in the 
neurosceicnes which often depend upon first person experience producing data 
and third person techno-enhanced observations.  
The reason why we each have our own private understanding of the 
meaning of common words (related to emotional experiences) is revealed when I 
discuss the processes of language internalization. This thesis argues that such 
internalization283 is part of the way we actually learn the communal aspects of 
the language components which are related to our private emotional lives. The 
process of learning the words for emotional ‘flash-bang’ experiences actually 
results in (1) the sense and meaning for each word deriving from the personal 
conditions under which the speaker learns to use the word competently.  (2) 
Instead of trying to disprove the Guess Work Objection in some clever way, I 
argue for it. I argue that some of the language of mind when used in a third 
person ascription is largely guesswork about an unobservable realm of 
experience. This is, indeed, how I answer the ‘Guess Work Objection’. I advocate 
it as a philosophical position. We often don’t know what someone is feeling from 
their behaviour and words, we have to guess using many of our own experiences 
to try and understand what they are feeling.   
 
283 Here I am deeply indebted to Daniel Kalpokas and his deep insight into Wilfrid Sellars’ and the 
problem of perceptual knowledge. Daniel Kalpokas. ‘Sellars on Perceptual Knowledge.’ Transactions 
of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 53, no 3. (2017): 425-446. 
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Instead of denying that emotive and personal statements are guesswork 
for other listeners like the Anti-Psychologistic philosophers argue, I say yes. Yes! 
Language is guesswork and speculation, but it involves a particular type of 
guesswork and speculation based on referential analogues of one’s own 
experiences. I describe these as ‘Analogical Constructs’ for the words used and 
the way meaning is applied to them. Our guesswork builds up into self-
referencing systems of our own experience which we apply to the words of 
others. We then apply these self-referencing guesses to others based on their 
language and behaviour, but at no time do we know if what they are feeling, 
which is associated with their words and behaviours they have learnt and 
internalized, is the same as what we are feeling. What is important is that the 
meaning we get for understanding others and the language being used comes 
from our own private qualitative experiences. Without these experiences we 
have no meaning behind the words we use to describe ourselves, or when we 
guess what other people are feeling when we apply these words.  
To partake and use an Analogical Construct the person needs to have a 
range of experiences as well as the ability to reflect and also needs to have 
undergone certain stages in the acquisition of language. As I say in the 
Introduction both (1) the ‘Autobiographical Theory of Meaning’ and (2) the Guess 
Work Hypothesis are conditions needing to be addressed or fullfilled for a 
Psychologistic theory about the mind to be considered tenable because they are 
the strongest objections Anti-Psychologism can raise. Tim Crane draws these 
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two objections from McDowell and Dummett. Both Michael Dummett and John 
McDowell argue against the type of Psychologism this paper is advancing. The 
reason why they argue against an Autobiographical Theory of Meaning in 
language, and the Guess Work Hypothesis, is that they both think such a view is 
untenable. I will argue the contrary and provide a story of how people discover 
meaning in autobiographical stages of language aquisition. I shall argue this 
based on firstly Sellars’ community of Ryleans which he presents at the end of 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Secondly I shall also draw on Gleeson’s 
critique of Functionalist Behaviourism. Thirdly I shall make use of Gilbert 
Ryle’s Occult Phenomenology. Fourthly, I shall draw on an obscure body of 
scholarship into inconsistencies, problematic trains of thought and lacunas in 
Wittgengein’s Philosophical Investigation. The combination of these four pieces 
of a puzzle, when laid out in the right order will unlock an insight into how 
humans learn the terms in a language for publicly unobservable mental 
phenomena (like personal emotional experiences). This access fulfils both the 
conditions necessary for a tenable form of Psychologism which Tim Crane drew 
out of Dummett and McDowell. Both McDowell and Dummett present these 
conditions as objections to the tenability of a return to Pre-Fregian 
Psychologism. Moreover, I will provide evidence such tenability of a return to 
Psychologism is so by showing that David Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie cannot 
learn the language of the community because he cannot learn to use flash-bang 
language. The zombie is missing essential elements of phenomenal 
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consciousness that make it impossible for it to experience and express emotion. 
Because of the type of creature the phenomenal zombie is, if it had these 
elements of experiences, which it doesn’t, those experiences would allow it to 
complete all the socio-linguistic stages of learning a Rylean language in an 
extended and detailed Neo-Sellarsian framework like that presented in this 
paper.   
The full explanation for Analogical Constructs will actually arise from the 
critique of Ryle in the Robert Wolff paper. There the explanation for Analogical 
Constructs is prised open by the cultivation of two strains of argument that 
began with what was missing in the David Chalmers and Morris Weitz accounts 
of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Philosophy of Mind. If one were to sketch a thumb 
nail city map of the paper one would see that these two threads form a subway 
system through the paper with many stops, and along those stops are stations 
that reveal the third strain of argument hidden in Ryle. The third strain of 
argument was of course the Occult Phenomenological Strain of Argumentata 
hidden inside of Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments. Such arguments as 
trying to anticipate one’s next thought, comparing how regret and nostalgia feel, 
or comparing the lived experience of being at a race, with merely imagining it 
from reading a report. This hidden third strain of argument in Ryle, containing 
a direct appeal to phenomenal aspects of consciousness, will emerge as a direct 
normative rival to the Linguistic Behavioural Argument. This is what is 
revealed in the analysis I present of the Robert Wolff piece. The rivalry between 
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the Linguistic Behavioural Argument and the Phenomenological Argument 
arises because both produce contradictory claims.    
My treatment of Wolff’s article will illustrate the problem with using 
Ordinary Language Arguments as an authority in the way that Ryle does and 
respond to the premises of the the three questions that underlie the mistakes of 
Ryle I proposed in the Introduction. These were  
  
1) Are there differences between first and third personal perspectives and 
if there are, can such differences be found in language? 
2) What do such differences consist in? 
3) Is one perspective prior to the other? 
 
Basically, the way I untangle the intersubjective illusion of language is to make 
an argument for Psychologism. This argument in favour of Psychologism will be 
defined in terms of the irreducibility of an Autophenomenological position. This 
irreducibility is important. I maintain that arguments that employ a normative 
force arising from an Autophenomenological source of investigation can not be 
reduced to the Heterophenomenologies of either Language or Neuroscience. The 
way I do that is to first show that a number of Ryle’s Ordinary Language 
Arguments have rival forms of normativity buried in them. The reason why rival 
sources of normativity are bad is because they can lead to formal contradictions 
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between propositions. Contradictions are, of course, bad for arguments and 
theories.  
Ryle thinks Ordinary Language Arguments only have one source of 
normativity which he thinks is the consuetudinal everyday use of terms about 
the mind. However, as this paper has shown, there actually are two different 
rival types of analyses hidden in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments which 
can provide eristic normative forces for compelling readers to agree with his 
arguments in different ways.  
Once one is aware of this distinction one can see that Linguistic 
Behavioural and Phenomenological froms of analyses are not mere sub-types of 
Ordinary Language Arguments, but instead they are eristic rivals. It will be 
shown by the thesis that the reason why they are eristic is that they create 
contradictions once some of the propositions that follow on from them are laid 
out. This is problematic for Ordinary Language Arguments. If (A) the two types 
of analyses derive from the same source of normativity, then (B) that source of 
normativty can not support rival contradictory claims. (If A then B). Being able 
to support contradictory rival claims is of course a very bad thing for any 
normative source. If any normative source supports two contradictory claims, 
then this invalidates the normative source and means it is inconsistent284. By 
Modus Tollens, (A) the assumption that the two sources of analyses derive from 
 
284 Castanada, Hector-Neri, ‘Imperative Reasonings’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
21(1960): pages 21-49.    
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the same source of normativity is wrong, because (B) there is a contradiction 
between claims. (Not B, therefore, not A).  
That is, if we treat the claims produced by a (C) phenomenological 
analysis, and the contradictory claim that arises from (D) Linguistic Behavioural 
analyses as both deriving from the same normative source, in this case Ordinary 
Language Arguments, then we have a normative source that provides us with a 
contradiction. (If C is true, then D is false. If D is true, then C is false). The 
conjunction of both C and D as true propositions will produce a contradiction). 
Both C and D must be true in order for B to be true. Since C and D can not both 
be true, this negates B which is the consequent to the antecedent of A. The 
negation of B, by Modus Tollens gives us the negation of A in the above 
paragraph. This means that Ordinary Language Arguments are not a consistent 
source of argument for a theory of mind.  
 
 
The Root of the Inconsistency in Ryle 
 
Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments are inconsistent because they can produce 
contradictory claims arising from the two rival eristic types of analyses. This, of 
course, is where that thread which began at the start of the paper with deficits 
in the accounts of Weitz’s and Chalmers’ reading on Ryle will ultimately end. 
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Such an end will come with the insight hidden in Robert Wolff’s paper. The 
application of Linguistic Behavioural Arguments and Phenomenological 
arguments to the insight in Robert Wolff’s paper will reveal the source of the 
inconsistency in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments. It will show that 
Ordinary Language Arguments have a deep-seeded inconsistency that can 
produce contradictory claims if they are treated as a singular source of 
normativity. This thesis argues that the inconsistency derives from Ryle’s chief 
mistake. Ryle’s chief mistake is that he treated the meaning attributed by 
speakers in first person and third person statements as the same thing. The 
mistake originates because he thought saying something and thinking it were 
the same thing. This means that he either did not see the phenomenological 
appeal in his own arguments as a rival source of normativity to that produced by 
the analysis of linguistic behaviours, or Ryle simply ignored the fact it was 
there.  
However, once we recognize that the first-personal perspective has access 
to non-linguistic components of experiences, and the third person perspective 
does not have that access then it can be seen that claims about the mind can 
produce two fundamentally different types of analyses. These two sources are 
found in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Philosophy, i.e. (I) a hidden phenomenology 
and (II) Linguistic Behaviourism and can produce an eristic rivalry. This eristic 
rivalry between the two fundamentally different types of analyses can, in some 
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cases, produce contradictory claims. This is what happens in the Ryle and 




















285 See Chapter Twenty. Insights into Dispositional Terms from the Age of Anti-Metaphysicians, in 





Part Four:  




Observational and Report Languages 
 
In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Wilfrid Sellars points out that a 
report286in the presence of a stimulus about that stimulus must have an 
authority that is recognized by a person. The recognition for the authority of a 
report ultimately rests upon the social conditions that make such a report 
possible. The stimulus itself is not enough.  
 Sellars writes 
 
For we have seen that to be the expression of 
knowledge, a report must not only have 
authority, this authority must in some sense be 
recognized by the person whose report it is287.  
 
286Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. See pg 72 for the technical specification that 
Sellars gives for the form for a report.  




Indeed, these social conditions are keyed into a background of standard 
conditions.  
 Sellars writes  
 
And this is a steep hurdle indeed. For if the 
authority of the report ‘This is green’ lies in the 
fact that the existence of green items 
appropriately related to the perceiver can be 
inferred from the occurrence of such reports, it 
follows that only a person who is able to draw 
this inference, and therefore who has not only the 
concept green, but also the concept of uttering 
‘This is green’ -- indeed, the concept of certain 
conditions of perception, those which would 
correctly be called 'standard conditions' -- could 
be in a position to token ‘This is green’ in 
recognition of its authority. 288 
 
 
288Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 74. 
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This authority constitutes the second part of Sellars direct refutation of 
empirical ‘giveness’ statements289 and the central core of his refutation of 
Empiricism. 
 
In other words, for a Konstatierung ‘This is green’ 
to ‘express observational knowledge,’ not only 
must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a 
green object in standard conditions, but the 
perceiver must know that tokens of ‘This is green’ 
are symptoms of the presence of green objects in 
conditions which are standard for visual 
perception.290 
 
Sellars’ point is evident. Not only must one have the standard conditions making 
up the fact stating role, but one must also have the concept of the fact stating 
role itself. Both rely upon a social background and a set of standard conditions. 
People are not geared up like Price’s thermometer to simply state ‘this is green’ 
 
289 These of course are Moritz Schlick’s, even though Sellars doesn’t reference them. See Willem A. 
DeVires, Timm Triplett. Knowledge, Mind and the Given. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
Inc, 2000. Pp 72- 77.  
290Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 76 Again I take it that Sellars is referring 
to the ‘role’ of an achievement verb out of Ryle. This is important to the reading. See Triplett and 
Devires discussion of William Aston on this point. Triplett, DeVires, Knowledge, Mind and the Given. 
2000. Pg 84-86. I think once we take Sellars position from the perspective of Ryle’s achievement 
verbs it clears up the alleged ambiguity in Sellars’ claim. Wilfrid Sellars’ specific type of claim is 
linguistic about the use of achievement verbs sanctioned by a community and recognized by the user 
rather than an epistemic claim about the conditions of knowledge.  
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in conditions in which green obtains as the proximal stimulant on the visual 
organs of the human sensory apparatus in the way mercury reacts to the heat 
bulb of a thermometer. Rather, the act of a report must come from the specific 
practice in a socio-linguistic community291. Different communities have different 
ways of making reports. The correctness of a report comes from the sanctioning 
norms of the community292. 
 Sellars writes 
 
As we have already noticed, the correctness of a 
report does not have to be construed as the 
rightness of an action. A report can be correct as 
being an instance of a general mode of behavior 
which, in a given linguistic community, it is 
reasonable to sanction and support293. 
 
 
291 See O’Shea, Wilfrid Sellars, 2007. Pg 75-81 for a discussion on this point.  
292See Wilfrid Sellars’ ‘Truth and 'Correspondence'.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, Pp 197 - 224. 
California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 203 for Sellars’ position on fact stating roles in a language and their 
relationship with forms of ‘correspondence’. Sellars treats a report qua ‘fact stating role’ merely as 
one ‘use’ or ‘role’, (role being his preferred terminology), in a language. However he thinks that a role 
and role aspects change in different languages, and they don’t all ‘correspond’. One example of this 
one might imagine could be the classic Whorf hypothesis that reports made of geological features by 
Native American speakers use a complex vocabulary of geometrical figures, compared with simile 
and metaphor which plays a larger role in English descriptions of Geological features. Another could 
be the deep structures that arise in English use of metaphor about containers, impersonalization, 
personification and deeper principles of coherence in structuring metaphors; see G. Lakoff, M. 
Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp 29 -30, 41-46, 49 – 
51, 126 – 128.  See also O’Shea, Wilfrid Sellars, 2007 and the discussion of Linguistic Communities 
pp 75-81, 102-105.  
293Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 76. 
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Sellars is forwarding a position on linguistic reports given in the presence of 
certain stimuli. In this case Sellars is arguing that social norms give the 
authority for what is essentially a fact stating role in standard conditions. One 
must first have the concept of the fact stating role and this concept must come 
out of social practice or a social linguistic context that allows one to acquire the 
concept of a fact stating role.  This is a socio-epistemic claim which has roots in 
the linguistic practices of the community.   
 Initially, when Wilfrid Sellars scrutinizes294 perception in terms of 
dispositionally based responses and abilities in Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind, it is to the end goal of three moves based on the propositional and 
descriptive content that Logical Positivists took to be sense data, that appears in 
structures based around looks-talk. Initially he divides the treatment of looks-
talk between a ‘sense datum’ and an ‘appearing’ in a disjunctive syllogism295. 
The ‘appearing’ he argues is ultimate and irreducible and he dismisses it for 
reasons he doesn’t completely explain in the paper, but, which, are ultimately 
tied into what’s bothering him in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man296 
and the Thomistic structure of the possible intellect in Being and Being 
 
294 I’m trying to avoid using the word ‘analyses’ in my exposition of Wilfrid Sellars because it 
acquires a highly technical use with specific applications in given contexts in relation to the body of 
his philosophy. See Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 33, 86, pp 53-53 
295Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 35 
296Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. NB The division of the Scientific Image, 
from the Manifest and the Empirical.  
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Known297 where he constructs a vocabulary of the senses298. However, in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, the sense data, he argues, can be 
dissassembled between an explanation and an analysis299.  
 What is interesting is that Sellars introduces his final position early 
on300. In Section Nine after considering the problems raised by treating sense 
data theories as an enriched code flagged301 from ordinary language expressions, 
in his critique of Ayer302 he raises the possibility that sense data are actually 
 
297 The senses informed by the character of the possible intellect. See the Tractarian criticism in 
Being and Being Known. Sellars, Wilfrid ‘Being and Being Known.’ In Science, Perception and 
Reality Pp 41 - 59. California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 49 
298Sellars, Being and Being Known, 1991. Essentially the difference between ‘picking’ and 
‘signifying’; the former pertaining to the real order and the later to the logical order in his critique of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The core of his concern involves the move from ‘first act’ in Being and 
Being Known which is dispositional, pg 43, in which someone gains the concept and the second act. 
The second act being the ability to think of something as an instance of that concept.  The move 
involves being informed by the ‘thing’s’ nature. This in turn involves an isomorphism between the 
knower and the known, involving the intellect and the senses. Pg 41-48. For Sellars picking involves 
more than just the logical order of significance, it requires an isomorphism of the second act.  
299Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 34 
300Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 31 
301 I am using flagged here in the highly technical sense Sellars introduces on pg 27, Sellars, 
Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 
302. Triplett, DeVires, Knowledge, Mind and the Given. 2000. Pg 104-106 Comparatively, see also 
Triplett and DeVires summary. However I think it is problematic that they introduce their 
vocabularly. Many of the terms are irrelevant to explaining Sellars argument, like locutions, which is 
Austin’s vocabulary, not Sellars, nor is it Ryle’s which Sellars is using. See Lecture IX Austin, J. L. 
How to Do Things with Words. Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1975. Pp 109-120 for Austin’s 
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Triplett and DeVires also do things like changing 
Sellars other highly technical terminology which puts the explanation of Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind they develop out of synch with Sellars other papers. They replace Sellars 
technical term ‘report’ which is a specific type of ‘language role’ with ‘beliefs’, and although it is 
perhaps influenced by a Brandom reading it is nonetheless problematic. ‘Report’ has specific 
applications in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, as well as his other papers. Moreover it is 
problematic because it is not obvious that ‘language roles’ and ‘reports’ are synonymous given Sellars 
developments in Sellars other papers like ‘Naming and Saying.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, 
Pp 225 - 246. California: Ridgeview, 1991, and Sellars, Truth and Correspondence, 1991. Sellars, 
Language of Theories, 1991. Considerations about maintaining and preserving the consistency of 
Sellars’ highly developed technical vocabulary aside there are other problems. On a naïve view, the 
general philosophical problem with treating ‘reports’ as synonymous with ‘beliefs’ as Triplett and 
DeVires do is that there is an interpretive ‘gap’ between reports and beliefs. One can take a beliefs as 
de dicto of the report or de re of the object the report is about. For a more sophisticated position on de 
dicto and de re see Devitt’s work in Thoughts and Their Ascription, 1984. 
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theoretical entities, but seemingly dismisses it in a slight of hand, on account of 
‘no one thinking of them this way’. Sellars then argues that sense data theories 
are a mismatching of two ideas. The first is what Brandom303 will come to refer 
to as ‘sentience’ that is, that there are certain inner episodes without which it 
would be impossible to hear musical notes or see a three-sided patch of colour304. 
That is to say, that such inner episodes are necessary for what you might call 
‘higher functions’ like recognizing and knowing that a certain musical tone is the 
note C#. These at the basic sensory level are shared by man and beast alike but 
at the higher level have epistemic content linked to social factors and the 
sanctioning norms of the community305. The second idea is that there are certain 
inferential ‘knowings that’. These are what Sellars reveals later as the fact 
stating roles of the subjunctive conditional structure revealed in looks-talk. Such 
subjunctive conditional structures arse between the withholding of a statement 
of fact and what Sellars refers to as the ‘residue' of the descriptive content306.  
 
303 See Brandom’s famous and seminal commentary on Wilfrid Sellars. Brandom, Robert. ‘Study Guide.’ 
In Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind. edited by Richard Rorty. United States: President & Fellows of Harvard  
University, 1997. 
304Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 33 
305 Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 76. 
306What I am defending Sellars against in this reading is the charge that he advocates a ‘boundlessly 
theory laden view of perception’ and a criticism that his view is subject to critique by 
‘bullheadedness’. See Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 1983. Pg 70. NB This ‘bull-headedness’ is a 
particular property of encapsulation that makes faculties, a fortiori, vertical. Vertical domains are 
modular by hypothesis and domain specific by definition, pg 101. Horizontal faculties are widely 
distinguishable across multiple content domains, pg 13. Fodor gives examples of these, and they are 
generally things like attention span, memory, perception, the multiplicity of imagination, pg 10-11. 
On this view a thoroughly horizontal faculty, functionally individuated, is one that may access 
mental content in other domains at one time or another. This horizontal and vertical architecture 
allows Fodor to distinguish input systems, which are encapsulated, modular and vertical, from 
central systems which are non-modular, un-encapsulated and involved in long term processes of 
review and chained reasoning like belief fixation. In-put systems, on this view, would deal with the 
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 My reading of Sellars presents a closer analysis of the ‘residue’ and fact 
stating role, in order to avoid Jerry Fodor’s criticism of the ‘New-look psychology’ 
and ‘the assumption all perception is boundlessly theory laden’. Fodor’s point is 
that if this were the case then we would learn to see the Muller Lyre arrowed 
lines at an equal length307.  
 Fodor writes 
 
The very same subject who can tell you that the 
Muller-Lyre arrows are identical in length, who 
indeed has seen them measured, still finds one 
looking longer than the other. In such cases it is 
hard to see an alternative to the view that at 
least some of the background information at the 
subject’s disposal is inaccessible to at least some 
of his perceptual mechanisms308.  
 
residual descriptive content of looks-claims, while central systems would deal with factual claims. 
The incompatibility isn’t in the architecture of Fodor’s system, it’s in the nature of specific elements 
of his claims against those of Sellars like categorization that relies on the most abstract members of 
implication that subtend objects of similar appearance. See pg 95 of Fodor’s Modularity of Mind. 
Sellars just wouldn’t think these are phenomenologically given. His residium allows for descriptive 
content but not categorization.  To insist on categorization over descriptive content, would be to go 
too far, and to fall into the myth of the given.  
307Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 1983. Pg 66 
308Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 1983. Pg 66 NB Fodor’s criticism is aimed in general at what he 
calls the ‘new-look psychology’ to which Sellars only features as a small part.Other examples are 
Bruner. ‘On Perceptual Readiness.’ Psychological Review 64,  (1957): 123-152., (Fodor’s in-text cites a 
1973 article, but his works cited list only has a 1957 article by the author of the same name.) 
Goodman, Nelson. Ways of World Making. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1954., Schank, Abelson. 
‘Scripts, Plans and Knowledge.’ In Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Artificial 




This, I think is a very important point that has been overlooked in much of the 
literature. However, I argue that there is a distinction in Sellars that takes 
account of this, and that distinction is strong enough to bear up to Fodor’s 
criticism as it parallels Fodor’s own distinction between input and central 
systems and can give an account of information encapsulation at the perceptual 
level309. The distinction in Sellars arises from the subjunctive conditional 
structure in Sellars exploration of ‘looks’ language which can be revealed by a 
close and careful reading of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. The 
subjunctive conditional structure is revealed by carefully scrutinizing the 
difference between the existential distinction and the qualitative distinction in 
the structure of claims based on the assent of the subject. The shift between 
existential and qualitative is the grounds for the transition between fact stating 
roles of a Report Language and the withholding of assent in an Observation 
Language. Sellars’ argument is that the withholding of assent is what allows the 
various features of an Observational Language to flourish, such as similes, 
 
309 Where the key clash occurs is between Fodor’s ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ architecture and Sellars 
‘residuum’ and ‘percept’  and bottoms out in Fodor’s basic categorizations, in particular (g) the 
‘giveness’ of the categorization which Fodor draws from the evidence of high frequency counts and 
associations in natural descriptions on pg 95 Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 1983. However Sellars 
would argue that these are acquired as part of a linguistic community. The residuum doesn’t change 
but our fact stating roles and linguistic practices do. Categorization in the sense Fodor means it in 
terms of information encapsulation as the essence of modularity involves fact stating roles and 
recognition, at least on the level of ‘perceptual encoding’. To insist that these are given basic 
categorizations, and as such that they cannot be changed as part of linguistic community’s set of 
roles or linguistic practices would be to commit the ‘myth of the given’. See Fodor, The Modularity of 
Mind, 1983, pg 66, 71, 94 – 97.  
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appropriated models, metaphorical structures and other figurative features that 
make an Observational Language possible.  The existential and qualitative 
distinction is revealed by distinctions in three separate cases. The three cases 
are 
 
a. Seeing that x, over there, is red 
b. It’s looking to one that x, over there, is red 
c. It’s looking to one as though there were a red object over 
there310 
 
As Sellars points out  
 
(a) is so formulated as to involve an endorsement 
of the idea that x, over there, is red, whereas in 
(b) this idea is only partially endorsed, and in (c) 
not at all. Let us refer to the idea that x, over 
there, is red as the common propositional content 
of these three situations311. 
 
 
310Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 50. 
311Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 Pg 50 – 51. His italics.  
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That is, (a) agrees with this propositional content (b) partially agrees with it, 
and (c) is the existential case that disagrees with what is common between (a) 
and (b) namely the existence of x. The difference between (a) and (b) is 
qualitative, which he can explain away with a story about standard conditions. 
However (c), the existential case is more troublesome. The propositional content 
for (c) involves a claim about an object that isn’t really there. This is what leads 
him to his final position. But the propositional content is only the first part of 
the story. If the propositional content was the only part of the story then Sellars’ 
would be subject to Fodor’s criticism of what Fodor calls ‘the New-Look 
Psychology School’. However, on Sellars’ account all three share a residual 
descriptive content as well as the propositional content. 
Sellars writes   
 
The propositional content of these three 
experiences is, of course, a part of that to which 
we are logically committed by characterizing them 
as situations of these three kinds. Of the 
remainder, as we have seen, part is a matter of 
the extent to which this propositional content is 
endorsed. It is the residue with which we are now 
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concerned. Let us call this residue the descriptive 
content312.  
 
By separating the propositional content from the descriptive content of the 
‘residue’ he can thus implement a distinction between the two within the 
subjunctive conditional structure that a denial in a ‘looks’ claim takes313. The 
‘linguistic behaviour’ of a denial in the language of an ‘x looks y’ or ‘there 
appears to be an x over there’ relies upon a mechanism that works on two levels. 
Instead of a flatly false antecedent indicated by a negation, (it is simply not the 
case that x is y), the protasis of the subjunctive conditional contains a denial and 
a description (x looks as though it were y). The denial is not a false truth value,  
nor is it a negation of the antecedent, but rather it is a withholding of 
propositional content to the descriptive residue by the agent making the claim. 
The agent asserts what appears to be the case, but also points out that it is not.  
This ‘wilful’ withholding is supported by an agent who is conditioned by factors 
 
312Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 Pg51, his italics.  
313 My treatment of Sellars here closely parallels Triplett and DeVires, t. Knowledge, Mind and the 
Given, 2000.Pp 24 – 28. My reading runs along similar lines to DeVires and Triplett’s distinction 
between ascribing and endorsing a claim, except I follow what I consider to be a closer reading of the 
text and proceeded under the assumption that Sellars himself isn’t using ‘locutions’, which is 
Austin’s vocabulary, but ‘achievement’ verbs which is Ryle’s, like Sellars says in Section 16. See 
Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997 Pg 40,Triplett, DeVires, Knowledge, Mind and 
the Given. 2000. Pg 223 of the DeVires and Triplett reproduction of Empiricism & the Philosophy of 
Mind for the same section. Both state ‘I pointed out above that when we use the word ‘see’ as in ‘S 
sees that the tree is green’ we are not only ascribing a claim to the experience, but endorsing it. It is 
this endorsement which Ryle has in mind when he refers to seeing that something is thus and so as 
an achievement, and to ‘sees’ as an achievement word. ‘I prefer to call it a ‘so it is’ or ‘just so’ word.’ 
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from the social background of a linguistic community, and what they perceive to 
be standardized conditions.  
A ‘looks’ statement uses subjunctive conditionals, but it is not a proper 
counterfactual like those David Lewis develops in his theory of Trans-Finite 
Counterfactual Modal Realism in which the subjunctive conditional refers to 
counterfactual cases by quantifying over worlds using a strong and weak modal 
operator314. Instead of truth values or a modal theory of worlds, Sellars discovers 
the values derived for the ‘looks’ statement are either affirmable or withhold-
able depending on the socio-linguistic background of the speaker within the 
space of discourse and standard conditions accepted and intially taught to the 
agent by his or her linguistic community. The affirmation or withholding of the 
descriptive content of an antecedent-consequent Sellarsian pseudo-subjunctive 
conditional statement are intrinsically linked to norms of the social and 
linguistic community the maker of the ‘looks’ statement comes from, once they 
acquire the language roles for Observational and Report languages. The former 
Observational Statement withholds assent, the latter Report Statements 
features full factual use of affirmable descriptive content in statements. 




314 Lewis, David. Counterfactuals.  
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Sellars writes  
 
Now, and this is the decisive point, in 
characterizing these three experiences as, 
respectively, a seeing that x, over there, is red, it’s 
looking to one as though x, over there, were red, 
and it’s looking to one as though there were a red 
object over there, we do not specify this common 
descriptive content save indirectly, by implying 
that if the common propositional content were 
true315, then all these three situations would be 
cases of seeing that x, over there, is red. Both 
existential and qualitative lookings are 
experiences that would be seeings if their 
propositional contents were true316.  
 
 
315Note that his 1963 amendments actually support my reading. Sellars writes ‘and if the subject 
knew that the circumstances were normal’ which was added to his 1963 version, NB see 
http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm.html in Sellars, Wilfrid. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. . 
1963 ed. Electronic Text. 1963 Amendments, edited by Andrew Chrucky. 
http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm.html 1995. 
316Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 51 The italics are his however I should 
like to emphasize them as well, as they reveal the subjunctive conditional structure of the residuum 
and the fact stating role.  
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This pseudo-subjunctive conditional structure, the one Sellars is identifying with 
the indirect mechanism of assent in ‘looks-talk’, is concerned with the set of 
propositional statements that one would attach to descriptive contents given in a 
stipulation in which the social linguistic and standardized conditions of the 
linguistic community are obtained. The Muller-Lyre lines on the reading I am 
purposing would appear in the residue of the descriptive content. In this way, I 
argue, that the ‘residue’ or ‘residuum’ of the descriptive content, in Sellars’ 
argument, is flexible enough that it can account for recalcitrant modulation in 
the form of information encapsulation of the sort that Fodor’s criticism of the 
New-look school of psychology makes, without damaging Sellars’ essential 
claims that Observation and Report Languages change the way people see the 
world. Further I argue it does so without making Sellars himself subject to the 
‘giveness’ of the sense data schools he criticizes. 
 That is to say the ‘bull-headed’ belligerence of the optical illusion for the 
Muller-Lyre lines to appear as though one were bigger than the other even while 
the viewer knows the lines are the same length can be accounted for by the 
descriptive residuum within the pseudo-subjunctive conditional structure of a 
‘looks’ statement.   
This is because, in Sellars’ account, as I pointed out, the confusion in sense 
data theories originally begins with the mix matching of a brute component with 
the ‘non-inferential knowings that’. The Brute component remains even after the 
propositional structure of the assent to the statement changes. The brute 
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component is found in the residuum which remains common in statements as 
the descriptive content that is either qualitatively or existentially withheld or 
affirmed. The descriptive content of the statements does not change, but the 
affirmational propositional component does. That is to say the person does not 
hear, see or experience a different stimulus, but rather the nature of the 
propositional value of the descriptive component changes. The descriptive 
component is the residuum of the sensory experience that is either affirmed or 
withheld propositionally. This residuum is the common sensory content behind 
all three statements. The residuum remains even when the qualitative and 
existential endorsements change. It is in this residuum that we would find the 
recalcitrance of the optical illusion. That is to say what Fodor calls the 
‘bullheadedness’ of the stimulus (which is the persistence for one of the lines to 
look longer even though they are of even length) remains in the residuum of the 
experience in all three cases of Sellars example. This residuum is the brute 
component of the sensory exeprience317. 
 
317 In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, Sellars draws on a Cartesian a sensory/conceptual 
dualism with the lower sensory experiences of the world, what Ryle would call ‘sensations’ in his 
‘sensations and observations’ distinction, and higher states of cognition like ‘wishing’, ‘wondering’, 
‘judging’ separated. This distinction arises from his reading of Descartes who thought sensations 
could be located in the body and brain, but higher states would not. We can see the argument in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind as the solution to the problem in Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man, if read the way I have suggested in this paper based on the order of 
publication in Science, Perception and Reality. The key to this is to see the sensory part of the 
dualism, as the residuum, and the brute sensory component man and animal alike share, while the 
higher cognitive states of the Cartesian sensory/dualism in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of 





 Sellars writes 
 
(1) The idea that there are certain ‘inner 
episodes,’ e.g. the sensation of a red triangle or of 
a C# sound, which occur to human beings and 
brutes without any prior process of learning or 
concept formation, and without which it would -- 
in some sense -- be impossible to see, for example, 
that the facing surface of a physical object is red 
and triangular, or hear that a certain physical 
sound is C#. 318 
And also 
(2) The idea that there are certain ‘inner 
episodes’ which are the non-inferential knowings 
that, for example, a certain item is red and 
triangular, or, in the case of sounds, C#, which 
inner episodes are the necessary conditions of 
 
linguistic practices of the community in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. When read this 
way, it can be seen how the papers are a continuation of the central themes found in each one.  
 
318Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 21. 
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empirical knowledge as providing the evidence 
for all other empirical propositions.319 
 
Now the split between sensory qualities and the non-inferential knowings that, 
are ultimately based on a ‘conceptual-sensory’ dualism, or what we might call a 
‘faculty-dualism’320 . Sellars left us with this ‘sensory-conceptual’ faculty-dualism 
at the end of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. The first side of the 
dualism is (a) conceptual and thinking processes which Sellars argues can be 
dealt with, firstly, by treating them as being analogous to the way novelists use 
sentences to represent people’s thoughts in novels, during the Manifest Image. 
Later he thinks these will be replaced with neurophysiological information like 
we now have with PET, (f)MIR and EEG devices in the technological growth of 
the Scientific Image. The second side of the dualism is (b), physical sensations 
like touch, taste and smell which he is unsure of what to do with at the end of 
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.  
 The root of this conceptual-sensory faculty dualism begins with Sellars 
consideration of Descartes’ distinction between different levels of thinking. 
Sellars reads Descartes’ problem of the mind as originating from two levels of 
 
319Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 22. 
320 My term used in a sense derivative of Fodor’s use of ‘faculty’ in The Modularity of Mind. By it I 
mean a dualism like that in Sellars, between thoughts qua thinking and sensations qua sensory 
faculties. This dualism, for Sellars, originates in Descartes distinction between  ‘conceptual thinking’ 
and sensory correspondence of perception, See Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 
1991. Pg 29 – 31 following the discussion of Eddington’s two tables.  
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cognition which he sees result in the final Cartesian unresolved and unfinished 
attempt to deal with mind/body dualism without recourse to a quasi-mystic 
Cartesian Platonism. In Sellars’ reading of Descartes human thought is split 
between (A) low-grade levels which comprise of sensations, images, and feelings 
and (B) the high-grade conceptual elements of thinking which Sellars sees in 
Descartes as the foundation of the Cartesian attempt to incorporate bodily 
sensation of the world and ‘higher’ consciousness states of cognition. Sellars sees 
the Cartesian project as representative of an early attempt at integrating what 
Sellars refers to as the Manifest and Scientific Images.  
 Sellars writes  
 
Let us consider in more detail the Cartesian 
attempt to integrate the manifest and the 
scientific images. Here the interesting thing to 
note is that Descartes took for granted (in a 
promissory-note-ish kind of way) that the 
scientific image would include items which would 
be the counterparts of the sensations, images, 
and feelings of the manifest framework. These 
counterparts would be complex states of the brain 
which, obeying purely physical laws, would 
resemble and differ from one another in a way 
318 
 
which corresponded to the resemblances and 
differences between the conscious states with 
which they were correlated. Yet, as is well-
known, he denied that there were brain states 
which were, in the same sense, the cerebral 
counterparts of conceptual thinking321.  
 
Basically, Sellars has worked out what to do with (A) higher cognitive states, 
that is, he treats them as analogous to speech which is how they are found in the 
Manifest Image. By focusing on language to model thought processes, like a 
novelist does, Sellars argues that this allows one to ignore the introspective 
qualities of those thought processes322. Ignoring ‘introspective qualities’ allows 
one to side-step a number of problems about the nature of human consciousness.  
 
Thus our concept of 'what thoughts are' might, 
like our concept of what a castling is in chess, be 
abstract in the sense that it does not concern 
itself with the intrinsic character of thoughts, 
save as items which can occur in patterns of 
relationships which are analogous to the way in 
 
321Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 29 – 30. 
322 The problem of Introspection, Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 31. 
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which sentences are related to one another and to 
the contexts in which they are used323.  
 
This allows him to envisage neuroscience as developing in such a way that it 
begins by treating (A) conceptual thinking as analogous to speech processes, 
picking out the role they play and identifying them with neurophysiolocial 
processes324. This, in turn allows him to see the Scientific Image merge with the 
Manifest Image of Man without a clash. 
 
Now if thoughts are items which are conceived in 
terms of the roles they play, then there is no 
barrier in principle to the identification of 
conceptual thinking with neurophysiological 
process. There would be no 'qualitative' 
remainder to be accounted for. The identification 
curiously enough, would be even more 
 
323Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 34. 
324 This is an over-simplification of the paper and his general position is a lot more complex than I 
have room to expand here. In Sellars see for example ‘Truth and 'Correspondence'.’ In Science, 
Perception and Reality, Pp 197 - 224. California: Ridgeview, 1991. Pg 197 – 207 where he 
distinguishes between thought  as acts of thinking, and thoughts as that which is thought. Linguistic 
utterances can express an act of thinking if it is the culmination of a process in which the initial 
stage is the act of thinking. On the other side of this distinction he points out in Sellars, Language of 
Theories, 1991. that not all linguistic roles are conceptual. See his footnote on page 115. The position 
offered by this paper supports the earlier close reading, where an emotional vocabulary is inter-
subjective because it is learnt as an achievement verb which becomes part of a Report Language 
after it shifts from an Observation Language where it starts as a Capacity Disposition.  
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straightforward than the identification of the 
physical things in the manifest image with 
complex systems of physical particles. And in this 
key, if not decisive, respect, the respect in which 
both images are concerned with conceptual 
thinking (which is the distinctive trait of man), 
the manifest and scientific images could merge 
without clash in the synoptic view325.  
 
However, at the end of the paper the process of integrating (B) the sensory 
qualities of the Manifest Image, still eludes him. We will return to his treatment 
of conceptual thinking as analogous to language later in the paper. For the 
moment let’s take a closer look at how he resolves the problem of sensory 
qualities.  
 In The Language of Theories Sellars argues that the division between 
the theoretical elements like postulates, theorems and various calculi and the 
non-theoretical elements, conveys what seems to be an ontological dualism 
between observables and non-observables which is bothering him in Philosophy 
and the Scientific Image of Man. This is the structural schema he inherits from 
Carnap’s frameworks where theoretical entities are attached to empirical 
 
325Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991. Pg 34.  
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experience. In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man he is still dealing with 
this framework because the difference between observables and non-observables 
is what he characterizes as the main difference between the Manifest Image and 
the Scientific Image326. 
 In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man Sellars deals with 
Carnap’s epistemology327 by collapsing first the theoretical framework into the 
correspondence rules and then the correspondence rules into the observational 
framework328 giving us the first sight of his solution in Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind of unifying ordinary language discourse with science, and 
the argument that theoretical and observational frameworks can shift over time. 
The way they shift is what Brandom will come to call ‘the space of reasons’ and 
the subjunctive conditional structure of withholding assent is important to this 
solution. Sellars’ solution of course, as Brandom points out329 will be to argue in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind that the difference between 
‘theoreticals’ and ‘observables’ is methodological and not ontological.  
 The relationship that develops between ‘analyses’ and ‘explanation’ is 
interesting in this regard. Both embody elements of the faculty dualism that I 
mentioned has roots in issues arising from Philosophy and the Scientific Image 
of Man. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars holds that if the 
 
326Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991, Pg 18-19. 
327 See the Supplement in Meaning and Necessity  
328Sellars, Language of Theories, 1991. Pg 106 – 109. 
329Brandom, Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. See Brandom’s commentary on 
Section 44, Pg163.  
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‘looks’ part of the sense datum is analysed then we find it hard to disbelieve the 
analyses, in this case, treating a car or B. C. Broad’s penny, say, as merely an 
oblong or elliptical bit of colour. However, if the sense datum in the way 
something looks is explained away we can believe otherwise because as Sellars 
points out one can accept a fact without accepting the explanation.  
 Eventually Sellars does away with ‘sense data analyses’ in Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind. He argues that it is merely a spatio-logical bit of 
sophistication that is related to our framework but does not belong to it330. 
Sellars’ argument here is that it is a spatial-conceptual sophistication to treat an 
object like a car as an oblong bit of colour and not a foundation on which our 
perception of the world is built. Sellars argues it is a sophistication to see the 
world in terms of shapes and not objects. He thinks that seeing an elliptical 
shape on the table instead of a penny is a sensory-perceptual sophistication that 
comes only after someone has acquired the language of a community and 
learned how to anticipate and recognize the propositional content in terms of 
that linguistic community. Here, his argument seems to be drawing on Ryle’s 
success verbs331except that Sellars is taking Ryle both in the strictly normative 
 
330Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg  52 -53. 
331Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 40 Sellars tells us that these correspond 
with Ryle’s success verbs in particular Ryle’s class of ‘see’ achievement verbs, which also have 
applications in a Linguistic Behavioural analysis that Ryle applies to the way sensations and 
observations linguistically behave. Ryle, of course, lacks the resources to make a number of the 
distinctions that he makes in order to uphold this distinction since he denies the existence of 
consciousness and introspection. Sellars’ position is pragmatic. He doesn’t deny the existence of 
consciousness, rather he thinks it is problematic for the Scientific Image of Man. For Ryle’s 
Observations and Sensations distinction see Ryle, Concept of Mind¸ 1983. Pg 190 – 200. In 
particular, see pg 196 for his argument on telescopes and confusion between sensations and 
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ordinary language sense and a naive phenomenal sense. But what Sellars is, of 
course, doing is developing specific grounds for the qualitative and existential 
distinction behind statements about the way something ‘looks’.  
 This then leaves him with what he holds as the only two remaining 
possibilities that the ‘sense datum’ in looks-talk can be explained by. The 
dilemma of these two possibilities is what leads to his third and final move332. 
Either we treat impressions or immediate experience as theoretical entities, or 
we make the discovery that the sense datum contains impressions or immediate 
experience as components. The later he’s already ruled out with the existential 
case since there is no object in the case of a vivid hallucination, hypnogogic 
image or optical illusion333. For the former he also needs to make a case for 
treating impressions and immediate experience as theoretical entities because 
we can withhold assent to a residuum even in ‘bull-headed’ cases like the 
Muller-Lyre lines, even when the illusory residuum component persists. That is 
even though we go on seeing the lines with the same lengths as different lengths 
because of the nature of the optical illusion, we can withhold propositional 
assent to it. Sellars then goes on to provide a story about a Rylean community to 
do this.  
 
observations. Observations have objects. I assume this is why Sellars’ fully developed Rylean 
language contains both public properties and public objects. Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of 
Mind, 1997. Pg 91, 87. 
332Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 86. 
333 (a) and (b) vs (c).  
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 The community begins with a language which can describe publicly 
observable objects, but which lacks the ability to talk about thoughts or the 
behaviours of its members. The way the tribe develops that ability is first 
through descriptions of behaviour and secondly the ability to come to see 
theoretical terms in observational descriptions. The point of the story is to make 
credible treating thoughts as theoretical entities334 which in turn gives an 
account for what seemed so puzzling about the existential looks case. 
 For Sellars the mechanics inside of the sense data of a bit of ‘looks talk’ 
is operated by a set of reasons that change the structure of a causally keyed-in 
disposition. This is what Brandom calls the space of reasons335. Sellars 
structures the shift between an ‘x looks y’ claim to an ‘x is y’ claim by dividing 
the propositional content of the disposition possessed by the subject making that 
claim, from that of the descriptive content336. The descriptive content is the 
residue at the back of the propositional content which possess a subjunctive 
conditional structure. We briefly looked at this a moment ago with Fodor’s 
criticism. This is the structural element that, were the propositional part true, 
then the descriptive part would be an accurate description. This is an important 
piece of Linguistic Behavioural analysis. For instance, ‘x seems to be the case’ 
 
334 See Jay F. Rosenberg. ‘Wilfrid Sellars on ‘Mental States’’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, no 28. 
(2004): 239 – 265. 
335 See Brandom’s famous and seminal commentary on Wilfrid Sellars. Brandom, Robert. ‘Study  
Guide.’ In Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind. edited by Richard Rorty. United States: President  
& Fellows of Harvard  
University, 1997. Pg 163. 
336Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 50. 
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states, counterfactually that ‘x isn’t the case’ but that it ‘looks’ to be. The ‘looks’ 
of course refers to the descriptive content. Similarly, ‘x looks y to z’ states that x 
is not y, but that it carries the descriptive content of y, the residuum, which is 
how things look for z. This is why Wilfrid explicitly rejects treating ‘looks’ 
statements as sets of relations337.  
 To explain this division between a descriptive content and propositional 
content with a counterfactual structure, Sellars introduces a short piece of 
fiction about a tie shop on the cusp of the introduction of electric lighting338. I 
only mention it briefly as it illuminates the division of the descriptive content 
from the fact stating role in the subjunctive of the conditional and the way 
reasons can be keyed into dispositional statements. These ‘reasons’ given within 
the practice of the community are what ultimately change a descriptive 
statement of an Observational Language, into a fact stating role in a Report 
Language. The Tie Salesman comes to see the tie that ‘looks’ green in the new 
electric lighting of his store, ‘as’ green once someone has given him a reason to 
 
337Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 36, Section 13. 
338 For those unfamiliar with it: during the course of his career as a tie salesman, lighting is 
introduced to the neighbourhood that John, the tie salesmen, works in. At first this puts John in to a 
bit of a confusion as a tie which looks green suddenly appears blue. ‘I know it is blue, even though it 
looks green.’ John might say. The ‘looks’ green is the part where John withholds his acquiesce from 
the propositional content and simply states the descriptive residuum. However, were one to convince 
John that electric lighting is a better medium to judge the visible band of electromagnetic radiation 
by than the old kerosene lighting, then John would come to see the residuum, the descriptive part 
that looks green, as if it were green. The standard conditions by which John takes to be true the 
propositional content will have shifted. In this way, Sellars is able to solve the earlier problem of the 
stereoscopic image between the Scientific Image and its methodological feeding upon the Manifest 




by explaining that the new electric lighting gives off a more accurate radiance 
when compared to older gas lighting.    
 Brandom in his commentary calls the move into the type of space the 
subjunctive conditional structure of ‘looks/is’ talk occupies between an 
Observational Language and a Report Language ‘entering the space of 
reasons’339. ‘Looks-talk’ and its descriptive vocabulary borrows heavily from 
other Fact Stating roles and Report Languages to build models, metaphors and 
similes which one uses to inform the descriptive statement the user of the 
language is employing, but withholding assent from. This is like when Robert 
Hooke first looked into a microscope and described the cell structures of cork as 
‘cells’ borrowing from the language of monastic buildings and the ‘cells’ monks 
occupy. Brandom takes Sellars to be arguing that (a) ‘looks-talk’ is parasitic on 
‘is’ talk, that is, the nature of the descriptive residue associated with a 
dispositionally keyed bit of observation is parasitic upon standard conditions, 
and (b) that reasons, such as an argument that the reliability of electric lighting 
is more loyal to the discernment of the visible band of electro-magnetic 
radiation, may cause the person to shift from withholding assent to a 
propositional content by instead of saying ‘x ‘looks’ y’, with the subjunctive 
conditional structure, to a propositional affirmation of the descriptive residue 
associated with the statement, to, of course ‘x is y’.   
 




 Recall now the move between the descriptive content and the fact 
stating role is a matter of whether someone uses either ‘looks’ or ‘is’ in their 
claim, or its propositional equivalent. The former ‘x looks to be the case’ is 
descriptive, and in natural language is indicative of similitude and figurative 
devices while ‘x is the case’, in the proper sense is fact stating.  
 Interestingly enough, to reinforce Sellars argument Brandom, in his 
commentary on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, introduces an Ordinary 
Language argument with a Linguistic Behavioural analysis, that doesn’t appear 
to be in the original text. Brandom points out that ‘looks-talk’ doesn’t iterate, 
that is, we cannot withhold our assent more than once, because the withholding 
has already been done in the original structure of the subjunctive conditional. 
That is, it doesn’t make sense to say ‘it looks as though x looks y’ or it does not 
make sense to say ‘it seems like x seems to look like y’ and so on, through various 
iterations340. Since the user has withheld assent to the factual propositional 
content of the statement by saying ‘x looks y’ or ‘there appears to be an x over 
there’ it does not make sense for them to withhold assent again.  There is no 
assent to withhold.  
 As I pointed out above, Sellars thinks that a Report Language itself is 
quite a sophisticated piece of linguistic behaviour that rests upon a foundation 
which brings with it a lot of social ‘baggage’. Not only must a perceiver know the 
 
340Brandom, Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 142, Brandom’s commentary.   
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standard conditions, he must also know the socio-linguistic conditions of 
appropriateness341. Before someone can make observations they need the ability 
to make an endorsement for a factual observation claim based in those 
conditions under which the observation takes place. This ability rests on 
linguistic competence and linguistic competence itself rests upon having the 
concepts342.  
 Now, as I pointed out earlier, in section forty of Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind343 Sellars argues, pace Ryle, that science follows the pre-
scientific stage of language, and further Sellars claims that failure to accept this 
will result in failure to understand ordinary language344. Thus, the affirmation 
that ‘looks talk’ can be based in the Linguistic Behaviourist analyses of iteration 
and applied to a normative Ordinary Language argument can be made. That is  
the propositional shift of the qualitative distinction of the residue in the 
subjunctive conditional structure of the ‘looks’ statement revealed by a 
Linguistic Behavioural style argument, which of course is the inability to iterate, 
as a bit of linguistic behaviour, is supported by an Ordinary Language argument 
that requires some type of normativity.  
 While one might say ‘it is not the case that Jones is not the killer’ 
making Jones the killer via iteration of negation, saying ‘it looks as though it 
 
341Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 73. 
342Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 75. 
343Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 80. 
344Sellars, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind, 1997. Pg 80. 
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looks like Jones did it’ or ‘it looks like it looks as though there is a red x over 
there’ does not have the same iterative effect. One can only withhold assent 
based on observational conditions of language once.  Similes, metaphors and 
descriptions do not recapitulate meaning. This is because the assent to the 
descriptive content is only withheld, not affirmed nor negated. The claim ‘x is 
like a red rose’ is really a withholding of assent to the proposition ‘x is a red 
rose’, while still stating an affirmation of the descriptive content, i.e. the 
‘redness’ and ‘rosiness’ which would obtain under standard social conditions for 
recognizing the descriptive qualities if ‘x is a red rose’ were true. This is 
important.    
 The social conditions for the observational language have to come from 
somewhere. Sellars thinks this is a process. Sellars creates his own tribe and 
from that builds up a developmental ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory of Language’ to 
explain this process. He begins with a socially observable language, and moves 
from that into a language capable of describing what Gleeson would call 
‘affective forms of life’ in others. However, the stages of the development of this 
tribe’s social-linguistic capacities in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
clash with the developmental stages of the Quasi-Pseudo-Hegelian Anthropology 
Wilfrid Sellars argues for in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.  We 







Wherein the clash between the primacy of (a) Object Languages and (b) 
concepts of Affective Life in the conflicting sequences of the 
Developmental Stages of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy are resolved. These 
conflicting sequences of Developmental Stages occur between (i) 
Wilfrid Sellars theory of Socio-Linguistics in Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind, and (ii) the Process Anthropology of his Philosophy 
and the Scientific Image of Man345.  
 
There is a tension between (i) the ‘Socio-Linguistic Theory of Language’ in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind and (ii) the developmental stages of the 
Two Images in the ‘Process Anthropology’ of Philosophy and the Scientific Image 
of Man. This problem, when I introduced it earlier was temporarily confined to 
discussion of the Manifest Image. There I said a temporary solution was to place 
‘Jones’ in the pre-history of the Manifest Image in order to account for the rich 
vocabulary of psychological terms used in the Anthropomorphic Era so as to be 
able to describe the wind as ‘cheeky’ or the lightning as ‘angry’ according to 
 
345 I apologize for the affectation to a Kantian style of title. It does serve a purpose which is to make 
as overtly and technically clear as possible the purpose of this section of the thesis.  
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Sellars’ ‘Process Anthropology’ model of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of 
Man.  
 In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man the Anthropomorphic era 
gives way to the Empirical Image when nature becomes the domain of truncated 
personifications left over from the Anthropomorphic Age. What I would call the 
Gleesonian ‘affective’ and ‘expressivity’ vocabulary and concepts that the Quasi-
Hegelian Tribes people of this alternative history apply to wind, fire, the 
universe and each other must first be purged in order for Empiricism to arrive 
on the scene. The ‘Empirical Age’ is a necessary period according to the 
alternative timeline of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. Empiricism 
needs to happen in order for the Manifest Image to develop the resources that 
will allow for a Scientific Image to emerge and challenge it. The moment this 
happens is when the Manifest Image becomes sophisticated enough to account 
for ‘imperceptible’ objects with theoretical entities and bring on the development 
of the Scientific Image to achieve the dream of a Neo-Carnapian Epistermology 
and theoretical framework.  
 Between Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (which can be 
shown on close analysis to use a Carnap-esque framework of theoretical and 
observational objects), and Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, which is a 
refutation of empirical-giveness, Wilfrid Sellars has another paper called The 
Language of Theories. What The Language of Theories reveals is that Sellars 
comes to reject a Neo-Carnapian framework.  
332 
 
 In Meaning and Necessity346 Rudolph Carnap develops a sophisticated 
doctrine of ‘Linguistic Frameworks’ in which abstract entities are attached to 
empirical experiences of the world. By the time Sellars reaches Empiricism and 
the Philosophy of Mind he has utterly come to reject Carnap’s view. It is a 
rejection of the empirical ‘giveness’ of Carnap’s seductive Empirico-nominalist 
treatment of language which I think is the stimulus behind why Sellars is 
writing Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.  What, perhaps, confuses some 
people who read Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is that it contains 
firstly, this refutation of Empiricism and the ‘given’, but that it also goes beyond 
this and into the description of the development of languages able to talk about 
non-observable emotional content and experiences. This additional story of how 
people seemingly come to be able to talk about private experienes seems ad hoc 
relative to the refutation of an increasingly complex empiricism which has 
dominated Anglo-Western philosophy for over three hundred years. The first 
time one reads Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one wants to ask Sellars 
why not stop at simply refuting empirical giveness? Surely this is a momentus 
achievement in its own right? 
 The answer I argue is that Sellars saw the end of empiricism and the 
understanding of how we come to be able to observe body language and talk 
about emotions as part of the same underlying process. Empiricism comes with 
 
346 Carnap, Rudolf. Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. London:  
Phoenix Books; The University of Chicago Press, 1958. 
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sets of deep implications about what is observable and what is not. One reason 
for accepting an end to empiricism is the ability to explain wider phenomena and 
to give a broader account with whatever replaces it than empiricism could. One 
of the key things that empirical philosophies seemed to really struggle with, and 
particularly since J.J.C. Smart and his treatment of Wittgenstein’s Beetle in a 
Box problem347, but also with roots going back to Thomas Reid348, was the 
problem of how people come to be able to talk about private emotional 
experiences. 
 At the end of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Wilfrid Sellars 
comes up with a story about a Rylean Tribe. The point of the story is to explain 
how a tribe is able to develop the resources for the types of complex descriptions 
of mind and intentionality that we find in Ryle’s Ordinary Language philosophy.  
 The reason for developing the story of this tribe and its language, Sellars 
writes, is 
 
because the philosophical situation it is designed to clarify is one 
in which we are not puzzled by how people acquire a  
 
347 Smart, J. J. C. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ Philosophical Review 141, no. 56 (1959). 





language for refering to public properties of public objects349, but 
we are very puzzled by how we learn to speak of inner episodes. 
 
To explain how the tribe first develops descriptions of behaviour, Sellars invents 
the myth of a ‘Messianic Behaviourist’ called Jones who arrives, perhaps, ‘magi-
like’ from the East with the descriptive vocabulary of an Observational 
Language that is capable of naming and offering descriptions of people’s actions. 
Since the language of Jones is an Observational Language it has available all 
the resources that arise from a subjunctive conditional structure which allows 
the user to implement a descriptive vocabulary with denial of assent to the fact 
stating content, that is it uses similes, models and metaphors with components 
appropriated from other parts of the language. The fact that it allows one to 
refrain from assent is important because it permits the user to create theoretical 
objects through a descriptive vocabulary. More importantly this is what allows 
the tribe to develop thoughts for the behaviours in Jones’ vocabulary. Thoughts 
are merely theoretical objects in the observational stage of the developing 
Jonesian language.   
 This means that language already contains the properties that allow for 
theoretical and imperceptible objects at the pre-Jones stage. More than this, the 
 
349 This is where my term ‘Object Language’ comes from. It is taken from Sellars description of 
languages and their stages, and a specific type of language in Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind, 1997. These are languages that can describe publicly observable objects in sets of standard 
conditions within a Socio-Linguistic Developmental Theory.  
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language in Jones’ Ryleans’ timeline of development can describe de-
personalized objects. The developmental language of Jones’ timeline begins with 
the ability to talk about both public properties and public objects.   
 This is a problem for the ‘Quasi-Hegelian tribes’ in the alternative 
timeline of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. It is a problem because 
the developmental stage in the alternative time line of Sellars ‘Process-
Anthropology’ for the transition to the Scientific Image from the Empirical 
Image, is marked by developing the sophistication to deal with imperceptible 
and theoretical objects. Recall that we had to place Jones in the Pre-History of 
the Manifest Image, when first approaching the goal of a synthesis between the 
two timelines, to account for the rich resources needed from his language to 
make the Anthropomorphic Age possible. The trouble was if we try to bring 
Jones’ Ryleans’ timeline and the Anthropomorphic Age together in a straight 
forward synthesis it creates a clash. In a merged timeline the Scientific Image 
will start before the history of the Manifest Image. If we appropriate the 
refutation of empiricism in the timeline of Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind to the epistemic conditions of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 
we reverse the order of development in the latter of the two. The reason why this 
occurs is that the capability and presence of what distinguishes the Scientific 
Image, i.e. the development of resources for and the presence of theoretical and 
imperceptible objects will already be present in Pre-History with Jones in an 
amalgamated timeline.  
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 The contradiction arises from an incongruence between the timeline of 
Wilfrid Sellars’ Socio-linguistics and his Process Anthropology. In the Socio-
Linguistics of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind the ability to talk about 
publicly observable objects and their properties develops before the projective 
‘affective’ behavioural vocabulary that the arrival of Jones makes possible. The 
language of objects precedes the language of personhood.   
 In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man Sellars’ ‘Process 
Anthropology’ begins with (what we would call after reading Gleeson), a 
Gleesonian vocabulary of ‘affect’ and ‘expressivity’ that can describe the wind as 
cheeky and personify nature. Within Sellars’ Process Anthropology the ability to 
talk about publicly observable objects, as merely objects, that is, nature as the 
domain of truncated persons, develops only after the Anthropomorphic Age and 
the purging of an ‘affective’ vocabulary. Here personhood and its language come 
first, then the Object Language develops.  
 Sellars writes in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man350 
 
 Nature became the locus of 'truncated persons'; that which things 
could be expected to do, its habits; that which exhibits no order, 
its impulses. Inanimate things no longer 'did' things in the sense 
in which persons do them—not, however, because a new category 
 
350 Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1991.  
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of impersonal things and impersonal processes has been achieved, 
but because the category of person is now applied to these things 
in a pruned or truncated form351. 
 
However, Sellars’ Socio-Linguistic Theory is different to the Process 
Anthropology of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. Where the Process 
Anthropology of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man begins is in the 
middle of an Anthropomorphic Age. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, on 
the otherhand, starts with an Object Language which develops into what will 
become a Jonesian ‘Paleo-Behaviourist’ language with the arrival of Jones. 
Jones’ Language is first learnt and taught as an Object Language about 
humans. The Age of Jones is out of sync with the Age of Anthropomorphism 
because Sellars’ ‘Process Anthropology’ starts with a rich ‘affective’ behavioural 
language embedded in an Anthropomorphic stage, and then develops into an 
Object Language only after the ‘affective’ vocabulary is purged through 
Empiricism.  
 To put it bluntly in one of Wilfrid Sellars’ accounts the stages of 
‘affective’ vocabulary happen with the arrival of Jones, while in the other the 
‘affective’ behavioural language is already present at the dawn of time, and only 
after a given time does the possibility for an Object Language happen, and only 
 
351 Wilfrid Sellars. ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.’ In Science, Perception and Reality, 
Pp 1 - 40. California: Ridgeview, 1991. 
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then when the categories of personhood are purged by the philosophies of 
empiricism.     
 A moment’s reflection should reveal there is only one way out of this 
dilemma without a contradiction. Since the authority of social factors pertaining 
to the practices of the linguistic community determine the acceptance of 
standard conditions for fact stating roles and their transition in descriptive 
vocabularies of Observational Languages, and the way these become accepted in 
Report Languages is by social assent through a space of discourse, then 
development of scientific discourse must rely on the socio-linguistic conditions 
that allow science, or any de-personified Object Language to progress as a group 
enterprise. The language of thinghood can grow independently of the language of 
personhood so long as there is a space of reasons. Einstein, for instance, derived 
the data for his theories from the work of Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell. 
Maxwell and Faraday in turn relied on earlier discourse themselves that was 
handed down through the linguistic practices of the scientific community in 
books, literature and educational practices by people like Henry Cavendish and 
Georg Ohm. However, in this process, at no stage do they need an affective 
account of the mind or behaviour in order to describe their electro-magnetic 
research into energy and mass. At no stage do Faraday and Maxwell need to 
empirically truncate a lesser god of resistance we might imagine named Volter, 
or what we may imagine as his feminine counterpart, the goddess Capacitor, 
who together make up two halves of a Galvometric Godhead.  When one picks up 
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Faraday or Maxwell, one finds the development of an Object Language, not a 
theory about other humans and their behaviours projected onto the universe.  
An Object Language can function and be communicable without a highly 
complex anthropomorphic language of emotion, motive or affectivity.  
 I therefore argue the socio-linguistic practices of the community have 
foundational priority in epistemic claims built on language practices, but these 
language practices do not need ongoing anthropomorphic theories or 
explanations about those language practices in order to work. Maxwell and 
Faraday never read Wilfrid Sellars nor based their studies into electromagnetic 
fields on studies of the behaviour and emotions of other humans studying 
electro-magnetic fields. What can be drawn from a lack of emotional, affective or 
Paleo-Behavioural analysis of motivations in the research and work of Maxwell’s 
experiments is that the Object Language does not need a Jonesian language in 
order to build Observational and Report Languages about objects and their 
properties. The Object Language is capable of progressing without any ‘affective’ 
or ‘expressive’ concepts of a Post-Jones age. Object Languages can feed on 
themselves in different stages and domains either factually or figuratively to 
produce Observation and Report Languages. Indeed they can become highly 
developed Object Languages, but they do not need the personification and 
truncation of an Anthropomorphic Age to develop. Positing such is superfluous.  
 I think that this is the reason behind the structure of Empiricism and 
the Philosophy of Mind. Sellars develops the language of human thought and 
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action specifically separate for the Object Languages and leaves them until the 
end of the paper. They are not necessary or foundational to the development of 
the Object Languages for the thesis of that paper, although they bring with 
them a revelation in retrospect about the nature of theoretical entities352.  
 If we apply this insight back to the developmental stages of the Manifest 
and Scientific Images we can see that the ‘Empirical Age’ of truncated persons is 
superfluous. In my reworked Neo-Sellarsian framework, I side with Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind, and argue that Object Languages do not need either 
affective vocabularies, nor Gross-Body-Language stages, nor Jonesian 
Behavioural languages to develop but are primal in linguistic communities and 
can develop without Post-Jonesian Affective Vocabularies. Moreover, the thesis 
that the clash between the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image arises as a 
distinct stage from some newfound ability a linguistic community acquires to 
comprehend theoretical objects, can also be seen as a redundant claim with the 
modification I am suggesting. Sellars argues in Philosophy and the Scientific 
Image of Man that what divorces the Manifest Image from and the Scientific 
Image is that the language of a linguistic community suddenly develops the 
ability to posit theoretical entities and unobservable objects in the Post-
Empirical Age. According to Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man this 
only occurs after the purging of the personifications of nature that society has 
 
352 See Jay F. Rosenberg. ‘Wilfrid Sellars on ‘Mental States’’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, no 28. 
(2004): 239 – 265. 
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developed. The purging of various personifications of nature, Sellars argues, 
occurs at the end of the Anthropomorphic Ages353 and signals the start of the 
Empirical Age.  
 I disagree with Sellars on this point. I maintain that the same capacity 
for positing non-humanized theoretical entities and speculating on unobservable 
objects, that Sellars thinks the Scientific Image gains, are there also in much 
earlier stages of development and discourse. I maintain that the same features 
of natural language like simile, metaphor, analogy, the orders and latitudes of 
similitude, semblances and descriptive borrowing from other categories of 
enquiry, also exist in the practices of natural language. I suggest that the 
explanatory theoretical entities that are only supposed to appear with the 
Scientific Image in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man occur and reoccur 
through out written history in accounts of Stoic-fire, atoms and the void, Thales’ 
theory of hydro-semina, and ancient accounts of Hebrew mana. In Hinduism and 
Buddhism we have accounts of matter that involve abstract concepts like Ksura 
and Aksura, Prakti and Purusa. There are Taoist essences as well as Major and 
Minor Trigrams of Yin and Yang and their manifestation in the Taoist forces 
that shape mountains and lakes, and primal elements of existence like wind, fire 
and water.   
 
353 What I am calling the ‘Anthropomorphic Age’ is what Sellars calls ‘the Original Image’. The 
‘Original Image’ is truncated, creating the ‘Empirical Image’. The Original and Empirical Images 
make up the Manifest Image. Sellars in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man thinks the 
Scientific Image emerges from the Manifest Image at the point in which that society develops the 
capacity to deal with theoretical entities.  
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 That is, I argue, the ability to deal with abstract entities, either 
theoretical or unobservable, through developing Observation Languages which 
are made possible by withholding assent, and the ability to employ metaphors, 
similes and structural abstractions are all there and evident in earlier periods of 
discourse. Indeed we find them occurring throughout natural language practices. 
I disagree with the Neo-Carnapian Sellarsian idea that science is a simple one 
stage process which suddenly appears with the emergence of a society’s capacity 
to talk about theoretical entities. Science is an ongoing practice and an 
endeavour to develop newer and better Object Languages.  
 The language of thinghood needs no concepts borrowed from the 
affective vocabularies that arise after an age of Jones. That is to say that science 
as an Object Language can develop high levels of complexity without psychology, 
psychiatry or the cognitive disciplines and research fields. However, the Neo-
Sellarsian model I am presenting in this thesis suggests that the Gross-Body-
Language at the observational stage of development does need a language of 
thinghood in order to have metaphorical and figurative vocabularies to borrow 
from.  
 Indeed, prior to internalization, the Paleo-Behaviourist vocabulary 
behaves like an Object Language in the observational stage of development. 
When Jones first creates his language, people are treated as curious publicly 
observable objects with publicly observable properties, such as actions, 
movements, and gestures, that can be pointed out and terms taught. This same 
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process of learning vocabularies continues in the initial stages of learning a 
standard Object Language right up to the point of internalization. Prior to 
internalization the meaning of emotional words is often taken from publicly 
observable behaviour. According to the speculative history of the Rylean 
linguistic community this thesis is selling, anger, to someone learning the tribal 
argot of the Rylean community, is learnt, initially, by certain types of publicly 
observable behaviour in others like yelling, ranting, certain gestures and violent 
actions. However, after internalization and when someone has fully developed 
the capacity to express themselves in a language, they can describe their own 
feelings as types of anger while exhibiting none of the publicly observable 
properties of anger. I will deal with this in more depth in the coming sections.  
 What is of most concern now is how best to capture Sellars’ insight in 
Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man without causing a contradiction in 
the sequence of developmental stages in the timelines between the two papers. 
Sellars has seized upon an important insight into two fundamental ways of 
seeing humans in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. What we want to 
do is capture that. So how exactly do we capture Sellars’ insight of two radically 
frameworks, made up of the Manifest and Scientific Image, from the latter 
position of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, without falling back into a 




The solution? Rejecting Sellars Neo-Carnapian framework in favour of 
his ‘Process Epistemology’.  
 
I propose that the above problem of merging Sellars’ insight in Philosophy and 
the Scientific Image of Man, with the story about Socio-Lingusitics in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, disappears, if one forgets the metaphor 
of ‘images’ and instead sees the Scientific and Manifest as specific types of 
linguistic structure. If instead of two ‘images’ one sees the ‘scientific’ and 
‘manifest’ as arising from two fundamentally different ways of using the 
affective and object vocabularies, one can then see that the scientific and 
manifest are actually making fundamentally different types of claims.  
 If we begin to look at the Medical-Psychiatric Object Languages and 
Behavioural Paleo-Psychological Languages like Jones’ descendants create, as 
two different types of language structure which arise from different ways of 
talking about humans within a linguistic community where the majority of 
members have undergone internalization, then we can deal with the different 
Images of ‘Man’ as arising from different types of ‘access’ these language 
structures have to the epistemic values of the Object Languages in that 
community. What I have in mind for this ‘access’ separating the Two Images are 
the types of statement Sellars unravels in what he calls ‘looks-talk’ and the 
pseudo-subjunctive conditional structures of assent-withholding that Sellars 
reveals underlies figurative and literal uses of fact stating roles in Report and 
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Observation Languages. This, I think is the correct way to understand the 
difference between the Two Images once we resolve the contradictory timelines 
in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy and the Scientific 
Image of Man. This picture I am presenting is one where fundamentally 
different language ‘access354’ to figurative and fact stating modes of expression in 
other fields of research and discovery, particularly the developed hard sciences 
like chemistry, anatomy, microbiology, and so on, is what separates the Images. 
The view I am presenting is supported by the clearly observable fact that the 
same sorts of descriptive features of language i.e. metaphors, appropriated 
models, similes and analogies also appear in other bits of natural language like 
poetry, folk tale myths and symbolic forms of artistic expression. These features 
of language do not suddenly appear in a Carnapian ‘scientific age’ in which 
empiricism abruptly develops the sophistication to attach theoretical entities on 
to observational frameworks. Rather they are simply natural features of 
language that reoccur with the same sorts of pseudo-subjunctive conditional 
features Sellars identifies in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.  
 
354 By ‘access’ I mean specifically the figurative and literal forms of language that characterize 
tendencies in psychological and psychiatric explanations. Psychology has a limiting tendency to only 
access bodies of knowledge with metaphors, similies, aphorisms, allegories, myths and other 
figurative modes of expression. Psychiatry tends to access and use both figurative and literal modes 
of expression, but more importantly than figurative and metaphorical uses of language, it has a 
deeply embedded explanatory tendency to use literal statements of fact drawn from the developed 
sciences of anatomy, chemistry, physics, microbiology and so on. Psychiatry tends to inherit literal 
fact stating ‘access’ to the vocabulary and discoveries of these developed scientific linguistic 
communities because psychiatrists receive training in the medical sciences.  
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 What I argue brings about the clash Sellars saw between a Scientific 
and Manifest Image are different ways of using language. It is language use, 
and not the ability for humans to suddenly develop the ability to deal with 
theoretical objects, that creates two vastly different views of the human-in-the-
world. That, I think, is an oversight on Sellars’ behalf which originated from 
grappling with Carnap’s Logical-Positivism. It is an oversight I think that arose 
because Sellars was still too deeply engaged with working out what was wrong 
in Carnap’s empirico-nominalistic framework. Carnap was an empiricist who 
maintained an ontological distinction between observable and theoretical 
entities. The empiricism that Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is 
refuting, most assuredly, is Carnap’s, as evidenced by the papers on Carnap, 
that Sellars wrote and published around the time period of those two works.  In 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars replaces Carnap’s ontological 
difference between empirical and theoretical beings, with a methodological 
difference between Obsevation and Report Languages. Unlike Carnap’s 
ontological distinction, Sellars methodological one can change over time. People 
can come to interpret the world through the Observation Language and learn to 
see ‘theoretical beings’ as observable facts. However, Sellars does not go back 
and re-write the Anthropology of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.  
 The oversight arises because he changes his position slightly when he 
refutes Carnap in the papers that appear between Empiricism and the 
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Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, and most 
directly when he wrote The Language of Theories355.   
 I argue we can maintain his latter position in Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind by abandoning the need for 1) a primal Psychological 
Behavioural Language (foundational and present at the dawn of time) to deify 
nature and thus give us the resources for 2), an Anthropological Age. Such an 
Anthropological Age is necessary under his old theory, in order to give us the 
foundations for an Object Language which can only happen when Empiricism 
purges the gods of the Anthropomorphic Age. The result of abandoning 1), and 
2), is there is no longer any need for 3); an Empirical Age which begets an 
Atheisitc Post-Anthropomorphic Age in which nature is now the domain of 
truncated persons and primed to create the Object Languages.  
 Thus, instead of 1), 2) and 3), we simply reject outright the idea that 
science requires roots in an Anthropomorphic Age. On this view religion might 
be viwed as a mere historical contingency of the human race, or a socio-historical 
process for collectivising groups of people together for survival and gathering 
resources, but not as a strict necessity of either underlying, or ongoing liguistic-
epistemic processes. Evidently, we need not posit disposable gods for science or 
scientific processes to flourish356. Nor have we needed to for quite some time. 
 
355 Sellars, Phenomenalism, 1963. Sellars, Being and Being Known, 1963.  
356 What will emerge from seeing Object and Psychological Behavioural languages as fundamentally 
different types of language is the view that Psychology is limited to accessing the Object Language in 
metaphorical and descriptive terms of an Observational Language. Psychiatry and the psychiatric 
sciences are not limited to merely Observational stage figurative uses of Object Languages, but also 
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There is no Galvatronic Godhead of Volter and Capacitor in the development of 
Electro-Magnetic Theory. Science does not need anthropomorphic deification of 
Jonesian mentalistic terms to progress its advances in its Object Languages.   
 On this view the Object Language comes first, and then the Jonesian 
Language grows out of the Object Language as a special type of Object Language 
about observing humans. What makes The Jonesian Language fundamentally 
different to other Object Languages arrives with the stage I refer to as 
‘internalization’. Here the language Jones created eventually deviates from the 
path of other Object Languages and develops special Affective-Behavioural 
properties. My suggestion is that the Affective Behavioural Language is a 
special type of language different to of the others. It has the capacity, following 
internalization, to develop Analogical Constructs. However there are praeter-
linguistic components that give the language these special properties. The 
praeter-linguistic components allow one to access the final stages of language 
acquisition and learn what terms mean. What is important to this account is 
Sellars’ insight that there is a clash between different ‘Images of Man’. Rather 
than developing the ability to deal with ‘theoretical entities’, I argue that what 
 
utilize fact stating roles of an Object Language in an account of the mind. Objects languages like 
chemistry and physics can feature in psychiatric accounts of the mind. What is missing from the 
body of the text and puzzling is an account of religion and what Sellars calls ‘the perennial 
philosophy’. While explicit description in the body of the text is, perhaps, not appropriate, a 
description of where it fits into this model is provided here. Religion is an Object Language that can 
make use of Fact Stating roles in the Behavioural Language, while Superstition is another Object 




brings about the clash between the Scientific Image of Man and the Manifest 
Image is the development of a Psychiatric Science that is able to connect the 
Affective Behavioural Language Jones creates with the Fact Stating Roles in the 
Object Languages in literal, as well as figurative ways of drawing on scientific 
developments to offer explanations of the mind. Psychiatry contains literal as 
well as figurative ways of accessing and employing the Object Languages in its 
explanations, while Psychology357 is characterized by merely figurative use of the 
Object and Scientific Languages in its explanations.   
 If we see that the Affective Behavioural Language that develops from 
Jones will become a fundamentally different type of language from the rest of 
the Object Languages the tribe develops then we can see that different 
relationships between these two languages based on the Observational and 
Report Stages of those languages produces different types of epistemic claim. 
The clash between the Manifest and Scientific Image in this new model (unlike 
the one presented by Sellars in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man), is 
no longer merely characterized by the ability to handle sophistications based on 
theoretical and unobservable entities. Such entities, if Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind is correct become visible over time. The scientist, of course, 
learns to see Mumesons in the Wilson Cloud Chamber. Rather what 
characterizes the difference between the Scientific and Manifest Image, I think, 
 
357 Where I use capitals, I am refering to the Psychiatric and Psychological Images as so defined 
under the Figurato-Litero Model suggested by this paper.  
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is the different type of access they have to pure Object Languages. The Manifest 
Image of Man only has metaphorical and figurative uses of the Object 
Languages and Sciences. However, the Scientific Image can use the Object 
Languages and Sciences in factual descriptions that feature in its explanations 
of the human being.  
 ‘Psychology’ in this specific sense is the development of Jones’ Affective 
Behavioural Language within both stages of the Observational and Report 
Languages but is limited to the subjunctive-conditional structure of fact 
withholding assent in its use of the Object Languages. ‘Psychology’ in this sense 
borrows descriptions from the Object Languages, but the descriptions are 
limited to forms of similitude, along with metaphorical and figurative uses. A 
Psychologist might describe a certain interesting human traits as being like ‘hot’ 
or ‘cold’, and may call their theory ‘Hot and Cold Cognition358’ but no scientific 
theory of heat, molecular expansion or thermodynamics features as an actual 
and factual part of their theory. The theory does not use ‘hot and cold’ in a literal 
sense that is continuous with the Object Languages of the tribe. The terms ‘hot’ 
and ‘cold’ are merely figurative as they are in a standard Observation Language 
which borrows from the domain of another Report Language and uses the terms 
descriptively.  
 
358 Dustin Albert and Laurence Steinberg. ‘Judgement and Decision Making in Adolescence ‘ Journal 





 Psychiatry is a development of Jones’ Language, but it has the ability to 
correlate the terms of Jones’ Language with the Object Language in Fact Stating 
Roles359 as well as figurative, metaphorical and types of descriptive similitude. 
This is why Psychiatry is able to employ advanced knowledge about physics, 
chemistry, bio-chemistry and bio-electrical information as literal features in the 
account of the mind psychiatrists offer. A psychiatrist might explain that the 
reason why a person acts a certain way is because they lack a certain key 
neurotransmitter like dopamine, or some sort of structural brain-tissue damage, 
or may refer to the blood-alcohol levels, or a type of hallucinogenic neurotoxin in 
their system, which they can describe factually in the Object Languages of 
Organic Chemistry and Human Anatomy.   
 While this distinction in the real world of psychiatric and psychological 
research may not exemplify every single nook and cranny of research, de lege 
ferenda, I argue that these methodological tendencies distinguishing the two 
fields can be used as a model, which can be encoporated into Sellars’ work to 
solve the conflict between the time lines of Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind, and Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. I call this model the 
Firgurato-Litero Model. I encourage the reader to read the literature of both 
fields with the above distinction in mind and note the way the language being 
used bears out. Psychology tends towards the language of metaphor and 
 
359 These are Sellars terms so I have put them in capitals for transparency.  
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figurative use when it borrows or engages the hard sciences. Psychology de 
Figurato is limited by this tendency. Psychiatry tends towards factual use of 
medicine, anatomy and the hard sciences in its descriptions and explanations as 
well as figurative uses common among Observation Languages in their research 
phase. The epistemic authority for scientific knowledge and factual statements 
that feature in psychiatric accounts of the mind, of course, are inherited from 
psychiatric training which features the same medical and scientific background 
as nurses and doctors as part of the Western Scientific Medico-Industrial 
Complex. However, there are also deeper language threads which also arise 
between the two branches.  
 The difference underlying the Manifest and Scientific Image on this view 
proposed by the Neo-Sellarsian Figurato-Litero Model I am suggesting, is that 
one type of Image, Psychiatry, which here represents the Scientific Image, is a 
combination of an Object Language and Jones’ Language to create a new 
Observational Language. Psychiatry can use both scientific factual statements 
that can feature in its models at the Observational stage, as well as 
metaphorical uses of the Object Language.  
 The other image, here represented by Psychology, and what we might 
characterize as the Manifest Image is merely the development of Jones’ Anthro-
Affective Language with figurative use of the Object Languages. The 
Psychologist cannot build up Fact Stating roles linking Jones’ Anthro-
Affectivism and the Object Language because The Psychologist lacks the ability 
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to use the Object Languages factually at the Paleo-Behaviourist stage when 
formulating what will become a Gross-Body Language. Any use the Psychologist 
makes of the Object Language is descriptively figurative and metaphorical 
because the type of access it has is limited to denial of the fact stating role in the 
subjunctive conditional structure of looks-talk.  
 The Psychiatrist is not limited in the same way. The Psychiatrist is able 
to develop a body of knowledge which correlates both Factual Statements of the 
Object Language, and metaphorical, descriptive uses with Jones’ Language in 
the Observational Stage of a Psychiatric Jonesian Language. This is why the 
Psychiatrist can use pharmacology and the advanced Object Languages of 
chemistry in his or her treatment of a subject. The Psychologist, however, can 
only use flowery and metaphorical descriptions that borrow from the Object 
Languages.   
 Thus the way forward, and avoiding the incongruence in the time line of 
the two accounts Sellars offers of the relationship between the Object Language 
and Jones’ Language which occurs between Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind, and Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, is to abandon the 
‘Process Anthropology’ of Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man which 
included the claim that a language based account of thought and the mind would 
be replaced by a neuroscientific view once the Scientific Image developed the 
ability to deal with Imperceptible Objects and Theoretical Entities. Instead, I 
argue that what Sellars recognized as a clash between the Scientific Image and 
354 
 
Manifest Image of Man should be understood to be based on a difference 
between general Observation-Report Languages that deal with objects and 
publicly perceptible qualities and a special type of Observation-Report Language 
that Jones develops which allows people to describe each other’s behaviour. This 
special type of Observational Language which Jones develops has properties 
that will become clear in the next move of the thesis when I deal with what 
happens when Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie tries to learn how to use Jones’ 
Language. What will be brought into view there is the special property that 
Jonesian Behavioural Languages have once they pass through Internalization 
and become an Endo-Affective Language. This results in a different type of 
claim.  This type of claim is what lies underneath the normative power of the 
phenomenological argument. The normative power of phenomenology actually 
arsies from an autobiographical element in how we come to ascribe meaning to 
some terms when we learn them.   
 Moreover, it is this autobiographical element, when spelled out, which is 
actually part of the reason why Chalmers zombie twin is unable to undergo all of 
the stages necessary for learning a language within Sellars’ model of a Rylean 
community. There is a stage that I will call ‘internalization’ which arises from 
the special property that sets Jones’ Language apart from the other Object 
Languages employed by the Tribe. This process of ‘internalization’ once fully 
spelled out results in the refutation of the claim Chalmers made that he and his 
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phenomenal zombie twin have the same corresponding Judgements. This is the 
refutation which I promised earlier in the thesis360.  
 What is important to the overall argument being presented is that 
Psychology, as explained above, and Psychiatry have the same language 
between them. This is Jones’ Language of human behaviour which I have been 
describing as an ‘affective’ language when fully developed and a Paleo-
Behaviourist language while in its observation stage, borrowing the term from 
Gleeson’s insight to avoid the reader becoming lost in different uses of 
‘psychological behaviourism’. However the languages of the Psychiatric Image 
can go beyond the limited metaphors and figurative languages of Psychology. So 
even though the two languages might begin with Jones’ ‘Paleo-Behaviourism’ 
and an Ur-Language, Psychiatry also has access to the factual knowledge of the 
tribe’s Object Language when formulating an Observational Language. This 
hybrid language is built into how a Psychiatrist sees patients, when the 
language of Psychiatry has sufficiently developed, and he or she arrives at a fact 
stating ‘Report Language’. That is a fully developed Psychiatric Gross-Body-
Language Behaviourism can attempt to do things like attribute behavioural 
descriptions of fidgeting with reports of ‘painful agitation while trying to 
concentrate’ to an insufficiency of neurotransmitter in the pre-frontal cortex. 
Here Psychiatry draws on the Object Languages of medicine as well as the 
 
360 See Chapter IV Chalmerian Zombies and the Flash-bang in this thesis.  
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epistemic authority real world psychiatrists receive in their training as medical 
doctors to form an explanation.  
 If we think about this in relation to Sellars’ original theory and the 
authority that upholds a fact stating report within the linguistic community, we 
can see that Psychiatrists originally gained this authority from their medical 
training, which contains extensive knowledge of chemistry and the effects of the 
chemistry of the body as well as developing branches of physics like Nuclear 
Medicine and scientific knowledge about the electro-magnetic wave spectrum 
used in diagnostic equipment like X-Rays. Western Medicine, of course, 
inherited the authority for using science on the human body from its historical 
connection to science and doctors who incorporated scientific knowledge from 
newly developed fields into their treatment.  A Psychiatrist inherits access to 
this body of knowledge and the authority these Object Languages contain when 
they do their medical training.  
 Psychology inherits methodological tendencies that limit it to the 
metaphors, similes, appropriated models and descriptive vocabularies of the 
Object Language because psychologists do not have the medical and scientific 
training of the medical establishment, which psychiatrists receive. They do not 
have the recognized epistemic authority to prescribe pharmacology to correct 
chemical imbalances nor do they receive advanced knowledge of brain chemistry, 
anatomy, nor do standardized medical observations like blood sample analysis, 
heart rate and blood pressure generally feature in their diagnosis or 
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explanations361. When we place the types of industry-based explanations 
psychologists have a tendency to give in to Sellars’ framework with the types of 
explanations that psychiatrists have a tendency to give, with an eye towards the 
model I have suggested, we can indeed begin to see the type of clash between 
two different ‘Images of Man’ that Wilfrid Sellars spoke about.  
 A Neo-Sellarsian Psychologist might describe ‘stress’ by metaphors to 
tension in bits of wood or metal and correlate this with an ‘affective’ vocabulary 
of the person’s behaviour and actions. The Neo-Sellarsian Psychiatrist however, 
unlike the Psychologist, might take blood pressure readings, register pulse and 
gather an account of certain hormones in a blood sample detected by the 
medically diagnostic use of organic chemistry which feature factually in their 
account along with the metaphorical and affective vocabularies.  
 According to this view I am arguing for, the medical and scientific 
tendencies inherited by Psychiatry’s access to Object Languages in the 
Observation Stage of development produces a fundamentally different type of 
 
361 Here, for instance if one tired of Jung, Freud, Fredrickson, Seligman, and other examples 
provided through this paper, one might look also to Zerka Toeman Monero’s seminal article and 
concept of ‘doubling’ and ‘role reversal’ for the ‘cosmic man’ applied in group therapy. See Zerka 
Toeman Monero. ‘The Significance of Doubling and Role Reversal for Cosmic Man. Group 
Psychotherapy and Psychodrama, A Quarterly Journal. No 28. (1975): 55-59. While one is in group 
therapy, one might venture in Irvin Yalom’s laterization and fictionalization and extensive use of 
metaphorical structures in Irvin D. Yalom, Ben Yalom. The Yalom Reader. New York. Perseus 
Books. 1998. Likewise one might venture into Eric Bernie’s adult, child and parent metaphors in 
Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy. California. Snowballpublishing. 1960. One might, here, go 




claim to base an argument on than the Psychological Source. This difference 
occurs even though both Psychology and Psychiatry start off with Jones’ 
Affective Behaviourism. Both sources use Jones’ Language, both sources might 
draw on metaphors and similes in the Observational stage, but the Psychiatrist’s 
use is not limited to metaphorical and figurative uses of the Object Languages, 
rather he or she can feature the Object Language as factual statements in the 
body of knowledge built up when constructing a Psychiatric Jonesian Language.  
 Thus, to conclude this section I have argued that Sellars was 
fundamentally right about the clash between a ‘Manifest Image’ and a ‘Scientific 
Image’ in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man was one of being a clash 
between fundamentally different frameworks. He was also right about the 
pseudo subjunctive conditional structure of the propositional statements in the 
Observational Stage in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Where the 
explanation on offer in this paper differs from Sellars’ own account is that the 
Figurato-Litero Model of Psychology and Psychiatry maintains the view that it 
is not the ability to handle theoretical objects which separates the Manifest and 
Scientific Images. No. Rather the Scientific Image that Psychiatry offers arises 
from the use of Object Languages in Fact Stating Roles in the descriptive and 
research phases of a Psychiatric Observational Language. Psychology, on this 
view, is limited to metaphorical uses of the Object Languages in formulating its 
Observational Languages. The clash is a clash over types of language access 
disciplines have. It is a clash about the types of language in use. The 
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Neuroscientific view is thus a genuine rival to the Ordinary Language Account 
of the Mind. Indeed, the Image emerging from Psychiatry, because of the factual 
access to the Object Languages of medicine and science that discipline inherits, 
presents itself as a genuine rival to the Manifest Image of Man presented by 
Psychology. Instead of a clash over the ability for human knowledge to handle 
abstract entities and theoreitical frameworks, I propose it is a clash of the ways 
in which languages are used in formulating theories and explanations. Can 
Psychology ever leave the metaphorical and figurative and descriptive stage? 
This paper argues that it cannot. To the Psychologist talk about human beings is 
but a vocabulary of metaphor and simile, and merely the manifestation of a 















Psychology, Psychiatry, Neuroscience and the Object Language. 
 
I 
Greek Prefixes and the Disciplines of Mind 
 
 ‘Psychology’ has become a terrible and confused word in use today. What is 
perhaps most unfortunate about the word ‘psychology’ is that it looks like the 
word ‘psychiatry’ to a layman not educated in the fineline meanings of prefixes, 
affixes and suffixes. So much so that people often cannot tell the difference and 
will sometimes go to a psychologist with a psychiatric problem. They might, on 
account of the confusion caused by the similarities between the two words, visit 
a psychologist with, for instance ‘Manic Depression’ which we now understand to 
be caused by an underlying chemical imbalance that is related to the brain’s 
inability to regulate a serotonin and dopamine reward cycle362. Instead of a 
 
362 Carter, Rita. Mapping the Mind Revised ed. Los Angles University of California Press, 2010. See  
Tariq Mahmood, Trevor Silverstone. ‘Serotonin and Bipolar Disorder.’ Journal of Affective Disorders  
66, no. 1 (2001): 1-11. for the original critical review following the development of pharmological  
probes for the 5-H neurotransmitter.  For further developments into the relationship between  
dopamine, serotonin regulation, depression and bipolar see Crystal Pinto, et al. ‘Parent of Origin  
Effect and Allelic Expression Imbalance of the Serotonin Transporter in Bipolar  
Disorder and Suicidal Behaviour.’ European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience 261,  
no. 8 (2011): 533-538. As well as Yuan Hwa-Chow, et al. ‘Impaired Cognition in Bipolar I Disorder:  
The Roles of the Serotonin Transporter and Brain-Derived Neurotrophic Factor.’ Journal of Affective  
Disorders 143, no. 1-3 (2012): 131-137. Serotnin and dopamine dysregulation have been regularly  
cited in the literature since the development of pharmological probes.  See also Leonardo Tondo  
‘Bipolar Disorder’. In Mood Disorders, Clinical Management and Research Issues, edited by Eric  
Griez, Corto Faravelli, David Nutt, Joseph Zohar. Pp 103 – 116. West Sussex. John Wiley and Sons  
Ltd. 2005.  
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pharmacological treatment like a bottle of pills to treat the imbalance, our Manic 
Depressive layman, who has confused the two professions, receives a theory 
about the ID, neurosis and the relationship between his mother and his anus.  
 The confusion between psychology and psychiatry is no incidental 
matter, but has a very long history behind it. Both words have their origins in 
the Greek word Psyche363 which at various stages of philosophy meant different 
things364. Plato, from which Freud, the Father of Psychology is no doubt drawing 
the word365, thought that the Psyche housed the tripartite elements of the soul; 
nous, eros and thumous366. Aristotle after Plato thought that Psyche was the 
animating element which separated life from inert matter. On his view plants, 
animals and man have different psyches367. What distinguishes man here is the 
rational element of the human psyche which Aristotle thought contained an 
active doing and a passive knowing component; the will and the intellect. It is 
uncertain whether Aristotle thought the rational human psyche survived 
death368, however Aquinas who came after him certainly did. So even the prefix 
 
363 Katona, G. ‘The Evolution of the Concept of Psyche from Homer to Aristotle.’ Journal of  
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22, no. 1 (2002): 28-44.  
364 Katona, G. ‘The Evolution of the Concept of Psyche from Homer to Aristotle.’ Journal of  
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22, no. 1 (2002): 28-44. Lynn, Morgan. ‘The Potentiality  
Principle from Aristotle to Abortion ‘ Current Anthropology 54, no. 57 (2013): 512-525. 
365 See the seminal Tourney, Ganfield. ‘Freud and the Greeks: A study of the Influence of Classical 
Greek Mythology and Philosophy upon the Development of Freudian Thought.’ Journal of the 
History of the Behavioural Sciences. (1965). No 1(1).   
366 Plato. The Republic. Translated by Desmond Lee. Victoria: Penguin, 2003. Pp 147-148. 
367 Watson, Gearard. ‘Φanta∑Ia in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3.’ The Classical Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1982):  
100-113. 
368 Chroust, Anton-Hermann. ‘Eudemus or on the Soul: A Lost Dialogue of Aristotle on the  
Immortality of the Soul.’ Mnemosyne 19, no. 1 (1966): 17-30. Chene, Dennis. Life Form: Late  
Aristotelian Cocneptions of the Soul. London: Cornell University 2000. Erbel, Jason. ‘Aquinas  
Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations‘, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy  
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for psychology and psychiatry contains referential confusions and vagueries that 
derive from rival philosophical theories and different periods of meaning. The 
use of the Greek prefix raises questions as to the sense in which we are we to 
take the ‘psych’ part of the word. We might here posit a beginning to separating 
the two terms by supposing that Psychology refers to Plato and Psychiatry 
draws its origins from Aristotle in keeping with the respective theories of matter 
and form in order to ground this distinction in the mystique and philosophical 
ardor of Greek linguistic origins.  
 However, I suggest that this confusion is much better remedied with a 
Pro-Sellarsian clarification that by ‘Psychiatry’ at a first approximation I mean 
that admirable profession in which someone trained in medicine, pharmacology, 
and anatomy like a doctor, who has access to the Object Languages of the 
scientific-medico tribe including physics and chemistry, then goes on to studies 
of the brain. The historical origins of psychiatry are perhaps, less clear, and 
confused by the origins of the history of psychology where we have discredited 
neurologists developing a ‘talking cure’ while becoming addicted through self-
prescription to cocaine369 and fathering a rival discipline to psychiatry. However, 
where the real world falls short, here we refer to an ideal Psychiatry in the 
description I have given according to the Figurato-Litero Model drawn from my 
treatment of Wilfrid Sellars and his Philosophy of Mind.  
 
30, (2005): 379-394. 
369 Freud, Sigmund. On Cocaine. London, Hesperus, 2011. 
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 ‘Psychology’ is perhaps even less clear. Unlike Psychiatry which relies 
heavily and draws upon training in, and the using of evidence and research from 
the medical sciences, psychologists are divided about what approach they should 
be taking. In the real world upon visiting actual psychologists one will find that 
no two psychologists agree on the methodologies, ethics, types of research, what 
constitutes research, domains and the theories or body of propositional 
knowledge that Psychology as a discipline should entail. As such let us 
temporarily set aside the questionable findings of a survey into the ‘practice’ of 
psychology and turn to the model presented in this paper.   
       ‘Gross-Body Language Psychology’ as defined by this paper is the pre-
internalized behaviourally descriptive language of Jones that develops into a 
‘Psychological’ account of the mind in the sense of this paper. This language may 
borrow from the Object Languages of Science, but it can only use these 
‘borrowings’ in metaphors, similes, appropriated models, and other language 
constructs that are only possible on the basis of the underlying pseudo-
subjunctive conditional structure Sellars reveals operating within different types 
of ‘looks-talk’. Such psychological talk is descriptive and figurative and limited to 
being so since it relies on denial of the fact stating role when it uses the Object 
Language in qualitative descriptions. This is the key to any formal difference 
from ‘Gros-Body-Language-Psychiatry’ as described in this paper which has 
access to the Fact Stating role of the Object Report Language and thus Factual 
Statements drawn from the Object Language can feature in explanations and 
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descriptions by the Psychiatrist when developing his or her Jonesian language. 
The Psychologist can say that changes in a person’s behaviour are like changes 
in the behaviour of a cluster of molecules but does not have the authority to 
make statements drawn from science or medicine. The Psychiatrist can say that, 
but they can also say changes in the person’s behaviour are due to changes in 
the chemical composition in the brain. 
 Jones’ Paleo-Behavioural Ur-Language, however, can evolve into any 
one of the Endo-Affective languages including Psychiatry, which borrows from 
the Object Languages and uses such borrowings factually. The language of an 
Endo-Affective Language is learnt as a Gross-Body-Language by members of the 
tribe, prior to being internalized370. A Gross-Body-Language is descriptive of 
behavioural actions. For instance, it might at the Gross-Behavioural level link 
‘crying’ with being ‘upset’. It can operate either as an Observation Language or a 
Report Language at the Gross-Behavioral level from the third person. However, 
while it is used as a Gross-Behavioral-Body-Language from the third personal 
point of view, people cannot Self Report with it. They may imitate the Self 
Reports of others, but they do not have the competency in the language for the 
semantics to know what such words mean in their own Self-Reports. They are 
 
370 This is perhaps confusing at first because the same term in a language may be learned and used 
as a Gross-Behavioural Language term by one person, and to Self Report by another. This is because, 
internalization, it will be revealed, happens individually. It is a process each member of a tribe goes 
through to master a language and Self Report.  
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like parrots or answering machines which can mimic sounds, but do not know 
the semantic content of the sounds as words.  
 
 
Where do Ryle and Gleeson’s Critiques fit into The Neo-Sellarsian 
Psychiatric and Psychological Model? 
 
Ryle’s understanding and criticism of historically situated ‘Psychological 
Behaviourism’ in The Concept of Mind can be classified as a sub-species of this 
Figurato-Litero Model I am proposing.   
 Ryle’s negative view of the historically situated Psychological 
Behaviourism of his day which he expresses in The Concept of Mind was that it 
had a methodological flaw. The flaw Ryle identified was that it used scientific 
causation as an appropriated model that it imports from physics. This made the 
Psychological Behavioruism of his day problematic.  Like various other species of 
categorical mistake Ryle identified, for instance the ‘Para-Mechanical Theory of 
Mind’ and the ‘Volitional Account’ of Saint Augustine, he saw the Psychological 
Behaviourism of his age as suffering from the same error of imposing concepts 
from the specialized domains of research on to what should be intuitive and 
common language understandings of a domain people should have intimate 
knowledge of. Ryle thinks that people already know how to have, think in and 
speak with the vocabularies of the mind by virtue of having one. For Ryle, to 
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understand the mind, all one need do, is examine the use of these commonly 
used vocabularies possessed by the competent ordinary language speaker.  
 The metaphorical, figurative, appropriated and borrowed languages of 
motion and causality that Ryle finds in the historically situated Psychological 
Behaviourism of thinkers like Watson, Thorndike and Skinner, and that Ryle 
thinks characterize their programme, is essentially what the ‘earlier’ Ryle of The 
Concept of Mind  sees as a continuation of the Bogey of Mechanism into the  
Historico-Behavioural Psychology of his age. He thinks the Behaviourists are 
trying to impose concepts of motion and mechanism on to the human mind.  
 By using the Figurato-Litero model these types of Historico-Behavioural 
Psychologies are now classifiable as forms of discourse under the Neo-Sellarsian 
‘Psychological Image of Man’ I propose, because they can borrow metaphorically 
and symbolically from the Object Languages of scientific causation but do not 
engage in any factual Report Language imported in literal fact stating 
explanations from the Object Sciences in their explanations. In Beyond Human 
Freedom and Dignity371 Skinner is not using blood sample analyse or blood 
pressure or looking at organic chemistry and the brain. These things do not 
feature in his accounts as explanations. Skinner’s use of ‘scientific causation’ in 
his explanation of Operant Conditioning is couched within ‘affective life’ 
 
371 Skinner, Beyond Human Dignity and Freedom, 1976. 
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concepts like pain, compliance, dignity, pleasure, fear and so on, which he uses 
to describe the reinforcement and extinction of human reactions.  
 While Ryle was not specific in The Concept of Mind about the type of 
methodological objections he has to the Historical ‘Psychological Behaviourists’ 
of his age beyond their recourse to scientific causation leading to a view of 
thinking as merely the twitching of limbs and a type of ‘Hobbism’, I take it he is 
talking about a ‘general recourse to scientific causation’ of which Skinner’s study 
and use of operant conditioning is an example. Here, of course, Skinner proposed 
that positive and negative re-enforcement conditions responses in subjects and 
went on to study and prove this with studies of various types of conditioning and 
observations of response. Underlying this, of course, is the paradigm of a linear 
‘efficient causation’ model that reoccurs in many areas of scientific research.  
 The model of efficient causation, historically in the sciences became most 
tenable, of course, as a quantifiable research project through the development 
and use of Cartesian co-ordinates on the x-y-axis to map equations based on 
measurements of phenomena that could be perceived as being connected. The 
development of efficient causation into a system of equations for plotting 
ordinates onto Cartesian grids resulted in the development of areas in physics 
like Snell’s laws which can explain refraction, or Ohms Law (I = V/R) which, of 
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course, describes current and resistance using equations and algebraic 
transposition372.   
 Here we would be able to classify Skinnerian Behaviourism, Pavlovian 
Behaviourism and some models of Cognitive-Behaviourism as being part of the 
‘Hobbist’ species via the critique Gilbert Ryle proposes. Specific strains of 
Historical Psychological Behaviourism like Pavlov, Watson, Skinner and 
Thorndike of course use different types of causation to model behaviour. Where 
Watson uses a Stimulus-Response Behaviourism, Skinner’s Operant 
Conditioning373 emphasizes the role of past responses and effects in shaping 
present and future behaviour, leading to Skinner’s theory for Behavioural 
Modification as a therapy. Skinner attempts to justify this approach with what 
he calls Methodical Behaviourism. Methodical Behaviourism is perhaps most 
similar to Putnam’s rationale for the general project of Functionalism where we 
cannot access internal states and must rely on antecedents and in-puts to 
determine what a subject will do. Skinner, like the early Putnam, thinks we 
must resort to behaviour when researching the mind.  Analytic Functionalism of 
the type advocated by Lewis and Braddon-Mitchel also relies on causal 
structures to define mental states374. So too does Ned Block who argues ‘that it is 
a matter of scientific fact that mental states are functional states with functional 
 
372 J. O. Bird, Science and Engineering Maths, 2009. Pg 246.  
373 John Cooper, Timothy Heron, William Heward. Applied Behaviour Analysis. Essex: Pearson  
Education Limited, 2014. Pp 22-30 
374 Gleeson, Andrew. ‘Animal Animation.’ Philosophia 1, no. 4 (2001): 137-169. 
369 
 
properties’ and models his Psycho-Functionalism on causal relations to in-puts, 
other mental states and outputs375. We might place all of these types of 
Behaviour-Functionalism under the label of Causal Behaviourism by observing 
that Ryle would object to these systems as examples of theories of mind which 
had fallen into what Ryle described as ‘the Bogey of Mechanism’.  
 Andrew Gleeson’s critique is different. Gleeson notices that many of the 
input/output methods for analysing and attributing mentality depend upon 
environmental effects. Gleeson thinks that such analysis is mistaken because it 
can attribute mentality to what could otherwise be random or mindless effects in 
the environment. For instance, attributing the banging of a tree against a house 
to the deliberate and agitated bloodthirsty thumping of an imagined homicidal 
killer with his axe could be one such way to think about the problem of false 
attribution. Another was the problem of attributing and thereby diagonosing 
AD(H)D to the computer program which takes the psychometric test as 
discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.  
 A taxon of Causal Behaviourism drawn from Ryle’s earlier critique of 
Historically Situated Behaviourism, for this thesis, thus gives us a system of 
classification under which different strands of theory can be classified depending 
on what the theorist is proposing in relation to the causal model and sub-
 






structures. The majority of these forms of Causal Behaviourism differ from 
Jones’ Behaviourism because unlike Jones’ Behaviourism they attempt to study 
behaviour as a fixed, static methodology in itself removed from the processes of 
the speculative developmental stages in a proposed linguistic community. To 
begin to see the difference clearly, we must see Jones’ Behaviourism as a 
developmental stage and not a complete theory in and of itself. Jones is a 
hypothetical lingusitic progenitor, while his Language of Paleo-Behaviourism 
according to the Sellarsian view, emerges at a specific “historical” stage in the 
Socio-Linguistic Development of the tribe.  
 For Sellars and a Sellarsian view, Post-Empiricism and the Philosophy 
Mind, Jones as a developmental stage is necessary for gaining the ability for 
tribal members to be able to talk about each other as emergent anthropic beings. 
While Sellars never quite says as much, and claiming he did would be an 
anarchronism, in my reconstruction of Jones’ age I see the language of Jones as 
a vague Paleo-behaviouristic ancestor to the folk terminology which Andrew 
Gleeson argues is not co-extensive with the scientific environmental effects of 
Analytic Functionalism, and by implication many types of Causal Behaviourism 
for the same reason. The reason, of course, is that when Jones’ Language 
develops it will not be co-extensive with environmental effect out-put analysis, 
and I argue so for reasons Gleeson makes clear. Jones Behaviourism will have 
concepts like sensibility, intentionality, emotional affect, and telelogically 
oriented actions i.e. motives. 
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 It is important, within the terminology of this paper, not to confuse (1) 
‘Causal Behaviourism’ and different types of ‘Psychological Behaviourism’ with 
another term I am using, which is (2) ‘Linguistic Behaviourism’.  Linguistic 
Behaviourism can be distinguished from (3) ‘Logical Behaviourism’ with the 
implicit theory of meaning proposed by Dummett. Linguistic Behaviourism is 
different from Logical Behaviourism in that it rejects the Analytic Doctrine of 
the Primacy of the Proposition. Instead, Linguistic Behaviourism embraces 
Dummett’s point about implicit language theorists. Linguistic Behaviourism also 
uses Ryle’s comparative frameworks and extra-sentential relationships which 
we might talk about as groups, families or classes376. 
 Specifically, Linguistic Behaviourism emerges from (4) Ryle’s focus on 
the way words behave rather than complete propositions and is a rejection of the 
uniform function model that Weitz suggested. Linguistic Behaviourism rejects 
earlier Logical Behaviourist readings of Ryle that utilized simplified complete 
propositional models with a uniform function, which, of course, Ryle himself 
rejects, and favours the actual comparative matrix of useages that Ryle makes 
use of when establishing his Dispositional and Episodic frameworks. Rather 
than looking for logical uniform functions, Ryle looked for differences in pieces of 
 
376 I have chosen the informal term ‘families’ when talking about the way that Ryle classifies 
dispositional and episodic verbs with adverbs and adverbial clauses, because firstly Ryle himself 
uses it, and secondly the groups of verbs, adverbs and nouns Ryle identifies have relationships not 




natural language. For instance, Ryle argued that dispositions ‘behave377’ 
differently to episodic verbs. Moreover, he argued that various and different 
types of dispositional verb will behave differently to each other. Ryle maintains 
that relationships between some of those dispositional verbs can be found by 
certain types of adverb they share in common, like, for instance, the class of 
dispositional verb that can be identified by the adverb of manner ‘carefully’.  The 
verbs and participle nouns that can be qualified by the adverb of manner 
‘carefully’, of course, form a set of dispositional verbs Ryle identified as Capacity 
verbs. Linguistic Behaviourism takes special and careful note of these 
relationship and does not try to reduce them to uniform functions or 
propositional models like Weitz did.  
 Causal Behavorism and different types of Psychological Behaviourism 
are not equivalent terms, salve vertate, with Linguistic Behaviourism. Nor is 
Linguistic Behaviourism equivalent to Logical Behaviourism. Nor is Logical 
Behaviourism synonymous with Psychological and Causal strains of 
Behaviourism.  Just because the terms I am using feature the word 
‘behaviourism’ in them, does not make them equivalent or identical, or even 
variations on a theme. Linguistic Behaviourism as a term refers to analysis of 
grammatical and linguistic useages and conventions. Causal Behavioruism 
refers to a critique of Behavourism where theorists of mind apply antecedent 
 




models derived from mechanical theories of causation to the human mind. Such 
theories as those classifiable as a type of Causal Behaviourism are in the lines of 
sight of a Gleesonian criticism about lacking co-extension with an environmental 
effect vocabulary if they employ affective terminology, or a Rylean charge they 
suffer from positing bogeys of mechanism to account for human action.  
 What is important for the Paleo-behavioural stages of a language are the 
types of access it has to explanations about the mind and figurative uses of the 
Object Language within the Figurato-Litero Model. The different types of access 
charcterized by descriptive fact-witholding assent, and ‘Fact Stating Roles’, of 
course, results in the Psychological and Psychiatric distinction this paper offers 
in the Neo-Sellarsian Figurato-Litero model.  
 I shall now spell out the historical connection between these terms and 
how Logical Behaviourism became associated with Functional Behaviourism as 
identified by Gleeson, General Functionalism as identified by Putnam, and 
Psycho-Functionalism like that identified by Putnam. Recall now that the term 
‘Linguistic Behaviourism’ earlier in this thesis was drawn from Ryle’s own 
description of his method. Ryle described his methodology of The Cocnept of 
Mind as analysing the ‘behaviour’ of the words. Earlier in the thesis the account 
I offered of a specific type of argument used by Ryle, his “Linguistic Behavioural 
Argumentative Method”, was set against a rejection of the propositional model of 
‘Logical Behaviourism’.  ‘Logical Behaviourism originally seemed like a good 
idea to philosophers like Weitz because they could use what had already been 
374 
 
discovered about the way propositions work to model the thought processes of 
the mind using dispositions with a uniform function. While the people who read 
Ryle, this way, were what Dummett clarified in his terms as an explicit 
language theorist and subscribed to the Primacy of the Proposition, I argued, 
and provided evidence that this reading of Ryle (as an explicit Logical 
Behaviourist) was erroneous378.  This misappropriated version of Ryle’s 
Linguistic Behaviourism by Weitz, and philosophers who came after him, then 
became a forerunner for the movement known as ‘Psychological Functionalism’ 
which we looked at with David Chalmers’ history and have examined in relation 
to Causal Behaviourism. The problem with Logical Behaviourism is that it 
reintroduces the complex raft of issues related to the Problem of the 
Indeterminacy of Reference since truth values require correspondence between 
propositions and states of affairs. This makes Logical Behaviourism a species of 
Psycho-Realism and suffers from all of the problems associated therewith. Why? 
Because the propositional content has truth value and suffers from a referential 
dilemma when dealing with propositions representing thoughts or mental 
entities. To be truthful propositional models they must picture the facts about 
the mind they model. This makes them liable to a charge of referential 
indeterminacy. Here, with Logical Behaviourism we have the problem of whose 
words and meanings do we use when looking at the truth values for the 
 
378 See Morris Weitz in Chapter One.  
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propositional content of a theory? Does Dr Fred’s theory about anger and guilt 
model what Sue means when she uses the word anger? Or what Jane means 
when she uses the word anger? How do we know they mean the same thing? Do 
they mean the same thing? Dr Fred’s theory about Fredricksonian analysis 
drawn from the propositional model of Sue’s verbalized thoughts may not be 
applicable to Jane. The same Fredricksonian theory may contain propositions 
and produce what some might call molecular sentences379. Such sentences are 
either true or false based on how they model states of affairs. The truth and 
falsity of those sentences will have an effect on a theory’s truth or falsity when 
put together. The trouble with this type of situation is that one sentence given in 
a psychological theory about the mind, regarding, for instance, how anger and 
jealousy effect cognition, might picture a true state of affairs by Sue’s meaning 
for the terms she uses, but be utterly false by the terms used by Jane.  
 
379 Here, of course, I am alluding to the vocabulary of the early Logical Atomists from whence the 
problem of truth and reference comes. There are historical reasons for doing this, though the 
problem need not be strictly understood this way. See Barry Gross. Analytic Philosophy. New York, 
Pegasus Press, 1970. In particular Chapter Four, Meaning and Reference. The problem put in a naïve 
sense is how do we assure the truth of sentences claiming facts about the mind when we have no 
assurance that the meaning for words used in those sentences, for instance ‘anger’, ‘sadness’, 
‘shame’, or ‘melancholy’, does not vary between people to whom the theory might be applied. In the 
early Logical Atomst theories of the Twentieth Century, it was argued that truth arose as a type of 
correspondence between pictures sentences constructed and states of affairs in the world. If the 
meaning of the words used in psychology and its fields of research varies between subjects, then any 
given sentence might be true for one subject, but false for another. A theory, thus, might be true and 
false. If this were to occur, then such a theory breaks fundamental laws of meaning, identity and 
logic. The discovery of this state of affairs is good grounds for rejecting such a theory. For a deeper 
analysis of Logical Atomistic theories, see Peter Carruthers, Tractarian Semantics. Oxford. Basil 
Blackwell Inc. 1989. This book is deeply insightful and I do not think it has received its full due. See 
also C. W. Kilmister. Russell. Kent, The Harvester Press, 1984. This work deals at length with 






 Were we to be pedantic we might go through and label every sub-form of 
Causal-Behaviourism, and subclassify these in relation to the earlier Ryle, and 
later Ryle’s critique. However what concerns us more is what becomes of the 
developmental stages of Jones’ Paleo-Behavioural language either in its 
Psychiatric Endo-Affective form, or its Psychological Endo-Affective form, down 
the track when the normative sources of the Psychological and Psychiatric 
Images clash in our Neo-Sellarsian model. This story becomes fruitful in the 
Hetrophenomnological and Autophenomenological Distinction and redefining 
the conflict in terms of the Psychologism and Anti-psychologistic debate.      
 This brings us to another unfortunate fact about the word ‘psychology’. 
The problem is that it sounds like ‘psychologism’ and this may, perhaps lead to a 
confusion that Jones’ developing roots for a ‘behavioural psychological language’ 
is a form of ‘psychologism’. This is not strictly true. What I argue is that a Post-
Jones Endo-Affective language has a special property that derives from an 
internalization process when the language moves from an Observational 
Language to a Report Language and flourishes into a fully developed Neo-
Sellarsian tribal argot shared by the Ryleans. Jones’ Behavioural Ur-Language 
eventually develops into an Endo-Affective Language when it passes through the 
final stages of internalization and members of the tribe can begin to self-
report380. That internalization process, when unpacked, provides grounds for the 
 
380 See Endo-Affective Languages in Chapter Eighteen, in this paper.  
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source of the authority for a psychologistic claim because it is based on 
phenomenal properties that cannot be re-covered in a ‘sola-lingua’ language-
based account of the mind. The reason is that our use of language and the 
meaning we bestow on it depends upon processes of discovery that arise from 
phenomeno-affective facts we can only ascertain from experience of our own 
mental lives. The proof is that the phenomenal zombie which lacks the capacity 
for these non-linguistic experiences cannot learn to fully master all of the 
language uses of the tribe and has a genuine problem with the semantics of 
flash-bangs.   
 ‘Psychologism’ is of course contrasted with an attempt at producing an 
exclusively language-based account of the mind. The attempt to argue that 
language and a theory of meaning are foundational in explanations of mind 
characterizes ‘Anti-Psychologism’. What is most interesting in Ryle, of course, is 
that he is an exponent of the argument that all of the facts relevant to the 
domain covered by a theory of mind can be covered by an account of language 
and we can see his project in The Concept of Mind as both an attempt to 
dismantle classical theories of mind, as well as the attempt to cover the facts 

















Endo-Affective Languages are the end products of Behavioural Ur-Languages. 
Behavioural Ur-Languages are Jonesian Paleo-Behavioural Languages which 
develop in the early stages of a Neo-Sellarsian Rylean tribe. Endo-affective 
Laguages have the capacity, once a member of the tribe learns them, to allow 
that member to make self-authoritative Reports about their own emotional 
state. However, when Jonesian Behavioural Ur-Languages become Endo-
Affective Languages, they may develop into either Figurato-Litero Psychiatric or  
Litero Psychological Languages based on the explanatory tendencies in the third 
person drawn from the type of access the research theorist has to the Object 
Languages. That type of access will depend, in large part, upon the type of 
linguistic community that trained him or her, and the types of authority and fact 
stating or figurative language roles they have acquired. However, even at this 
stage the language is just a Neo-Sellarsian argot until it develops the special 
properties that can only be acquired once a language user goes through all of the 
stages required in the acquiring of that language. These stages make a language 
Endo-Affective. Prior to becoming fully developed and Endo-Affective the 
languages are merely Anthro-Affective. The user might use the terms to identify 
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behaviours in others, but can not use them to self-identify, or understand those 
behaviours.  
 However, developed the language of a community might become, there is 
still a further developmental stage it must constantly undergo by each member 
of that community, privately, when they learn that language and there are 
special properties that arise from that process. One of the special properties that 
distinguishes Anthro-Affective Languages that develop into fully developed 
Endo-Affective Neo-Sellarsian post-argots of the Rylean community is the 
process of internalization. After internalization languages can undergo even 
further development with their users which makes them capable of complex 
prosopopeia, with special properties of insight into others built from analogical 
structures that project personalized learning experiences on to new ways of 
seeing others.  
 These learning experiences are important for individual members of the 
tribe to undergo as they learn a language. They allow the later stages of Endo-
Affective languages to occur. They are necessary for the member to develop the 
full capacity for building and using Analogical Constructs. Analogical Constructs 
are important because they provide the grounds, in the argument I am offering, 
for answering the Guess Work Objection381.   
 
381 See Ordinary Language Arguments and the Project of Anti-Psychologism in the Philosophy of 
Mind in the Introduction to this thesis.  
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 Internalization, and the learning process that allows people to create 
Analogical Constructs from internalization, are what separates these fully 
developed Endo-Affective Tribal Argots from a) merely Observational Languages 
of the lower developmental stages, and b) Object Languages of any 
developmental stage that can describe publicly observable properties and 
objects. The ‘internalization’ process I propose involves phenomenal properties 
and a theory about their relationship to language. However, I argue that 
internalization occurs twice. The language must become capable of 
internalization which I propose happens (i) during the Socio-Developmental 
stages of a language once it passes from a Jonesian Paleo-Behaviroual Ur-
Language to an Endo-Affective Language capable of complex prosopopeia. (ii) It 
happens autobiographically when the learner of the language moves from Gross-
Body-Language Behaviorism during learning a language to being able to Self-
Report with that language even in the absence of body language or other social 
cues and contexts. The second, Autobiographical Internalization, is what allows 
a member of the Rylean tribal community to be able to use insight from Self-
Reporting to then be able to make competent statements about the life of 
another and understand what those words mean in terms of one’s own 
experiences and the vocabularly one attaches to it. Prosopopeia is of course one 
of the most complex anthropo-linguistic Analogical Constructs, but the 
foundation for it is internalization. Without it, one cannot speak the words for 
another with one’s own meaning.  
382 
 
 For the purposes of the argument I am propounding, I propose that 
when a language is missing the Socio-Developmental stages of internalization, 
and thus lacks the Report Language Stage in its development, then the first 
time that a member of the Rylean tribe learns Jones’ Behavioural Ur-Language, 
which can describe the actions of others, and begins to self-report with it, 
thereby internalizing it, the language develops the capacity for self-report, and 
thus the resources for a Report Language. However, note, within the framework 
of my argument, I am not saying that other members of the tribe automatically 
inherit the ability to use these languages to self report. They too must learn the 
earlier stages and then internalize the language, to be able to achieve higher 
competency in the use of the language, including various Analogical Constructs 
that are foundationally essential for prosopopeia.    
 So which language is a member of the tribe using when they use a term 
that other members of the tribe, (who have undergone internalization, and 
either been trained to Self-Report, or have developed Analogical Constructs for 
understing others), are using when they themselves have not undergone such 
stages but merely use the word? We would call such a common language term an 
Autobiographical Pre-Internalized Observational Behavioural Term. In such a 
language, a term can only be learnt for one’s own behaviour and is the first stage 
of connecting private experiences with behaviour that will later allow the person 
to Self Report, or used for observing another. Such a term is used as part of a 
Gross-Body-Language. One cannot make a report about oneself, or about 
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another in terms of oneself with such a term, since one does not have the 
competence or the authority to use it prior to internalization. Since it cannot be 
used to report formally, the term can be neither Psychological or Psychiatric in 
terms of the Neo-Sellarsian Figurato-Litero Model this paper describes. This 
point is important because I describe use of an Autobiographical Pre-
Internalizaed Observational Term as (B1) when I look into Wittgenstein’s 
crypto-theory of phenomenal language acquisition. (B1) is the stage where one 
learns Jones’ Language and begins to be able to apply that language in 
observations of others. We will look at (B1) more in-depth in the next part of the 
paper.  
 These Autobiographical Pre-Internalized Observational Behavioural 
Terms are the common vocabularies making up the Gross-Body-Language-
Behavioural descriptions available to people learning a language, but have not 
yet been internalized by that person learning the language. As such a person 
using one of these terms has not yet gained the ability to make Reports about 
themselves or others in that language. But such words have what I describe as 
‘Analogical Semblances’382, which means if a subject used these terms, then 
other members of the tribe attribute meaning to the term based on that other 
member’s own understanding of what the words mean from their own learning 
experiences and drawing on the Analogical Constructs they have built up, even 
 
382 See also the supplementary paper at the end of this thesis The Telephone Theory of Language, 
where I spell out Gleeson’s argument about parasitic language forms.  
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if the subject using the term does not know what the word means. Affective 
Semblances ascribed to a subject are parasitic on the emotional learning and 
emotive understanding of others. Imagine, for instance, a man who dressed as a 
woman and then went on to describe having period pain in a group of women. 
The man himself has never experienced the pains associated with menstruation, 
however, women upon hearing of this man complain about his menstrual pain, 
will immediately commiserate and attribute their own meaning to his words. 
Such is an Affective Sembalance and certain words that have a common 
language affective meaning to people who have learned them and undergone 
internalization, can be used to evoke these experiences, by people, beings or 
things that have not had those experiences but have simply learned to parrot the 
language.  
 The being parroting the language has not internalized the language and 
achieved a level of competency whereby they can report their own feelings and 
emotional experiences and be authoritative about it. They do not know what the 
words mean, even though the people around them do. They cannot recognize and 
describe their own emotional and personal experiences, if they have any, and 
truthfully make meaningful statements about them.  
 This ‘internalization process’ is the key to understanding the link 
between the phenomenal zombie, (as well as the Anti-psychologistic attempt at 
producing a language-based account of the mind) and the Occult 
Phenomenological Strain of arguments in Ryle. Phenomenological arguments 
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are, of course, made up of composites of phenomenal properties which require 
comparing them in various ways to make claims about the mind. One must 
compare different experiences to see the point of these arguments. The 
phenomenal zombie would not understand these arguments and so would have 
no insight into the language distinctions that rest on the comparison of these 
phenomenal properties. Once this point is grasped, with a little reflection, the 
pieces of the central argument of the thesis should begin to fit together.  
 Since I argue (1) emotional language is to a significant degree guesswork 
about an unobservable realm of experience, and (2) each sense of a word to be 
learned must derive from or be informed by the conditions under which the user 
learned to use the word competently, there needs to be an account of how (1) and 
(2) are either connected, or at least compatible. These of course are the two 
objections which Tim Crane lays out in his reading of Dummett and McDowell, 
and their rejection of Psychologism. I endorse both propositions not as 
objections, but as pillars of my argument on how people actually arrive at the 
meaning for the words they use, and build my theory of Psychologism on them. 
What is missing from the Psychologisticist’s position is an explanation of the 
process whereby the conditions under which a member of the Rylean tribe learns 
a word, and an account of how this learning has an autobiographical effect on 
the meaning of that word, which the member of the tribe uses to talk about a 
private realm of experience. By ‘private realm of experience’ I take the meaning 
to be one that depends upon an experience that cannot be observed by other 
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members of the community such, as what a ‘flash of anger’ feels like to the 
person experiencing it.  
 The explanation of this process that connects (1) and (2) together, the 
Crane-Dummett-McDowell conditions for Psychologism, will also reveal why the 
Indeterminacy of Reference Problem emerges in theories and research on the 
mind. The key to grasping the process is the developmental stages that involve 
the public and private conditions under which someone learns an emotional 
language and then comes to self report in that language. Object languages can 
be deceptive because what we take to be ‘detecting’ like Price’s thermostat can 
fool us into thinking something has phenomenal experiences of properties when 
in fact, all we are doing is applying our own insight in Analogical Constructs, 
and in effect producing prosopopeia. This occurs where we talk for another 
person or being, using the words we have attached our own meanings to, which 
we acquire autobiographically and which are more like guesses for an 
unobservable realm of structures and experiences we call ‘another person’. Such 
is evidence of our own consciousness, but not that of the beings we project we 
project our vocabulary of affective concepts on to.  
 David Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie can not do this. Chalmers zombie 
is able to detect publicly observable phenomena and make factual statements 
about them in the Object Language, like a thermostat, without the phenomenal 
qualities of the experiences. I argue that such is so. The phenomenal zombie, for 
instance, with an internal heat sensor keyed into Price’s Thermometer may 
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learn how to use the word ‘warm’ correctly, at the accepted temperature 
according to the practices of the community, to be able to detect a ‘glow of 
warmth’ and make a seemingly convincing statement without being able to ‘feel’ 
the glow of warmth. However, the argument I am building up to is that firstly, 
this ability to detect ‘warmth’ by temperature alone is parasitic on the 
experiences of beings who do have qualitative phenomenal experiences; and 
more to the point, the phenomenal zombie cannot do the same thing for the 
content of a ‘flash-bang’ and this inability is an important difference which leads 
to him being unable to form the same Judgements as his real world twin. This is 
because a ‘flash of anger’ is not publicly observable but it only appears so 
because certain emotive words trigger Analogical Semblances in the audience to 
the statement when they hear them. However, there is one more stage we need 
































Part of what is so puzzling about language is that certain expressions of 
language, for instance Ryle’s Reader/Witness argument, or the sentence ‘try to 
imagine lighting so bright it hurts your eyes’ contain within them 
phenomenological insights that can only be grasped once you try the exercise. 
However, getting to that point and conveying that insight requires using 
language. The Reader/Witness argument, for instance, must be laid out in steps 
and written down, or spoken aloud in order to transmit the material the person 
needs to think about to have the insight on offer unless, of course, you are the 
one who discovered it.  I argue that this problem has plagued philosophers and 
muddled the debate about whether people do their thinking in words. For how is 
one able to convey an insight to another except by words? If one argues that 
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language is insufficient to ground a theory of mind, his or her opponent can 
simply point to the medium of transmission being used. Books on philosophy, 
psychiatry, psychology, thinking and the mind are all written in words.   
 Hence the first step of the paper was to restrict Ryle’s ‘Linguistic 
Behaviourism’ to his grammatical descriptions of the behaviour of collections, 
fragments, useages and expressions of language and distinguish between ways 
of reading the distinctions Ryle uses in his arguments. Doing this permits a 
number of moves that by careful strategic analysis of his arguments bring out 
the ‘Occult Strain of Phenomenology’ hidden in Ryle’s work. This is like the two 
sides of the ‘Remember When/ Remember How’ argument. One way we can 
interpret that argument is to think about skills we have learnt and see if we 
remember how to do them, and compare that experience with instances of 
remembering when a particular event occurred in order to understand the 
difference between them. Another way of reading the ‘Remember 
When/Remember How’ distinction is to observe the linguistic patterns and 
relationships in statements about ‘remembering when’ and ‘remembering how’, 
and try to restrict the distinction between ‘remembering how’ and ‘remembering 
when’ to the level of descriptions of the grammatical behaviour of the words. In 
this case the grammatical description arises from the dispositional and episodic 
verbs that occur in the different types of statements someone makes.  
 Using this type of meta-analysis of Ryle’s arguments in The Concept of 
Mind, allows us to see that there are certain arguments that Ryle makes which 
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exceed the bounds of Linguistic Behaviourism because there are no grammatical 
descriptions on offer. This analysis was able to show that there are ‘experiences’ 
and ‘phenomenal exercises383’ in Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account of the Mind 
that put into jeopardy his position as an implicit language theorist and to a 
larger extent, if Dummett is right about explicit language theorists being 
mistaken in their approach, and an implicit theory really is the correct 
approach, and Ryle is the strongest implicit Ordinary Language Philosopher, 
then the critique of Ryle in this paper is a threat to the general project of Anti-
Psychologism.  
 I think that the strongest of these surreptitiously hidden 
phenomenological claims that put Ryle’s Ordinary Language Account and the 
project of Anti-Psychologism in jeopardy is the flash-bang strain because without 
a way of distinguishing between ‘flashes of anger, envy, pain’ on a linguistic 
basis there’s recourse to Psychologism and the need for a theory of consciousness 
to give us an account of the semantics of such language choices that allow one to 
tell them apart.  This places a theory of mind in explanatory priority to a theory 
of language, since the user of the language relies upon phenomenological insight 
in order to know what their words mean, and any account of mind based on 
language that tries to cover ‘flash-bangs’ would need to go beyond language and 
into the domain of qualitative consciousness. I have yet to reveal, in full, the 
 
383 I use phenomenal in David Chalmers sense. See Chalmers. The Conscious Mind. 1996 Pg 11 – 17. 
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analogical mechanism that allows a language learner to attach their emotions to 
the words they use, or to use that insight in understanding the visible behaviour 
and the language usage of another except to say it fulfils the autobiographical 
criticism in the Dummett-McDowell claim that Psychologism is a theory where 
the means of acquiring a concept from a language and what it means to hold this 
concept in a language are hopelessly ravelled together.  
 So far, we have looked at and adopted Wilfrid Sellars’ developmental 
theory of ‘Socio-Linguistics’ as espoused in Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind, with a number of caveats. These caveats were drawn from; (a) Fodor’s 
Muller-Lyre criticism, which required us to go deeply into the pseudo-
subjunctive conditional structures behind looks-talk that makes various non-
literal, fact-witholdng and figurative forms of language possible.  (b) We took 
very seriously Andrew Gleeson’s criticism of Functionalism; and (c) 
inconsistencies between the developmental stages of a language community as 
proposed in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man, most notably when the languages of personhood, which 
utilize Gleesonian vocabularies384, occur in relation to the ‘Object Languages’ of 
 
384 These vocabularies, of course, are affective, sensitive, animate motion, motive and various 
emotive terms including some terms that utilize intentionality. These Gleesonian vocabularies 
separate our concepts of animal and human motion from mere environmental effect. Gleeson’s 
critique, of course, is that these languages were not co-extensive with environmental effect 
vocabularies. These languages the paper designates as languages of personhood. In Empiricism and 
the Philosophy of Mind these languages develop only at the end of the paper once the tribe has 
developed a language to talk about objects. In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man these 
languages exist at the dawn of the civilization which describes the wind as ‘cheeky’ or lightning as 
‘angry’. This, of course, led to the Figurato-Litero Model this paper suggests, which re-organizes 
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the tribe.  The question that arises is whether such languages occur before or 
after the Object Languages of the Tribe? This paper argued they occur after the 
Object Languages and in favour of the Jonesian developmental stage, which this 
paper refered to as the Paleo-linguistic era385.  
 Sellars’ language theory, in order to explain private episodes, posited the 
development of a language capable of picking out publicly observable objects and 
properties. We might call this (L1). (L1) contains a special type of subjunctive 
conditional using which the person may construct theoretical models, use 
metaphors and similes and borrow models and descriptive phrases from other 
parts of the language in order to develop new vocabularies for talking about 
things. This becomes possible because of the subjunctive conditional structure 
which allows the user to withhold fact stating assent but still make descriptive 
statements. Where (L1) does this it creates an Observational Language (OL). It 
is possible and common practice that L1 has multiple developing Observational 
Languages for different fields (O1), (O2), (O3) and (O&c). An Observational 
Language moves from the domain of merely qualitative and descriptive 
statements when statements of the Observational Language (O1) are accepted 
into the standard language and does so when reasons for accepting these 
languages are given and accepted by the community. When this happens (O1) 
 
Wilfrid Sellars’ insight in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man in relation to the theory of 
language Sellars develops in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.  
385 See Chapter Five: Gilbert Ryle, Wilfrid Sellars and science, in this thesis.  
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becomes a Report Language (R1) capable of giving fact stating roles accepted by 
the norms of the linguistic community. Most Observational Languages are 
classifiable as Object Languages (EL). However as already explained a very 
special type of Observational Language is created by the Messianic Behaviourist 
Jones (B1) that allows people to use resources of an Observational Language to 
talk about other people’s actions. I urge that it is questionable at this stage 
whether the phenomenal zombie is able to learn the Observational Language 
because of the subjunctive conditional structure that allows the user to withhold 
assent to the descriptive content. It is questionable whether a phenomenal 
zombie can feel doubt. I should argue that it cannot. But let us temporarily and 
conditionally give the zombie the benefit of our doubt and do so for the purposes 
of the argument. We may suppose the zombie either learns the language and 
treats it like Price’s thermostat, or he is out of the village, and arrives back on 
the day (B1) becomes used as a third person report language.    
 Now I take it as non-controversial that the zombie can make statements 
in (B1) about the publicly observable behaviour of others. I see this as a non-
controversial statement because high level security companies now have 
‘character recognition technology’ where surveillance equipment is able to 
construct models using points on the human body that can identify movement 
with body language; for instance they can combine the way a suspect or culprit 
walks, in conjunction with facial recognition technology to positively identify 
recurring trouble makers in some security premises.  We might suppose the 
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zombie has this particular feature or a sophistication of it. To be clear the 
zombie would have no phenomenal experience of other people’s body language. 
Threatening and aggressive body language would make the zombie neither feel 
angry nor afraid. The zombie would not be ‘aroused’ at the sexy and alluring 
body language of a Rylean tribe member who wished to court the zombie. The 
zombie would lack the phenomenal experience to feel the various ‘sensations’ 
and physical and emotional ‘feels’ one has when one is aroused. But it would be 
able to ‘detect’ the body language and react accordingly. 
 But while the phenomenal zombie may be able to ‘detect’ the body 
language of other members of the tribe there is a question about whether it 
would be able to understand its own behaviour and language in terms of Jones’ 
Language. Now one might venture so far as to argue that the zombie can be 
fitted with some sort of device which is similar to the identity recognition 
software in advanced surveillance systems which can register the zombie’s body 
language and give the zombie the vocabulary to describe his actions and 
behaviours. Call this Solution One, (S1). Solution One will interpret the body 
language of the zombie and feed the zombie the words that correspond to the 
zombie’s actions. It is debatable as to whether the zombie has learnt to describe 
itself in Jones terms. Specifically, the zombie would not be able to articulate how 
it is feeling, except when it displays body language. This will be important when 
we reach my refutation of Chalmers, because my claim is that Chalmers’ zombie 
can not tell us how it is feeling when it is not displaying body language, but 
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Chalmers can. However, the more important question for the moment, given all 
of these considerations; is this enough to allow the zombie to internalize Jones’ 
Language and make ‘Judgements’ about the way it ‘feels’ in terms of Jones 
vocabulary and transition to (B2)? (B2) occurs when someone has both learned 
Jones’ Language and used it for describing others and begins using the terms to 
talk about themselves. The transition from (B1) to (B2) is the point where an 
Anthro-Affective Language begins to become an Endo-Affective Language and 
the person can describe how they are feeling, even when they are not displaying 
the body language. The zombie cannot do this. The zombie cannot describe how 
it is feeling in cases where it is not demonstrating the body language because 
the only means it has for knowing how it is feeling when it can’t feel because it is 
phenomenally mute, is when the equipment we’ve given it, reads the zombie’s 
body language and informs it. 
 Finally we might posit that even if the zombie has an identical neurology 
to its twin, and that we fitted neuroscanning equipment onto the zombie that 
could inform it how it should be feeling according to its brain chemistry, even 
though it can not actually feel anything because it is a phenomenological zombie, 
this still would not suffice, for as we saw with the case for disgust and mistrust 
and activity in the Insula Cortex in the Introduction, a patient may exhibit 
identical behaviour in the brain on neuro-imaging equipment on two separate 
occasions, and yet report entierly different phenomenal experiences associated 
with this activity. The zombie would still not be able to accurately tell us how it 
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is feeling. The zombie’s language would be indeterminate and suffer the same 
indeterminacy that plagues neuroscience. It would be indeterminate because the 
same neuro-activity can be reported by patients as different types of emotion, 
flash-bang or sensation. Because the phenomenal zombie does not have the 
phenomenal experiences to tell us whether an experience in one part of the brain 
is anger or jealousy, it is as indeterminate as the neurological machine. The 
zombie does not have caveat authority to correct the machine. The zombie does 
not know if activity in its insula cortex is anger or disgust. The zombie does not 
have the authority the first-person subject has to determine between cases of the 
same brain pattern activity. The zombie’s reports lack the determination and 
authority of a first-person subject who can tell us whether he or she is 
experiencing digust or distrust. Since the zombie lacks the authority for a self 
report it can not move from an Observation Language to a Report Language. 
This point will become important when we look at the question, what is required 
to move between (B1) and (B2) in the next part of the thesis.  
 Before we can answer this question, we need to ask how normal people 
learn and come to apply (B2) to themselves. Because in addition to applying (B2) 
to others in fact stating roles once the language of (B1) is accepted and 
transitions from an Observational Language to a Report Language, people also 
learn how to apply (B2) to themselves and are able to internalize Jones’ 
Language and report their own feelings, and see themselves and others (in a 
non-optical sense) in the idiom of Jones’ terminology.  
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 Unlike publicly observable objects and properties the emotional content 
of a ‘flash-bang’ is rather like ‘a beetle in a box’. It is fundamentally different to 
body language, behaviour, or the properties of a publicly observable Object 
Language.  
 Wittgenstein describes this scenario  
 
(293) Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we 
call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and 
everyone says he knows what a beetle is by only looking at 
his beetle386.  
 
The phenomenal zombie, unlike everyone else, does not have a beetle in his box. 
The beetle in this model represents the content of a ‘flash-bang’.  We might refer 
to the content of the flash-bang as a sensation.   
 A very good question to ask at this stage is the affiliation that develops 





386 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Philosophical Investigations Trans G.E.M. Anscombe, 1958, Basil  
Blackwelll, Oxford. #293. As is customary I refer to the Aphoristic numbering of The Philosophical  
Investigations, and not the page number. Smart, J. J. C. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’  
Philosophical Review 141, no. 56 (1959). 
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 J. J. C. Smart writes  
 
How could descriptions of experiences, if these are genuine 
reports, get a foothold in language? For any rule of language 
must have public criteria for its correct application387.   
 
So what accounts are there? 
 Wittgenstein thinks the rules that govern language systems388 are what 
is most important in his account of the beetle in the box problem. Wittgenstein 
thinks we can ignore the content of the box, as long as we know the rules 
governing discourse on the box. There is a very good reason for rejecting 
Wittgenstein’s Rule Based Account of Language Games which I introduce from 
Sellars below and explain in the next chapter. Wittgenstein’s Rules-Based 
account for the use of expressions leads to an infinite regress of rules governing 
the application of words, and rules for those rules.  
 However, before reaching that point it is best to consider J. J. C. Smart’s 
point because it relates directly to the zombie, and its acquisition of languages. 
What accounts does Wittgenstein actually give in The Investigations for how 
descriptions of experiences get, as J. J, C, puts it, “a foothold in language?”  
 
387 Smart, J. J. C. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ Philosophical Review 141, no. 56 (1959). 
388 Ting, Fu-Ning. ‘Wittgenstein's Descriptive Method ‘Doctroial Dissertation, Pontificia Universitas 
Gregoriana, 1989. I use the word system here for reasons that Ting gives over in his paper.  
See Pg 48 for Fu-Ning Ting’s discussion of the bricklayer example and pp 45 – 46 for his illuminating  









The Incompleteness of the Philosophical Investigations 
 
One of the problems with the Philosophical Investigations is how disjointed the 
comments are. Part of this has to do with the way the papers were constructed 
from different drafts389. 
 We find various drafts of the same propositions in The Zettel390, and the 
Philosophical Grammar391 with similar propositions to The Investigations 
appearing in different orders and even some of the same content rearranged in 
different ways392. The order of the propositions in The Philosophical 
Investigations becomes hard to follow at a certain point. Kripke complains of 
this393. Kripke openly admits that he abandons following the order of the 
propositions and arguments after Tractate 243 because of what he describes as 
‘exegetical puzzles’.   
 
389  Stern, David. Wittgenstein on Mind and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. See 
also Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Philosophical Investigations London Routledge 2001. Kenny,  
Anthonny. Wittgenstein. Middlesex: Pelican 1973. 
390 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Zettel. Translated by G.E.M Anscombe. Berkley: University of California,  
1970. 
391 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Grammar. Translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Basil  
Blackwell, 1978. 
392 Kenny, Wittgenstein, 1973. Pp 1 – 19. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, 1995. Pp 120 – 
128,  
393 Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1982. See 
Kripke’s introduction.  
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 There has been interesting shadowy research and ethereal scholarship 
on this point with different philosophers coming together to work out what 
exactly went wrong with the ‘Private Language Argument’ in The Philosophical 
Investigations. John Cook is perhaps the most forthright on this point. He claims 
the Private Language Argument section of The Philosophical Investigations is 
‘irremediably confused’. The confusion, Cook argues, arises between the sense in 
which one can know they are in pain in the first person, and knowing someone is 
in pain in the second or third person. The muddle, for Cook, starts with the 
conditions for knowing J. is in pain, for instance, which involve knowing who J. 
is and that he is in pain, and this being confused with the sensation of pain one 
experiences one’s self. From there Cook argues that the confusion works its way 
in to deeper complexity394.  
 Alan Donagan lends himself to the view that the ‘Sensations and Pain’ 
sections of the Private Language Argument seem confused because they are 
incomplete395. Donagan has the insightful and thought-provoking argument that 
the thread on Pain and Private Language reaches final resolution through the 
Vorstellung and Bild distinction if carried out to its natural conclusion396.  
 
394 Cook, John. ‘On Privacy.’ The Philosophical Review LXXIV, (1965): 281-314. 
395 Donagan, Alan. ‘Wittgenstein on Sensation.’ In Wittgenstein: A Collection of Critical Essays,  
edited by George Pitcher, 324-351. Macmillion: MacMillion Co, 1966. 
396 Donagan, Alan. ‘Wittgenstein on Sensation.’ In Wittgenstein: A Collection of Critical Essays,  
edited by George Pitcher, 324-351. Macmillion: MacMillion Co, 1966. 
While Bild is a pictorial display like that of a teapot used in the original example, a vorstellung is an 
imaginative representation. Whereas the question ‘what is in the bild of the teapot’ does not make 
sense, because a bild is a mere pictorial image of a teacup, the vorstellung has an imaginative life 
and it makes sense for us to imagine tea in the teapot boiling. The confusion in Wittgenstein’s 
argument, Donagan thinks, is a confusion between the bild and the vorstellung of pain. Whereas a 
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 Dale Jacquette has a different view. He thinks there are missing stages 
of clarity and exposition that explain the language game being played between 
knowledge and doubt397. Jacquette argues that a missing explanation of the 
polarity between knowledge and doubt is what is at the centre of the confusion 
in the Pain and Sensation thread398. He thinks what is missing is a thread of 
arguments that proposes doubt must first be possible in order to have 
knowledge. This line of argument maintains that since one cannot doubt they 
are in pain it does not make sense to speak in the polarized sense of knowing one 
is in pain. He thinks the language game of knowledge, once fully understood, 
requires a polarity of doubt as a possibility. I think this also is an important 
insight into the jagged threads of The Investigation and points to the possibility 
that On Certainty may have started out at some point as the missing 
propositions Jacquette is looking for with his Knowledge-Doubt Polarity Thread 
Hypthoesis. 
 Stern, with impressive scholarship and insight, argues that any 
confusion and contention between philosophers over the Private Language and 
Sensation thread originates in older layers of Wittgenstein’s Self Criticism of the 
 
pain behaviour in another is analogous to the bild of the tea pot where it does not make sense to ask 
oneself about another’s person’s pain behaviour like it does not make sense to inquire into the bild of 
the tea pot. The pain behaviour of another is pictorial. However, pain when experienced in the first 
person, one’s own pain, is like the vorstellung and we might represent it with a jiggered line. This 
Donagan thinks is what the completed argument should be like when carried all the way through.  
397 I think Dale Jacquette here, is on to something, and it is perhaps these missing stages that lead 
Wittgenstein into his work in On Certainty. In particular Tractates 41, and 389 deal with pain, 
certainty and G.E. Moore. See Ludwig Wittgenstein. On Certainty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1975. 
398 Jacquette, Dale. Wittgenstein: Thought in Transition Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1998. Pp  
278 -280.  
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Tractatus buried in the notes making up the Philosophical Investigations. Stern 
argues that in the move between Logical Atomism and Meaning Holism 
Wittgenstein passes through three phases of self criticsm and that the evident 
confusion philosophers find in the work arises between these three threads 
which appear, largely rough and unresolved in The Philosophical Investigations 
as we have it. The reason why there is so much contention, on this view, is that 
philosophers reading Wittgenstein are picking up on individual and often 
conflicting threads from these stages of his self criticsm399. Likewise Fu-Ning 
Ting is another philosopher who has picked up on different layers of self 
criticism running through Wittgenstein’s work400.  
 Briefly I shall lay these out, because I am in favour of Stern and Fu-
Ning Ting’s Three Stages of Self Criticism Hypothesis. I think they go some of 
the way towards explaining the disjointedness of the arguments and their views 
are complementary. The first phase is rejection of the Aprioristic focus of The 
Tractatus401. Fu-Ning Ting agrees on this point with Stern, but he also goes 
further.  Ting has an interesting view. He argues that in The Investigations 
Wittgenstein is conceptually inverting the normative force of appeal in ordinary 
language from the aprioricity of the Tractatus to an aposteriori investigation of 
the conditions for language402. Ting thinks Wittgenstein’s goal is a total 
 
399 Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, 1995. Pp 103 – 105, 120 – 127.  
400 Ting, Wittgenstein’s Descriptive Method, 1989. 
401Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, 1995. Pg 103. Fu-Ning Ting. ‘Wittgenstein's  
Descriptive Method ‘ Doctroial Dissertation, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1989. 
402 Ting, Wittgenstein’s Descriptive Method, 1989. Pp 44 – 51.  
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inversion of his earlier philosophy from an apriori investigation of language to 
an aposteriori investigation of the types of games and conventions that we 
actually find in natural languages403.  
 The second phase of the Stern and Fu-Ning Ting Three Stages of Self 
Criticism Hypothesis is what Fu-Ning Ting describes as the ‘Tendency for the 
Craving of Generality’404. Fu-Ning Ting thinks Wittgenstein is constantly 
struggling against his own tendency to generalize from specific examples to 
 
403 Ting, Wittgenstein’s Descriptive Method, 1989. The central thesis of Ting’s Doctorial Dissertation 
is impressive in its insight and stark simplicity. Ting argues that the purpose of The Investigations is 
to invert the authority of an investigation into the force of normative rule following in the use of a 
language from an apriori source to an aposteriori investigation into the conditions for use of a 
language to develop. According to Ting’s fascinating dissertation for the earlier Wittgenstein, the 
original normative source of correct language use was the apriori atomistic structure we are familiar 
with from the Tractatus. Ting argues that the Later Wittgenstein inverts this and wants to establish 
what the conditions are under which a language develops alongside the history of man as a form of 
life, what Ting refers to as ‘the natural history of man’. The inversion, according to Ting, comes from 
the argument that language games have priority over facts (and/or propositions depending, of course, 
on your translation of German) which were the source for the Logical Atomist apriori normativity in 
following rules semantics. The priority of language games is asserted, according to Ting’s reading, by 
the argument that language games must pre-exist facts because facts themselves are a type of 
language game. This means that games have priority since even the facts of these games, and what a 
fact is, are governed by the games themselves. The language game of facts must establish what type 
of thing a fact is before a language game can have any.  
Ting points out that Games may vary from simple to complex, but this does not mean the 
simple games are incomplete. So primal language games which exist before facts are not incomplete, 
nor do they need a linguistic concept of what facts are for the game of facts and propositions to be 
played. Therefore, the language game must precede the atomist’s investigation into the apriority of 
structures between facts. Hence Ting concludes The Investigations are essentially a product of this 
insight, and an inversion of the Tractatus., 
However. I want to avoid a confusion of Ting’s conception of Ordinary Language in relation 
to normativity, the apriori and the aposteriori sources and conditions for the normativity in 
language. So I refrain from using ‘language game’ and “use system”.  
I think Ting is right on this point and admire his insight. He has found something very 
interesting in Wittgenstein. Suffice to say a full explanation of Ting’s final position, in comparison 
with that offered by this thesis is the subject content of an entirely different paper. There I would 
argue, with many caveats, that there is a relationship between implicit language theorists like Ryle’s 
analysis of the type of language as we find it used in everyday conversation, and the types of 
Linguistic Behavioural Argument Ryle gives us, with the aposteriori inversion of the normative rule 
following force in Wittgenstein’s analysis of ordinary language. That is to say Ryle’s arguments are 
consistent with the aposteriori conditons for an enquiry into the use of language, if we follow Ting’s 
reading of Wittgenstein about the inversion of the normative force in ordinary language.  
404 Ting, Wittgenstein’s Descriptive Method, 1989. Pp 44.  
406 
 
underlying truths about language and this fractures the sequence of the 
arguments and the unity of his argumentative method. I argue that Fu-Ning is 
right on this point. When we examine The Philosophical Investigations we find 
patterns where Wittgenstein is clearly wavering between particular instances 
and an almost compulsive need to universalize these. He then finds other 
instances drawn from language use that contradict these universalizations.  
 The third phase is the ‘Pneumatisch phase’ where Wittgenstein rejects the 
idea that a calculus of symbols can get its meaning through a private inner 
mental process that illuminates signs, and instead goes forth with the thesis 
that meaning can be grasped publicly through use. This is the Anti-
Psychologistic thread in Wittgenstein’s work. My answer to this thread is that 
while meanining in some aspects of language may begin publicly, with what 
Sellars would describe as ‘standard conditions’ and a class of observable 
symptoms like ‘pain behaviour’, it is part of the process of learning a language 
that people are later able to internalize words which they learn with their 
behaviour to be able to describe a stimulus in a realm of private experience.  
 Following from the Fu-Ning Ting and Stern Scholary Hypothesis about 
the stages of Wittgenstein’s self criticism there is an inconsistency between (1) 
the first stage which involves Wittgenstein’s  rejection of his earlier Aprioristic 
analysis of language and the ways Wittgenstein thinks people learn to use 
language, and (2) the final stage of Wittgenstein’s self-criticism, the 
‘Pneumatisch phase’ where Wittgenstein rejects the idea, left over from his 
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earlier philosophical work, (and still evident in the rejection and inversion of an 
Aprioristic analysis of language), that a calculus of signs can be illuminated by 
some private inner experience. The conflict between the two self critical threads 
can be seen most clearly in an inconsistency that runs between some of the ways 
Wittgenstein thinks people learn a language. One way to approach this 
inconsistency is to look at Wittgenstein’s account of rules and language 
acquisition because this is where the two threads become most disjointed.   
 The best way to bring out this inconsistency is through Sellars because 
there is an important infinite regress Sellars finds in Wittgenstein, that it is 
essential to avoid, in order not to fall into the same inconsistency. I will discuss 







Wittgenstein’s Account of Language Acquisition for Phenomenal 
Experiences in the Philosophical Investigations 
 
 
With the above scholarly concerns reviewed, Wittgenstein does have one passage 
about the way experiences get a foothold in language405. 
 He writes  
 
244. How do words refer to sensations? – There doesn’t seem 
to be any problem here: don’t we talk about sensations every 
day, and give them names?  But how is the connexion 
between the name and the thing named set up? This 
question is the same as: how does a human being learn the 
meaning of the names of sensations?   – of the word ‘pain’ for 
example. Here is one possibility : words are connected with 
the primitive, the natural expression of the sensation used in 
their place. A child hurts himself and he cries; and then 
adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later, 
 
405 This is J.J.C. Smart’s term. See Smart, J. J. C. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’ Philosophical 
Review 141, no. 56 (1959). 
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sentences. . . The verbal expression of pain replaces crying 
and does not describe it.406  
 
This suggestion involves two stages.  
 
1. The child hurts itself and displays natural pain behaviour that is 
dispositional to children by their nature. The claim made here is that 
either all, or a large enough majority of human children cry in the 
presence of pain to make stage 2 possible. 
2. Adults then teach the child the appropriate exclamations, terms, 
words, sentences and moves in the language game which have the 
same role as crying and can substitute for it.  
 
What is important in this model is that the moves in the language game become 
the expression for the pain, not descriptions of it. What also is important here is 
that the pain pre-exists the linguistic expression in the form of a sensation that 
finds expression in a ‘natural behaviour’. This allows the child to replace the 
‘natural behavioural expression’ of pain with a term endorsed by the linguistic 
community. Where might such terms for behavioural patterns originate? Here 
 
406 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Philosophical Investigations Trans G.E.M. Anscombe, 1958, Basil  





we might fill the gap in the Wittgensteinian account with a Gleeson-Sellarsian 
backstory about a Messianic Jones as thus far, posited in this paper.  
 But at what point does the child learn to see his sensations as ‘pain’ and 
report it? How is he able, if we take this account, to ‘internalize’ pain, and thus 
connect the public word in use by the linguistic community with his private 
feeling of pain? Wittgenstein here has given us a clue, but Sellars’ ‘Socio-
Linguistic Theory’ is helpful to unravel the stages involved.  
 At the Observation Stage Jones’ Language (B1) is an Autobiographical 
Pre-Internalized Behavioural Term. It is one of the Gross-Body-Language 
Behavioural Terms available to someone learning a language, which means it 
has the capacity for either Analogical Semblances, or Analogical Constructs in a 
Gleesonian vocabulary of affect or sensitivity when fully developed, and if, and 
only the learner is capable of learning it to the nth stage. It describes the visible 
publicly observable actions of the Rylean tribe’s people. Crying is pain 
behaviour. Crying is what somebody who is in pain does. Likewise, when Reg 
hits Rod, he is displaying publicly observable anger-behaviour. At the level of 
the descriptive vocabulary of B1 this is what anger is. Jones’ Language while in 
B1 is descriptive of actions. It has not yet developed, in its infancy, the ability to 
deal with private episodes beyond the possibility of perhaps a crude premature 
theoretical intuition. 
 Both Reg and the child learn the words associated with their behaviour. 
Reg learns the Rylean ancestral tribal argot for hitting someone in a rage, let us 
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say ‘calid’ drawing on the descriptive resources of other parts of the language, 
and the child, likewise, learns the same for crying.   
 Reg feels some sort of emotional content when expressing the behaviour 
of which he learns Jones’ word ‘calid’. Hitting Rod is the natural expression of 
Reg’s emotion like crying is the natural expression of Wittgenstein’s child. The 
members of the tribe see only the behaviour, not the sensation Reg has access to 
when he attacks Rod.  
 When Jones teaches the language of (B1) to his fellow tribesmen 
something interesting occurs. They begin to see Reg hitting Rod in association 
with Jones’ new word ‘calid’. They begin to see ‘calid-behaviour’ everywhere in 
the angry and aggressive behaviour of their fellow tribes’ people. However, 
something extra happens to Reg when he learns the word ‘calid’. Reg learns the 
feeling that went with the behaviour. When Reg transitions to (B2) not only does 
he have the behavioural concept for ‘calid’, he also has the emotional association, 
an association between the word and the feeling of the ‘flash bang’.  
 The distinction is like this. From Reg’s perspective, when taught the 
word for his behaviour he can associate whatever he is feeling while displaying 
the behaviour with the word. For the rest of the tribe they can only associate the 
word with the behaviour.  
 As I pointed out earlier the move from Observational Languages which 
contain theoretical objects, postulates, similes and ‘looks’ statements such as ‘x 
looks y’ to Report Languages, in Sellars, is the shift to fact stating roles. The 
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molecular theorist comes to see the effects of the molecules as the molecules 
when he shifts from an Observation Language to a Report Language. But this is 
different in the case of flash-bangs because only each of us has access to our own 
emotions and phenomenal experiences. It does not make sense to talk about 
seeing or feeling someone else’s ‘flash of anger’ from the third person 
perspective. Flash-bangs only occur in the first person or when an omniscient 
narrator explains what someone is feeling in the first person, from the third 
person. For instance, ‘he felt a sudden flash of rage’ and ‘I felt a sudden flash of 
rage’ but never ‘I felt Reg’s sudden flash of rage’.   
 However, we can observe body language, and we can be taught words for 
types of body language and attribute our own experiences of emotions to other 
people’s body language. I can also feel emotions while being taught the word for 
the publicly observable behaviour.  I call this process ‘internalization’. 
Internalization happens when a person exhibits a publicly observable behaviour, 
is given the word for that behaviour, and associates a sensation with the word 
for the behaviour.   
 The stage that Chalmers’ phenomenal zombie is missing is being able to 
link the word for its behaviour with the emotional content of its ‘flash-bang’ 
because it does not have any. The phenomenal zombie cannot link its behaviour 
and its emotional experience because it is missing the phenomenal content of the 
content bearing cognitive state. The person who learns the word for the 
behaviour and internalizes it by associating the word with the way they ‘feel’ 
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while exhibiting the behaviour can do something important that a phenomenal 
zombie cannot do, and that is, they can use the word when they feel that 
emotion, but they are not exhibiting the behaviour.   
 This is one key and very important difference between David Chalmers 
and his twin phenomenal zombie. For David Chalmers can report the presence 
of a sensation he has previously learned to associate with a word while 
exhibiting a behaviour, in the absence of that behaviour. Chalmers’ phenomenal 
zombie can only use the word while he is exhibiting the behaviour. In a case 
where Chalmers experiences a sensation, but does not exhibit any behaviour, he 
would be able to form a Belief407 with a Judgement408 about the identity of that 
 
407 See Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 1996, pp 11 – 17, 182, 175-176. Where I use capitals, I am 
referring to his original terminology. He argues that ‘Beliefs’ contain ‘Judgements’ but Judgements 
have all the phenomenal properties of experience removed.  
408 Ibid. ‘Judgements’ are a term from his terminology. I have adopted his term, but there are 
Sellarian reasons why I reject Chalmers’ ‘Three Orders of Judgement’ related to Sellars’ account of 
the ‘residue’ of descriptive content in fact-stating roles and the pseudo-subjunctive-conditional 
structure Sellars identifies in fact-stating accounts. See my discussion of Konstatierung statements 
in Observation and Report Languages in Chapter Sixteen of this thesis. In this case, I should argue, 
that the zombie would not be able to search its feelings in order to form a ‘Second Order Judgement’ 
and, thus could not make a statement about whether the flash-bang feels like a flash of remorse, a 
flash of disgust, or a flash of anger because it does not have feelings to search. This is like the case of 
a person who has congenital insensitivty to pain trying to describe what it feels like when you kick 
them in the shin. They do not know the difference between sharp stabbing pains, dull aches, itches, 
pings, pin pricks, prickiling sensations or vague discomfort. They lack both the capacity to develop 
language competence to describe their feelings, and also, the feelings themselves, (i.e. in the case of 
someone, for instasnce, who had language competency but for some reason then lost the ability to 
feel pain. They may have developed the ability to tell aches and throbs from prickling sensations, but 
they could not describe what was happening to their shins being kicked, behind a screen, because 
they can not search the sensation and use the vocabulary and language competence they have 
already developed in order to make Second Order Judgements about the sensation they are having. 
Why? Because they are not having one. They can not feel the pain, even though they have developed 
language competency prior to losing the ability, i.e. they could not tell a stab of pain, from a dull 
aching pain, from a prickiling pain even if they knew what those things felt like for them, because 
they could no longer feel them or have pain experiences in order to classify the pain, with their 
already developed linguistic competency. This would be like asking a man who has gone blind to tell 
you what colour sheet of paper you are holding up in front of him.) The phenomenal zombie, and a 
person turned into a phenomenal zombie (but who had developed prior language competence to 
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sensation which a corresponding phenomenal zombie twin would not be able to 
formulate because the zombie does not have that phenomenal experience. The 
zombie can not search its feelings and tell us what it is feeling. It cannot identify 
its emotional experience. The zombie can not examine its feelings and tell us 
whether it feels a flash of anger, a flash of remorse, a flash grief, or a flash of 
disgust. The zombie can form no Judgement about the identity of the emotion it 
is feeling, because as a phenomenal zombie, it can feel nothing. This is an 
instance where Chalmers and his phenomenal twin zombie would not have the 
same Judgement as him. This, of course, is the refutation of Chalmers’ assertion 
that both he and his twin phenomenal zombie could form the same 







search their feelings and describe them) would (likewise) not be able to form ‘Second Order 
Judgements’ about flash-bangs. Ergo, Chalmers and his zombie twin cannot have a one-to-one 
correspondence between Judgements about the identity of an emotional flash-bang they are feeling, 
nor could the zombie develop the capacity to develop the linguistic competence to deliver verbal 
reports like his, nor even if it had prior language competence (like a man turned into a zombie), 
could it deliver verbal reports like Chalmers because it can no longer have flashes of fear, anger, 
disgust or remorse to apply its language competency to. What is of direct importance to the overall 
argument of this paper for a return to Pre-Fregeian Psychologism is that without the foundational 
experiences the phenomenal zombie needs to develop competency in flash-bang emotional 
descriptions of its feelings, it cannot progress to higher stages of language development.  






Wilfrid Sellars’ Re-formulation of Wittgenstein’s Language Rules 
Regress 
 
So, the model suggested by Wittgenstein as one explanation, which we’ve 
analysed within Sellars’ framework, allows for internalization so long as people 
share sufficient similarities underlying the patterns of behaviour which they can 
learn words for, and then associate the words they learn for their behaviour with 
the emotion they’re feeling while they exhibit the behaviour. Later this allows 
the person learning the language to express when they are feeling a sensation 
like a flash of anger, without exhibiting the publicly observable behaviour. This 
allows the person to develop an ‘Internalized Report Language’ that they can use 
to talk about the phenomenal experiences of their non-publicly-observable 
emotions. 
 Furthermore, this model is flexible enough to allow for an ego-centric 
view and an inverted spectrum possiblity. So long as the behaviour is the same, 
the person may learn the word everyone uses, but the emotional experience 
might be different. All that is necessary for words to get a ‘foothold’ in language, 
as J.J. C. Smart puts it, is that patterns of behaviour be sufficiently similar that 
they can be publicly identified with the vocabulary learnt in (B1), and that the 
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person then learns to associate what they are feeling while exhibiting this 
behaviour with the word they learn for it, such that they come to internalize it 
and can come to express it later with a report.  
 There is a case with two related clusters of problems someone might use 
to attack this model. 
 Firstly, since the model relies on patterns of identifiable behaviour there 
arises a question about what happens when this is not the case. What about 
cases in which the person exhibits strange or uncommon behaviours that have 
no underlying vocabulary that can be used for third-person ascriptions in the 
community? Secondly what about the rules governing the use of any terms one 
might borrow, invent or draw figurative comparisons for this sensation? How 
does one employ the new term with consistency? There are no shared or common 
patterns of behaviour with which it is associated that could govern the use of 
that term.  
 Herein lies the importance of the Heterophenomenological and 
Autophenomenological distinction made earlier in this paper.  One can doubt 
that another is in pain, but one cannot doubt that they themselves are in pain. 
The reason for this is that the pain of another person is exhibited in behaviour 
and languages which are publicly observable, but the pain itself, the ‘beetle’ in 
the box is, not.   




It cannot be said of me at all (except as a joke) that I know I 
am in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps I 
am in pain. . . . The truth is: it makes sense to say about 
other people that they doubt whether I am in pain: but not to 
say it about myself.410 
  
I take Wittgenstein here to be claiming that there is a difference between 
knowing someone is in pain and being in pain. The person who is in pain cannot 
doubt that they are in pain. However, knowing someone else is in pain is 
different. This allows room for doubting they are in pain.  
 If we labour at Wittgenstein’s comment, we can make it a little bit less 
cryptic with the following suggestion. We might say that people can shown how 
to interpret the symptoms of pain in others using manuals of body language, 
perhaps written by Jones, and learning the language the person who is in pain 
knows and the moves in the games of that language which express the pain, but 
they themselves do not experience the pain. Someone might learn these moves 
in the language game and simulate them. There is room here to doubt that the 
person is in pain, which the person with the pain cannot doubt. Likewise, people 
can be taught to read body language cues to detect underlying emotions like 
 
410 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Philosophical Investigations Trans G.E.M. Anscombe, 1958, Basil  





conceit, anger, disdain, deception, envy, but they do not have access to that 
person’s feelings for those emotions.  
 We can bring Wittgenstein and Sellars insight together in a table like 
this.  
 






Natural reactions like crying 
which are replaced with 
expressions and words in a 
language game a child 
learns. 
 
By connecting the emotion I 
have with the behaviour I 
am exhibiting when I am 
taught the word, I will later 
be able to report the emotion 
or sensation when I am not 
exhibiting a publicly 
observable behaviour with a 
Jones creates an 
Observation Language to 
describe people’s 
behaviour. Learning this 
language allows tribe 
members to posit 
theoretical entities like 
‘thoughts’ for sensations 
and emotions in others 
which they lack access to. 
This system of language is 
the system of expressions 




term for the stimulus in the 
Observation Language of the 
tribe.  
 
Report Language  
 
I come to report my own 
experiences only I have 
access to within a language-
game and see my own 
experiences in terms of the 
language I use.   
 
One important 
distinguishing feature is that 
I am able to report on an 
emotional stimulus when I 
am not exhibiting the 
publicly observable 
behaviour.  
Tribe members learn to see 
and ‘know’ other member’s 
emotions and behaviours 
and report their behaviour 
even though they do not 
have access to those 
emotions. 
 
When Reg sees that Rod is 
in pain he can know Rod is 
in pain and report it, but 
he cannot have access to 
that pain without the 







The objection one might further raise to this use of Wittgenstein’s model is, of 
course, to raise the following question. Are people naturally disposed to 
understand certain reactions in others like crying, which do not require an 
Observation Language and it is the case that understanding these reactions 
comes easily and can be replaced with a language? Or do people need to be 
specifically taught a language to interpret the behaviour of others which they 
find naturally vexing and indecipherable? Both views relate to the first stage of 
Wittgenstein’s model, the natural pain-behaviour of the child. Where this 
becomes important is in the Private Language argument, which relies on a 
sensation that has no known word in a language. To try and get at the root of 
this problem Wittgenstein considers the case of a community which displays no 
outward body language. Here the child is forced to create his own word because 
the medium of similar patterns of body language is absent. 
 Wittgenstein writes  
 
What would it be like if human beings showed no outward 
signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc)? Then it would be 
impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘tooth-ache’. 
‘Well, let’s assume the child is a genius and invents a name 
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for the sensation!’ – But then, of course, he couldn’t make 
himself understood when he used the word411. 
  
We might further clarify, since it underlies our suggested model that people 
have to have similar patterns of behaviours which they can learn the name for, 
and then when they move to an ‘Internalized Report Language’ that they 
associate with what they feel in their behaviour at the time they learn it412. This 
latter is the autobiographical element I laid out with Tim Crane’s work on 
Dummett and McDowell in the introduction and will become the first part of my 
reply to the Guess Work Objection.  
 What is missing for Wittgenstein in the example of a community without 
body language is the middle part necessary for learning a language and 
internalizing it. The behaviour-pattern is the medium for connecting word-
behaviour-emotion together when learning the language of the tribe. The middle 
part is missing here in Wittgenstein’s example. The child cannot learn the word 
of the tribe that replaces the behaviour because the tribe is ‘body-language’ deaf.  
 So, what are we to make of the person who exhibits a sensation-
behaviour which is not common, but is different and perhaps unknown to the 
rest of the tribe? Here too the behaviour-access point for learning Jones’ word is 
 
411 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Philosophical Investigations Trans G.E.M. Anscombe, 1958, Basil  
Blackwelll, Oxford. #257 
412 Where might the terms for these patterns of behaviour come from? Here we would point back 
towards Jones and his Paleo-Behavioural Ur Languages. 
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blocked. We can imagine a case very much like this if we take the example of a 
child with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder in a classroom. The child, 
when suffering from Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder, will squirm in his 
or her seat, will fidget, will find ways of distracting the class. This is pain-
behaviour, perhaps, unknown to the teacher who is ‘deaf’ to the student’s body 
language and outward expressions.   
 The child may even invent a word for what produces these outward signs 
and blurt it out. However, the teacher does not know how to interpret this word, 
because the teacher does not suffer from Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) 
Disorder. The teacher is like the person who does not understand the body-
language of others and needs to be taught a specific language to understand it 
but they are also deprived of the experiences that such a word might relate to. 
The teacher is in the position of one of the members of Jones’ tribe and needs a 
way to understand what is happening to the student but has no internal access 
to what the student is undergoing.  
 Wittgenstein writes  
 
So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the 
point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate 
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sound. – But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs 
in a particular language-game413. 
  
Suppose the student’s sound is ‘Irrattention’ which is an example of a word that 
does not belong, yet, to a language game and which he associates with the 
painful state of trying to concentrate in a difficult environment. The teacher 
does not understand this condition. This is the closest sound the student with 
Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder can arrive at to what he is 
experiencing. The teacher might learn to apply this word to the student 
whenever the student manifests the symptoms of his condition, and that is what 
“irrattention” means for the teacher. But the teacher does not know or 
understand the internal ‘pain’ state the student is in and that is central to what 
the child means by the word.  
 Here we have a publicly accessible point for understanding the student’s 
mental state – this is what students who have ‘irrattention’ do. This is the 
behaviour they manifest. But the teacher has no access or ability to understand 
the pain the student has. He cannot repeat the word for himself or for others in 
the context of ‘irrattention’ because he does not know the rules that allow him to 
apply the term except in the case of specific behaviours.   
 
413 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Philosophical Investigations Trans G.E.M. Anscombe, 1958, Basil  
Blackwelll, Oxford. #261. 
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 This is a problem. What Wittgenstein refers to as a language game has 
certain rules. One of those rules means being able to repeat the use of the word 
within the context appropriate for that word. Sellars describes this rules-based 
approach when he critiques Wittgenstein’s thesis on the rules of a language 
game. This leads Sellars to reject it because it leads to an infinite regress414.  
 Wilfrid Sellars writes  
 
 Thesis. Learning to use a language (L) is learning to 
obey the rules of L. But, a rule enjoins the doing of an action 
(A) in a sentence (E) in a language, which contains an 
expression for A.  
 Hence, a rule which enjoins the using of a linguistic 
expression (E) is a sentence in a language which contains an 
expression for E – in other words, a sentence in a 
metalanguage.  
 Consequently, learning to obey the rules for L 
presupposes the ability to use metalanguage (ML) in which 
the rules for L are formulated.  
 So that learning to use a language (L) presupposes 
having learned to use a metalanguage (ML). And by the 
 
414 See Lu, Jiayi. ‘Sellars’ Paradox and Language Games’ Res Cogitans 6, no. 1 (2015)., for formal  
formulations of the regress leading to this paradox.  
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same token, having learned to use ML presupposes having 
learned to use a meta-metalanguage (MML) and so on.  
 But this is impossible (a vicious regress). 
Therefore, the thesis is absurd and must be rejected415.  
 
In the same paper Sellars goes on to develop the notions of ‘language entry 
transitions’ and ‘language departure transitions’ which are part of the 
background for the development of his solution to Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind. These of course are his ‘observation’ and ‘report’ languages. 
Observation Languages contain a number of natural language traits, as has 
been discussed at length through the paper. An Observation Language might 
use metaphors or similes in structures Sellars identifies such as ‘x looks like y’, 
and avoids formal Fact Stating Roles which carry the full epistemic endorsement 
of a community and ‘standard conditions’ like Report Languages employ. Such 
an Observation Language may describe new and novel experiences of an 
observation in terms of models and descriptive content borrowed from other 
Report Languages. Indeed, such languages have a tendency to use descriptive 
language in place of Fact Stating Language and, as we saw, this derives from 
the pseudo-subjunctive conditional structure which allows the user of the 
language to withhold assent to literal factual statements. We also saw from 
 
415 Sellars, Wilfrid. ‘Some Reflections on Language Games.’ Philosophy of Science 1, no. 21 (1954). 
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Sellars’ treatment of Carnap, that Observation Languages are also characterized 
by theoretical objects and postulates which later come to be factually stated as 
part of Report Languages. Whereas Carnap saw the difference between 
observables and theoreticals as fixed and ontological, Sellars rejects Carnap’s 
sophisticated brand of Logical Positivist Empicricism. Sellars thinks the 
difference between observables and theoreticals is fluid, not fixed and 
methodological.      
 If asked what the word ‘irrattention’ meant the student might draw on 
the resources which we find are characteristic of Object Languages, and explain 
the pain of trying to concentrate with Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder 
like this: 
 
Each time someone speaks, moves a chair, taps a pencil or a 
bird flies past the window I lose my train of thought. It is 
like a gust of fierce hot wind blows leaves everywhere in my 
mind and each leaf is a lost thought from that chain. The 
more I try to concentrate when that happens the more 
painful it becomes holding on to that train of thought until 
the pain is too much to take.  
 
So that while the term ‘fierce hot wind’ does not mean a literal ‘hot’ ‘windy’ type 
of ‘thought’ in a language the teacher and student share together (in the strict 
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rule governed sense in which Wittgenstein thinks language ought to work in The 
Philosophical Investigations), we can see that the language the student is using 
has some of the traits familiar to Sellars’ Observation Languages. That is, the 
student is constructing an Observation Language for his private experiences. He 
is presenting the same sorts of Observation Languages as Wilfrid Sellars 
discusses in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, The Language of Theories 
and Some Reflections on Language Games.  
 The teacher might here be able to grasp the simile between leaves being 
blown away and the student losing their train of thought. Working on the 
student’s definition the teacher might be able to apply ideas of headaches and 
anguish and other types of mental pain to the student’s descriptions of ‘painful 
distraction’ and in this way incorporate models into his or her understanding. 
While the teacher may have no direct private experience of Attention Deficit 
(Hyperactive) Disorder, the flexibility found in the sorts of language games and 
systems that  Sellars talks about, allows the teacher and the student to build an 
Observation Language together. When the Observation Language passes to a 
Report Language the descriptions lose their subjective character and the student 
will be able to offer Reports about being in ‘irrattention’, and the teacher will 
know what that means in terms of the teacher’s own experience which he has 
assembled by analogical reference to terms he has attached his own knowledge 
of his private affect, to model the descriptions of his student. This is an 
‘Analogical Construct’. The teacher may never be in ‘irrattention’ like the 
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student. The teacher may however come sufficiently to grasp what is happening 
to the student.  The knowledge shared between the teacher and the student with 
Attention Deficit (Hyperactive) Disorder about ‘irrattention’ is an indirect 
knowledge sitting between what I will refer to in the next part of the paper as 
the third and first personal view. This knowledge is shared by building up 
analogical structures between the two personal views in which assumptions in 
the descriptive features of an Observational Language can pass via an indirect 
domain. This ‘indirect knowledge’ creates the illusion of the intersubjectivity of 
language that Ryle’s Ordinary Language Arguments are caught up in. It is to 











Insights into Dispositional Terms from the Age of Anti-Metaphysicians 
 
To arrive at the final insight on offer in this thesis, it is neccessary to see where 
Robert Wolff’s criticism of Gilbert Ryle comes from. Philosophers of Ryle’s era, in 
the early to mid part of the Nineteen Hundreds, can often be characterized by 
either a self-conscious embarrassment at, or a fear of, being caught out at 
engaging in ‘metaphysics’. A large number of the schools of thought of the era 
(and a legacy of Logical-Positivism) were strands of philosophy that were 
involved in critiques and rebuttals of classical metaphysics. What seems curious 
to us now is that many of these philosophers found ingenious ways of levelling 
charges against one another that their rival had returned to the classic domain 
of metaphysical problems and metaphysical doctrines. To do such was perceived, 
in the wisdom of the day as a most grievous sin.  
 To philosophers of this era, proving that your opponent had 
metaphysical leanings was seen as a felling criticism of that philosopher and a 
good reason to be dubious about the leanings of their philosophy. To our modern 
eyes this pejorative use of the term ‘metaphysician’ and various pejorative uses 
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of terms like ‘realist’, ‘anti-nominalist’ and ‘trans-substantialist’, is perhaps a 
curious and quaint way to talk.  According to the wisdom of that age one need 
only to find some means of justifiably calling one’s opponent a metaphysician in 
order to dismiss their views as ‘claptrap’ and ‘hogswobble’416.  Nevertheless, this 
is the place and the time that the final insight for this thesis comes from.  
 I believe that it is important when doing philosophy, to keep, display 
and share a historical awareness of these shifts in philosophy in order to be able 
to pan for any gold an argument may offer417. The era of the Wolff paper is, of 
course, the era before Saul Kripke and David Lewis came to redefine 
metaphysics and its problems with new types of transfinite mathematics and 
modal logic. With Lewis and Kripke metaphysics gained a new prestige, and 
today the title of ‘metaphysician’ is most coveted. The swing towards 
metaphysics comes to us primarily, of course, out of Quine, Kripke and Lewis in 
the second part of the twentieth century. The status of the modern 
‘metaphysician’ is augmented by new applications for metaphysics in fields of 
discrete mathematics, and digtal data mathematics with the development of 
‘online ontologies’ and new types of programming structures which often find 
their ways into highly profitable fields of the information industry. 
 
416  Ayer, Alfred. Language, Truth and Logic. United States Dover, 2002. See page 27, and Ayer’s 
notes on Carnap’s critique of Heidegger for a typification of this type of criticism.  
417 Such are the lessons of Edward ‘Ted’ Sadler, one of my undergraduate lecturers, who taught me to 
value rigour, exactitude and above all else historical awareness of the changing tides of philosophy in 
my scholarship.  
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  Such being so, we must put this late Twentieth Century and Millenial 
knowledge aside, and begin in a historical time-capsule with Ryle’s own 
denouncement of metaphysics and Robert Wolff’s claim of Ryle’s hypocrisy in 
relation to metaphysics. This will allow us to examine Ryle’s likely reply to Wolff 
and finally this will open-up the last and penultimate insight on offer in this 
thesis.  
 Robert Wolff, in a very short and obscure paper418, attacks Ryle’s 
dispositional account as a piece of speculative metaphysics. Robert Wolff accuses 
Ryle of metaphysical postulation and hypostatization and an almost 
Empedoclean Fidoism. One might almost say that Wolff’s criticism, rather 
amusingly, paints Ryle, himself, as a Fidoist.   
 Fidoism is a term used by Carnap’s419 for Ryle’s criticisms of an Anti-
Nominalist Realist position 420. Carnap derives it from Ryle’s argument that a 
Neo-Platonic Pro-Realist hypothesizes the existence of an entity for any 
expression that loosely resembles a noun. Thus, according to Ryle’s argument, if 
one has a pet called Fido, the Anti-Nominalist would assert in the name of 
Realism that there are in fact two entities. These two entities are Fido-the-dog 
and Fido-the-name-of-the-dog. According to Ryle this creates problems between 
 
418 Wolff, Robert. ‘Professor Ryle's Discussion of Agitations.’ Mind Vol. 63, no. No. 250 , (1954): Pp. 
239-241. 
419Carnap, Rudolf. Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. London: Phoenix 
Books; The University of Chicago Press, 1958. See pg 216 in‘Supplement A. Empiricism, Semantics 
and Ontology’ Pp 205-248 
420Ryle, Gilbert. ‘Systematically Misleading Expressions.’ In Collected Essays 1929-1968, edited by 
Julia Tannery, II. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
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identity statements, the properties of the name as an entity, as well as the dog 
as a separate entity. For instance, when one calls out the word ‘Fido’ it is 
unclear whether one is referring to the dog or the name of the dog. This 
tendency to attribute entities to expressions and terms is at the foundation of 
Ryle’s rejection of metaphysics.   
 Indeed, one could almost posit the debate between Ryle and Wolff in the 
shape of a satisfyingly philosophical Ouroboros, with each biting the tail of the 
other, over who is the Empedoclean Fidoist.   
 Wolff writes  
 
The attempt to explain law like statements about  
the physical world has often led to the 
postulation of some sort of ‘substance’ or ‘stuff’ 
which endured through the many alterations of 
the world and hence accounted for the continuity 
and order of those alterations. In the same way, a 
dispositional account of mental concepts runs the 
risk of hypostatizing the patterns of behaviour 
either as ‘Faculties’ and ‘Ideas’ or as 
Dispositions.421 
 






Here, of course, Wolff is accusing Ryle of creating ontological distinctions on the 
basis of ordinary language foundations. As Wolff points out even though Ryle 
‘commits this error. Ryle would undoubtedly repudiate it if confronted with it 
explicitly422‘. And indeed, Ryle, would passionately object to such an attribution. 
Ryle is purportedly Anti-Fidoist and claims to eschew metaphysics of this type, 
altogether, from his philosohy. Wolff’s charge is one of hypocrisy. The charge of 
hypocrisy arises because of Ryle’s Anti-Fidoist Ordinary Language critique of 
Platonism.  In Systematically Misleading Expressions423 Ryle points out that 
sentences which have as their subjects non-existent entities, or as their 
predicates the claim that the subject does not exist, present a paradoxical 
problem for the philosophy of language. Ryle argues that if the subject of a 
sentence with a propositional claim is a non-existent, or the predicate denies the 
existence of the subject, then it raises the two part question; what is the 
predication of an entity referring to and what is the sentence actually about?424 
 Ryle’s argument and underlying concern is that ‘terms couched in 
grammatical or syntactical terms’ which are perfectly useable and understood in 
 
422 Wolff, Professor Ryle’s Discussion of Agitations, 1954.  
423See Ryle, Systematically Misleading Expressions, 2009. 
424See Ryle, Systematically Misleading Expressions, 2009. 
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everyday ordinary language use by the natural language speaker, become 
‘monsters’ when philosophers begin to take them too seriously and subject them 
to logical and semantical analysis. Ryle thinks that their ‘syntactic elements’ 
make expressions of Ordinary Language into monsters inhabiting what we 
would today describe as a Meniong swampland when philosophers apply truth 
conditions, referential theories of meaning, types of modal realist calculi, 
counterfactual truth values, or search among common expressions for ontological 
hints into the nature of reality. Ryle thinks the trouble with this sort of 
approach is that such philosophers begin to analyse idioms, argots and bits 
taken out of common language and its dialects in ways in which the terms were 
never meant to be used425.  
 Officially, Ryle thinks that all quasi-ontological statements are 
systematically misleading and end in a sort of layman’s inspired Platonism. For 
instance Ryle argues that taking a bit of natural language like ‘honesty compels 
me’ to mean that there is a Platonic force called “honesty” that literally compels 
someone who uses that expression to tell the truth, and this ‘veracious force’ can 
be treated as an actual entity, is to fall into the illusion created from the 
Ordinary Language expression and be misled by it.  
 In a moment we will see that Ryle commits a similar error in his 
analysis, as he criticizes other philosophers of doing in Misleading Expressions, 
 
425Ryle, Systematically Misleading Expressions, 2009. See Pg 44. 
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with his analysis of dispositions and that there is some meat to Wolff’s criticism.  
However, my analysis of Wolff’s criticism will show that what arises from Ryle’s 
analysis of dispositions is not a Platonic force, but rather a confusion between 
first and third person perspectives.   
 Wolff writes   
 
One of the most interesting examples of this 
hypostatisation is the discussion of agitations in 
the chapter entitled the Emotions. An analysis of 
the argument will illustrate the way in which the 
error is committed and the care which must be 
exercised to avoid objectifying dispositions, 
tendencies and other pseudo-substantives. . . 
.Motives are simply the dispositions and 
inclinations which he has previously analysed; 
pride, vanity, avarice, patriotism, laziness and so 
forth. ‘Feelings are the sorts of things people 
often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs’. . . Quite 
different to these are agitations or commotions426. 
 
 




Wolff makes the following argument  
 
As soon as we speak of two motives or 
inclinations as opposing and interfering with one 
another, we get into trouble. For ‘patriotic’ and 
‘cowardly’ are descriptions of the man’s behaviour 
and therefore the description of what he would do 
when confronted by conflicting interests must 
necessarily be a part of that self-same pattern427.  
 
Wolff contends thus  
 
Part of saying that this particular man is 
patriotic is saying that when offered a chance to 
serve his country, he does so unless there is 
danger involved. Likewise, to describe him as 
cowardly is to say that he shies away from 
danger, although on occasion he will risk danger 
for the sake of his country428. 
 
427 Wolff, Professor Ryle’s Discussion of Agitations, 1954.  Pg 240 Italics are his 




Wolff’s criticism of Ryle’s notion of dispositions, in its essence, is simply that 
they are far too narrowly formulated, and that the way dispositions behave 
when they go together in ordinary language usage by the natural language 
speaker, Wolff thinks, is to form a general holistic description of a person’s 
characteristic nature.  
 And indeed, that sounds about right. I side with Wolff and argue that 
this is indeed how people use dispositions in holistic accounts of people, not in 
descriptions of hidden and specific forces compelling people towards different 
behaviours.  
 But, given that, surely Ryle is also onto something. Surely there are 
cases like the following which we can relate to.  
 Plato, as Socrates, writes 
 
Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to 
have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, 
that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one 
day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the 
outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the 
ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire 
to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of 
them; for a time he struggled and covered his 
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eyes, but at length the desire got the better of 
him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the 
dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your 
fill of the fair sight429. 
 
I think everyone can relate to this type of turmoil and self conflict. If not in that 
specific context, then the more general agitation one feels when one wants to do 
one thing and feels an inhibition not to or a compulsion to do something else. 
Notice the space we have at last moved into. In the course of formatting an 
Ordinary Language argument in terms of a Linguistic Behavioural analysis we 
have arrived in the space between a holistic descriptive analysis of dispositions 
as Wolff argues for in natural language usage, and a narrowed interpretation of 
dispositions as Ryle argues for and to which we can find our own sympathy. 
That is we’ve moved into a direct conflict between introspective scrutiny and 
ordinary language usage in a piece of Ordinary Language Philosophy. On the 
one side we have the Plato-Leontis-Ryle position, that is, a direct appeal made to 
the first personal perspective about what it is like to have competing impulses. 
This direct appeal to the first personal perspective carries over into an indirect 
appeal to the third personal perspective via an assumption that the Ryle-Plato 
argument makes on behalf of ordinary language when we think someone else is 
 
429Plato. The Republic. Translated by Desmond Lee. Victoria: Penguin, 2003. Pp 147-148. 
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agitated. These assumptions make up the third person indirect. Similarly we 
have a direct third person appeal in the Wolffian form of a linguistic 
behaviourist analysis about the holistic behaviour of dispositions expressed as 
descriptions as exemplified by the cowardly but patriotic man who ‘shies away 
from danger, although on occasion he will risk danger for the sake of his 
country’. This incorporates an implicit indirect appeal to the first person domain 
of language enabling Wolff’s rejection of Ryle’s own position for that is in fact  
how such descriptions work.   
 The two indirect appeals, the indirect first personal appeal, and the 
indirect third personal appeal taken together with the direct appeal might 
constitute an inchoate normative source for the claimed authority of the 
linguistic understanding of the natural language speaker. From these one might 
ground an Ordinary Language claim like that which I gave in the earlier 
example of Ryle’s critical censure of Augustine and the Stoics use of the concept 
of ‘volitions’. Ryle advances the claim that nobody actually uses ‘volitions’ in 
natural language descriptions and so concludes against them. He effectively uses 
this domain as a normative body to advance his own arguments and refute 
others. In the present case, however, Wolff out-Ryles Ryle. Wolff derails Ryle’s 
attempt at developing an ‘Agitational Calculus’ based on an occult appeal to a 
first person perspective. Wolff does this, firstly, by pointing out that dispositions, 
Inclinations and Motives in the third person work holistically as descriptions in 
Ordinary Language use. Secondly, Wolff has revealed that Ryle’s ‘Agitational 
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Calculus’ is actually based on an occult appeal to a first personal perspective. 
The allegedly occult first personal perspective is what I have called the direct 
first personal perspective understood phenomenologically. The argument works 
by sympathy. We see someone behave in a certain way, and we introspect and 
apply our own recollections or memories of a prior consciousness when we found 
ourselves in a similar agitational state.  We might see the same domain involved 
in the form of an appeal for the difference between, for example, a glow of 
warmth or pride where we cannot locate a Linguistic Behavioural distinction for 
such an analysis. This, of course, is the sphere from which I’ve distinguished 
phenomenological arguments as an occult subset of Ryle’s Ordinary Language 
Arguments.  
 The problem concerns how we understand dispositions. We have 
introspective motives on the one side and descriptions attributing them subjects 
on the other. The introspective source, the phenomenologically reflective act, is 
entirely opposed to the bit of natural language analysis as Wolff’s holistic 
Linguistic Behavioural argument about ordinary language motive talk shows. 
The two direct sources say different things, and the indirect sources that they 
ground, consequently, say correspondingly different things. The Linguistic 
Behavioural analysis invites us to go one way and maps the ordinary language 
claim at the source in that direction. The direct third personal perspective in 
turn invites an indirect first personal perspective view of dispositions as holistic 
entities. The introspective scrutiny that arises from a conscious reflective act, 
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however, which has our sympathies in the form of a direct first personal 
perspective, such as the case I quoted from Plato’s Republic, invites us to go in 
another direction and this in turn maps the indirect third person assumption 
that dispositions can conflict with each other, i.e. a man cannot be both patriotic 
and cowardly or he’ll suffer from an ‘Agitation’. We sympathize with this 
agitation from the first personal direct point of view which gives force to the 
indirect third person positional perspective and ends with ascribing conflicting 
motives to another.   
    It seems that there is a direct contradiction in what a disposition is as 
understood in Ordinary Language. From the directly first personal point of view 
motives can conflict with each other and with various impulses. From first 
personal insight when we reflect on our own experiences of conflicting motives, 
impulses and inclinations we find ourselves agreeing with Ryle and Plato. 
Anyone forced between going to a big game, or concert, and commitments to 
family or work will recall the mixture of emotions and motivating forces within 
them. We each have our own experiences of self conflict. So, from the first-
personal point of view competing inclinations and movtives can make us 
conflicted, but from the directly third-personal point of view they cannot. When 
we examine the way we talk about our friends and people we know, we find that 
dispositions behave exactly as Robert Wolff says they do. They work as holistic 
descriptions of what people are like.  
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 Having now arrived at this point, I want to take it back in a certain 
sense. That is, though so called ‘Ordinary Language Arguments’ concerning 
motives as dispositions lead us to contradictory positions about them, I wish to 
diagnose the contradiction. The cost, however, will be to undermine the 
authority of Ordinary Language Arguments, by revealing two underlying 
sources of analyses which can rival one another and in the case in point, produce 
contradictory claims. The contradiction between these claims seems inevitable 
until we realize what is going on in the phenomenology of the interospective act 
of reflection that we make implicitly and in the Linguistic Behavioural analysis 
that Wolff offers about the holistic way that dispositional descriptions fit 
together. If the data of the direct first personal perspective is irreducible to the 
data of the direct third personal perspective, then that suggests we should 
expect the possibility for inconsistency between some claims which purportedly 
make their claim to authority by appeal to a shared common source and that 
shared common source is the normative force of ordinary language usage. Ryle 
seems to get away with it because of an inconsistency connected to his claim that 
consciousness does not exist which diverts the reader’s attention away from 
what is happening when they read some of his arguments. Ryle uses 
unacknowledged phenomenological arguments that rely on introspective 
scrutiny, but he pretends that he doesn’t. This is Ryle’s surreptitious play. 
Hence the clash between the normative authority in Linguistic Behavioural 
Arguments and phenomenology is not obvious. Indeed this is the fault line 
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running through The Concept of Mind, that I pointed out at the start of this 
paper in the Introduction. 
 What we have identified is a contradiction between a source disclosing 
the normative force of a phenomenological claim based on the introspective 
scrutiny of performing the examination of conscious recollections, and another 
based on analysis of a bit of natural language. The source of the tension is 
readily identified. Each notion of dispositional motives maps a rival source of 
normativity. This complicates a straight forward division of perspectives into the 
first and third person point of view. The contradiction is made serious by the 
assumption they both are aspects of the domain of knowledge possessed by the 
ordinary language user and this is where both claims are drawing their 
normative force from. The Linguistic Behaviourist analysis lodged by Wolff 
makes an appeal to the behaviour of language based on the direct knowledge of 
the third personal use of language. Likewise, the appeal to our own introspective 
scrutiny, in the form of a conscious act of sympathy, of recalling a moment of self 
conflict is also a direct appeal. The problem of the contradiction persists for as 
long as we think of ‘ordinary language’ as one unified source. This problem is 
solved even if the contradiction is not dissolved once we recognise that indirect 
knowledge of the third person perspective is reducible to direct knowledge of the 
first person perspective. Indirect experience of the first person perspective is 
reducible to direct experience of the third person perspective. Neither direct 
knowledge of the first person, nor direct knowledge of the third person, is 
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reducible to the other. If we insist that they are then we do so on pain of 
admitting a contradiction. That is to say, if we insist things are reducible by the 
way Ryle treats them, then Ordinary Language Arguments are bad arguments 
because they produce contradictions. Saying that they are not removes the 
contradiction, but destroys the unity of ‘Ordinary Language’ as a unifying 
normative force of discourse on the mind.  
 The domain which the two threads of rival analysis, that is Ryle’s Occult 
Phenomenology and his Linguistic Behavioural Arguments would have shared is 
indirect. That is, the indirect domain poses any number of assumptions carried 
over from bits of analysis, as the domain we used to map onto the area of 
knowledge possessed by the natural language user, as a normative source. This 
domain, under scrutiny, has now disappeared into the first and third-person 
direct views. These are simply rival perspectives from which to approach the 
nature of mind. 
 The impact of the argument should now become apparent. Ordinary 
Language usage can’t be a normative source for mapping arguments on pain of 
admitting a contradiction from distinct sources, such as a Linguistic Behavioural 
analysis, or from introspective scrutiny in the form of phenomenological 
arguments. In short order, the domain of knowledge marked out by the ‘ordinary 
language user’ is no good as a source for justifying arguments concerning the 
nature of mind. Such a domain can admit contradictory claims about the mind 
because it conceals two direct points of view, not a single intersubjective point of 
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view. The illusion of a single intersubjective source arises from analogical 
structures which allow assumptions to pass between the direct views into 
indirect views. These are the Analogical Constructs I have spoken of throughout 
the paper, and are provided as an answer to the Guess Work Objection. We 
experience these Analogical Constructs, for instance when we see a man 
behaving in a way we might ourselves report in the first person as agitated.  
 When we see his behaviour and we use the word, we allow our own 
private experiences of what agitation feels like, which we learnt as a behavioural 
term and internalized, to pass through the analogical structures between the 
direct third and first person via the indirect domain. We project our own 
experiences of agitation on to that person’s behaviour. 
 The phenomenal zombie cannot do this since it has no experience of 
agitation. It thus would not be able to become a competent language user and 
would be restricted to a behavioural vocabulary, not a fully developed language 
with Analogical Constructs that allow it to project its understanding of 
sensations on to the behaviour of others. The zombie would not be able to learn 
to ‘see’ its emotions in other people. What it has developed is a quasi-language 
and not a real one. Such a quasi-language is not capable of explaining all of the 
facts germane to an Anti-Psychologistic theory of mind, since a fortori it cannot 




 Since the development of a language theory capable of explaining all of 
the facts of mind, depends upon a non-linguistic domain of introspection and 
consciousness from which sensations and feelings must be encoded by the 
speaker, passed through the medium of language, and decoded by the listener, 
by Dummett’s own light430 the project of Anti-Psychologism is untenable. Mind 
has priority to language in an explanatory theory about the facts both theories 
share in their domains because the meaning of the encoded language depends 
upon the non-linguistic domain the words are encoded from.  
 An Analytical Construct is a ‘post-internalized’ projection of our feelings 
and experiences on to the behaviour of another, and not merely the common 
language description of the behaviour in the language, associated with the word. 
Here, we apply by analogical construction, our own experiences onto another 
person when we hear them use the word to describe their own experiences, and 
in sophisticated circumstances when we analyse their behaviour. We 
sympathize, and empathize, and recall our own experiences. This makes 
language seem intersubjective, but really, all we are doing is a sophisticated 
 
430 See Dummett, What Do I Know When I Know a Language?, 1993. Dummett writes  
‘Philosophers before Frege assumed. . . that what a speaker knows is a kind of code. Concepts are 
coded into words and thoughts which are compounded out of concepts, into sentences, whose 
structure mirrors, by and large, the complexity of the thoughts. We need language, on this view, only 
because we happen to lack the faculty, that is, of the direct transmission of thoughts. 
Communication is, thus essentially like the use of a telephone: the speaker codes his thoughts in a 
transmissible medium, which is then decoded by the hearer430.The whole analytical school of 
philosophy is founded on the rejection of this conception, first clearly repudiated by Frege. The 
conception of language as a code requires that we ascribe concepts and thoughts to people 
independently of their knowledge of language; and one strand of objection is that, for any but the 
simplest concepts, we cannot explain what it is to grasp them independently of the ability to express 
them in language.’ 
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form of guessing and speculate on what they are feeling by applied personal 
experience. We are seeing the ‘agitated man’ in terms of our own experiences of 
agitation, which has an autobiographical history between when we learned the 
word, and what we take the word to mean. 
 The Rylean, unlike the zombie, learns his emotional language from 
being taught the word for his behaviour and associates that word with the 
sensation he experiences while exhibiting the behaviour. The word is a code for 
what he is feeling.  When another tribal member listens to his words, the second 
Rylean tribal member decodes these words in terms of his own experiences.  On 
this view I am presenting, pace Dummett, mentalistic language is actually 
rather like a telephone that encodes the private experiences of sensations into a 
language and then decodes language using analogical structures to relate the 
words back to private sensations which have been associated with the words via 
behaviour in the early stages of acquiring a language. This is how the means of 
acquiring a language and what it means to be competent in the terms of a 
language are connected to the meaning of the words in that language. Along 
with my answer to the Guess Work Hypothesis, this completes my explanation 
fulfilling the conditions for the tenability of the viability of Psychologism as a 
research approach in the Philosophy of Mind. With this last piece in place I 
complete my call for a return to a Pre-Fregeian theory of mind and conclude my 














Conclusion and Afterword 
 
 
What should emerge from this thesis is the treacherous crevasse between first 
person and third person positions in the use of language. Theories that fail to 
take into account of the fact that terms used in first-personal phenomenological 
descriptions, and those used in third-person discourse may mean different 
things, and thus fall victim to a range of treacherous illusions.  The treachery is 
that assumptions hidden in Analogical Structures lead one to assume that terms 
used in the first and third person are thoroughly interchangeable, and that 
language is not personal or subjective, but rather merely communal and public. 
This thesis argues that such is not so.  
In the introduction of the paper I reveaed three suppositions in Ryle’s 
philosophy, which Ryle took to unite the use of language between first and third 
position, and which I wanted to challenge431. This thesis has argued that Ryle 
was mistaken on all three of these suppositions. The thesis argues against Ryle 
that there is something fundamentally different between the first and third 
 
431 See Section II, Ordinary Language Arguments and the project of Anti-Psychologism in the 
Philosophy of Mind, in the Introduction. Also, see The Robert Wolff Paper and Autophenomenology in 
Chapter Fifteen. Midway Map of the Paper, in this thesis.  
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positions432. We answer yes to the first condition against Ryle’s mistakes. The 
first person use and third person uses of language are fundamentally different. 
More importantly the choice of word we use depends upon a private experience 
that other people cannot have. What I call my ‘anger’ is my experience of my 
anger. At the mere level of language this is indicative of the stages of language 
development that one must go through to use a vocabulary for ‘flash-bangs’. We 
can say ‘I felt a flash of anger’ but never ‘I felt Tod’s flash of anger’. More 
importantly the choice of word we use depends upon a private experience that 
other people can not access. The second premise in the three mistakes of Ryle is 
answered by the careful analysis of the Wolff paper.  If there were no difference 
between the first and the third person position, then there would be no 
contradiction between Ryle and Wolff’s propositions about the way dispositions 
work. If there were no difference, then it would not matter whether we were 
using dispositions from the perspective of the first or the third person, because 
either use would be identical. However, there is. There is a difference in how we 
use dispositions in the first and third person position. The fact dispositions work 
holistically to describe characteristics in the third person, while exerting a 
phenomenal normative force when we think of them in the first person (as in the 
Plato example from the argument on the tripartite soul) means, not only that we 
are using language differently in those perspectives, but that we are thinking 
 
432 See Section II, Ordinary Language Arguments and the project of Anti-Psychologism in the 
Philosophy of Mind, in the Introduction.  
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differently when we articulate those perspectives because the ascriptive 
semantics and the phenomenal experiences associated with those words 
changes. Language has different properties that arise from the perspective it is 
used from. Some words will mean different things and exhibit different 
properties and behaviour when used in different personal perspectives. This 
creates questions, because we must ask the psychologist, the cognitive scientist 
and the philosopher in which sense is he or she using a word?  This is the insight 
behind the metaphysical ‘force’ objection that Robert Wolff levels against Ryle’s 
account of dispositions.  
When we forget that we are applying our own experiences to the language 
of others it can mislead us to see meaning in language as intersubjective and 
forget the autobiographical processes we, ourselves, underwent and continue to 
refine in the vocabulary we use to describe our private life. A twenty-one-year-
old, a seven-year-old, and a fifty-one-year old will have different life experiences 
that contribute to different understandings of what the word ‘heartbreak’ 
means. To talk about all of their undestandings as thought they were identical 
objects, from the third-personal perspective, I urge, is the underlying cause for 
the glacier of problems that has frozen over the sciences of mind, which I pointed 
out in the Introduction to this thesis433.  To speak of people’s emotional and 
 
433 See The Three Tiers of Solving the Indeterminacy of Reference Problem in the Philosophy of Mind 
in the Introduction to this thesis where I introduced the ‘Silver Thaw’ metaphor for a common root 
problem underlying all of the research issues surfacing within the various disciplines of mind.  
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mental life under the assumption they are made up of identical and uniform 
objects, from the third personal perspective, is a treacherous assumption which 
leads to the sorts of problems that are manifested in attempts at building a 
science of the mind. Problems will appear like cracks in the glacier. The 
problems revealed by close exampination of these cracks are the Inverted 
Spectrum Argument, the Beetle in the Box Problem, ‘Situational Responses’ and 
the failure of Context-Dependent Identity Claims. In one way or another, as this 
thawing paper has revealed, these are all symptoms of an underlying 
Indeterminacy of Reference that plagues psychological research, theories, data 
collection, cognitive science and domains that involve language about the mind.  
This led us to answering the third premise in the three mistakes of Ryle. 
First person phenomenal experience is prior to third person language 
description. Firstly, the reason why first person phenomenal experience is prior 
to meaning in third person language descriptions is that we learn to associate 
with mentalistic words via body language in a linguistic community. But, prior 
to the body language or the word, is the phenomenal experience which we learn 
to eventually associate to the word.  Secondly, first person phenomenal 
experience is prior to third person language descriptions because our private 
experiences, when we have mastered a language, are what we use to determine 
the words and descriptions we offer of our private emotional lives. This shows 
that a theory of mind is necessary for, and prior to a theory for the semantics of 
language since the semantics for the language depend upon private conscious 
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experience.  To understand the word choice, we have to understand what 
determines the word choice. We can not understand the meaning of a ‘pang of 
regret’ and a ‘pang of sadness’ if we cannot understand the phenomenal ‘pang’ 
that determine the word choice.  
This is why the phenomenological argument is so strong. First person 
insight drawn from analysis of phenomenal properties, like the difference 
between visualizing and witnessing an event, or the comparison of individual 
feelings to decide if the introspectable phenomenal experiences of an emotion 
one has is a ‘flash of anger’ or a ‘flash of guilt’, engages us on a personal concious 
level.   
 Further proof of the priority of private phenomenal experience in 
emotional and mental vocabularies was found in the Rylean community’s’ 
developmental stages where we could say that David Chalmers’ phenomenal 
zombie was not able to learn the mature language of Sellar’s Rylean community. 
The Chalmerian zombie was not able to internalize the language to describe the 
feelings it felt while exhibiting the publicly observable behaviours for Jones’ 
Language because it had no feelings to determine and base word choice on. It 
could not examine its feelings to self-report, because, it was a phenomenal 
zombie. It had none. This meant it could not pass beyond the internalized 
reporting stage, and onto the final stage in which it learnt to apply its own 
experiences to the behaviours of others. The zombie lacked the necessary 
capacities to fully master language and use it meaningfully. Ergo something 
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prior to language determines meaning in language and is necessary to master 
language competency. If this were not so, the phenomenal zombie could learn to 
use the final stages of the language with full competence.  
We gained insight into the final stages of language mastery and 
competency by applying Wittgenstein’s ‘Pain Argument’ to the teacher and the 
AD(H)D student. The student first exhibited pain-behaviour which the teacher 
did not understand. When in pain, the student fidgeted, disrupted the class, 
would get up and wander around. Eventually, drawing on metaphorical 
structures, similes and constructs made possible by the withholding of assent to 
the propositional content of the subjunctive conditional structure that ‘looks-
talk’ adopts when it borrows from the vocabulary of the language, the student 
could make statements about his AD(H)D. The teacher and student were then 
able to build a language together that allowed the teacher to construct 
analogical structures from the teacher’s own experiences and come to a model of 
the AD(H)D student’s behaviour that the teacher could understand even though 
the teacher had no experiences like the student’s and possessed no common word 
and no common behaviour. 
 This offers an insight into why there is an indeterminacy of reference in 
the disciplines and sciences of the mind. Each person goes through a private 
autobiographical process, which may begin with the inherited behavioural 
Gross-Body-Language descriptions of a tribe, but which, to master the language, 
the person must first learn to internalize in order to describe and articulate 
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their own emotions, and then use those personal meanings to project as a sort of  
self-educated guesswork to understand others.  
 At no time does the teacher grasp the full meaning of ‘irrattention’. The 
teacher’s understanding of the student’s condition is analogical, not 
intersubjective. The teacher’s model refers to the student’s behaviour and 
language in a speculative way through analogues of his own experiences 
assembled by structures based on the student’s figurative, metaphorical, and 
similitudinal use of an Object Language. This is where we applied insight from 
Sellars’ to Wittgenstein’s account. What is important in this account we develop 
from Sellars and Wittgenstein in the example used is that the teacher’s 
experiences are not the same experiences as the student. The teacher does not 
have AD(H)D. The space between what the student says and the analogical 
understanding of what the teacher thinks those words mean, is entirely 
constructed in terms of the teacher’s own experiences and the semantics the 
teacher draws on when working at understanding the student’s experiences. We 
know that such is so because the teacher does not have AD(H)D, and thus 
cannot possibly have the same experiences as the student. Thus, the teacher’s 
understanding of the student, such as it is, must be analogical. This allowed us 
an insight into where the Problem of the Indeterminacy of Reference arises. 
 Full mastery of a languge requires internalization, which involves an 
autobiographical component where the process of acquiring a concept in a 
language, and what that word means, are hopelessly ravelled together. That 
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meaning is then projected onto others, like the two Rapunzels in their towers, 
staring at each other, and trying to build up a model of the inside of the other’s 
tower from her own experiences of hers. So to do we guess at the emotions of 
others. Thus, such completes the Dummett-McDowell-Crane conditions for an 
account of Psychologicism.  
 What should also emerge from the thesis are notes for the death of 
classical theories of psychology. If this paper is right and the clash of Scientific 
and Manifest Images is based on different types of access to the Object 
Languages, then Psychology is, in a certain sense, doomed to speculations about 
the nature of mind but cannot arrive at intersubjective facts of the kind physics 
enjoys. The reason for this is that what one person means by the term ‘anger’ is 
applied to a non-public emotion they felt, which they learnt while exhibiting 
public behaviour associated with the word ‘anger’ that comes down to them from 
Jones’ descriptive vocabulary. The person then later is able to use this term 
when they are talking about prior instances434 or are not displaying public 
symptoms of anger but may be feeling it435. This means that Psychology, de 
Figurato, is forever doomed to speculations about the identity claims of 
underlying emotions. Since it has no Object Languages it cannot refer to a 
Neural Correlate of Consciousness or a First Person Science to begin building up 
identity claims about the mind. The problem, when fully spelled out means that 
 
 
435 Recall that Chalmers can do this, but his phenomenal zombie cannot.  
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since Psychology lacks the Fact Stating Roles of an Object Language, a fortori, 
the scope of the language of Psychology must remain foundationally speculative. 
Psychology cannot make factual statements because the language it uses is 
referentially indeterminate. It cannot express knowledge about the mind in the 
Object Languages of the Sciences, nor can it make identity claims about 
emotional states that transverse what any one person learns to associate with a 
feeling while displaying a behaviour to what another person has learned to 
associate with a word, without creating indeterminacy. The domain of 
Psychology is, in this way, endemically speculative.  
Psychiatry can make factual statements about the body. It is not limited 
to metaphorical uses of the Object Language but can also feature these as part of 
its explanations. This introduces the possibility for a Neural Correlate of 
Consciousness in Psychiatry, since, unlike the Psychology of the Figurato-Litero 
Model, Psychiatry utilizes fact-stating language roles that draw on the hard 
medical sciences. Psychiatry is Litero, as well as de Figurato.  
The idea of a Neural Correlate of Consciousness is David Chalmers’ 
concept and not my own. The chief difference here, is that I think the authority 
for an identity claim about whether two pieces of neurological data correspond to 
the same emotion depends on a first personal point of view. It is up to the person 
who is strapped to the machine to say whether neurological data 1 is disgust, 
and seemingly identical data 2 in the same subject is not disgust, but a different 
emotion, which the subject calls ‘mistrust’.  The authority does not derive from 
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the data, nor the machine, but the subject’s own experience. This is the Caveat 
Authority implied by first person access to praeter-linguistic sources of 
phenomenal experience. How would one describe anger to someone who had 
never had it? Indeed, words fall short. One might mouth ‘anger’, but then what? 
How do you describe that sudden familiar flash of ire and irritation that washes 
through you to a phenomenal zombie who has never felt it? Such a thing is 
praeter-linguistic, beyond language, and yet, it is exactly these praeter-linguistic 
sources we rely upon, when we search our feelings and use them to determine 
what words we use to talk about how we feel. The people who listen to us, do not 
have our experiences of that particular instance of anger we are describing, but 
rather use their own experiences as an analogue to understand our words on 
how something made us feel.  
A formal theory of consciousness should also be able to solve the problems 
researchers are having with context dependent claims, by introducing an 
explanation for why subjects respond to the same stimulus in different ways, 
and why identical neurological information can ‘feel’ different for the same 
subject by providing grounds for what can count towards a claim for correlating 
neural scientific information with a theory of consciousness from the perspective 
of the first person, as a first person science.  Here the paper finds some common 
ground with David Chalmers. But where Chalmers advocates for an amphibious 
view between Functionalism and Consciousness with any clash over claims 
about the mind, favouring Functionalism. I, however, argue for a view that 
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favours consciousness as a First-Person Science, an Autophenomenology, but 
one supported by other Heterophenomenologies.  
An analysis of behaviour and language as a research field, I think is 
possible. Where, perhaps, I differ is whether to call the investigation of language 
and behaviour ‘psychology’. The attribution, study of, and investigation into the 
relationship between language, behaviours and actions occurs in such a wide 
range of fields there are grounds to question whether a ‘psychology’ of ‘action’ or 
‘behaviour’ could even be distinguished as a distinct field among them in any 
classical sense. Martial artists, skateboarders, sports commentators, sewing 
instructors, Master Masons and manuals on etiquette all have names, slang, 
terms and descriptions for behaviours, skills and actions. Naming human 
actions seems more like a feature common to natural languages than a specific 
psychological field of enquiry or research on the mind. What I have described as 
a Psychological Endo-Language and descended from a Jonesian Paleo-
Behavioural Language, might equally be made to apply to any branch of human 
endeavour where humans develop names for their actions and eventually come 
to Self-Report and think in those terms. One might argue that Karate, Fencing, 
Rugby Union, The Cha-Cha and Table d’Hote all have their Jonesian 
Behavioural Messiahs. 
This leads us to the final fate of Psychology. Since there is no way to know 
if the emotional experiences people attach to behaviours when they learn them 
are the same, the language of affect is endemically idiosyncratic, 
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autobiographical and indeterminable. It follows that if Psychology cannot 
investigate the idiosyncratic and inaccessible realm of private emotional affect, 
and also that the creation of names for human actions and behaviours is a 
feature of natural language, and thus not a specific domain of enquiry into the 
mind, there is no subject domain left for Psychology, per se, to investigate. What 
we took to be classical Psychology was a confusion between the first and the 
third person, which generated indeterminacy in the very terms theorists 
attempted to build their theories from. The one true and best hope for a way out 
of the indeterminacy problem was Ryle’s Ordinary Language Philosophy which 
rested on the observation that people seem to know how to talk publicly about 
their private emotional experiences. But we saw that Ryle’s philosophy was 
hopelessly riddled with surrepetitiously disguised appeals to our private 
experiences436. Ryle’s Occult Phenomenological Strain of Arguments undid his 
Ordinary Language claims, and what we found in them, was the same 
possibility for indeterminacy to arise. This was most evident in the ‘flash-bang’ 
thread, where the person must search their own feelings to decide if a 
phenomenal qualitative flash is one of anger or grief.    
The prolegomena this thesis offers for any future philosophy of mind is 
that research into the mind is fundamentally of two different types. Firstly, 
 
436 Like examining our memories of private studies for private twinges of studiousness, or the 
qualitative phenomenal difference between seeing a light so bright it hurts our eyes, and trying to 
visualize a light so bright it hurts our eyes. 
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there is Heteropheneomenalogical research which is done from the third person, 
and covers behaviours, language, physiology and neurophysiology. Secondly 
there is Autophenomenology, which involves private experiences, introspections, 
phenomenological refutations, understanding of one’s own emotional experiences 
and exploration of consciousness through reflective introspective states.  
In practice, if we relate this back to Francis’ subject it would seem, on first 
glance, that she would be able to correlate claims by a single patient with the 
Object Languages of Neuroscience. She might state that the patient knew what 
the terms meant in the semantics of their own developing autobiographical 
understanding of language, and talk about ‘negative internalizing emotion 1’ of 
‘patient 1’ in a “speculative guesswork way” from her own autobiographical 
understanding of language.  Where this becomes a problem is that the meanings 
the subject has for the words they use may not neccesairly be the ones the 
researcher has. To avoid this problem, the practioner of mind needs to become 
the subject in order to evade the problem of identity claims that differ between 
people. This is what this thesis argues for. This, of course, is 
Autophenomenology, and as you have read Ryle’s Occult Phenomenological 
Strain surreptitiously hidden in his other arguments, you too, reader have built 
up your own autobiograpgical understanding and private phenomenology for 
perfoming your own introspective analysis of the evidence in Ryle’s philosophy 
presented to your own private consciousness. With the Death of Psychology, 
there opens up a new and interesting area of first person research. Since 
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language is not intersubjective enough to allow for identity claims in a shared 
domain of meaning, the psychiatrist or theorist of mind needs to strap 
themselves into the (f)MIR, EEG or PET device and explore the identity of their 
own emotional experiences to determine whether, for instance, ‘disgust’ and 
‘mistrust’ are the same sorts of cognitive experiences even when the neurological 
data tells them they are.   
 This paper has killed a myth, a very dangerous myth, that language is 
entirely intersubjective, and that what both you and I mean by ‘anger’, as 
members of the same linguistic community, is the same thing when we use it to 
refer to our own private experiences. The problem of the possibility for 
indeterminacy arises when we each use the same term to refer to other people’s 
publicly observable behaviour, and again when we draw on analogical structures 
to reflect on what someone displaying those publicly observable behaviours 
might be feeling. This myth was dangerous because it lead us down research 
paths that ended in muddles about what the identity conditions for words like 
‘anger’, ‘fear’ and ‘envy’ were based on, or simply ignored the issue of whether 
Sue and Rod meant the same thing as the theorist, when any one of the three 
used a term in a self-description or an observation. This dangerous myth 
produced over a century of ‘speculative’ claims and produced rival and 
contradictory schools of psychology that lacked a genuine foundation to make 
identity claims about the mind beyond the mere speculations of what one person 
feels and learns to associate with a word in conjunction with similar patterns of 
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publicly observable behaviour, to what another person has learned to associate 
with a word. Such cannot be done without creating indeterminacy. Any such 
reasonings are thus guesswork for an unobservable realm of experience in 
another and thus merely speculative, not determinate. The trouble, of course, is 
that the experience behind the words in common useage may not be the same 
type or even kind of experience between people using the same word. This is a 
problem given that words like “anger”, “oedipal jealousy”, “infatuation”, “shame”, 
“mistrust”, “disgust”, “distress”, “internalizing guilt” and “desire” are what 
psychological theories are typically made-out of. Even the descriptions of the 
phenomenological aspects for these emotions may be endemically subjective and 
thus incurably speculative when we turn them into theories and apply them to 
other people’s private lives. There is no guarantee that the feeling of the emotion 
I learn the word for while exhibiting certain types of behaviour, is the same type 
of experience you have when you learn the word for your behaviour.  
All that is needed to create the illusion of intersubjectivity is similar 
patterns of behaviour a Jonesian Behaviourist can name at a developmental 
stage in language. The illusion of intersubjectivity arises because at certain 
developmental stages the language is learnt both from and for observable 
behaviours. While the words are at the observable behavioural stages of 
development (the Paleo-Behaviourist era) or the Gross-Body-Language learners’ 
stage, (i.e. someone learning the tribe’s established language) the words appear 
to have a gross behavioural uniformity because they refer to similar symptoms 
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of behaviour. However, once someone has internalized the language there is no 
way to know if the words they are using refer to the same emotions. This is 
because there is no way of knowing if the emotions and experiences related to 
the behaviours, which we ascribe words to (creating the illusion of uniformity) 
are the same emotions and experiences between different people. There is no 
guarantee that the autobiographical ascription of words to emotion and 
experience, in Self Reports, following the internalization of a word for a private 
experience, is in fact the same across different people. Thus, arises both the root 
and cause of the indeterminacy of language plaguing the disciplines of mind. 
Any theory constructed from these words, and applied to another person is 
speculative at best and suffers the problem that the theorist is using their own 
private autobiographical vocabulary of meanings. Freud’s schadenfreude might 
be Jung’s guilt, and what Jung is calling guilt could be Freud’s feelings of 
oedipal jelousy. They might not. We simply have no way of knowing and any 
attempt we make is speculative at best. However, accepting this frees us from 
the baggage of a century of blind alleys, shifting bedrock and discredited 
theories.  
 Some might read into my refutation of Michael Dummett’s implicit Anti-
Psychologism as an argument for the end of Analytic Philosophy. I think this is 
a mistake. Dummett offers us one particular view of the mind favoured by a 
generation of Analytic Philosophers concerned with the Philosophy of Mind and 
its relationship with The Philosophy of Language.  
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I argue that Analytic Philosophy can survive a Phenomenological Turn 
and thrive. There has been a recent generation of Analytic Philosophers like 
Peter Jackson, Richard Menary, Kerry Sanders, Tim Crane, Mark Rowlands, 
Hector-Neri Castaneda, Michael Devitt, Stephan Darwall, John Waterman and 
David Chalmers who are interested in a re-examination of consciousness. This 
suggests to me that the Phenomenological Turn towards Psychologism may 
already be here in its earliest stages, particularly in Tim Crane and Mark 
Rowlands. Rather than an end of Analytic Philosophy, I argue that a 
Phenomenological Turn in Analytic Philosophy is simply a new stage in the 
development of a tradition of philosophy spanning the Twentieth Century. 
Analytic Philosophy on this view might be seen as not merely concerned with 
upholding a certain thesis about the priority of language in layer-cake 
explanations about the mind, but as an evolving systematic concern that 
involves methodological rigour, and a developing body of specific training for 
dealing with philosophical problems that is passed down from generation to 
generation.  
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